CN103020533A - Static attribute remote attestation method based on multi-measurement of control flow model - Google Patents
Static attribute remote attestation method based on multi-measurement of control flow model Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention provides a static attribute remote attestation method based on multi-measurement of a control flow model. The method comprises the steps as follows: S1, a service provider makes rules for static attributes during task run so as to generate a policy certificate according to the safety requirement of a user; S2, a mobile terminal acquires the policy certificate and implements policy control, wherein the policy control means that the mobile terminal performs visit control to a terminal operation system, based on the policy certificate and the control flow model; and S3, the mobile terminal performs measurement and remote attestation to static attributes of a plurality of measurement points during task run. The static attribute remote attestation method can be used for performing multiple measurements and remote attestation to static attributes, solves the problem of static attribute attestation of password service parts of a trusted computing platform, and can ensure that the attestation can embody the state of the system more accurately and can conform to the expectation of the user.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to computing machine and electronic information technical field, particularly a kind of static attribute remote certification method based on many tolerance of control flow model BPCF.
Background technology
Checking computing environment secure and trusted is an important goal of credible calculating.Along with technical development, the security threat on the portable terminal is also continuing to increase.Studies show that only on the Android platform, 800,000 people's infected with malware are just arranged in per month, 2011.The security mechanisms such as traditional anti-virus, intrusion detection also all rely on the safety of underlying operating system and support.Reliable computing technology passes through computing machine from the trusted root to the reliable hardware, and to trusted operating system, the general safety that arrives the whole computing system of trusted application strengthens, and reaches and guarantees the reliable purpose of computer security." credible " in the credible calculating comprised safety and reliable, and " credible proof " is exactly to guarantee system's " behavior meets expection all the time ".Remote proving (Remote Attestation) is one of major function of providing of reliable computing technology, and it mainly is to utilize credible platform to protect and realize that server is to the credible checking of client computing environment.Common remote certification method based on the binary code integrality mostly based on start or the once result of tolerance when starting carry out remote validation, can't satisfy the characteristics that portable terminal seldom shuts down.Control flow model BPCF is a kind of based on the user behavior security strategy, can carry out synthetic determination to dynamic conditions such as master, object attribute, powers and functions, environment, constraints, during certain section tasks carrying, implement the novel access control model of stepless control, the related control with behavior of the changeable control of condition.Research is significant for checking portable terminal computing environment secure and trusted based on the static attribute remote certification method of many tolerance of control flow model BPCF.
Summary of the invention
(1) technical matters to be solved
The invention provides a kind of static attribute remote certification method of repeatedly measuring based on control flow model, solved prior art and can only once measure and carry out remote proving, the credible low problem of portable terminal.
(2) technical scheme
The invention provides a kind of static remote certification method of repeatedly measuring based on control flow model, the method comprises:
S1, service provider carry out Rulemaking to the static attribute during the task run, the generation strategy certificate according to user's demand for security;
S2, acquisition for mobile terminal strategy certificate, and implementation strategy control; Described policy control is portable terminal based on tactful certificate and control flow model to the terminal operating system control that conducts interviews;
S3, portable terminal are measured and remote proving the static attribute of a plurality of metric point in the task run; Described metric point is consistent with the reference mark in the control flow model.
Further, described static attribute comprises the static attribute in main body attribute, object attribute and/or the operating system environment.
Further, described a plurality of metric point comprises: the startup of process, load, stop and dormancy.
Further, the method also comprises: when the constraint condition in the control stream changed, described portable terminal was measured step with remote proving to static attribute.
Further, described step S3 specifically comprises:
S31: specify static attribute to initiate tolerance, characteristic information extraction in the mobile terminal system dominating pair of vertices strategy certificate;
S32: application proxy Agent initiates remote proving, submits characteristic information to server by security protocol;
S33: the instrument of server is by comparing the checking characteristic information with proper characteristics information.；
Further, described step S31 also comprises: the mobile trusted module of system use algorithm to characteristic information be encrypted, hash and signature protection.
Further, described control flow model is arranged in operating system nucleus.
(3) beneficial effect
The present invention repeatedly measures and remote proving by main body attribute ATTs, object attribute ATTo and environment CONe are carried out static attribute, solved the static attribute proof problem of cryptographic service parts in the credible calculating platform, made checking can more accurately embody system state and meet all the time user's expection.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the flow chart of steps of the inventive method;
Fig. 2 is the control synoptic diagram of the control flow model BPCF of system of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is that control flow model is repeatedly measured schematic flow sheet with remote proving in the specific embodiment of the invention.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments the present invention is described in further details.
The invention provides a kind of static attribute remote certification method of repeatedly measuring based on control flow model, as shown in Figure 1, the step of the method specifically comprises:
S1, service provider carry out Rulemaking to the static attribute during the task run, the generation strategy certificate according to user's demand for security;
S2, acquisition for mobile terminal strategy certificate, and implementation strategy control; Described policy control is portable terminal based on tactful certificate and control flow model to the terminal operating system control that conducts interviews;
S3, portable terminal are measured and remote proving the static attribute of process metric point in service; Described metric point is consistent with the reference mark in the control flow model.
Wherein, described service provider's generation strategy certificate refers to work out security strategy, i.e. tasks clear run duration by the service provider according to user's safety requirements; the rule request of static attribute, strategy is implemented the rear generation strategy certificate of certificate protection by trusted module.
Described static attribute is mainly, the static attribute of object requires with the operating system environment condition in the requirement of static attribute.
Described attribute refers to the various features descriptions in operating system of system body and/or object, comprises static attribute and dynamic attribute.Wherein, static attribute refers to system's feature that can not change in service, comprises configuration, script, code integrity, data integrity etc.State refers to system occur expected in service but uncertain system features.For example: by increasing this object attribute of file " reading times ", then can support such as " certain image file can only be play 10 times " this security strategy.For example: the security strategy that, then can support " only having the process that satisfies the integrality requirement to conduct interviews to the particular safety file " by increasing " code integrity " this main body attribute of process main body.
Described environmental baseline refers to the various features that operating system is in operation, and comprises static attribute and dynamic attribute.Wherein, static attribute refers to system's feature that can not change in service, comprises configuration, script, code integrity, data integrity etc.The environment here is exactly the attribute of operating system during as main body in fact.For example: as environmental baseline, it has represented the current state of operating system will " to start the integrity detection of whether having passed through operating system nucleus ", then can support the strategy of " only having the system of credible startup just can carry out the higher level service operation ".
Wherein, described acquisition for mobile terminal strategy certificate is, the service provider generate or the update strategy certificate after, acquisition for mobile terminal.
Wherein, the control of described portable terminal implementation strategy is to realize control flow model BPCF in the kernel of portable terminal, realizes that in application layer proof acts on behalf of Agent, and system is according to the control that conducts interviews of the strategy of tactful certificate.The each time access control of master, object all is that system is to the synthetic determination of main body attribute, object attribute and environmental baseline in the control stream.In the method, policy control mainly be according in the strategy to the requirement of static attribute among main body attribute ATTs, object attribute ATTo and the operating system environment CONe control that conducts interviews.The control here refers to whether allow access.Only according to tactful requirement, after judging control, just can carry out the access of main object.
Fig. 2 is the control synoptic diagram of the control flow model BPCF of embodiment of the invention system, has embodied the each time access control of master, object, all is that system is to the synthetic determination of main body attribute, object attribute, environmental baseline, powers and functions condition and constraint condition.In the control flow of reality, at first according to strategy whether the main body attribute is met and judge, by after judging, this is sequentially judged according to powers and functions, object attribute, environmental baseline, constraint condition again, forms at last synthetic determination.It realizes the stepless control to control stream by introducing time shaft.In the control flow of reality, result of determination the variation of main body attribute, object attribute, environmental baseline, powers and functions condition and constraint condition and is changed, and makes last instruction character share the family to the safety requirements of system action.
Control flow model BPCF has solved the problem of " the operating system absenceofsubject " of traditional access control model existence, Fig. 2 embodies the working control mode of " main body is to operating system; operating system is again to object " in the reality system, and embodies the service ability of operating system in powers and functions.Control flow model BPCF has also solved the problem of " the discontinuous and constraint disappearance of behavior " that traditional access control model exists, embodies system action continuously and the mutual characteristics of constraint, and the dynamic change of each attribute and condition in the embodiment system.The security system that realizes based on control flow model BPCF can be supported the subscriber policy that more enriches, and more accurately policy control is implemented in system action, realizes protection and control to the upper strata security mechanism.
Wherein, access control is can be accessed for definite process, and whether behavior meets expection; Whether can be accessed, tolerance all needs to carry out, and tolerance does not have the set time order with access control.In the system that reality realizes, consider the cost of actual metrics, can measure according to being set in some reference mark.Described portable terminal is measured and remote proving the static attribute of process metric point in service, be mobile terminal system for the specific run process, measure and remote proving at the static attribute that a plurality of dominating pair of vertices of control flow model are relevant.The reference mark that requires in these metric point and the security strategy is consistent, and reality, metric point can comprise process initiation, loading, dormancy and stop etc.
Here, mobile terminal system is measured and remote proving mainly for static attribute among main body attribute ATTs, object attribute ATTo in the control flow model and the operating system environment CONe when tolerance.Comprise: the static attribute among the main body attribute ATTs is measured, such as: tolerance user role, program code integrality etc.; Static attribute among the object attribute ATTo is measured, such as: tolerance file data integrality, assembly certificate of authority information, media file authorization message etc.; Static attribute among the operating system environment condition C ONe is measured, such as the whether credible startup etc. of: operating system, namely gathered the status flag information of these tolerance objects.
Fig. 3 is that control flow model is repeatedly measured the schematic flow sheet with remote proving, has embodied the realization position of this method in mobile terminal operating system.In operating system nucleus, realize control flow model BPCF, realize the stepless control based on security strategy.In operating system nucleus, realize mobile trusted module MTM, realize metric algorithm and preserve tolerance result's PCR register.Act on behalf of Agent in application layer realization proof, and initiate remote proving by the agency.Realize verification tool at server.The step of a remote proving comprises:
Step 1: specify static attribute to initiate tolerance, characteristic information extraction in the mobile terminal system dominating pair of vertices strategy certificate;
Step 2: application proxy Agent initiates remote proving, submits characteristic information to server by security protocol;
Step 3: the instrument of server is by comparing the checking characteristic information with proper characteristics information.
Described step 1 also comprises: the mobile trusted module of system use algorithm to characteristic information be encrypted, hash and signature protection.Can guarantee like this in the remote proving process not can leakage system privacy information.
Finally only have checking to pass through, portable terminal could continue to execute the task.
Wherein, when described constraint condition in control stream changes, described portable terminal is measured and remote proving static attribute, when referring to the constraint condition CONr generation of mobile terminal system appointment in the security strategy of control flow model, relevant static attribute is measured and remote proving.Wherein, these restriction relations comprise: triggering, dependence, restriction, merging etc.; Dependence: for example only connecting specific secure vpn, and finished authentication wait operate after, just can carry out processing and the transmit operation of specific file.Trigger: in case for example antivirus software finds to have the virus of high-risk, wooden horse to occur, stop immediately the operation to critical file.Opposition: certain two kinds of action can not be carried out simultaneously, for example can not in the situation that QQ software is opened, carry out the operational processes of certain critical file.Comprise: write function if forbid file, then also comprised simultaneously all similar operations of writing, such as network transmission, printing etc.Restriction: A action meeting retrains some part action of B.
The present invention can be dispatched by constraint condition CONr, can carry out static attribute to main body attribute ATTs, object attribute ATTo and environment CONe repeatedly measures and remote proving, solved the static attribute proof problem of cryptographic service parts in the credible calculating platform, made checking can more accurately embody system state and meet all the time user's expection.
Simultaneously Fig. 3 has embodied at the relevant static attribute of a plurality of dominating pair of vertices of control flow model and has measured and remote proving, and the reference mark that requires in these metric point and the security strategy is consistent, and the actual metrics point can comprise process initiation, loading, dormancy and stop etc.
By repeatedly tolerance and the remote proving of static attribute, tolerance and the proof of the static attribute that also to have embodied an assembly special case to operating system be the cryptographic service parts, its vacuum metrics content comprises the drive software integrality, software configuration, cryptographic service ability etc.
By the static attribute remote proving of the embodiment of the invention to computing environment, can effectively verify the credibility of operating system in the computing environment.
The above only is preferred implementation of the present invention; should be pointed out that for those skilled in the art, under the prerequisite that does not break away from the technology of the present invention principle; can also make some improvement and replacement, these improvement and replacement also should be considered as protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. one kind based on the static remote certification method of the repeatedly tolerance of control flow model, it is characterized in that the method comprises:
S1, service provider carry out Rulemaking to the static attribute during the task run, the generation strategy certificate according to user's demand for security;
S2, acquisition for mobile terminal strategy certificate, and implementation strategy control; Described policy control is portable terminal based on tactful certificate and control flow model to the terminal operating system control that conducts interviews;
S3, portable terminal are measured and remote proving the static attribute of a plurality of metric point in the task run; Described metric point is consistent with the reference mark in the control flow model.
2. method as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that described static attribute comprises the static attribute in main body attribute, object attribute and/or the operating system environment.
3. method as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that described metric point comprises: the startup of process, load, stop and dormancy.
4. method as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that the method also comprises: when the constraint condition in the control stream changed, described portable terminal was measured step with remote proving to the static attribute of a plurality of metric point in the task run.
5. method as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that described step S3 specifically comprises:
S31: specify static attribute to initiate tolerance, characteristic information extraction in a plurality of dominating pair of vertices strategy certificates of mobile terminal system;
S32: application proxy is initiated remote proving, submits characteristic information to server by security protocol;
S33: the instrument of server is by comparing the checking characteristic information with proper characteristics information.
6. method as claimed in claim 5 is characterized in that described step S31 also comprises: the mobile trusted module of mobile terminal system use algorithm to characteristic information be encrypted, hash and signature protection.
7. shown in claim 1, it is characterized in that described control flow model is arranged in the mobile terminal operating system kernel.
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| CN105528306B (en) * | 2014-09-28 | 2019-01-25 | 宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司 | A kind of data read-write method and dual system termi-nal of dual system termi-nal |
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
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| CN103220300A (en) | 2013-07-24 |
| CN103023922B (en) | 2014-07-02 |
| CN103220300B (en) | 2016-01-20 |
| CN103023922A (en) | 2013-04-03 |
| CN103020533B (en) | 2016-01-20 |
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