EP1274050A2 - Method for enciphering data, which is sent from a peripheral module to a control unit of a coin-feed apparatus - Google Patents
Method for enciphering data, which is sent from a peripheral module to a control unit of a coin-feed apparatus Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1274050A2 EP1274050A2 EP02013341A EP02013341A EP1274050A2 EP 1274050 A2 EP1274050 A2 EP 1274050A2 EP 02013341 A EP02013341 A EP 02013341A EP 02013341 A EP02013341 A EP 02013341A EP 1274050 A2 EP1274050 A2 EP 1274050A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- control unit
- coin
- transmitted
- value
- authenticity
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
- G07D5/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of coins, e.g. for segregating coins which are unacceptable or alien to a currency
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for encryption of data coming from a peripheral assembly sent to a control unit of a coin-operated machine be according to the preamble of claim 1.
- From DE 199 47 42.A1 is a coin operated automatic entertainment machine with a control unit and a coin unit, consisting of an electronic coin validator with assigned coin-specific coin stack tubes, which each associated with the bottom side a payout device is known.
- an electronic coin validator with the Control unit connecting line variety is a converter arranged for the purpose, coin validator exit side To adapt signals to a new event. Because of the engagement the converter will change during currency conversion DM on EURO allows existing coin operated amusement machines continue to use trouble-free when Euro coins are fed, although the coin operated Amusement machines designed for accepting DM coins were.
- Object of the present invention is the data transport between a coin unit and a control unit a coin-operated amusement machine against possible Secure manipulation.
- the inventive method has the advantage that due to the secured data transfer between a peripheral assembly, z. B. an electronic coin validator, and a control unit of a coin operated amusement machine a mechanical and / or electrical Attack on contact points to modify signals does not lead to success.
- a mechanical and / or electrical Attack on contact points to modify signals does not lead to success.
- the ever-changing Security key provided by the control unit is spent on the coin validator is spying the possible procedure made difficult by third parties and can only be traced under the greatest use of measuring equipment. Spying the required data on-site at a Operating coin-operated amusement machines is thus sufficiently difficult and prevents manipulation to the from the coin validator to the control unit transmitted value impulses that are used to change a Credit on the coin operated amusement machine to lead.
- the coin validator From the control of the peripheral assembly, z. B. the coin validator, below is the authenticity number and the value the accepted means of payment to the control unit transmitted.
- the control unit checks whether the value of the means of payment transported in the authenticity number matches the submitted value. Only at a match between the value of the means of payment, which was transmitted, and that from the authenticity number
- the value determined by the control unit is the credit meter the transmitted value of the accepted tender, z. As coins, increased.
- the control unit are the related algorithm and the constant to education the authenticity number known.
- the related constant can, for example, be taken from the current date, the time and / or the serial number of the peripheral Assembly, z.
- the part of the control unit to the peripheral module transmitted transaction count is from a random number generator educated.
- the related authenticity number has one size of 2 bytes.
- the control unit is periodically by the control unit one by one Pseudo-random generator formed transaction number determined and to the controller comprising a microcontroller the peripheral assembly, z. B. the Münzprüfer transmitted.
- the peripheral assembly e.g. the coin validator
- the control unit is determined from the transaction number Value and at least one other constant an authenticity number formed.
- the authenticity number and additionally the calculated value of the accepted means of payment are transmitted to the control unit.
- On the part of the control unit is determined by the value obtained in plain text of the accepted means of payment of the previously determined and the control unit sent transaction number of the Constants and on the basis of the known algorithm the authenticity number educated.
- the formed by the control unit Authenticity is from this with the sent authenticity number compared. In a match, the the value of the means of payment transmitted in clear text in the credit meter
- the control unit cumulates.
Abstract
Description
Die Erfindung bezieht sich auf ein Verfahren zur Verschlüsselung von Daten, die von einer peripheren Baugruppe an eine Steuereinheit eines münzbetätigten Automaten gesandt werden gemäß dem Oberbegriff des Patentanspruches 1.The invention relates to a method for encryption of data coming from a peripheral assembly sent to a control unit of a coin-operated machine be according to the preamble of claim 1.
Aus der DE 199 47 42.A1 ist ein münzbetätigter Unterhaltungsautomat mit einer Steuereinheit und einer Münzeinheit, bestehend aus einem elektronischen Münzprüfer mit zugeordneten münzindividuellen Münzstapelrohren, denen jeweils bodenseitig eine Auszahlvorrichtung zugeordnet ist, bekannt. In der den elektronischen Münzprüfer mit der Steuereinheit verbindenden Leitungsvielfalt, ist ein Konverter angeordnet zum Zweck, münzprüferausgangsseitige Signale einem neuen Ereignis anzupassen. Durch den Einsatz des Konverters wird es während der Währungsumstellung von DM auf EURO ermöglicht, vorhandene münzbetätigte Unterhaltungsautomaten weiterhin störungsfrei zu benutzen, wenn Euro-Münzen zugeführt werden, obwohl die münzbetätigten Unterhaltungsautomaten für die Annahme von DM-Münzen konzipiert waren.From DE 199 47 42.A1 is a coin operated automatic entertainment machine with a control unit and a coin unit, consisting of an electronic coin validator with assigned coin-specific coin stack tubes, which each associated with the bottom side a payout device is known. In the electronic coin validator with the Control unit connecting line variety, is a converter arranged for the purpose, coin validator exit side To adapt signals to a new event. Because of the engagement the converter will change during currency conversion DM on EURO allows existing coin operated amusement machines continue to use trouble-free when Euro coins are fed, although the coin operated Amusement machines designed for accepting DM coins were.
Aufgabe der vorliegenden Erfindung ist es, den Datentransport zwischen einer Münzeinheit und einer Steuereinheit eines münzbetätigten Unterhaltungsautomaten gegen mögliche Manipulation zu sichern.Object of the present invention is the data transport between a coin unit and a control unit a coin-operated amusement machine against possible Secure manipulation.
Diese Aufgabe wird erfindungsgemäß durch die Merkmale des kennzeichnenden Teiles des Patentanspruches 1, 2, 8, 9, 15 oder 16 gelöst.This object is achieved by the features of characterizing part of claim 1, 2, 8, 9, 15 or 16 solved.
Weitergehende vorteilhafte Ausgestaltungen sind den Unteransprüchen entnehmbar.Further advantageous embodiments are the subclaims removable.
Das erfindungsgemäße Verfahren weist den Vorteil auf, daß aufgrund des gesicherten Datentransfers zwischen einer peripheren Baugruppe, z. B. einem elektronischen Münzprüfer, und einer Steuereinheit eines münzbetätigten Unterhaltungsautomaten ein mechanischer und/oder elektrischer Angriff auf Kontaktstellen zum Verändern von Signalen nicht zum Erfolg führt. Durch den sich ständig verändernden Sicherheitsschlüssel, der von der Steuereinheit an den Münzprüfer ausgegeben wird, ist ein Ausspähen des möglichen Verfahrens durch Dritte erschwert und kann nur unter größtem Einsatz von Meßmitteln nachvollzogen werden. Ein Ausspähen der erforderlichen Daten vor Ort an einem in Betrieb befindlichen münzbetätigten Unterhaltungsautomaten ist somit ausreichend erschwert und verhindert eine Manipulation an den von dem Münzprüfer an die Steuereinheit übermittelten Wertimpulsen, die zur Veränderung eines Guthabenzählers am münzbetätigten Unterhaltungsautomaten führen. The inventive method has the advantage that due to the secured data transfer between a peripheral assembly, z. B. an electronic coin validator, and a control unit of a coin operated amusement machine a mechanical and / or electrical Attack on contact points to modify signals does not lead to success. By the ever-changing Security key provided by the control unit is spent on the coin validator is spying the possible procedure made difficult by third parties and can only be traced under the greatest use of measuring equipment. Spying the required data on-site at a Operating coin-operated amusement machines is thus sufficiently difficult and prevents manipulation to the from the coin validator to the control unit transmitted value impulses that are used to change a Credit on the coin operated amusement machine to lead.
Seitens der Steuereinheit des münzbetätigten Unterhaltungsautomaten wird an eine Steuerung des als Münzprüfers ausgebildeten peripheren Baugruppe eine Transaktionszahl übermittelt. Die Steuerung der als Münzprüfer ausgebildeten peripheren Baugruppe sendet bei keinem Vorliegen eines Münzwertes eine Antwort ohne eine Echtheitszahl an die Steuereinheit zurück. Seitens der Steuereinheit wird erkannt, daß kein Münzwert vorliegt und übersendet die zuvor gesendete Transaktionszahl wiederholt an die als Münzprüfer ausgebildete periphere Baugruppe. Beim Vorliegen eines Münzwertes an der als Münzprüfer ausgebildeten peripheren Baugruppe wird die von der Steuereinheit der Steuerung des Münzprüfers zugesandte Transaktionszahl mit dem ermittelten Wert des zugeführten und akzeptierten Zahlungsmittels und mindestens einer weiteren der Steuereinheit bekannten Konstanten eine Echtheitszahl nach einem vorgegebenen Algorithmus von der einen Mikrocomputer umfassenden Steuerung der peripheren Baugruppe gebildet. Von der Steuerung der peripheren Baugruppe, z. B. des Münzprüfers, wird nachfolgend die Echtheitszahl und der Wert des entgegengenommenen Zahlungsmittels an die Steuereinheit übermittelt. Von der Steuereinheit wird geprüft, ob der in der Echtheitszahl transportierte Wert des Zahlungsmittels mit dem übermittelten Wert übereinstimmt. Nur bei einer Übereinstimmung zwischen dem Wert des Zahlungsmittels, der übermittelt wurde, und dem aus der Echtheitszahl ermittelten Wert wird von der Steuereinheit der Guthabenzähler um den übermittelten Wert des akzeptierten Zahlungsmittels, z. B. Münzen, erhöht. Der Steuereinheit sind der verwandte Algorithmus als auch die Konstante zur Bildung der Echtheitszahl bekannt.From the control unit of the coin operated amusement machine is sent to a controller of the coin validator trained peripheral assembly a transaction number transmitted. The control of trained as Münzprüfer peripheral module does not send if there is one Coin value an answer without an authenticity number to the Control unit back. On the part of the control unit it is recognized that no coin value is present and sends the previously The number of transactions sent repeatedly to the as a coin validator trained peripheral module. When present a coin value at the trained as Münzprüfer peripheral Assembly is the control unit of the controller of the Münzprüfer sent transaction number with the determined value of the supplied and accepted cash and at least one other of the control unit known constants an authenticity number after a given algorithm from the one microcomputer comprehensive Control of the peripheral assembly formed. From the control of the peripheral assembly, z. B. the coin validator, below is the authenticity number and the value the accepted means of payment to the control unit transmitted. The control unit checks whether the value of the means of payment transported in the authenticity number matches the submitted value. Only at a match between the value of the means of payment, which was transmitted, and that from the authenticity number The value determined by the control unit is the credit meter the transmitted value of the accepted tender, z. As coins, increased. The control unit are the related algorithm and the constant to education the authenticity number known.
Die verwandte Konstante kann zum Beispiel aus dem Tagesdatum, der Uhrzeit und/oder der Seriennummer der peripheren Baugruppe, z. B. Münzprüfer, Chipkartenleser, Schreibeinheit, oder Banknotenakzeptor, gebildet werden.The related constant can, for example, be taken from the current date, the time and / or the serial number of the peripheral Assembly, z. B. coin validator, smart card reader, writing unit, or banknote acceptor.
Die seitens der Steuereinheit an die periphere Baugruppe übermittelte Transaktionszahl wird von einem Zufallsgenerator gebildet. Die verwandte Echtheitszahl hat eine Größe von 2 Byte.The part of the control unit to the peripheral module transmitted transaction count is from a random number generator educated. The related authenticity number has one size of 2 bytes.
In einer weiteren erfindungsgemäßen Ausgestaltung wird seitens der Steuereinheit periodisch eine durch einen Pseudozufallsgenerator gebildete Transaktionszahl ermittelt und an die einen Mikrocontroller umfassende Steuerung der peripheren Baugruppe, z. B. dem Münzprüfer, übermittelt. Seitens der Steuerung der peripheren Baugruppe, z.B. dem Münzprüfer, wird aus der Transaktionszahl, dem ermittelten Wert und mindestens einer weiteren Konstanten eine Echtheitszahl gebildet. Die Echtheitszahl und zusätzlich der ermittelte Wert der akzeptierten Zahlungsmittel werden an die Steuereinheit übermittelt. Seitens der Steuereinheit wird anhand des im Klartext erhaltenen Wertes des akzeptierten Zahlungsmittels der vorher ermittelten und der Steuereinheit zugesandten Transaktionszahl der Konstanten und anhand des bekanntes Algorithmus die Echtheitszahl gebildet. Die von der Steuereinheit gebildete Echtheitszahl wird von dieser mit der zugesandten Echtheitszahl verglichen. Bei einer Übereinstimmung wird der im Klartext übermittelte Wert des Zahlungsmittels im Guthabenzähler der Steuereinheit kumuliert.In a further embodiment of the invention is periodically by the control unit one by one Pseudo-random generator formed transaction number determined and to the controller comprising a microcontroller the peripheral assembly, z. B. the Münzprüfer transmitted. From the control of the peripheral assembly, e.g. the coin validator, is determined from the transaction number Value and at least one other constant an authenticity number formed. The authenticity number and additionally the calculated value of the accepted means of payment are transmitted to the control unit. On the part of the control unit is determined by the value obtained in plain text of the accepted means of payment of the previously determined and the control unit sent transaction number of the Constants and on the basis of the known algorithm the authenticity number educated. The formed by the control unit Authenticity is from this with the sent authenticity number compared. In a match, the the value of the means of payment transmitted in clear text in the credit meter The control unit cumulates.
Claims (18)
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Münzprüfer ein elektronischer Münzprüfer ist, dem von der Steuereinheit eine Transaktionszahl übermittelt wird und daß aus dieser Transaktionszahl und dem ermittelten Münzwert der zugeführten und akzeptierten Münze und/oder einer der Steuerung des Münzprüfers bekannten Konstanten die Steuerung eine Echtheitszahl nach einem vorgebenen Algorithmus bildet, wobei die Echtheitszahl und der ermittelte Münzwert von der Steuerung an die Steuereinheit übermittelt werden und seitens der Steuereinheit überprüft wird, ob der in der Echtheitszahl transportierte Münzwert mit dem übermittelten Münzwert identisch ist, wobei bei einer Übereinstimmung der Münzwerte von der Steuereinheit der übermittelte Münzwert im Guthabenzähler des Automaten kumuliert wird.A method for encrypting data sent from a peripheral module to a coin operated machine control unit, the control unit comprising at least one credit meter associated with the display means,
characterized in that the coin validator is an electronic coin validator, which is transmitted by the control unit, a transaction number and that from this transaction number and the determined coin value of the supplied and accepted coin and / or one of the control of the coin validator known constants, the controller an authenticity number after a vorgebenen Algorithm forms, wherein the authenticity number and the determined coin value are transmitted from the controller to the control unit and checked by the control unit, whether the transported in the authenticity number Münzwert is identical to the transmitted coin value, wherein in a match of the coin values from the control unit of the transmitted Coin value is accumulated in the credit meter of the machine.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Münzprüfer ein elektronischer Münzprüfer ist, dem von der Steuereinheit eine Transaktionszahl übermittelt wird und daß aus dieser Transaktionszahl und dem ermittelten Münzwert der zugeführten und akzeptierten Münze und/oder eine der Steuerung des Münzprüfers bekannten Konstante die Steuerung eine Echtheitszahl nach einem vorgegebenen Algorithmus bildet, wobei die Echtheitszahl und der ermittelte Münzwert von der Steuerung an die Steuereinheit übermittelt wird, und daß seitens der Steuereinheit anhand des übermittelten Münzwertes, der Steuereinheit bekannten Transaktionszahl und der bekannten Konstanten und des verwandten Algorithmus die Echtheitszahl ermittelt wird und diese mit der von der Steuerung übermittelten verglichen wird, und daß bei einer Identität der übersandte Münzwert von der Steuereinheit im Guthabenzähler des Automaten kumuliert wird.A method of encrypting data sent from a peripheral module to a coin operated machine controller, the controller comprising at least one credit meter associated with the display means,
characterized in that the coin validator is an electronic coin validator, which is transmitted by the control unit, a transaction number and that from this transaction number and the determined coin value of the supplied and accepted coin and / or a control of the coin validator known constant control, the authenticity number according to a predetermined Algorithm forms, wherein the authenticity number and the determined coin value is transmitted from the controller to the control unit, and that the authenticity number is determined by the control unit based on the transmitted coin value, the control unit known transaction number and the known constant and the related algorithm and this with the is compared with the controller, and that, in the case of an identity, the transmitted coin value is cumulated by the control unit in the machine's credit meter.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Transaktionszahl eine von der Steuereinheit gebildete Zufallszahl ist.Method according to claim 1 and / or claim 2,
characterized in that the transaction number is a random number formed by the control unit.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß eine Konstante aus der Seriennummer des Münzprüfers und/oder dem Datum gebildet wird.Method according to claim 1 and / or claim 2,
characterized in that a constant is formed from the serial number of the coin validator and / or the date.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß von der Steuereinheit periodisch eine Transaktionszahl zur Steuerung des Münzprüfers übermittelt wird.Method according to claim 1 and / or claim 2,
characterized in that the control unit periodically transmits a transaction number for controlling the coin validator.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Echtheitszahl gleich oder größer ist als 1 Byte.Method according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized in that the authenticity number is equal to or greater than 1 byte.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß eine an die Steuerung des Münzprüfers gesandte Transaktionszahl bei keinem Vorliegen eines zu übermittelnden Münzwertes an die Steuereinheit eine Antwort ohne Echtheitszahl an diese zurücksendet.Method according to claim 1 and / or claim 2,
characterized in that a transaction number sent to the control of the Münzprüers sends back to a non-authenticated answer to the control unit in the absence of a coin value to be transmitted to the control unit.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß von der Steuereinheit an die periphere Baugruppe eine Transaktionszahl übermittelt wird und daß aus dieser Transaktionszahl und einem ermittelten Wert der von der peripheren Baugruppe zugeführten Zahlung und/oder einer der Steuerung der peripheren Baugruppe bekannten Konstanten die Steuerung eine Echtheitszahl nach einem vorgebenen Algorithmus bildet, die Echtheitszahl und der ermittelte Wert von der Steuerung an die Steuereinheit übermittelt werden und seitens der Steuereinheit überprüft wird, ob der in der Echtheitszahl transportierte Wert mit dem übermittelten Wert identisch ist, wobei bei einer Übereinstimmung der Werte von der Steuereinheit der übermittelte Wert im Guthabenzähler des Automaten kumuliert wird.A method of encrypting data sent from a peripheral module to a coin operated machine controller, the controller comprising at least one credit meter associated with the display means,
characterized in that a transaction number is transmitted from the control unit to the peripheral module and that from this transaction number and a determined value of the supplied from the peripheral module payment and / or a control of the peripheral module known constants, the controller an authenticity number according to a given algorithm the authenticity number and the determined value are transmitted by the control unit to the control unit and it is checked by the control unit whether the value transported in the authenticity number is identical with the transmitted value, whereby if the values from the control unit coincide the transmitted value is Credit meter of the machine is cumulative.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die periphere Baugruppe einen Mikrocomputer umfaßt, dem von der Steuereinheit eine Transaktionszahl übermittelt wird und daß aus dieser Transaktionszahl und dem ermittelten Wert des zugeführten und akzeptierten Zahlungsmittels und/oder eine der Steuerung der peripheren Baugruppe bekannten Konstante die Steuerung eine Echtheitszahl nach einem vorgegebenen Algorithmus bildet, wobei die Echtheitszahl und der ermittelte Wert des Zahlungsmittels von der Steuerung an die Steuereinheit übermittelt wird und daß seitens der Steuereinheit anhand des übermittelten Münzwertes, der Steuereinheit bekannten Transaktionszahl und der bekannten Konstanten und des verwandten Algorithmus die Echtheitszahl ermittelt wird und diese mit der von der Steuerung übermittelten verglichen wird und daß bei einer Identität der übersandte Wert des Zahlungsmittels von der Steuereinheit im Guthabenzähler des Automaten kumuliert wird.A method of encrypting data sent from a peripheral module to a coin operated machine controller, the controller comprising at least one credit meter associated with the display means,
CHARACTERIZED IN THAT said peripheral assembly comprises a microcomputer to which a control number is transmitted by said control unit, and in that said number of transactions and said determined value of said supplied and accepted currency and / or a constant known to said controller of said peripheral assembly, said controller has an authenticity number after one predetermined algorithm forms, wherein the authenticity number and the determined value of the means of payment is transmitted from the controller to the control unit and that on the part of the control unit based on the transmitted coin value, the control unit known transaction number and the known constant and the related algorithm, the authenticity number is determined and this with the value transmitted by the controller is compared and that, in the case of an identity, the transmitted value of the means of payment is cumulated by the control unit in the machine's credit meter.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Transaktionszahl eine von der Steuereinheit gebildete Zufallszahl ist.Method according to claim 8 and / or claim 9,
characterized in that the transaction number is a random number formed by the control unit.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß eine Konstante aus der Seriennummer der peripheren Baugruppe und/oder dem Datum gebildet wird.Method according to claim 8 and / or claim 9,
characterized in that a constant is formed from the serial number of the peripheral assembly and / or the date.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß von der Steuereinheit periodisch eine Transaktionszahl zur Steuerung der peripheren Baugruppe übermittelt wird.Method according to claim 8 and / or claim 9,
characterized in that from the control unit periodically a transaction number for controlling the peripheral assembly is transmitted.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Echtheitszahl gleich oder größer ist als 1 Byte.Method according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized in that the authenticity number is equal to or greater than 1 byte.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß eine an die Steuerung der peripheren Baugruppe gesandte Transaktionszahl bei keinem Vorliegen eines zu übermittelnden Wertes eines Zahlungsmittels an die Steuereinheit eine Antwort ohne Echtheitszahl an diese zurücksendet.Method according to claim 8 and / or claim 9,
characterized in that a transaction number sent to the control of the peripheral assembly returns to the control unit in the absence of a value of a means of payment to be transmitted to the control unit without an authenticity number.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die periphere Baugruppe ein elektronischer Münzprüfer ist, dem von der Steuereinheit eine Transaktionszahl übermittelt wird und daß aus dieser Transaktionszahl und einem ermittelten Wert der zugeführten und akzeptierten Münze und/oder einer der Steuerung des Münzprüfers bekannten Konstanten die Steuerung eine Echtheitszahl nach einem vorgegebenen Algorithmus bildet, wobei die Echtheitszahl und der ermittelte Münzwert von der Steuerung an die Steuereinheit übermittelt werden und seitens der Steuereinheit überprüft wird, ob der in der Echtheitszahl transportierte Münzwert mit dem übermittelten Münzwert identisch ist, wobei bei einer Übereinstimmung der Münzwerte von der Steuereinheit der übermittelte Münzwert im Guthabenzähler des Automaten kumuliert wird.A method of encrypting data sent from a peripheral module to a coin operated machine controller, the controller comprising at least one credit meter associated with the display means,
characterized in that the peripheral assembly is an electronic coin validator to which a control number is transmitted by the control unit and that from this transaction count and a determined value of the supplied and accepted coin and / or a control of the coin validator known constants, the controller has a authenticity number after one predetermined algorithm, wherein the authenticity number and the determined coin value are transmitted from the controller to the control unit and is checked by the control unit, whether the transported in the authenticity number coin value with the transmitted coin value is identical, wherein in a match of the coin values of the control unit transferred coin value in the credit meter of the machine is cumulative.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die periphere Baugruppe ein elektronischer Münzprüfer ist, dem von der Steuereinheit eine Transaktionszahl übermittelt wird und daß aus dieser Transaktionszahl und dem ermittelten Münzwert der zugeführten und akzeptierten Münze und/oder eine der Steuerung des Münzprüfers bekannten Konstante die Steuerung eine Echtheitszahl nach einem vorgegebenen Algorithmus bildet, wobei die Echtheitszahl und der ermittelte Münzwert von der Steuerung an die Steuereinheit übermittelt wird, und daß seitens der Steuereinheit anhand des übermittelten Münzwertes, der Steuereinheit bekannten Transaktionszahl und der bekannten Konstanten und des verwandten Algorithmus die Echtheitszahl ermittelt wird und diese mit der von der Steuerung übermittelten verglichen wird, und daß bei einer Identität der übersandte Münzwert von der Steuereinheit im Guthabenzähler des Automaten kumuliert wird.A method for encrypting data sent from a peripheral module to a coin operated machine control unit, the control unit comprising at least one credit meter associated with the display means,
characterized in that the peripheral assembly is an electronic coin validator to which a control number is transmitted by the control unit and that from this transaction count and the determined coin value of the supplied and accepted coin and / or a control of the coin validator known constant control, the authenticity of a number predetermined algorithm, wherein the authenticity number and the determined coin value is transmitted from the controller to the control unit, and that on the part of the control unit based on the transmitted coin value, the control unit known transaction number and the known constant and the related algorithm, the authenticity number is determined and this with the is compared by the controller, and that, in the case of an identity, the transmitted coin value is accumulated by the control unit in the machine's credit meter.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die periphere Baugruppe eine Vorrichtung zur Entgegennahme und Prüfung auf Echtheit und Wertigkeit für Banknoten ist.Method according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized in that the peripheral assembly is a device for receiving and checking for authenticity and value for banknotes.
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die periphere Baugruppe eine Vorrichtung zur Annahme und Auslesung von Chipkarten ist.Method according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized in that the peripheral assembly is an apparatus for accepting and reading smart cards.
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10132052 | 2001-07-05 | ||
DE2001132052 DE10132052B4 (en) | 2001-07-05 | 2001-07-05 | A method of encrypting data sent from a coin validator to a coin operated machine control unit |
DE10210173 | 2002-03-07 | ||
DE10210173A DE10210173B4 (en) | 2001-07-05 | 2002-03-07 | A method of encrypting data sent from a peripheral module to a coin operated machine control unit |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1274050A2 true EP1274050A2 (en) | 2003-01-08 |
EP1274050A3 EP1274050A3 (en) | 2004-05-12 |
EP1274050B1 EP1274050B1 (en) | 2007-10-10 |
Family
ID=26009629
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP02013341A Expired - Lifetime EP1274050B1 (en) | 2001-07-05 | 2002-06-19 | Method for enciphering data, which is sent from a peripheral module to a control unit of a coin-feed apparatus |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7406602B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1274050B1 (en) |
AT (1) | ATE375578T1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU785418B2 (en) |
DE (2) | DE10210173B4 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2294066T3 (en) |
Families Citing this family (11)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1999061994A1 (en) * | 1998-05-23 | 1999-12-02 | Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd | Secured inter-processor and virtual device communications system |
US7491122B2 (en) * | 2003-07-09 | 2009-02-17 | Wms Gaming Inc. | Gaming machine having targeted run-time software authentication |
US7794323B2 (en) * | 2003-07-25 | 2010-09-14 | Igt | Gaming apparatus with encryption and method |
GB0414840D0 (en) * | 2004-07-02 | 2004-08-04 | Ncr Int Inc | Self-service terminal |
US8038530B2 (en) | 2005-02-28 | 2011-10-18 | Wms Gaming Inc. | Method and apparatus for filtering wagering game content |
US8705739B2 (en) * | 2005-08-29 | 2014-04-22 | Wms Gaming Inc. | On-the-fly encryption on a gaming machine |
EP1881467A3 (en) * | 2006-07-19 | 2008-03-05 | Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty. Ltd. | A gaming machine |
AU2008202767A1 (en) * | 2007-06-27 | 2009-01-15 | Acei Ab | A system and method for managing meters in a gaming system |
US8135648B2 (en) * | 2007-11-01 | 2012-03-13 | Gtech Corporation | Authentication of lottery tickets, game machine credit vouchers, and other items |
US9424712B2 (en) | 2008-06-27 | 2016-08-23 | Bally Gaming, Inc. | Authenticating components in wagering game systems |
US20170162003A9 (en) * | 2012-01-23 | 2017-06-08 | Novomatic Ag | Gaming Machine Including Moving Wild Symbols |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5464087A (en) * | 1991-04-24 | 1995-11-07 | Mars, Incorporated | Transaction systems |
US5737418A (en) * | 1995-05-30 | 1998-04-07 | International Game Technology | Encryption of bill validation data |
US5918720A (en) * | 1995-03-30 | 1999-07-06 | Nkl Corporation | Money control system |
Family Cites Families (15)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP4095680B2 (en) * | 1994-08-01 | 2008-06-04 | 富士通株式会社 | Security management method for card type storage device and card type storage device |
US5674128A (en) * | 1995-02-21 | 1997-10-07 | Oneida Indian Nation | Cashless computerized video game system and method |
US5643086A (en) * | 1995-06-29 | 1997-07-01 | Silicon Gaming, Inc. | Electronic casino gaming apparatus with improved play capacity, authentication and security |
US5953424A (en) * | 1997-03-18 | 1999-09-14 | Hitachi Data Systems Corporation | Cryptographic system and protocol for establishing secure authenticated remote access |
US6071190A (en) * | 1997-05-21 | 2000-06-06 | Casino Data Systems | Gaming device security system: apparatus and method |
US6185316B1 (en) * | 1997-11-12 | 2001-02-06 | Unisys Corporation | Self-authentication apparatus and method |
DE19803179B4 (en) * | 1998-01-28 | 2010-01-28 | Adp Gauselmann Gmbh | Method for limiting the use of coin-operated amusement machines |
US6565443B1 (en) * | 1999-09-14 | 2003-05-20 | Innovative Gaming Corporation | System and method for verifying the contents of a mass storage device before granting access to computer readable data stored on the device |
DE19947420A1 (en) * | 1999-10-01 | 2001-04-05 | Adp Gauselmann Gmbh | Mode of slot machine play, augments wins by multiplication on successive plays, increasing player incentive |
US6368219B1 (en) * | 1999-10-15 | 2002-04-09 | Gtech Rhode Island Corporation | System and method for determining whether wagers have been altered after winning game numbers are drawn |
US6595856B1 (en) * | 2000-01-04 | 2003-07-22 | Sigma Game, Inc. | Electronic security technique for gaming software |
US7043641B1 (en) * | 2000-03-08 | 2006-05-09 | Igt | Encryption in a secure computerized gaming system |
US7203841B2 (en) * | 2001-03-08 | 2007-04-10 | Igt | Encryption in a secure computerized gaming system |
US7162036B2 (en) * | 2001-08-06 | 2007-01-09 | Igt | Digital identification of unique game characteristics |
US6685567B2 (en) * | 2001-08-08 | 2004-02-03 | Igt | Process verification |
-
2002
- 2002-03-07 DE DE10210173A patent/DE10210173B4/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2002-06-19 ES ES02013341T patent/ES2294066T3/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2002-06-19 DE DE50211029T patent/DE50211029D1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2002-06-19 AT AT02013341T patent/ATE375578T1/en active
- 2002-06-19 EP EP02013341A patent/EP1274050B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2002-06-26 US US10/184,200 patent/US7406602B2/en active Active
- 2002-07-04 AU AU52786/02A patent/AU785418B2/en not_active Ceased
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5464087A (en) * | 1991-04-24 | 1995-11-07 | Mars, Incorporated | Transaction systems |
US5918720A (en) * | 1995-03-30 | 1999-07-06 | Nkl Corporation | Money control system |
US5737418A (en) * | 1995-05-30 | 1998-04-07 | International Game Technology | Encryption of bill validation data |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20030008704A1 (en) | 2003-01-09 |
DE50211029D1 (en) | 2007-11-22 |
US7406602B2 (en) | 2008-07-29 |
ES2294066T3 (en) | 2008-04-01 |
ATE375578T1 (en) | 2007-10-15 |
AU5278602A (en) | 2003-01-09 |
DE10210173B4 (en) | 2012-12-06 |
AU785418B2 (en) | 2007-05-03 |
EP1274050B1 (en) | 2007-10-10 |
DE10210173A1 (en) | 2003-09-25 |
EP1274050A3 (en) | 2004-05-12 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
DE1944134C3 (en) | Access control device, for example for issuing banknotes | |
DE2350418C2 (en) | ||
DE4119924C3 (en) | Process for securing loadable credit in chip cards | |
EP2277149B1 (en) | Method for storing information about banknotes and self-service terminal | |
WO2003102881A1 (en) | System comprising an authorisation device, a security module and a terminal | |
CH629902A5 (en) | PROCEDURE FOR IDENTITY VERIFICATION. | |
WO2006005475A1 (en) | Method for identifying banknotes origin | |
EP1274050B1 (en) | Method for enciphering data, which is sent from a peripheral module to a control unit of a coin-feed apparatus | |
EP1700275A2 (en) | Method for identifying counterfeit banknotes | |
DE3031470C2 (en) | Facility for cashless telephoning | |
DE3013211C2 (en) | ||
EP0909434B1 (en) | Method and device for loading input data into an algorithm during authentication | |
EP1066607B1 (en) | Device and method for securely dispensing items with a monetary value | |
DE10132052B4 (en) | A method of encrypting data sent from a coin validator to a coin operated machine control unit | |
EP0117907A2 (en) | Method and module for testing electronic data | |
DE19803179B4 (en) | Method for limiting the use of coin-operated amusement machines | |
EP1745443A2 (en) | Method and device for identifying the person depositing suspicious banknotes at an automatic teller machine | |
DE4135450A1 (en) | Cash point system receiving cheques and dispensing banknotes or coins - has cheque data used together with card and keyboard data with delivery of banknotes that can be changed for coins | |
DE60224481T2 (en) | Banknote validator and method for processing the test data | |
DE102015117369B4 (en) | Method for operating a machine that can be used after a credit | |
EP0778552A2 (en) | Method and apparatus for payment from an IC-card with purse-function | |
DE4337277B4 (en) | A method for registering meter readings of credit counters in a microcomputer-comprehensive control unit for game sequence control of a coin operated amusement machine | |
DE102016102864A1 (en) | Method for activating a use of a coin-operated machine. | |
DE10055239B4 (en) | Methods and apparatus for achieving a closed cash cycle on a coin operated amusement machine | |
WO2019155254A1 (en) | Device, system and method for processing virtual value documents |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A2 Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE TR |
|
AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Free format text: AL;LT;LV;MK;RO;SI |
|
PUAL | Search report despatched |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009013 |
|
RIC1 | Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant |
Ipc: 7G 07F 17/32 A Ipc: 7G 07D 11/00 B |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A3 Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE TR |
|
AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: AL LT LV MK RO SI |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20040525 |
|
17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20040930 |
|
AKX | Designation fees paid |
Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE TR |
|
AXX | Extension fees paid |
Extension state: LV Payment date: 20040525 Extension state: MK Payment date: 20040525 Extension state: LT Payment date: 20040525 Extension state: AL Payment date: 20040525 |
|
GRAP | Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1 |
|
GRAS | Grant fee paid |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3 |
|
GRAA | (expected) grant |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: B1 Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE TR |
|
AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: AL LT LV MK |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: GB Ref legal event code: FG4D Free format text: NOT ENGLISH |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: EP |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: IE Ref legal event code: FG4D Free format text: LANGUAGE OF EP DOCUMENT: GERMAN |
|
REF | Corresponds to: |
Ref document number: 50211029 Country of ref document: DE Date of ref document: 20071122 Kind code of ref document: P |
|
GBT | Gb: translation of ep patent filed (gb section 77(6)(a)/1977) |
Effective date: 20080116 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: ES Ref legal event code: FG2A Ref document number: 2294066 Country of ref document: ES Kind code of ref document: T3 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: SE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20080110 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: PT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20080310 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: IE Ref legal event code: FD4D |
|
EN | Fr: translation not filed | ||
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: DK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20071010 |
|
PLBE | No opposition filed within time limit |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT |
|
26N | No opposition filed |
Effective date: 20080711 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: FR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20080725 Ref country code: IE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20071010 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: MC Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20080630 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: FI Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20071010 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: CY Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20071010 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: LU Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20080619 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: TR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20071010 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: GR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20080630 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: BE Payment date: 20200622 Year of fee payment: 19 Ref country code: GB Payment date: 20200625 Year of fee payment: 19 Ref country code: NL Payment date: 20200622 Year of fee payment: 19 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: AT Payment date: 20200618 Year of fee payment: 19 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: ES Payment date: 20200717 Year of fee payment: 19 Ref country code: DE Payment date: 20200721 Year of fee payment: 19 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IT Payment date: 20200630 Year of fee payment: 19 Ref country code: CH Payment date: 20200630 Year of fee payment: 19 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R119 Ref document number: 50211029 Country of ref document: DE |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: LT Ref legal event code: MM4D |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: PL |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: NL Ref legal event code: MM Effective date: 20210701 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: AT Ref legal event code: MM01 Ref document number: 375578 Country of ref document: AT Kind code of ref document: T Effective date: 20210619 |
|
GBPC | Gb: european patent ceased through non-payment of renewal fee |
Effective date: 20210619 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: BE Ref legal event code: MM Effective date: 20210630 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: LI Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20210630 Ref country code: GB Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20210619 Ref country code: DE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20220101 Ref country code: CH Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20210630 Ref country code: AT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20210619 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: NL Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20210701 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20210619 Ref country code: BE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20210630 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: ES Ref legal event code: FD2A Effective date: 20220826 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: ES Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20210620 |