US20070150740A1 - Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions - Google Patents
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- US20070150740A1 US20070150740A1 US11/483,176 US48317606A US2007150740A1 US 20070150740 A1 US20070150740 A1 US 20070150740A1 US 48317606 A US48317606 A US 48317606A US 2007150740 A1 US2007150740 A1 US 2007150740A1
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- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 17
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 20
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 18
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 claims description 4
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 4
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000009795 derivation Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 239000000284 extract Substances 0.000 claims 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000011084 recovery Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000003466 anti-cipated effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005265 energy consumption Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention relates generally to cryptographic schemes, and specifically to cryptographic schemes relating to wireless applications.
- Information security is required to secure many types of transactions performed electronically using a wide range of computing and communication technologies.
- technologies such as wireless networks, paging infrastructures and smart cards are being deployed to support critical, information sensitive applications including account inquiries, electronic cash, secure communications and access control.
- One of the key features of each of these technologies is that they offer consumers the convenience of service anywhere, any time. The convenience offered to consumers results in a challenge for the vendors to create smaller and faster devices while providing a high level of security for information computed and transmitted.
- cryptosystems Information security is provided through the application of cryptographic systems (commonly referred to as cryptosystems).
- the two main classes of cryptosystems are symmetric and public key.
- a symmetric cryptosystem two users wishing to participate in a secure transaction must share a common key. Therefore, each user must trust the other not to divulge the key to a third party.
- Users participating in a secure transaction using public key cryptosystems will each have two keys, known as a key pair. One of the keys is kept secret and is referred to as the private key, while the other can be published and is referred to as the public key.
- applications use a combination of both these classes of cryptosystems to provide information security.
- Symmetric technologies are typically used to perform bulk data encryption
- public key technologies are commonly used to perform key agreement, key transport, digital signatures and encryption of small messages.
- Elliptic curve cryptosystems are based on an exceptionally difficult mathematical problem, Thus, elliptic curve systems can maintain security equivalent to many other systems while using much smaller public keys.
- the smaller key size has significant benefits in terms of the amount of information that must be exchanged between users, the time required for that exchange, the amount of information that must be stored for digital signature transactions, and the size and energy consumption of the hardware or software used to implement the system.
- the public key is a point (Q) on an elliptic curve (represented as a pair of field elements) and the private key is an integer (k).
- Elliptic curves are defined over an underlying field and may be implemented over the multiplicative group F p , (the integers modules a prime p) or characteristic 2 finite fields (F 2 m where m is a positive integer).
- Wireless devices including cellular telephones, two-way pagers, wireless modems, and contactless smart cards, are increasing in popularity because of the convenience they provide while maintaining a low cost and small form factor.
- a method of communicating between a pair of correspondents through an intermediary comprising the steps, registering one of said correspondents with said intermediary to share an identifier, preparing at said one correspondent a secure communication including a message between said correspondents, preparing a signature component including a derivation of said secure communication and said identifier forwarding said signature component to said intermediary and verifying said signature component at said intermediary, attaching to said communication a certificate of the public key and identity of the said one correspondent, and forwarding said communication and certificate to said other correspondent.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic drawing of a pager system
- FIG. 3 is a representation of a message transfer system for the system of FIG. 1
- FIG. 4 is a schematic representation of an alternative embodiment of a communication system.
- a paging system is represented generally by the numeral 100 .
- a first pager 102 is operatively coupled with a first home terminal 104 through a wireless communication.
- the first home terminal 104 is operatively coupled to a second home terminal 106 via a network 108 and the second home terminal 106 in turn is operatively coupled to a second pager 110 .
- the pagers 102 , 110 are typically coupled to their respective home terminals 104 , 106 by radio frequency.
- the network 108 is typically a public switched telephone network (PSTN), but can include a data network, and the Internet.
- PSTN public switched telephone network
- Every pager 102 contains a subscriber unit address and a public key C of the pager manufacturer or service provider (herein referred to as the company public key). This information is loaded at the manufacture stage.
- the company public key Q C is derived from a company private key d C .
- Each home terminal 104 has a private key d H and a public key Q H .
- the public key Q N is signed by the company private key d C to create a certificate denoted C M .
- the company public key Q C could be system wide or defined for a given region.
- a subscriber purchases a pager 102 from a retail outlet and the pager is then loaded with a home index 112 and identifier ID using the protocol outlined below.
- the home index is typically a 32-bit index which uniquely identifies the pager 102 and correlates it with a specific home terminal 104 .
- the subscriber calls a number, typically a toll-free number, to contact a service provider and a home terminal 104 is assigned.
- the home terminal 104 sends the pager 102 its public key Q H and its certificate C M .
- the pager verifies Q H , with the company public key Q C .
- the pager generates a private key d p and a corresponding public key Q p which is communicated to the home terminal 104 .
- the pager 102 sends to the home terminal 104 the necessary authorization information (including identification, credit card number, subscriber unit address, and the like) encrypted under the home terminal public key Q H ).
- the home terminal gets authorization from a central repository that this subscriber unit has not already been activated and thereby prevents counterfeiting of subscriber units.
- the home terminal 104 sets up a subscriber account and sends the pager 102 its home index and identifier ID encrypted under Q p and signed by the home terminal.
- Each pager 102 in a paging infrastructure 100 is registered with a home terminal using the registration protocol described above.
- the pagers have a private and public key pair, dp,Q p , each of which are approximately 20 bytes in length.
- the home terminals 104 have a private and public key pair dh, Q H each of which are approximately 25 bytes in length. It is desirable to have a longer key length at the home terminal for providing additional security. Further, since the home terminal 104 does not have the same power constraints as the pager 102 , the extra computational power required for the longer key is not a significant issue. The additional security at the home terminal 102 is important since a compromise of the home terminal would permit counterfeiting of subscriber units.
- each of the pagers 102 has a certificate registered for it at the home terminal 104 .
- the certificate, cert ca validates the public key Q p , and identity ID.
- Each of the home terminals maintains a table for the pagers and their associated certificate. Rather than having the pager sign the certificate and send the message to the home terminal, the certificate cert ca is signed by the pager's home terminal. The transmission process used to implement such a protocol is described in detail below.
- the first pager P 1 wishes to send a message M to a recipient, e.g. a second pager P 2 having a public key Q P 1 .
- the sender P 1 initially obtains an authentic copy of a recipient's public key Q P 2 .
- the first pager then transmits the signature, m a , and the signed, encrypted message, W, to the first home terminal.
- the signature, m a is used by the home terminal 104 associated with pager P 1 to verify that P 1 is a legitimate user.
- the message W and a nonce CN which is unique for each transmission, are coupled with the ID of P 1 and signed.
- the nonce is used to prevent replay of the transmission, W is a signed, encrypted form of the message M. Signing then encrypting is preferred over encrypting then signing.
- the bandwidth requirement of the transmission from the pager to the base are reduced since the pager does not have to transmit a certificate.
- the first home terminal 104 stores a pre-computed table of values which allows it to increase the speed of verifying P 1 's signature. Alternately, if verification is fast enough, as would be the case with a hardware implementation, the table of values is not required.
- the second home terminal, 106 receives the transmission and verifies Q P 1 using Cert ca (Q P 1 , ID P 1 ). To save bandwidth, the second home terminal 106 signs Q P 1 according to the signature function S dp 1 (W
- Q P1 has been validated by the signature of the home terminal 104 and therefore communicating between the second home terminal 106 and the second pager 110 in this manner keeps the certificates off the transmission channel and reduces bandwidth requirements.
- M consists of t bytes. If the Nyberg-Rueppel protocol is used for signing the message, t+20 bytes are required for S P 1 (M). A further 20 bytes a used to encrypt S P 1 (M), therefore W is t+40 bytes in length. Hashing h(W) uses 20 bytes if SHA-1 is used. The nonce CN uses 4 bytes and the identification ID P 1 uses 4 bytes. Once again, if Nyberg-Rueppel is We for signing, 20 additional bytes are used. Hence m a will be 48 bytes. Therefore, the transmission between the first pager and the first home terminal uses t+92 bytes.
Abstract
Description
- This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/680,501 filed on Oct. 5, 2000.
- The present invention relates generally to cryptographic schemes, and specifically to cryptographic schemes relating to wireless applications.
- Information security is required to secure many types of transactions performed electronically using a wide range of computing and communication technologies. As consumers demand more flexible, convenient services, technologies such as wireless networks, paging infrastructures and smart cards are being deployed to support critical, information sensitive applications including account inquiries, electronic cash, secure communications and access control. One of the key features of each of these technologies is that they offer consumers the convenience of service anywhere, any time. The convenience offered to consumers results in a challenge for the vendors to create smaller and faster devices while providing a high level of security for information computed and transmitted.
- Information security is provided through the application of cryptographic systems (commonly referred to as cryptosystems). The two main classes of cryptosystems are symmetric and public key. In a symmetric cryptosystem, two users wishing to participate in a secure transaction must share a common key. Therefore, each user must trust the other not to divulge the key to a third party. Users participating in a secure transaction using public key cryptosystems will each have two keys, known as a key pair. One of the keys is kept secret and is referred to as the private key, while the other can be published and is referred to as the public key. Typically, applications use a combination of both these classes of cryptosystems to provide information security. Symmetric technologies are typically used to perform bulk data encryption, while public key technologies are commonly used to perform key agreement, key transport, digital signatures and encryption of small messages.
- Since the introduction of public key cryptosystems, there have been many implementations proposed. All of these public key systems are based on mathematical problems which are known to be hard, that is, it is thought that breaking a system is equivalent to solving a hard mathematical problem. These problems are generally easy to solve for numbers that are small in size, but become increasingly difficult as lager numbers are used. One of the differences among the systems is how large the numbers have to be so that the system is too hard to solve given present and anticipated computing power. This is typically linked to the length of the key and referred to as the key size. A system using a small key size while maintaining a high level of security is considered better, as it requires less information to be transmitted and stored.
- Diffie-Hellman key agreement provided the first practical solution to the key distribution problem by allowing two parties to securely establish a shared secret over an open channel. The original key agreement protocol provides unauthenticated key agreement. The security is based on the discrete logarithm problem of finding integer x given a group generator α, and an element β, such that αx=β.
- Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) was the first widely deployed realization of a public key system. The RSA system is a full public key cryptosystem and can be used to implement both encryption and digital signature functions. The security of the RSA cryptosystem depends on the difficulty of factoring the product of two large distinct prime numbers. To create a private key/public key pair, a user chooses two large distinct primes P and Q, and forms the product n=PQ. With knowledge of P and Q, the user finds two values e and d such that ((M)e)d mod n=M.
- The public key of the user is the pair (e, n) while the private key is d. It is known that the recovery of d from and e and n requires the recovery of P and Q, and thus is equivalent to factoring n.
- Elliptic curve cryptosystems are based on an exceptionally difficult mathematical problem, Thus, elliptic curve systems can maintain security equivalent to many other systems while using much smaller public keys. The smaller key size has significant benefits in terms of the amount of information that must be exchanged between users, the time required for that exchange, the amount of information that must be stored for digital signature transactions, and the size and energy consumption of the hardware or software used to implement the system. The basis for the security of the elliptic curve cryptosystem is the assumed intractability of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. The problem requires an efficient method to find an integer k given an elliptic curve over a finite field, a point P on the curve, another point Q such that Q=kP.
- In this system, the public key is a point (Q) on an elliptic curve (represented as a pair of field elements) and the private key is an integer (k). Elliptic curves are defined over an underlying field and may be implemented over the multiplicative group Fp, (the integers modules a prime p) or characteristic 2 finite fields (F2m where m is a positive integer).
- There are typically three levels in a cryptosystem, which are encryption, signatures, and certificates. These three levels can be implemented using to above mentioned systems or a combination thereof.
- The first level of a cryptosystem involves encrypting a message between correspondent A and correspondent B. This level is vulnerable to attack since there is no way for correspondent A to verify whether or not correspondent B sent the message, or if a third party in the guise of correspondent B sent the message.
- Therefore, the second level of signing a message was introduced. Correspondent B can sign the encrypted message using, for example, a hashing function to hash the original message. If correspondent A uses the same hashing function on the decrypted message and it matches the signature sent by correspondent B, then the signature is verified. However, a third party may act as an interloper. The third party could present itself to correspondent A as if it were correspondent B and vice versa. As a result, both correspondents would unwittingly divulge their information to the third party. Therefore, the signature verifies that the message sent by a correspondent is sent from that correspondent, but it does not verify the identity of the correspondent.
- To prevent this type of attack, the correspondents may use a trusted third party (TTP) to certify the public key of each correspondent. The TTP has a private signing algorithm and a verification algorithm assumed to be known by all entities. The TTP carefully verifies the identity of each correspondent, and signs a message consisting of an identifier and the correspondent's public key. This is a simple example as to how a TTP can be used to verify the identification of the correspondent.
- Some of the most significant emerging areas for public key cryptosystems include wireless devices. Wireless devices, including cellular telephones, two-way pagers, wireless modems, and contactless smart cards, are increasing in popularity because of the convenience they provide while maintaining a low cost and small form factor.
- However, implementing the above mentioned cryptosystems requires computational power, which is limited on such wireless devices. Therefore, there is a need for a cryptosystem that provides all of the advantages as described above, but requires less power from the wireless device.
- In accordance with the present invention there is provided a method of communicating between a pair of correspondents through an intermediary comprising the steps, registering one of said correspondents with said intermediary to share an identifier, preparing at said one correspondent a secure communication including a message between said correspondents, preparing a signature component including a derivation of said secure communication and said identifier forwarding said signature component to said intermediary and verifying said signature component at said intermediary, attaching to said communication a certificate of the public key and identity of the said one correspondent, and forwarding said communication and certificate to said other correspondent. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
- An embodiment of the invention will now be described by way of example only with reference to the following drawings in which:
-
FIG. 1 is a schematic drawing of a pager system; -
FIG. 2 is a representation of a registration process for the ofFIG. 1 -
FIG. 3 is a representation of a message transfer system for the system ofFIG. 1 -
FIG. 4 is a schematic representation of an alternative embodiment of a communication system. - For convenience, like numerals in the description refer to like structures in the drawings. Further, although the description refers only to pagers, it is intended that the description includes wireless devices in general.
- Referring to
FIG. 1 , a paging system is represented generally by the numeral 100. Afirst pager 102 is operatively coupled with afirst home terminal 104 through a wireless communication. Thefirst home terminal 104 is operatively coupled to asecond home terminal 106 via anetwork 108 and thesecond home terminal 106 in turn is operatively coupled to asecond pager 110. Thepagers respective home terminals network 108 is typically a public switched telephone network (PSTN), but can include a data network, and the Internet. - Before a
pager 102 can communicate with thehome terminal 104 it must be registered. Everypager 102 contains a subscriber unit address and a public key C of the pager manufacturer or service provider (herein referred to as the company public key). This information is loaded at the manufacture stage. The company public key QC is derived from a company private key dC. - Each
home terminal 104 has a private key dH and a public key QH. The public key QN is signed by the company private key dC to create a certificate denoted CM. The company public key QC could be system wide or defined for a given region. A subscriber purchases apager 102 from a retail outlet and the pager is then loaded with a home index 112 and identifier ID using the protocol outlined below. The home index is typically a 32-bit index which uniquely identifies thepager 102 and correlates it with aspecific home terminal 104. - The subscriber calls a number, typically a toll-free number, to contact a service provider and a
home terminal 104 is assigned. Thehome terminal 104 sends thepager 102 its public key QH and its certificate CM. The pager verifies QH, with the company public key QC. The pager generates a private key dp and a corresponding public key Qp which is communicated to thehome terminal 104. Thepager 102 sends to thehome terminal 104 the necessary authorization information (including identification, credit card number, subscriber unit address, and the like) encrypted under the home terminal public key QH). The home terminal gets authorization from a central repository that this subscriber unit has not already been activated and thereby prevents counterfeiting of subscriber units. Thehome terminal 104 sets up a subscriber account and sends thepager 102 its home index and identifier ID encrypted under Qp and signed by the home terminal. - Each
pager 102 in apaging infrastructure 100 is registered with a home terminal using the registration protocol described above. The pagers have a private and public key pair, dp,Qp, each of which are approximately 20 bytes in length. Thehome terminals 104 have a private and public key pair dh, QH each of which are approximately 25 bytes in length. It is desirable to have a longer key length at the home terminal for providing additional security. Further, since thehome terminal 104 does not have the same power constraints as thepager 102, the extra computational power required for the longer key is not a significant issue. The additional security at thehome terminal 102 is important since a compromise of the home terminal would permit counterfeiting of subscriber units. - To reduce the computational requirements on the pager thereby reducing the power required to encrypt a message M, each of the
pagers 102 has a certificate registered for it at thehome terminal 104. The certificate, certca, validates the public key Qp, and identity ID. Each of the home terminals maintains a table for the pagers and their associated certificate. Rather than having the pager sign the certificate and send the message to the home terminal, the certificate certca is signed by the pager's home terminal. The transmission process used to implement such a protocol is described in detail below. - Referring once again to
FIG. 1 andFIG. 3 , the first pager P1 wishes to send a message M to a recipient, e.g. a second pager P2 having a public key QP1 . The sender P1 initially obtains an authentic copy of a recipient's public key QP2 . The first pager P1 calculates ciphertext with of a signed message M such that W=EQP2 (SP1 (M)), where EQP1 is encryption under the public key QP1 and SP1 is the signature of the first pager on message M using the private key dp. - The first pager also calculates a signature ma=SP
1 (h(w)||CN||IDP1 ) where h(w) is a hash of W, such as SHA-1. CN is a timestamp or some other nonce, IDP1 is the unique identifier of the first pager, and || represents concatenation. The first pager then transmits the signature, ma, and the signed, encrypted message, W, to the first home terminal. - The signature, ma, is used by the
home terminal 104 associated with pager P1 to verify that P1 is a legitimate user. In order to avoid a challenge-response authentication to save time and bandwidth, the message W and a nonce CN, which is unique for each transmission, are coupled with the ID of P1 and signed. The nonce is used to prevent replay of the transmission, W is a signed, encrypted form of the message M. Signing then encrypting is preferred over encrypting then signing. - The first home terminal receives ma and W from P1 and uses ma to verify that P1 is a legitimate user. ID P
1 is recovered from ma, and the first home terminal retrieves the certificate, certca for P1 from the corresponding table and attaches it to W. Certca is a full certificate such as X.509 and consists of 1 bytes. There is no loss of security in storing the certca certificates at the first home terminal. - In addition to saving computational power on the pager, the bandwidth requirement of the transmission from the pager to the base are reduced since the pager does not have to transmit a certificate.
- The
first home terminal 104 stores a pre-computed table of values which allows it to increase the speed of verifying P1's signature. Alternately, if verification is fast enough, as would be the case with a hardware implementation, the table of values is not required. - The first home terminal then removes the signature component Ma and transmits the signed, encrypted message W and the certificate Certca to the recipient. Since the recipient in this example is the
second pager 110, W and Certca are sent to thesecond home terminal 106 that has public and private keys QP3 dP3 respectively. - The second home terminal, 106 receives the transmission and verifies QP
1 using Certca(QP1 , IDP1 ). To save bandwidth, thesecond home terminal 106 signs QP1 according to the signature function Sdp1 (W||QP1 ||IDP1 ) and sends it along with W to P2. A time stamp CNl may be included to prevent replay attacks. P2 trusts the second home terminal to do this honestly. The pager P2 can then verify W and recover the message M using its private key dP2 and the senders public key QP1. QP1 has been validated by the signature of thehome terminal 104 and therefore communicating between thesecond home terminal 106 and thesecond pager 110 in this manner keeps the certificates off the transmission channel and reduces bandwidth requirements. - An example of the bandwidth requirements for such a method is described as follows. Suppose M consists of t bytes. If the Nyberg-Rueppel protocol is used for signing the message, t+20 bytes are required for SP
1 (M). A further 20 bytes a used to encrypt SP1 (M), therefore W is t+40 bytes in length. Hashing h(W) uses 20 bytes if SHA-1 is used. The nonce CN uses 4 bytes and the identification IDP1 uses 4 bytes. Once again, if Nyberg-Rueppel is We for signing, 20 additional bytes are used. Hence ma will be 48 bytes. Therefore, the transmission between the first pager and the first home terminal uses t+92 bytes. - For the transmission from the first home terminal to the second home terminal, W uses t+40 bytes, Certca uses l bytes, and therefor the bandwidth required is t+l+40 bytes.
- For the transmission from the second home terminal, W uses t+40 bytes, QP
1 uses 20 bytes, IDP1 uses 4 bytes, and CN1 uses 4 bytes. Therefore, using Nyberg-Rueppel for signing, the bandwidth used in sending W and Sdp3 (W||QP1 ||IDP1 ) and the nonce CN1 is a total of 25+(t+40)+20+4+4=t+93 bytes. - In the above example, the transmission is from pager to pager. However, the protocol may be used from the input devices, for example, a DTMF telephone as illustrated in
FIG. 4 . In this case, the transmission T, would be With and Certca(Qd; IDD) where QD and IDD are the public key and identity of the telephone. - The transmission T2 would be W and certca(Qd; IDD) and the transmission T3 to the pager, after verification of Certca would be QD, With IDD and CN all signed by the home terminal.
Claims (15)
Priority Applications (3)
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US11/483,176 US20070150740A1 (en) | 2000-10-05 | 2006-07-10 | Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions |
US12/848,745 US20110010540A1 (en) | 2000-10-05 | 2010-08-02 | Method for Providing Information Security for Wireless Transmissions |
US13/549,176 US9003182B2 (en) | 2000-10-05 | 2012-07-13 | Communication system and method for securely communicating a message between correspondents through an intermediary terminal |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US68050100A | 2000-10-05 | 2000-10-05 | |
US11/483,176 US20070150740A1 (en) | 2000-10-05 | 2006-07-10 | Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions |
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US68050100A Continuation | 2000-10-05 | 2000-10-05 |
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US12/848,745 Continuation US20110010540A1 (en) | 2000-10-05 | 2010-08-02 | Method for Providing Information Security for Wireless Transmissions |
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US12/848,745 Abandoned US20110010540A1 (en) | 2000-10-05 | 2010-08-02 | Method for Providing Information Security for Wireless Transmissions |
US13/549,176 Expired - Fee Related US9003182B2 (en) | 2000-10-05 | 2012-07-13 | Communication system and method for securely communicating a message between correspondents through an intermediary terminal |
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US12/848,745 Abandoned US20110010540A1 (en) | 2000-10-05 | 2010-08-02 | Method for Providing Information Security for Wireless Transmissions |
US13/549,176 Expired - Fee Related US9003182B2 (en) | 2000-10-05 | 2012-07-13 | Communication system and method for securely communicating a message between correspondents through an intermediary terminal |
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EP (2) | EP2309670B1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU2001293598A1 (en) |
CA (2) | CA2424897C (en) |
HK (1) | HK1155869A1 (en) |
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US9729528B2 (en) | 2015-07-03 | 2017-08-08 | Afero, Inc. | Apparatus and method for establishing secure communication channels in an internet of things (IOT) system |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CA2793746A1 (en) | 2002-04-11 |
US20120284509A1 (en) | 2012-11-08 |
AU2001293598A1 (en) | 2002-04-15 |
EP1325586A2 (en) | 2003-07-09 |
CA2793746C (en) | 2016-09-20 |
WO2002030038A3 (en) | 2002-12-12 |
US9003182B2 (en) | 2015-04-07 |
CA2424897C (en) | 2015-08-04 |
EP2309670A2 (en) | 2011-04-13 |
WO2002030038A2 (en) | 2002-04-11 |
EP2309670A3 (en) | 2011-11-23 |
EP2309670B1 (en) | 2013-05-01 |
HK1155869A1 (en) | 2012-05-25 |
US20110010540A1 (en) | 2011-01-13 |
CA2424897A1 (en) | 2002-04-11 |
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