US8218459B1 - Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks - Google Patents

Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US8218459B1
US8218459B1 US12/004,214 US421407A US8218459B1 US 8218459 B1 US8218459 B1 US 8218459B1 US 421407 A US421407 A US 421407A US 8218459 B1 US8218459 B1 US 8218459B1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
network
administrative
topology hiding
messages
topology
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active, expires
Application number
US12/004,214
Inventor
Brian Stucker
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Genbrand U S LLC
Ribbon Communications Operating Co Inc
Original Assignee
Genbrand U S LLC
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Genbrand U S LLC filed Critical Genbrand U S LLC
Priority to US12/004,214 priority Critical patent/US8218459B1/en
Assigned to NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED reassignment NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: STUCKER, BRIAN
Assigned to GENBAND US LLC reassignment GENBAND US LLC CHANGE OF NAME (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: GENBAND INC.
Assigned to ONE EQUITY PARTNERS III, L.P., AS COLLATERAL AGENT reassignment ONE EQUITY PARTNERS III, L.P., AS COLLATERAL AGENT PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Assignors: GENBAND US LLC
Assigned to GENBAND US LLC reassignment GENBAND US LLC ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED
Assigned to COMERICA BANK reassignment COMERICA BANK SECURITY AGREEMENT Assignors: GENBAND US LLC
Assigned to COMERICA BANK (A TEXAS BANKING ASSOCIATION), AS AGENT; ATTN: NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION SERVICES reassignment COMERICA BANK (A TEXAS BANKING ASSOCIATION), AS AGENT; ATTN: NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION SERVICES AMENDED AND RESTATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY AGREEMENT Assignors: GENBEND US LLC (A DELAWARE LLC)
Priority to US13/470,712 priority patent/US11044235B2/en
Publication of US8218459B1 publication Critical patent/US8218459B1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Assigned to GENBAND US LLC reassignment GENBAND US LLC RELEASE BY SECURED PARTY (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: ONE EQUITY PARTNERS III, L.P., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Assigned to SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT reassignment SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Assignors: GENBAND US LLC
Assigned to SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT reassignment SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT PATENT NO. 6381239 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 039269 FRAME: 0234. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT. Assignors: GENBAND US LLC
Assigned to GENBAND US LLC reassignment GENBAND US LLC TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Assignors: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT
Assigned to SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT reassignment SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT SECURITY INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: GENBAND US LLC, SONUS NETWORKS, INC.
Assigned to CITIZENS BANK, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT reassignment CITIZENS BANK, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT SECURITY INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING COMPANY, INC.
Assigned to RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING COMPANY, INC. reassignment RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING COMPANY, INC. MERGER (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: GENBAND US LLC
Assigned to RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING COMPANY, INC. (F/K/A GENBAND US LLC AND SONUS NETWORKS, INC.) reassignment RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING COMPANY, INC. (F/K/A GENBAND US LLC AND SONUS NETWORKS, INC.) TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT AT R/F 044978/0801 Assignors: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT
Active legal-status Critical Current
Adjusted expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L45/00Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
    • H04L45/02Topology update or discovery
    • H04L45/04Interdomain routing, e.g. hierarchical routing

Definitions

  • the invention relates generally to providing topology hiding of a first network for an administrative interface between the first network and a second network.
  • IP multimedia subsystem IMS
  • IP multimedia subsystem IMS
  • An IP multimedia subsystem can be used in conjunction with a wireless network, such as a wireless network according to the GSM (Global System for Mobile) or UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) standard, as defined by 3GPP, or a wireless network according to CDMA 2000 (Code Division Multiple Access 2000), as defined by 3GPP2.
  • a wireless network such as a wireless network according to the GSM (Global System for Mobile) or UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) standard, as defined by 3GPP, or a wireless network according to CDMA 2000 (Code Division Multiple Access 2000), as defined by 3GPP2.
  • An IP multimedia subsystem can also be used with wireline networks.
  • the equivalent of the IP multimedia subsystem is sometimes referred to as a multimedia domain (MMD) network.
  • MMD multimedia domain
  • NTN Next Generation Networks
  • topology hiding is typically performed, such as by providing an IMS application level gateway (ALG), sometimes referred to as a topology hiding internetwork gateway (THIG), in a proxy call session control function (P-CSCF) or interconnect border control function (IBCF) of the IMS network.
  • ALG implemented in the P-CSCF or IBCF is used to obscure network topology information of the visited network for the call signaling interface.
  • topology hiding is performed for an administrative interface between a first network and a second network, where the administrative interface is separate from communications session signaling interface(s) between the first and second networks.
  • the administrative interface can be used for communicating authorization, authentication, and/or accounting messages.
  • FIGS. 1 and 2 illustrate example network arrangements and signal flows according to some embodiments
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a node in which an application level gateway for providing topology hiding is provided, according to some embodiments.
  • topology hiding is provided at an administrative interface between a first network and a second network, where the administrative interface is separate from one or more communications session signaling interfaces between the first network and second network.
  • Topology hiding allows topology information (e.g., network address, port, identifier, etc.) of one network to be hidden from another network.
  • a communications session signaling interface refers to a signaling interface between the first and second networks through which control messages can be exchanged for establishing communications sessions, such as voice-over-IP (Internet Protocol) call sessions, video conferencing sessions, chat sessions, web browsing sessions, and so forth.
  • control messages that can be communicated through a communications session signaling interface for establishing a communications session are SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) messages, as described by RFC (Request for Comments) 3261, entitled “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” dated June 2002.
  • SIP Session Initiation Protocol
  • SIP is an application-layer control signaling protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating multimedia sessions (any one or more of a voice session, or audio session, video session, text chat session, or any combination of the foregoing).
  • SIP is used as the call control signaling protocol by control functions of the first and second networks, in accordance with some implementations. Note that in other implementations, other types of control messages can be used for establishing communications sessions, where such other control messages are exchanged between first and second networks through the communications session signaling interface.
  • the first and second networks can be Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia subsystem (IMS) networks, as defined by 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project).
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • IMS Internet Protocol multimedia subsystem
  • An IMS network includes various control functions for provision of IP multimedia services, including audio, video, text, chat, or any combination of the foregoing.
  • the first and second networks can be according to the System Architecture Evolution (SAE) architecture, which is an evolution of the IMS architecture that adds support for non-3GPP access systems as well as other features.
  • SAE System Architecture Evolution
  • the first network can be considered the serving network for a mobile station, while the second network can be considered the home network for the mobile station.
  • the second network can also be considered a serving network for a second mobile station, while the first network is considered the home network for the second mobile station.
  • the mobile station typically may have to exchange control messages with one or more nodes of the home network to enable establishment of a communications session with another network element.
  • control messages for establishing the communications session is provided through one or more communications session signaling interfaces between the serving network and the home network.
  • various modules are provided to perform topology hiding such that the internal network topology of the serving network is hidden from the home network (or vice versa). Topology hiding at the communications session signaling interface is performed by stripping or encrypting certain information, such as identifier information, address information, or other information, in control messages that are passed through the communications session signaling interface.
  • topology hiding is also provided in an administrative interface between the serving network and the home network.
  • the administrative interface between the serving network and the home network is used for communicating administrative messages for performing various administrative tasks, including any one or more of authorization, authentication, or accounting tasks.
  • authentication refers to confirming that a user who is requesting services is a valid user of the network services requested.
  • Authentication is typically accomplished by presenting an identity and/or credentials of the user, such as passwords, tokens, digital certificates, etc.
  • Authorization refers to granting specific types of service to a user, subject to predefined restrictions, quality of service (QoS) specifications, bandwidth/traffic management, etc.
  • Accounting generally refers to tracking consumption of network resources by a user, such that the tracked consumption can be used for management, planning, billing, or other purposes.
  • Exchanges of administrative messages to perform any of the above tasks through the administrative interface can be performed prior to establishment of a communications session, or during a communications session.
  • administrative messages can be exchanged to determine quality of service (QoS) settings for a particular user.
  • QoS quality of service
  • administrative messages can be exchanged through the administrative interface when a mobile station roams to a visited network and attempts to access services at the home network.
  • the administrative messages exchanged between modules of the serving network and the home network over the administrative interface are Diameter messages according to the Diameter Protocol.
  • One version of the Diameter Protocol is described in RFC 3588, entitled “Diameter Base Protocol,” dated September 2003.
  • the Diameter Protocol defines messages that are used for performing authentication, authorization, and accounting tasks. Note, however, in other implementations, other types of administrative messages can be used between a serving network and home network.
  • FIG. 1 shows an example network arrangement that includes a first mobile station 100 and a second mobile station 102 , where the first mobile station 100 is connected to a first network 104 , and the second mobile station 102 is connected to a second network 106 .
  • the modules depicted in FIG. 1 are provided for purposes of example. In other implementations, other modules can be used.
  • the first network 104 is a serving network for the mobile station 100
  • the second network 106 is the home network of the mobile station 100
  • the mobile station 100 is attached to an access network 108 , which can be a wireless access network, for example.
  • wireless access networks include CDMA 2000 (Code Division Multiple Access 2000), GSM (Global System for Mobile), UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System), WiMAX, or other types of wireless access networks.
  • the mobile station is attached to an access network 109 .
  • the access network 108 is connected to a serving gateway 110 in the serving network 104 .
  • the serving gateway 110 has various functions, including mobility anchoring for inter-3GPP mobility, packet routing and forwarding, and other functions.
  • the serving gateway 110 is connected to a packet data network (PDN) gateway 112 in the serving network.
  • the PDN gateway 112 has various functions, including mobility anchor for mobility between 3GPP access networks and non-3GPP access networks, policy enforcement, charging support, and other functions.
  • the PDN gateway 112 is connected to a V-PCRF (visiting policy control and charging rules function) 114 and a CBGF (core border gateway function) 116 .
  • a PCRF provides policy control and charging rules.
  • the PCRF provides network control regarding service data flow detection, gating, QoS (quality of service), and flow-based charging.
  • the packet data network gateway 112 is also connected to a visited P-CSCF (proxy call session control function) 120 , which is the first call control contact point for a terminal in the network.
  • a visited P-CSCF proxy call session control function
  • the tasks performed by the P-CSCF 120 is forwarding of call control messages (e.g., SIP messages) to other control functions, call control message compression and decompression, and determination of which network a particular call control message should be routed to.
  • call control messages e.g., SIP messages
  • the visited P-CSCF 120 is connected to an interconnect border control function (IBCF) 122 , which issues policy instructions regarding the media plane (the plane associated with communication of media traffic).
  • IBCF 122 issues policy instructions regarding the media plane (the plane associated with communication of media traffic).
  • the IBCF 122 applies policy-based controls to the flow of multimedia across transport networks.
  • the IBCF 122 also provides topology hiding in the communications session signaling interface.
  • the IBCF 122 can also implement an internetwork gateway (THIG) to perform the topology hiding.
  • THIG internetwork gateway
  • the THIG can be implemented in the P-CSCF 120 .
  • An interconnect border gateway function (IBGF) 118 is also present to control the transport boundary at layers 3 and 4 between the first and second networks 104 , 106 .
  • the IBGF 118 can also act as a pinhole firewall and a network address translator.
  • an application level gateway 124 is provided in the V-PRCF 114 to perform topology hiding of the network topology of the serving network 104 at the administrative interface.
  • the administrative interface is provided between the V-PCRF 114 and a home PCRF (H-PCRF) 126 in the home network 106 .
  • Administrative messages e.g., Diameter messages
  • the ALG 124 is a Diameter ALG; however, other types of ALGs can be used in other embodiments.
  • One way of performing topology hiding is to substitute a local address (of network 104 ) with another address.
  • the Diameter ALG 124 can allocate a new address from a Diameter ALG pool of addresses, and can bind this new address to the local address reported from the PDN gateway 112 or the visited P-CSCF 120 .
  • Diameter messages sent from the V-PCRF 114 to the H-PCRF 126 in the home network 106 are updated to replace (substitute) the local address (e.g., A 1 ) with the new address (e.g., A 2 ).
  • the new address e.g., A 2
  • Diameter messages are updated by replacing A 2 with A 1 .
  • topology hiding can be performed, including encryption of address information in administrative messages, hashing of addresses in administrative messages, or removal (stripping) of addresses from administrative messages.
  • topology hiding can be performed by substituting, encrypting, hashing, or removing port information, such as user datagram protocol (UDP) port information, or other identifier information in the administrative messages.
  • UDP user datagram protocol
  • topology hiding can be accomplished by using existing Diameter data types (referred to as attribute value pairs or AVPs).
  • AVPs attribute value pairs
  • new AVPs do not have to be defined to support topology hiding.
  • the home network 106 (from the perspective of the mobile station 100 ) also includes an IBGF 128 (which interacts with the IBGF 118 in the serving network 104 ) and an IBCF 130 (which interacts with the IBCF 122 in the serving network 104 ).
  • the home network 106 also includes a PDN gateway 132 , and a P-CSCF 134 .
  • the network 106 also includes a serving CSCF (S-CSCF) 210 , which handles session control for a communications session.
  • S-CSCF serving CSCF
  • SIP messages for example, can be exchanged between P-CSCF and S-CSCF for performing communications session establishment and control.
  • the network 106 also includes a serving gateway 136 that is connected to the access network 109 .
  • the serving gateway 136 is connected to the PDN gateway 132 .
  • FIG. 1 also shows various task boxes that illustrate tasks performed by the various modules of FIG. 1 .
  • Box 150 indicates that the local address used by the PDN gateway 112 for mobile station 100 is address A 1 .
  • box 152 indicates that the visited P-CSCF 120 changes the body portion of a signaling message, e.g., a SIP message, to bind A 1 to another address C 1 (in other words, the body portion is updated by replacing A 1 with C 1 ).
  • the body portion of a SIP message is a Session Description Protocol (SDP) portion. SDP is used for describing multimedia sessions for purposes of session announcement, session invitation, and so forth.
  • SDP Session Description Protocol
  • box 154 indicates that the IBCF 122 changes the SDP portion of a signaling message to bind C 1 to C 2 (in other words, address C 1 in the SDP portion of a signaling message is substituted with address C 2 ).
  • Messages sent from the IBCF 122 in the serving network 104 to the IBCF 130 in the home network 106 would thus contain address C 2 .
  • This provides topology hiding in the communications session signaling interface between the IBCF 122 and IBCF 130 .
  • the Diameter ALG 124 is used to bind local address A 1 to address A 2 for certain administrative messages (see box 156 ). In the example of FIG. 1 , this binding is for administrative message provided over both the Gx interface and the Rx interface.
  • the Rx interface resides between a PCRF and an application function (AF).
  • AF application function
  • One example of an application function is the visited P-CSCF 120 .
  • the Gx interface resides between the PCRF and a PCEF (policy and charging enforcement function), which performs data flow detection, policy enforcement, and flow-based charging functionalities.
  • PCEF policy and charging enforcement function
  • box 158 indicates that the Diameter ALG 124 allocates a new address (A 2 ) from its pool of addresses, and binds this new address to local address A 1 that is reported from the PDN gateway 112 or the visited P-CSCF 120 .
  • Box 158 also indicates that diameter signaling sent from the V-PCRF 114 to H-PCRF 126 is updated to replace local address A 1 with external address A 2 .
  • Box 158 also indicates that the Diameter ALG 124 converts address A 2 with A 1 in the reverse direction (signaling from the H-PCRF 126 to the V-PCRF 114 ).
  • FIG. 1 also shows a box 160 that indicates that the Gx interface and the Rx interface of the H-PCRF 126 both refer to the external address A 2 reported by the V-PCRF. Thus, in administrative messages sent from the H-PCRF 126 to the V-PCRF, the external address A 2 is used.
  • FIG. 2 shows a different scenario in which services for the roaming mobile station 100 are provided by the home network 106 rather than by the serving network 104 (as was the case for FIG. 1 ).
  • services can be provided by an application server 202 in the home network 106 .
  • the topology hiding procedures performed at the communications session signaling interface and the administrative interface are independent of each other.
  • the topology hiding binds local address A 1 to C 2 .
  • the topology hiding binds local address A 1 to A 2 , which is different from C 2 at the communications session signaling interface.
  • Task boxes 150 , 152 , and 154 in FIG. 2 indicate the same tasks as the corresponding boxes in FIG. 1 for performing topology hiding at the communications session signaling interface.
  • task box 156 also indicates that the Diameter ALG 124 binds A 1 to A 2 for both Gx and Rx signaling.
  • box 204 in FIG. 2 indicates that the Diameter ALG 124 also coordinates with the IBCF 122 to determine that address C 2 should be the address reported to the peer H-PCRF 126 .
  • Diameter signaling sent from the V-PCRF 114 to the H-PCRF 126 is thus updated to replace address A 1 with C 2
  • Diameter signaling from the H-PCRF 126 to the V-PCRF 114 is updated to replace C 2 with A 1 in the reverse direction. Note that this topology hiding at the administrative interface performed in FIG. 2 is different from the topology hiding at the administrative interface performed in FIG. 1 .
  • the H-PCRF 126 in the home network 106 refers to C 2 (rather than to A 2 in the FIG. 1 example) at both the Gx and Rx interfaces.
  • Box 208 in FIG. 2 also indicates that, at the application server 202 , the Gx and Rx interfaces both refer to address C 2 .
  • FIG. 3 shows an example node 300 that includes the ALG 124 of FIGS. 1 and 2 .
  • the node 300 can be a computer node. Note that the V-PCRF 114 can also be deployed on the node 300 , in some implementations.
  • the ALG 124 can be a software module that is executable on one or more central processing units (CPUs) 302 .
  • the CPU(s) 302 is (are) connected to a storage 306 , which can store topology hiding binding information 308 used by the ALG 124 to perform topology hiding when communicating messages over the administrative interface with a node in another network.
  • the node 300 has a network interface 310 to enable communication over the administrative interface with another node.
  • topology hiding at an administrative interface between different networks By using topology hiding at an administrative interface between different networks, “leakage” of topology information of one network to another network over the administrative interface can be avoided. In this manner, enhanced security can be achieved.
  • processors include microprocessors, microcontrollers, processor modules or subsystems (including one or more microprocessors or microcontrollers), or other control or computing devices.
  • a “processor” can refer to a single component or to plural components.
  • Data and instructions (of the software) are stored in respective storage devices, which are implemented as one or more computer-readable or computer-usable storage media.
  • the storage media include different forms of memory including semiconductor memory devices such as dynamic or static random access memories (DRAMs or SRAMs), erasable and programmable read-only memories (EPROMs), electrically erasable and programmable read-only memories (EEPROMs) and flash memories; magnetic disks such as fixed, floppy and removable disks; other magnetic media including tape; and optical media such as compact disks (CDs) or digital video disks (DVDs).
  • DRAMs or SRAMs dynamic or static random access memories
  • EPROMs erasable and programmable read-only memories
  • EEPROMs electrically erasable and programmable read-only memories
  • flash memories magnetic disks such as fixed, floppy and removable disks; other magnetic media including tape
  • optical media such as compact disks (CDs) or digital video disks (DVDs).

Abstract

An administrative interface is provided between a first network and a second network, where the administrative interface is separate from one or more communications session signaling interfaces between the first network and second network. At least one of authorization, authentication, and accounting messages is communicated over the administrative interface. A module associated with the administrative interface is provided to perform topology hiding of the first network such that topology information of the first network is hidden from the second network.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD
The invention relates generally to providing topology hiding of a first network for an administrative interface between the first network and a second network.
BACKGROUND
Many types of communications can be performed over data networks (wireless and/or wireline networks), including electronic mail, web browsing, file downloads, electronic commerce transactions, voice or other forms of real-time, interactive communications, and others. To enable the establishment of communications sessions in a network, various control functions are deployed in the network. Some standards bodies have defined subsystems within communications networks that include such control functions. One such standards body is the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), which has defined an Internet protocol (IP) multimedia subsystem (IMS) that includes various control functions for provision of IP multimedia services, including audio, video, text, chat, or any combination of the foregoing.
An IP multimedia subsystem can be used in conjunction with a wireless network, such as a wireless network according to the GSM (Global System for Mobile) or UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) standard, as defined by 3GPP, or a wireless network according to CDMA 2000 (Code Division Multiple Access 2000), as defined by 3GPP2. An IP multimedia subsystem can also be used with wireline networks. In the 3GPP2 context, the equivalent of the IP multimedia subsystem is sometimes referred to as a multimedia domain (MMD) network. In the wireline context, the equivalent of an IP multimedia subsystem is sometimes referred to as a Next Generation Networks (NGN).
When a mobile station roams to a visited network, signaling messages exchanged with the roaming mobile station can be communicated between the visited network and a home network of the mobile station. The visited network and home network are usually provided by different service providers. Therefore, security is a concern between the visited network and the home network, since it would be undesirable for the home network to be able to learn network topology information associated with the visited network based on the exchanged signaling messages of the mobile station. To address this, topology hiding is typically performed, such as by providing an IMS application level gateway (ALG), sometimes referred to as a topology hiding internetwork gateway (THIG), in a proxy call session control function (P-CSCF) or interconnect border control function (IBCF) of the IMS network. The P-CSCF and IBCF are part of the call signaling interface between the visited network and the home network. The IMS ALG implemented in the P-CSCF or IBCF is used to obscure network topology information of the visited network for the call signaling interface.
However, an issue that has arisen is that the topology hiding provided by the IMS ALG is often insufficient to protect network topology information.
SUMMARY
In general, according to an embodiment, topology hiding is performed for an administrative interface between a first network and a second network, where the administrative interface is separate from communications session signaling interface(s) between the first and second networks. The administrative interface can be used for communicating authorization, authentication, and/or accounting messages.
Other or alternative features will become apparent from the following description, from the drawings, and from the claims.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIGS. 1 and 2 illustrate example network arrangements and signal flows according to some embodiments;
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a node in which an application level gateway for providing topology hiding is provided, according to some embodiments.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
In the following description, numerous details are set forth to provide an understanding of some embodiments. However, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that some embodiments may be practiced without these details and that numerous variations or modifications from the described embodiments may be possible.
In accordance with some embodiments, for enhanced security, topology hiding is provided at an administrative interface between a first network and a second network, where the administrative interface is separate from one or more communications session signaling interfaces between the first network and second network. Topology hiding allows topology information (e.g., network address, port, identifier, etc.) of one network to be hidden from another network. A communications session signaling interface refers to a signaling interface between the first and second networks through which control messages can be exchanged for establishing communications sessions, such as voice-over-IP (Internet Protocol) call sessions, video conferencing sessions, chat sessions, web browsing sessions, and so forth. Examples of control messages that can be communicated through a communications session signaling interface for establishing a communications session are SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) messages, as described by RFC (Request for Comments) 3261, entitled “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” dated June 2002.
SIP is an application-layer control signaling protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating multimedia sessions (any one or more of a voice session, or audio session, video session, text chat session, or any combination of the foregoing). SIP is used as the call control signaling protocol by control functions of the first and second networks, in accordance with some implementations. Note that in other implementations, other types of control messages can be used for establishing communications sessions, where such other control messages are exchanged between first and second networks through the communications session signaling interface.
The first and second networks can be Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia subsystem (IMS) networks, as defined by 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project). An IMS network includes various control functions for provision of IP multimedia services, including audio, video, text, chat, or any combination of the foregoing. Alternatively, the first and second networks can be according to the System Architecture Evolution (SAE) architecture, which is an evolution of the IMS architecture that adds support for non-3GPP access systems as well as other features. Features of the SAE architecture are described in 3GPP TS 23.402. Note that in other implementations, other types of networks according to other protocols can be employed.
The first network can be considered the serving network for a mobile station, while the second network can be considered the home network for the mobile station. Note that the second network can also be considered a serving network for a second mobile station, while the first network is considered the home network for the second mobile station. When a mobile station is in a serving network, the mobile station typically may have to exchange control messages with one or more nodes of the home network to enable establishment of a communications session with another network element. As noted above, such control messages for establishing the communications session is provided through one or more communications session signaling interfaces between the serving network and the home network. For enhanced security between the serving network and the home network, various modules are provided to perform topology hiding such that the internal network topology of the serving network is hidden from the home network (or vice versa). Topology hiding at the communications session signaling interface is performed by stripping or encrypting certain information, such as identifier information, address information, or other information, in control messages that are passed through the communications session signaling interface.
In accordance with some embodiments, to further enhance security between a serving network and a home network, topology hiding is also provided in an administrative interface between the serving network and the home network. The administrative interface between the serving network and the home network is used for communicating administrative messages for performing various administrative tasks, including any one or more of authorization, authentication, or accounting tasks. In general, authentication refers to confirming that a user who is requesting services is a valid user of the network services requested. Authentication is typically accomplished by presenting an identity and/or credentials of the user, such as passwords, tokens, digital certificates, etc. Authorization refers to granting specific types of service to a user, subject to predefined restrictions, quality of service (QoS) specifications, bandwidth/traffic management, etc. Accounting generally refers to tracking consumption of network resources by a user, such that the tracked consumption can be used for management, planning, billing, or other purposes.
Exchanges of administrative messages to perform any of the above tasks through the administrative interface can be performed prior to establishment of a communications session, or during a communications session. For example, administrative messages can be exchanged to determine quality of service (QoS) settings for a particular user. Alternatively, administrative messages can be exchanged through the administrative interface when a mobile station roams to a visited network and attempts to access services at the home network.
In one specific embodiment, the administrative messages exchanged between modules of the serving network and the home network over the administrative interface are Diameter messages according to the Diameter Protocol. One version of the Diameter Protocol is described in RFC 3588, entitled “Diameter Base Protocol,” dated September 2003. The Diameter Protocol defines messages that are used for performing authentication, authorization, and accounting tasks. Note, however, in other implementations, other types of administrative messages can be used between a serving network and home network.
FIG. 1 shows an example network arrangement that includes a first mobile station 100 and a second mobile station 102, where the first mobile station 100 is connected to a first network 104, and the second mobile station 102 is connected to a second network 106. Note that the modules depicted in FIG. 1 are provided for purposes of example. In other implementations, other modules can be used.
It is assumed that the first network 104 is a serving network for the mobile station 100, whereas the second network 106 is the home network of the mobile station 100. The mobile station 100 is attached to an access network 108, which can be a wireless access network, for example. Examples of wireless access networks include CDMA 2000 (Code Division Multiple Access 2000), GSM (Global System for Mobile), UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System), WiMAX, or other types of wireless access networks. Similarly, the mobile station is attached to an access network 109.
In the example of FIG. 1, it is assumed that services are provided by the serving network 104 to the visiting mobile station 100. As explained further below, the topology hiding at the administrative interface performed in such a scenario is slightly different from the topology hiding performed when services are provided by the home network (106) of the mobile station 100. This alternative scenario is described in the context of FIG. 2 below.
In the ensuing discussion, focus is made on the mobile station 100 that has roamed into visited network 104, and whose home network is network 106. However, note that the same principles can be applied to other mobile stations in other networks.
The access network 108 is connected to a serving gateway 110 in the serving network 104. The serving gateway 110 has various functions, including mobility anchoring for inter-3GPP mobility, packet routing and forwarding, and other functions. The serving gateway 110 is connected to a packet data network (PDN) gateway 112 in the serving network. The PDN gateway 112 has various functions, including mobility anchor for mobility between 3GPP access networks and non-3GPP access networks, policy enforcement, charging support, and other functions.
The PDN gateway 112 is connected to a V-PCRF (visiting policy control and charging rules function) 114 and a CBGF (core border gateway function) 116. A PCRF provides policy control and charging rules. Generally, the PCRF provides network control regarding service data flow detection, gating, QoS (quality of service), and flow-based charging.
The packet data network gateway 112 is also connected to a visited P-CSCF (proxy call session control function) 120, which is the first call control contact point for a terminal in the network. Among the tasks performed by the P-CSCF 120 is forwarding of call control messages (e.g., SIP messages) to other control functions, call control message compression and decompression, and determination of which network a particular call control message should be routed to.
The visited P-CSCF 120 is connected to an interconnect border control function (IBCF) 122, which issues policy instructions regarding the media plane (the plane associated with communication of media traffic). The IBCF 122 applies policy-based controls to the flow of multimedia across transport networks. The IBCF 122 also provides topology hiding in the communications session signaling interface. For example, the IBCF 122 can also implement an internetwork gateway (THIG) to perform the topology hiding. Alternatively, the THIG can be implemented in the P-CSCF 120.
An interconnect border gateway function (IBGF) 118 is also present to control the transport boundary at layers 3 and 4 between the first and second networks 104, 106. The IBGF 118 can also act as a pinhole firewall and a network address translator.
Although the various functions depicted in the networks 104, 106 are represented as separate blocks, note that at least some of the functions can be deployed on a common network node.
In accordance with some embodiments, an application level gateway 124 is provided in the V-PRCF 114 to perform topology hiding of the network topology of the serving network 104 at the administrative interface. In the embodiment of FIG. 1, the administrative interface is provided between the V-PCRF 114 and a home PCRF (H-PCRF) 126 in the home network 106. Administrative messages (e.g., Diameter messages) can be exchanged between the V-PCRF 114 and the H-PCRF 126 to perform authentication, authorization, and/or accounting tasks.
In some embodiments, the ALG 124 is a Diameter ALG; however, other types of ALGs can be used in other embodiments. One way of performing topology hiding is to substitute a local address (of network 104) with another address. For example, the Diameter ALG 124 can allocate a new address from a Diameter ALG pool of addresses, and can bind this new address to the local address reported from the PDN gateway 112 or the visited P-CSCF 120. Diameter messages sent from the V-PCRF 114 to the H-PCRF 126 in the home network 106 are updated to replace (substitute) the local address (e.g., A1) with the new address (e.g., A2). In the reverse direction, from H-PCRF 126 to V-PCRF 114, Diameter messages are updated by replacing A2 with A1.
In other embodiments, other types of topology hiding can be performed, including encryption of address information in administrative messages, hashing of addresses in administrative messages, or removal (stripping) of addresses from administrative messages. Note that although reference is made to substituting, encrypting, hashing, or removal of addresses (e.g., IP addresses) in administrative messages, it is noted that in alternative implementations, topology hiding can be performed by substituting, encrypting, hashing, or removing port information, such as user datagram protocol (UDP) port information, or other identifier information in the administrative messages.
In accordance with some embodiments, topology hiding can be accomplished by using existing Diameter data types (referred to as attribute value pairs or AVPs). In such embodiments, new AVPs do not have to be defined to support topology hiding.
As further depicted in FIG. 1, the home network 106 (from the perspective of the mobile station 100) also includes an IBGF 128 (which interacts with the IBGF 118 in the serving network 104) and an IBCF 130 (which interacts with the IBCF 122 in the serving network 104). The home network 106 also includes a PDN gateway 132, and a P-CSCF 134. Moreover, the network 106 also includes a serving CSCF (S-CSCF) 210, which handles session control for a communications session. Note that SIP messages, for example, can be exchanged between P-CSCF and S-CSCF for performing communications session establishment and control.
The network 106 also includes a serving gateway 136 that is connected to the access network 109. The serving gateway 136 is connected to the PDN gateway 132.
FIG. 1 also shows various task boxes that illustrate tasks performed by the various modules of FIG. 1. Box 150 indicates that the local address used by the PDN gateway 112 for mobile station 100 is address A1. Moreover, box 152 indicates that the visited P-CSCF 120 changes the body portion of a signaling message, e.g., a SIP message, to bind A1 to another address C1 (in other words, the body portion is updated by replacing A1 with C1). In one embodiment, the body portion of a SIP message is a Session Description Protocol (SDP) portion. SDP is used for describing multimedia sessions for purposes of session announcement, session invitation, and so forth.
As further depicted in FIG. 1, box 154 indicates that the IBCF 122 changes the SDP portion of a signaling message to bind C1 to C2 (in other words, address C1 in the SDP portion of a signaling message is substituted with address C2). Messages sent from the IBCF 122 in the serving network 104 to the IBCF 130 in the home network 106 would thus contain address C2. This provides topology hiding in the communications session signaling interface between the IBCF 122 and IBCF 130.
Note that in an alternative implementation, if an IMS ALG was not provided or invoked at the visited P-CSCF 120, then the change from address A1 to C1 would not have occurred. In this case, the IBCF 122 would then substitute the local address A1 in the SDP portion of the signaling message with address C2.
In accordance with some embodiments, in the administrative interface between V-PCRF 114 and H-PCRF 126, the Diameter ALG 124 is used to bind local address A1 to address A2 for certain administrative messages (see box 156). In the example of FIG. 1, this binding is for administrative message provided over both the Gx interface and the Rx interface. The Rx interface resides between a PCRF and an application function (AF). One example of an application function is the visited P-CSCF 120. The Gx interface resides between the PCRF and a PCEF (policy and charging enforcement function), which performs data flow detection, policy enforcement, and flow-based charging functionalities. Although reference is made to Gx and Rx signaling in the FIG. 1 example, note that the Diameter ALG 124 can perform topology hiding for other types of signaling over an administrative interface.
As further depicted in FIG. 1, box 158 indicates that the Diameter ALG 124 allocates a new address (A2) from its pool of addresses, and binds this new address to local address A1 that is reported from the PDN gateway 112 or the visited P-CSCF 120. Box 158 also indicates that diameter signaling sent from the V-PCRF 114 to H-PCRF 126 is updated to replace local address A1 with external address A2. Box 158 also indicates that the Diameter ALG 124 converts address A2 with A1 in the reverse direction (signaling from the H-PCRF 126 to the V-PCRF 114).
FIG. 1 also shows a box 160 that indicates that the Gx interface and the Rx interface of the H-PCRF 126 both refer to the external address A2 reported by the V-PCRF. Thus, in administrative messages sent from the H-PCRF 126 to the V-PCRF, the external address A2 is used.
FIG. 2 shows a different scenario in which services for the roaming mobile station 100 are provided by the home network 106 rather than by the serving network 104 (as was the case for FIG. 1). In this example, services can be provided by an application server 202 in the home network 106.
In the example of FIG. 1, the topology hiding procedures performed at the communications session signaling interface and the administrative interface are independent of each other. At the communications session signaling interface, the topology hiding binds local address A1 to C2. On the other hand, at the administrative interface, the topology hiding binds local address A1 to A2, which is different from C2 at the communications session signaling interface.
However, if services are provided at the home network, such as by the application server 202 in FIG. 2, then coordination is performed between the communications session signaling interface and the administrative interface such that coordination of the topology hiding procedures at the communications session signaling interface and the administrative interface can be provided. Task boxes 150, 152, and 154 in FIG. 2 indicate the same tasks as the corresponding boxes in FIG. 1 for performing topology hiding at the communications session signaling interface.
At the administrative interface, task box 156 also indicates that the Diameter ALG 124 binds A1 to A2 for both Gx and Rx signaling. However, box 204 in FIG. 2 indicates that the Diameter ALG 124 also coordinates with the IBCF 122 to determine that address C2 should be the address reported to the peer H-PCRF 126. Diameter signaling sent from the V-PCRF 114 to the H-PCRF 126 is thus updated to replace address A1 with C2, and Diameter signaling from the H-PCRF 126 to the V-PCRF 114 is updated to replace C2 with A1 in the reverse direction. Note that this topology hiding at the administrative interface performed in FIG. 2 is different from the topology hiding at the administrative interface performed in FIG. 1.
With the topology hiding performed in FIG. 2, the H-PCRF 126 in the home network 106 refers to C2 (rather than to A2 in the FIG. 1 example) at both the Gx and Rx interfaces. Box 208 in FIG. 2 also indicates that, at the application server 202, the Gx and Rx interfaces both refer to address C2.
FIG. 3 shows an example node 300 that includes the ALG 124 of FIGS. 1 and 2. The node 300 can be a computer node. Note that the V-PCRF 114 can also be deployed on the node 300, in some implementations. The ALG 124 can be a software module that is executable on one or more central processing units (CPUs) 302. The CPU(s) 302 is (are) connected to a storage 306, which can store topology hiding binding information 308 used by the ALG 124 to perform topology hiding when communicating messages over the administrative interface with a node in another network. The node 300 has a network interface 310 to enable communication over the administrative interface with another node.
Note that the other nodes of the networks of FIGS. 1 and 2 can be similarly arranged as in FIG. 3.
By using topology hiding at an administrative interface between different networks, “leakage” of topology information of one network to another network over the administrative interface can be avoided. In this manner, enhanced security can be achieved.
Instructions of software described above (e.g., ALG 124 in FIGS. 1 and 2) are executed on a processor. The processor includes microprocessors, microcontrollers, processor modules or subsystems (including one or more microprocessors or microcontrollers), or other control or computing devices. A “processor” can refer to a single component or to plural components.
Data and instructions (of the software) are stored in respective storage devices, which are implemented as one or more computer-readable or computer-usable storage media. The storage media include different forms of memory including semiconductor memory devices such as dynamic or static random access memories (DRAMs or SRAMs), erasable and programmable read-only memories (EPROMs), electrically erasable and programmable read-only memories (EEPROMs) and flash memories; magnetic disks such as fixed, floppy and removable disks; other magnetic media including tape; and optical media such as compact disks (CDs) or digital video disks (DVDs).
In the foregoing description, numerous details are set forth to provide an understanding of the present invention. However, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced without these details. While the invention has been disclosed with respect to a limited number of embodiments, those skilled in the art will appreciate numerous modifications and variations therefrom. It is intended that the appended claims cover such modifications and variations as fall within the true spirit and scope of the invention.

Claims (19)

1. A method comprising:
providing an administrative interface between a first network and a second network, wherein the administrative interface is different from one or more communications session signaling interfaces between the first network and second network;
communicating control messages over the one or more communications session signaling interfaces for establishing a communications session;
performing first topology hiding at the one or more communications session signaling interfaces between the first and second networks;
communicating authorization, authentication, and accounting messages over the administrative interface between a first module in the first network and a second module in the second network; and
providing a topology hiding module implemented in a computer and associated with the administrative interface to perform second topology hiding of the first network at the administrative interface, wherein the second topology hiding is in addition to the first topology hiding, and the first topology hiding and second topology hiding are to hide topology information of the first network from the second network,
wherein performing the first topology hiding at the one or more communications session signaling interfaces is independent of the second topology hiding at the administrative interface.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein providing the topology hiding module comprises providing an application level gateway (ALG).
3. The method of claim 2, wherein providing the ALG comprises providing a Diameter ALG.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein providing the administrative interface comprises providing the administrative interface over which Diameter messaging is exchanged for performing authorization, authentication, and accounting tasks.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein performing the first topology hiding at the one or more communications session signaling interfaces comprises performing the topology hiding at the one or more communications session signaling interfaces over which Session Initiation Protocol messaging is exchanged.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein performing the second topology hiding comprises substituting a local address of the first network with an external address in an administrative message communicated over the administrative interface.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein performing the second topology hiding comprises encrypting a local address of the first network in an administrative message communicated over the administrative interface.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein performing the second topology hiding comprises hashing a local address of the first network in an administrative message communicated over the administrative interface.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein performing the second topology hiding comprises removing a local address of the first network from an administrative message communicated over the administrative interface.
10. A system comprising:
at least a first node in a visited network of a mobile station, comprising:
at least one processor;
a network interface to send administrative messages on behalf of the mobile station to a home network of the mobile station, the administrative messages comprising authorization, authentication, and accounting messages to perform respective authorization, authentication, and accounting tasks; and
a module executable on the at least one processor to perform first topology hiding of the visited network such that topology information of the visited network is hidden from the home network, wherein the first topology hiding is performed by modifying the administrative messages;
at least a second node in the visited network, comprising:
at least one processor;
a network interface to send control messages on behalf of the mobile station to the home network to establish a communications session; and
a module executable on the at least one processor of the at least second node to perform second topology hiding of the visited network with respect to the control messages such that the topology information of the visited network is hidden from the home network,
wherein the first topology hiding is independent of the second topology hiding.
11. The system of claim 10, wherein the administrative messages comprise Diameter messages.
12. The system of claim 10, wherein the first topology hiding comprises one of: substituting a local address in at least one of the administrative messages with an external address; encrypting the local address in at least one of the administrative messages; hashing the local address in at least one of the administrative messages; and removing the local address from at least one of the administrative messages.
13. The system of claim 10, wherein the control messages comprise Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) messages.
14. An article comprising at least one non-transitory computer-readable storage medium containing instructions that when executed cause a processor to:
communicate administrative messages over an administrative interface between a first network and a second network, wherein the administrative interface is different from one or more communications session signaling interfaces between the first network and second network, and wherein the administrative messages are communicated to perform respective authorization task, authentication task, and accounting tasks;
perform first topology hiding at the administrative interface to protect topology information of the first network such that the topology information of the first network is hidden from the second network, wherein the first topology hiding is performed by modifying the administrative messages;
communicate control messages over the one or more communications session signaling interfaces for establishing a communications session; and
perform second topology hiding at the one or more communications session signaling interfaces between the first and second networks, where the second topology hiding is in addition to the first topology hiding,
wherein performing the first topology hiding at the administrative interface is independent of the second topology hiding at the one or more communications session signaling interfaces.
15. The article of claim 14, wherein communicating the administrative messages comprises communicating Diameter messages.
16. The method of claim 1, wherein the first network is a visited network of a mobile station, and the second network is a home network of the mobile station, and wherein providing the topology hiding module to perform the second topology hiding comprises providing the topology hiding module in the visited network to perform the second topology hiding by modifying the authorization, authentication, and accounting messages sent on behalf of the mobile station from the visited network to the home network.
17. The system of claim 10, wherein the administrative messages are configured to be sent over an administrative interface between the visited network and the home network, and wherein the control messages are configured to be sent over a communications session signaling interface between the visited network and the home network.
18. The article of claim 14, wherein the first network is a visited network of a mobile station, and the second network is a home network of the mobile station, and wherein performing the first topology hiding comprises performing the first topology hiding by modifying the authorization, authentication, and accounting messages sent on behalf of the mobile station from the visited network to the home network over the administrative interface.
19. The method of claim 1, wherein the first module is a first policy control and charging rules function and the second module is a second policy control and charging rules function.
US12/004,214 2007-12-20 2007-12-20 Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks Active 2028-10-02 US8218459B1 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US12/004,214 US8218459B1 (en) 2007-12-20 2007-12-20 Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks
US13/470,712 US11044235B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2012-05-14 Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US12/004,214 US8218459B1 (en) 2007-12-20 2007-12-20 Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US13/470,712 Continuation US11044235B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2012-05-14 Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US8218459B1 true US8218459B1 (en) 2012-07-10

Family

ID=46395949

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/004,214 Active 2028-10-02 US8218459B1 (en) 2007-12-20 2007-12-20 Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks
US13/470,712 Active 2029-04-24 US11044235B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2012-05-14 Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US13/470,712 Active 2029-04-24 US11044235B2 (en) 2007-12-20 2012-05-14 Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks

Country Status (1)

Country Link
US (2) US8218459B1 (en)

Cited By (16)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20110167150A1 (en) * 2010-01-04 2011-07-07 Yusun Kim Riley METHODS, SYSTEMS, AND COMPUTER READABLE MEDIA FOR DETECTING INITIATION OF A SERVICE DATA FLOW USING A Gx RULE
US20120127926A1 (en) * 2009-05-26 2012-05-24 Nicolas Drevon Session transfer between access networks
US20120226814A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2012-09-06 Brian Stucker Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks
US20120246254A1 (en) * 2009-12-01 2012-09-27 Zte Corporation Method and Apparatus for User Equipment Accessing in IP Multimedia Subsystem
US20140372546A1 (en) * 2011-11-02 2014-12-18 Nokia Solutions And Networks Oy Method and apparatus for indicating a type of a network interface
WO2015035075A1 (en) * 2013-09-04 2015-03-12 Qualcomm Incorporated Operator controlled apn routing mapping
EP2965204A4 (en) * 2013-03-07 2016-10-26 F5 Networks Inc Server to client reverse persistence
US20170012824A1 (en) * 2015-07-09 2017-01-12 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for selective diameter topology hiding
US10033736B2 (en) 2016-01-21 2018-07-24 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for remote authentication dial-in user service (radius) topology hiding
US20190362061A1 (en) * 2014-06-12 2019-11-28 Maxell, Ltd. Information processing device, application software start-up system, and application software start-up method
US11558737B2 (en) 2021-01-08 2023-01-17 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for preventing subscriber identifier leakage
US11570689B2 (en) 2021-05-07 2023-01-31 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for hiding network function instance identifiers
US11627467B2 (en) 2021-05-05 2023-04-11 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for generating and using single-use OAuth 2.0 access tokens for securing specific service-based architecture (SBA) interfaces
US11638155B2 (en) 2021-05-07 2023-04-25 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for protecting against mass network function (NF) deregistration attacks
US11695563B2 (en) 2021-05-07 2023-07-04 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for single-use authentication messages
US11888894B2 (en) 2021-04-21 2024-01-30 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for mitigating network function (NF) update and deregister attacks

Families Citing this family (27)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1846832B1 (en) 2004-12-17 2012-04-11 Tekelec Methods, systems, and computer program products for clustering and communicating between internet protocol multimedia subsystem (IMS) entities
WO2010055402A1 (en) * 2008-11-14 2010-05-20 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Detection and report of limited policy and charging control capabilities
CN101959164A (en) * 2009-07-17 2011-01-26 中兴通讯股份有限公司 Method and system for deleting redundant information of home policy and charging rule function
US8615237B2 (en) * 2010-01-04 2013-12-24 Tekelec, Inc. Methods, systems, and computer readable media for policy and charging rules function (PCRF) node selection
WO2011100166A2 (en) 2010-02-11 2011-08-18 Tekelec Methods, systems, and computer readable media for dynamic subscriber profile adaptation
US9094819B2 (en) * 2010-06-06 2015-07-28 Tekelec, Inc. Methods, systems, and computer readable media for obscuring diameter node information in a communication network
CN103477660B (en) 2011-03-01 2017-04-19 泰科来股份有限公司 Methods, systems, and computer readable media for sharing Diameter binding data
WO2012118963A1 (en) 2011-03-01 2012-09-07 Tekelec, Inc. Methods, systems and computer readable media for dynamically learning diameter binding information
US8737304B2 (en) 2011-03-01 2014-05-27 Tekelec, Inc. Methods, systems, and computer readable media for hybrid session based diameter routing
JP5732550B2 (en) 2011-03-03 2015-06-10 テケレック・インコーポレイテッドTekelec, Inc. Method, system, and computer-readable medium for enhancing Diameter signaling messages
CN103535080B (en) 2011-05-06 2017-07-18 泰科来股份有限公司 Method, system and computer-readable media for changing user between access networks
US9253163B2 (en) 2011-12-12 2016-02-02 Tekelec, Inc. Methods, systems, and computer readable media for encrypting diameter identification information in a communication network
US20140068101A1 (en) * 2012-09-04 2014-03-06 Alcatel-Lucent Canada, Inc. Received message context objects
US9143498B2 (en) * 2012-08-30 2015-09-22 Aerohive Networks, Inc. Internetwork authentication
US9319378B2 (en) 2013-01-23 2016-04-19 Tekelec, Inc. Methods, systems, and computer readable media for using a diameter routing agent (DRA) to obtain mappings between mobile subscriber identification information and dynamically assigned internet protocol (IP) addresses and for making the mappings accessible to applications
US9769056B2 (en) 2013-03-15 2017-09-19 Aerohive Networks, Inc. Gateway using multicast to unicast conversion
US9762679B2 (en) 2013-03-15 2017-09-12 Aerohive Networks, Inc. Providing stateless network services
US9992619B2 (en) 2014-08-12 2018-06-05 Aerohive Networks, Inc. Network device based proximity beacon locating
CN104363573B (en) * 2014-10-28 2017-12-22 北京邮电大学 The communication means that a kind of VoLTE international roamings system using local break-out is realized
CN104866174A (en) * 2015-05-20 2015-08-26 天脉聚源(北京)教育科技有限公司 Information displaying method and apparatus
US10951519B2 (en) 2015-06-17 2021-03-16 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for multi-protocol stateful routing
US9923984B2 (en) 2015-10-30 2018-03-20 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for remote authentication dial in user service (RADIUS) message loop detection and mitigation
US10554661B2 (en) 2015-08-14 2020-02-04 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for providing access network session correlation for policy control
US9668135B2 (en) 2015-08-14 2017-05-30 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for providing access network signaling protocol interworking for user authentication
US10084755B2 (en) 2015-08-14 2018-09-25 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for remote authentication dial in user service (RADIUS) proxy and diameter agent address resolution
US9668134B2 (en) 2015-08-14 2017-05-30 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for providing access network protocol interworking and authentication proxying
US11283883B1 (en) 2020-11-09 2022-03-22 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for providing optimized binding support function (BSF) packet data unit (PDU) session binding discovery responses

Citations (29)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6292839B1 (en) * 1998-12-09 2001-09-18 3Com Corporation Method and system for reflexive tunneling
US20020080752A1 (en) * 2000-12-22 2002-06-27 Fredrik Johansson Route optimization technique for mobile IP
US6484257B1 (en) * 1999-02-27 2002-11-19 Alonzo Ellis System and method for maintaining N number of simultaneous cryptographic sessions using a distributed computing environment
US20040057442A1 (en) * 2000-12-04 2004-03-25 Ilkka Westman Communication system and method for establishing a connection to a serving network element
US20040088419A1 (en) * 2001-03-30 2004-05-06 Ilkka Westman Passing information in a communication system
US20040095944A1 (en) * 2002-11-15 2004-05-20 Julian Mitchell Network address translator and secure transfer device for interfacing networks
US20040121760A1 (en) * 2001-04-25 2004-06-24 Illkka Westman Authentication in a communication system
US20040153667A1 (en) * 2002-05-22 2004-08-05 Georg Kastelewicz Method for registering a communication terminal
US20040162892A1 (en) * 2003-02-18 2004-08-19 Hsu Raymond T. Provisioning server information in a mobile station
US20040260747A1 (en) * 2003-06-19 2004-12-23 Sbc, Inc. Method and apparatus for Voice over Internet Protocol telephony using a virtual private network
US20050083974A1 (en) * 2003-10-21 2005-04-21 Nokia Corporation Routing information processing for network hiding scheme
US6941377B1 (en) * 1999-12-31 2005-09-06 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for secondary use of devices with encryption
US20060077965A1 (en) * 2004-10-07 2006-04-13 Nokia Corporation Callback services in a communication system
US20060155871A1 (en) * 2000-10-10 2006-07-13 Westman Ilkka Techniques for hiding network element names and addresses
US7092398B2 (en) * 2000-06-12 2006-08-15 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. System, method and computer program product for charging for competitive IP-over-wireless service
US20060233140A1 (en) * 2003-02-28 2006-10-19 Jochen Grimminger Method for transmitting data in a wlan network
US20070076728A1 (en) * 2005-10-04 2007-04-05 Remi Rieger Self-monitoring and optimizing network apparatus and methods
US20070186281A1 (en) * 2006-01-06 2007-08-09 Mcalister Donald K Securing network traffic using distributed key generation and dissemination over secure tunnels
US20070209067A1 (en) * 2006-02-21 2007-09-06 Fogel Richard M System and method for providing security for SIP-based communications
US20070232301A1 (en) 2006-03-31 2007-10-04 Fujitsu Limited Roaming in wireless networks
US20070291650A1 (en) * 2003-10-03 2007-12-20 Ormazabal Gaston S Methodology for measurements and analysis of protocol conformance, performance and scalability of stateful border gateways
US20080016550A1 (en) * 2006-06-14 2008-01-17 Mcalister Donald K Securing network traffic by distributing policies in a hierarchy over secure tunnels
US20080039085A1 (en) * 2006-03-28 2008-02-14 Nokia Corporation System and method for carrying trusted network provided access network information in session initiation protocol
US20080075097A1 (en) * 2006-09-26 2008-03-27 Fujitsu Limited IP application service providing system
US20080104692A1 (en) * 2006-09-29 2008-05-01 Mcalister Donald Virtual security interface
US20080274739A1 (en) * 2004-07-30 2008-11-06 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Method of Informing a Network of Change of User Equipment Capability
US20090172391A1 (en) * 2004-06-30 2009-07-02 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Communication handover method, communication message processing method, and communication control method
US7809003B2 (en) * 2007-02-16 2010-10-05 Nokia Corporation Method for the routing and control of packet data traffic in a communication system
US7933994B1 (en) * 2006-09-29 2011-04-26 Sprint Communications Company L.P. Extracting embedded NAIS (network access identifiers)

Family Cites Families (19)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20020194378A1 (en) * 2001-04-05 2002-12-19 George Foti System and method of hiding an internet protocol (IP) address of an IP terminal during a multimedia session
US7102996B1 (en) * 2001-05-24 2006-09-05 F5 Networks, Inc. Method and system for scaling network traffic managers
US20030009561A1 (en) * 2001-06-14 2003-01-09 Sollee Patrick N. Providing telephony services to terminals behind a firewall and /or network address translator
US7072332B2 (en) * 2001-09-27 2006-07-04 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Soft switch using distributed firewalls for load sharing voice-over-IP traffic in an IP network
US7274684B2 (en) * 2001-10-10 2007-09-25 Bruce Fitzgerald Young Method and system for implementing and managing a multimedia access network device
US8503437B2 (en) * 2003-03-13 2013-08-06 Verizon Business Global Llc Integrated customer premises equipment device
US7020130B2 (en) * 2003-03-13 2006-03-28 Mci, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing integrated voice and data services over a common interface device
US7561586B2 (en) * 2003-09-19 2009-07-14 Nortel Networks Limited Method and apparatus for providing network VPN services on demand
KR20070026331A (en) * 2003-11-11 2007-03-08 사이트릭스 게이트웨이즈, 아이엔씨. System, apparatus and method for establishing a secured communications link to form a virtual private network at a network protocol layer other than that at which packets are filtered
US7602748B2 (en) * 2004-08-13 2009-10-13 Verizon Business Global Llc Fixed-mobile communications with mid-session mode switching
US7983228B1 (en) * 2005-07-14 2011-07-19 Nextel Communications Inc. Integration of IP multimedia subsystem and a push-to-talk interoperability infrastructure
US7570941B2 (en) * 2005-09-02 2009-08-04 Aricent Inc. Method enabling detection of stolen mobile communication devices and systems thereof
CN101300764B (en) * 2005-09-02 2014-09-10 黑莓有限公司 communication system based on grouping and communication method by multimedia communication protocol in communication system based on grouping
US7694011B2 (en) * 2006-01-17 2010-04-06 Cisco Technology, Inc. Techniques for load balancing over a cluster of subscriber-aware application servers
US8442485B2 (en) * 2006-06-19 2013-05-14 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for measuring and reporting service usage
US8856860B2 (en) * 2006-08-18 2014-10-07 Cisco Technology, Inc. System and method for implementing policy server based application interaction manager
US7830875B2 (en) * 2007-06-13 2010-11-09 Juniper Networks, Inc. Autonegotiation over an interface for which no autonegotiation standard exists
EP2232820B1 (en) * 2007-12-13 2018-04-04 Nokia Technologies Oy Location tagging method for packet based signalling
US8218459B1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2012-07-10 Genbrand US LLC Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks

Patent Citations (29)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6292839B1 (en) * 1998-12-09 2001-09-18 3Com Corporation Method and system for reflexive tunneling
US6484257B1 (en) * 1999-02-27 2002-11-19 Alonzo Ellis System and method for maintaining N number of simultaneous cryptographic sessions using a distributed computing environment
US6941377B1 (en) * 1999-12-31 2005-09-06 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus for secondary use of devices with encryption
US7092398B2 (en) * 2000-06-12 2006-08-15 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. System, method and computer program product for charging for competitive IP-over-wireless service
US20060155871A1 (en) * 2000-10-10 2006-07-13 Westman Ilkka Techniques for hiding network element names and addresses
US20040057442A1 (en) * 2000-12-04 2004-03-25 Ilkka Westman Communication system and method for establishing a connection to a serving network element
US20020080752A1 (en) * 2000-12-22 2002-06-27 Fredrik Johansson Route optimization technique for mobile IP
US20040088419A1 (en) * 2001-03-30 2004-05-06 Ilkka Westman Passing information in a communication system
US20040121760A1 (en) * 2001-04-25 2004-06-24 Illkka Westman Authentication in a communication system
US20040153667A1 (en) * 2002-05-22 2004-08-05 Georg Kastelewicz Method for registering a communication terminal
US20040095944A1 (en) * 2002-11-15 2004-05-20 Julian Mitchell Network address translator and secure transfer device for interfacing networks
US20040162892A1 (en) * 2003-02-18 2004-08-19 Hsu Raymond T. Provisioning server information in a mobile station
US20060233140A1 (en) * 2003-02-28 2006-10-19 Jochen Grimminger Method for transmitting data in a wlan network
US20040260747A1 (en) * 2003-06-19 2004-12-23 Sbc, Inc. Method and apparatus for Voice over Internet Protocol telephony using a virtual private network
US20070291650A1 (en) * 2003-10-03 2007-12-20 Ormazabal Gaston S Methodology for measurements and analysis of protocol conformance, performance and scalability of stateful border gateways
US20050083974A1 (en) * 2003-10-21 2005-04-21 Nokia Corporation Routing information processing for network hiding scheme
US20090172391A1 (en) * 2004-06-30 2009-07-02 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Communication handover method, communication message processing method, and communication control method
US20080274739A1 (en) * 2004-07-30 2008-11-06 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Method of Informing a Network of Change of User Equipment Capability
US20060077965A1 (en) * 2004-10-07 2006-04-13 Nokia Corporation Callback services in a communication system
US20070076728A1 (en) * 2005-10-04 2007-04-05 Remi Rieger Self-monitoring and optimizing network apparatus and methods
US20070186281A1 (en) * 2006-01-06 2007-08-09 Mcalister Donald K Securing network traffic using distributed key generation and dissemination over secure tunnels
US20070209067A1 (en) * 2006-02-21 2007-09-06 Fogel Richard M System and method for providing security for SIP-based communications
US20080039085A1 (en) * 2006-03-28 2008-02-14 Nokia Corporation System and method for carrying trusted network provided access network information in session initiation protocol
US20070232301A1 (en) 2006-03-31 2007-10-04 Fujitsu Limited Roaming in wireless networks
US20080016550A1 (en) * 2006-06-14 2008-01-17 Mcalister Donald K Securing network traffic by distributing policies in a hierarchy over secure tunnels
US20080075097A1 (en) * 2006-09-26 2008-03-27 Fujitsu Limited IP application service providing system
US20080104692A1 (en) * 2006-09-29 2008-05-01 Mcalister Donald Virtual security interface
US7933994B1 (en) * 2006-09-29 2011-04-26 Sprint Communications Company L.P. Extracting embedded NAIS (network access identifiers)
US7809003B2 (en) * 2007-02-16 2010-10-05 Nokia Corporation Method for the routing and control of packet data traffic in a communication system

Non-Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
3rd Generation Partnership Project, 3GPP TS 23.203 V7.4.0 (Sep. 2007), Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Policy and Charging Control Architecture (Release 7), pp. 1-72 (2007).
3rd Generation Partnership Project, 3GPP TS 23.402 V1.4.0 (Oct. 2007), Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Architecture Enhancements for Non-3GPP Accesses (Release 8), pp. 1-125 (2007).
Mpirical Companion, "Topology Hiding Inter-Working Gateway," http://www.mpirical.com/companion/mpirical-companion.html, p. 1 (at least as early as Nov. 17, 2007).
P. Calhoun et al., Network Working Group, Request for Comments 3588, "Diameter Base Protocol," pp. 1-138 (Sep. 2003).

Cited By (24)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20120226814A1 (en) * 2007-12-20 2012-09-06 Brian Stucker Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks
US11044235B2 (en) * 2007-12-20 2021-06-22 Ribbon Communications Operating Company, Inc. Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks
US20120127926A1 (en) * 2009-05-26 2012-05-24 Nicolas Drevon Session transfer between access networks
US10327180B2 (en) * 2009-05-26 2019-06-18 Nicolas Drevon Methods for session transfer between access networks for a user equipment
US20120246254A1 (en) * 2009-12-01 2012-09-27 Zte Corporation Method and Apparatus for User Equipment Accessing in IP Multimedia Subsystem
US9350876B2 (en) * 2010-01-04 2016-05-24 Tekelec, Inc. Methods, systems, and computer readable media for detecting initiation of a service data flow using a Gx rule
US20110167150A1 (en) * 2010-01-04 2011-07-07 Yusun Kim Riley METHODS, SYSTEMS, AND COMPUTER READABLE MEDIA FOR DETECTING INITIATION OF A SERVICE DATA FLOW USING A Gx RULE
US20140372546A1 (en) * 2011-11-02 2014-12-18 Nokia Solutions And Networks Oy Method and apparatus for indicating a type of a network interface
US9509725B2 (en) * 2011-11-02 2016-11-29 Nokia Solutions And Networks Oy Method and apparatus for indicating a type of a network interface
EP2965204A4 (en) * 2013-03-07 2016-10-26 F5 Networks Inc Server to client reverse persistence
CN105519051A (en) * 2013-09-04 2016-04-20 高通股份有限公司 Operator controlled APN routing mapping
WO2015035075A1 (en) * 2013-09-04 2015-03-12 Qualcomm Incorporated Operator controlled apn routing mapping
US20190362061A1 (en) * 2014-06-12 2019-11-28 Maxell, Ltd. Information processing device, application software start-up system, and application software start-up method
US10783228B2 (en) * 2014-06-12 2020-09-22 Maxell, Ltd. Information processing device, application software start-up system, and application software start-up method
US11461446B2 (en) 2014-06-12 2022-10-04 Maxell, Ltd. Information processing device, application software start-up system, and application software start-up method
US20170012824A1 (en) * 2015-07-09 2017-01-12 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for selective diameter topology hiding
US9967148B2 (en) * 2015-07-09 2018-05-08 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for selective diameter topology hiding
US10033736B2 (en) 2016-01-21 2018-07-24 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for remote authentication dial-in user service (radius) topology hiding
US11558737B2 (en) 2021-01-08 2023-01-17 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for preventing subscriber identifier leakage
US11888894B2 (en) 2021-04-21 2024-01-30 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for mitigating network function (NF) update and deregister attacks
US11627467B2 (en) 2021-05-05 2023-04-11 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for generating and using single-use OAuth 2.0 access tokens for securing specific service-based architecture (SBA) interfaces
US11570689B2 (en) 2021-05-07 2023-01-31 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for hiding network function instance identifiers
US11638155B2 (en) 2021-05-07 2023-04-25 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for protecting against mass network function (NF) deregistration attacks
US11695563B2 (en) 2021-05-07 2023-07-04 Oracle International Corporation Methods, systems, and computer readable media for single-use authentication messages

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US20120226814A1 (en) 2012-09-06
US11044235B2 (en) 2021-06-22

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US8218459B1 (en) Topology hiding of a network for an administrative interface between networks
US9967348B2 (en) Methods and apparatus for providing session policy during a registration of a device
KR101503569B1 (en) Creating a globally unique identifier of a subscriber device
US9077661B2 (en) System and method for policy selection and switching function in a network environment
JP5575928B2 (en) Various source message associations
US7899039B2 (en) System and method for providing location and access network information support in a network environment
US20190124125A1 (en) Distributed connectivity policy enforcement with ice
US9059871B2 (en) Policy-based communication system and method
US20080253368A1 (en) Policy control of multiplexed real time protocol and real time control protocol
CN105101176B (en) A kind of binding session methods, devices and systems under roaming scence
US10659278B2 (en) Video interconnect system
EP3656089B1 (en) Methods, systems, and computer readable media for operating a telecommunications network using an on-premises computing system and an off-premises cloud computing system
US10104604B2 (en) S9 roaming session destination selection
CN101040539A (en) Method for controlling terminal user roaming in NGN network system
CN103563412A (en) Method, device and system for processing address information

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, CANADA

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:STUCKER, BRIAN;REEL/FRAME:020315/0708

Effective date: 20071219

AS Assignment

Owner name: GENBAND US LLC, TEXAS

Free format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:GENBAND INC.;REEL/FRAME:024468/0507

Effective date: 20100527

AS Assignment

Owner name: ONE EQUITY PARTNERS III, L.P., AS COLLATERAL AGENT

Free format text: PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:GENBAND US LLC;REEL/FRAME:024555/0809

Effective date: 20100528

AS Assignment

Owner name: GENBAND US LLC, TEXAS

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:024879/0475

Effective date: 20100527

AS Assignment

Owner name: COMERICA BANK, MICHIGAN

Free format text: SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:GENBAND US LLC;REEL/FRAME:025333/0054

Effective date: 20101028

AS Assignment

Owner name: COMERICA BANK (A TEXAS BANKING ASSOCIATION), AS AGENT; ATTN: NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION SERVICES, MICHIGAN

Free format text: AMENDED AND RESTATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:GENBEND US LLC (A DELAWARE LLC);REEL/FRAME:027315/0293

Effective date: 20110729

Owner name: COMERICA BANK (A TEXAS BANKING ASSOCIATION), AS AG

Free format text: AMENDED AND RESTATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:GENBEND US LLC (A DELAWARE LLC);REEL/FRAME:027315/0293

Effective date: 20110729

STCF Information on status: patent grant

Free format text: PATENTED CASE

CC Certificate of correction
AS Assignment

Owner name: GENBAND US LLC, TEXAS

Free format text: RELEASE BY SECURED PARTY;ASSIGNOR:ONE EQUITY PARTNERS III, L.P., AS COLLATERAL AGENT;REEL/FRAME:031968/0955

Effective date: 20121219

FPAY Fee payment

Year of fee payment: 4

AS Assignment

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, CALIFORNIA

Free format text: PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:GENBAND US LLC;REEL/FRAME:039269/0234

Effective date: 20160701

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, CALI

Free format text: PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:GENBAND US LLC;REEL/FRAME:039269/0234

Effective date: 20160701

AS Assignment

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, CALIFORNIA

Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT PATENT NO. 6381239 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 039269 FRAME: 0234. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:GENBAND US LLC;REEL/FRAME:041422/0080

Effective date: 20160701

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, CALI

Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE REMOVE PATENT NO. 6381239 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 039269 FRAME: 0234. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:GENBAND US LLC;REEL/FRAME:041422/0080

Effective date: 20160701

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, CALI

Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT PATENT NO. 6381239 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 039269 FRAME: 0234. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:GENBAND US LLC;REEL/FRAME:041422/0080

Effective date: 20160701

AS Assignment

Owner name: GENBAND US LLC, TEXAS

Free format text: TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT;REEL/FRAME:044986/0303

Effective date: 20171221

AS Assignment

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, CALIFORNIA

Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:GENBAND US LLC;SONUS NETWORKS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:044978/0801

Effective date: 20171229

Owner name: SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, CALI

Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:GENBAND US LLC;SONUS NETWORKS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:044978/0801

Effective date: 20171229

MAFP Maintenance fee payment

Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 8TH YEAR, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1552); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY

Year of fee payment: 8

AS Assignment

Owner name: CITIZENS BANK, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, MASSACHUSETTS

Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING COMPANY, INC.;REEL/FRAME:052076/0905

Effective date: 20200303

AS Assignment

Owner name: RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING COMPANY, INC., MASSACHUSETTS

Free format text: MERGER;ASSIGNOR:GENBAND US LLC;REEL/FRAME:053826/0602

Effective date: 20191220

AS Assignment

Owner name: RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS OPERATING COMPANY, INC. (F/K/A GENBAND US LLC AND SONUS NETWORKS, INC.), MASSACHUSETTS

Free format text: TERMINATION AND RELEASE OF PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT AT R/F 044978/0801;ASSIGNOR:SILICON VALLEY BANK, AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT;REEL/FRAME:058949/0497

Effective date: 20200303

MAFP Maintenance fee payment

Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 12TH YEAR, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1553); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY

Year of fee payment: 12