WO1997013340A1 - Network security device - Google Patents
Network security device Download PDFInfo
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- WO1997013340A1 WO1997013340A1 PCT/US1996/014285 US9614285W WO9713340A1 WO 1997013340 A1 WO1997013340 A1 WO 1997013340A1 US 9614285 W US9614285 W US 9614285W WO 9713340 A1 WO9713340 A1 WO 9713340A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- network
- node
- security device
- packet
- address
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
- H04L63/164—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the network layer
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/40—Network security protocols
Definitions
- the present invention is directed to a network security device that is connected between a protected computer (the client) and a network and a method for utilizing the network security device.
- the network security device negotiates a session key with any other protected client. Then, all communications between the two clients are encrypted.
- the inventive device is self configuring and locks itself to the IP (Internet Protocol) address and MAC address of its client. The client cannot change its IP or MAC address once set. Thus, the inventive network security device does not allow a client to emulate another client by setting a false IP or MAC address.
- FIG. 1 An internet communications network 100 is depicted in FIG. 1 including five transmit or backbone networks A,S,C,D, and E and three stub networks R, Y, and Z.
- a "backbone” network is an intermediary network which conveys communicated data from one network to another network.
- a "stub” network is a terminal or endpoint network from which communicated data may only initially originate or ultimately be received.
- Each network, such as the stub network R includes one or more interconnected subnetworks I, J, L and M.
- subnetwork refers to a collection of one or more nodes, e . g .
- Each subnetwork may be a local area network or LAN.
- Each subnetwork has one or more interconnected nodes which may be host computers ("hosts”) u,v,w,x,y,z or routers a,b, c,d, e, f,g,h, i, j ,k, 1,m,n,o,p,q, r, s .
- a host is an endpoint node from which communicated data my initially originate or ultimately be received.
- a router is a node which serves solely as an intermediary node between two other nodes; the router receives communicated data from one node and retransmits the data to another node.
- the node may include a CPU 11, a memory 12 and one or more I/O ports (or network interfaces) 13-1, 13-2, . , 13-N connected to a bus 14.
- each I/O port 13-1, 13- 2, . . ., 13-N is connected by wires, optical fibers, and/or switches to the I/O port of another node.
- 13-N are for transmitting communicated data in the form of a bitstream organized into one or more packets to another node and for receiving a packet from another node If the host 10 is a host computer attached to subnetwork which is an Ethernet, then the host will have one I/O port which is an Ethernet interface
- a host which initially generates a packet for transmission to another node is called the source node and a host which ultimately receives the packet is called a destination node Communication is achieved by transferring packets via a sequence of nodes including the source node, zero or more intermediary nodes, and the destination node, m a bucket brigade fashion
- a packet may be communicated from the node w to the node c, to the node d, to the node b, and to the node x
- An exemplary packet 40 is shown m FIG 3A having a payload 41 which contains communicated data (i.e., user data) and a header 42 which contains control and/or address information
- the header information is arranged in layers including an IP layer and a physical layer.
- the IP layer typically includes an IP source address, an IP destination address, a checksum, and a hop count which indicates a number of hops in a multihop network
- a physical layer header includes a MAC address (hardware address) of the source and a MAC address of the destination.
- the user data may include a TCP (Transfer Control Protocol) packet including TCP headers or a UDP (User Data Protocol) packet including UDP headers. These protocols control among other tnings, the packetizing of information to be transmitted, the reassembly of received packets into the originally transmitted information, and the scheduling of transmission and reception of packets (see e.g., D. Commer, "Internetworking With TCP/IP", Vol. 1 (1991) ; D. Commer and D. Stevens, “Internetworking With TCP/IP", Vol. 2 (1991) ) .
- each node of the internet 100 is assigned an internet (IP) address which is unique over the entire internet 100 such as the internet address for the node y shown in FIG. 3B. See, Information Sciences Institute, RFC 791 "Internet Protocol", September, 1981.
- IP internet
- the IP addresses are assigned in a hierarchical fashion; the internet (IP) address of each node contains an address portion 31 indicating the network of the node, an address portion 32 indicating a particular subnetwork of the node, and a host portion 33 which identifies a particular host or router and discriminates between the individual nodes within a particular subnetwork.
- the IP addresses of the source and destination nodes are placed in the packet header 42 by the source node.
- a node which receives a packet can identify the source and destination nodes by examining these addresses.
- Eavesdropping in a network can be thwarted through the u ⁇ e of a message encryption technique.
- a message encryption technique employs an encipherment function which utilizes a number referred to as a session key to encipher data (i.e., message content) . Only the pair of hosts in communication with each other have knowledge of the session key, so that only the proper hosts, as paired on a particular conversation, can encrypt and decrypt digital signals.
- encipherment functions Two examples are the National Bureau of Standards Data Encryption Standard (DES) (see e.g., National Bureau of Standards, “Data Encryption Standard", FIPS-PUB-45, 1977) and the more recent Fast Encipherment Algorithm (FEAL) (see e.g., Shimizu and S. Miyaguchi, "FEAL-Fast Data Encipherment Algorithm, " Systems and Computers in Japan, Vol. 19, No. 7, 1988 and S. Miyaguchi, "The FEAL Cipher Family", Proceedings of CRYPTO '90, Santa Barbara, Calif., Aug., 1990) .
- IDEA Industry Data Encryption Standard
- encipherment function is the electronic codebook technique.
- Session key agreement between two communications hosts may be achieved using public key cryptography. (See e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 5,222,140, 5,299,263) .
- CDH Composite Diffie-Hellman
- Output g xy mod N.
- each user i has a public key P. (e.g., a modulus N) and a secret key S ⁇ (e.g., the factors p and q) .
- a message to user i is encrypted using a public operation which makes use of the public key known to everybody (e.g., squaring a number mod N) .
- this mes ⁇ age i ⁇ decrypted u ⁇ ing a secret operation e.g. , square root mod N which makes use of the secret key (e.g., the factors p and q) .
- a secret operation e.g. , square root mod N
- firewalls such as Janus and ANS
- software products such as encrypted mail, secured http, one time password, etc.
- the firewall is a dedicated computer, usually running a Unix operating system. It acts as a filter for incoming and outgoing communications.
- the firewall is placed as a router between the local area network (LAN) and the outside world. The decision whether to pa ⁇ a packet is made based on the source and/or destination IP address, and the TCP port number. Some firewall ⁇ also have the ability to encrypt data, providing that both sides of the communication employ the same brand of firewall. Some firewalls have a personal authentication feature.
- the ⁇ e product ⁇ are ba ⁇ ed on the premi ⁇ e that they are 100% ⁇ ecured. Once the product i ⁇ compromised, it becomes totally ineffective. Sometimes, careless use by the one user may jeopardize all other users of the product.
- Firewalls are more effective in maintaining network security. However they are very expensive. Their price range is between $10,000 and $50,000, plus the price of the hardware. They require a high level of expertise to in ⁇ tall and maintain. The mo ⁇ t ⁇ ophisticated and effective firewalls require a specially trained technician or engineer for their maintenance. The ⁇ pecial training cost is up to $10,000 per person, and the salary adds $60,000 to $120,000 or more per annum to the cost .
- Firewalls have to be constantly maintained, modified, and monitored in order to yield reasonable security. They only cover the TCP part of the Internet Protocol and not the UDP part. Thus, they do not provide security to NFS (Network File
- the firewall i ⁇ a full service computer which can be logged into for maintenance and monitoring. Thus, it can be broken into. Once a firewall i ⁇ compromised it loses its effectiveness and becomes a liability rather than a security aid. Firewalls only protect the connection between a LAN and a WAN (Wide Area Network) . It does not protect against intrusion into a particular host from within the LAN. In view of the foregoing, it is an object of the present invention to provide a network security device which overcomes the shortcoming ⁇ of the prior art network ⁇ ecurity device ⁇ .
- the network security device of the present invention comprise ⁇ a first network interface connected to a protected client, a second network interface connected to a portion of a network, and a proces ⁇ ing circuit connected to both interface ⁇ .
- the portion of the network to which the protected client is connected is an Ethernet and the first and second network interfaces are Ethernet interfaces.
- the proce ⁇ ing circuit connected in between the two interface ⁇ may be a conventional CPU ⁇ uch a ⁇ an Intel 486 DX2-66 or a Pentium.
- the proce ⁇ ing circuit may be implemented as one or more ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits) or a combination of ASICs and a CPU.
- a communication from the protected client goes from the client, to the first interface, to the processing circuit, to the second interface and into the network.
- a communication received from the network goes from the second interface, to the processing circuit, to the first interface and to the protected client.
- the network security device is a ⁇ ealed device and it cannot be logged into. It ha ⁇ the same IP address as the protected client.
- the network security device learns the MAC and/or IP address of its client and locks itself to these addres ⁇ e ⁇ . To lock, the MAC and/or IP addre ⁇ is ⁇ tored in a permanent memory of the network ⁇ ecurity device. A packet arriving from the client will not be passed into the network if the packet has a MAC and/or IP addre ⁇ different from that which is stored m memory Thus, the protected client is unable to change its MAC and/or IP addre ⁇ .
- the proces ⁇ ing circuit substitutes a MAC address of the network security device for the MAC address of the protected client. Then the packet is pas ⁇ ed to the second interface and into the network. The same translation is performed m reverse for packets arriving at the network security device from the network side. Packets received from the protected client are encrypted using an encipherment function such as IDEA, FEAL or DES before being transmitted via the network to a destination Similarly encrypted packets received from a destination are decrypted. Such encryption and decryption requires a common se ⁇ sion key to be possessed jointly by the protected client and the destination (the destination being a protected client of another network security device located someplace else in the network) .
- the common se ⁇ sion key is obtained using a public key cryptography technique.
- a static database contains information about secured hosts or nodes in the network.
- a secured host or node is a host or node that is protected by a network security device.
- Each entry in the static database contains information about a particular secured host, i.e., the host IP address, time entered in the database, and the host's permanent public key.
- a dynamic data base contains information about secured and unsecured host ⁇ .
- Each entry in the dynamic databa ⁇ e includes a host' ⁇ IP address, a flag indicating whether or not the host is secured, a flag indicating whether the host is in tran ⁇ ition (i.e., in the middle of a key exchange) , and a pointer to a common secret session key.
- the protocol used by the network security device of host i to agree on a common se ⁇ sion key with a network ⁇ ecurity device of host j is as follows. Consider a communication from host i to host j . The communication arrives at the network security device of host i from host i. The network security device checks if host j i ⁇ in the dynamic database. If host j is in the dynamic database, it is determined if the dynamic database has a common session key for communication between host i and host j . If there is such a common session key, the communication from host i is encrypted using the common ses ⁇ ion key and tran ⁇ mitted to host j . If there i ⁇ no common ses ⁇ ion key, then host i sends the dynamic part of its public key P.
- the inventive network security device has a number of significant advantages. Like a firewall, the inventive network security device is a hardware/software combination in a preferred implementation. However, it is a ⁇ ealed "box" and cannot be logged into. Hence, it cannot be compromised the way a firewall can. It i ⁇ much cheaper than a firewall. Thu ⁇ , each node in the LAN can be equipped with it. This way, it provides protection inside the LAN a ⁇ well as outside. The network security device works directly at the IP level. It therefore, covers all types of IP protocols and requires no special configuration to different network application ⁇ . Thu ⁇ , the inventive network security device i ⁇ maintenance free.
- the inventive network security device senses the IP address of the client host and locks itself to it. It requires no installation. Once locked, it does not allow the client host to change its IP address.
- the inventive network security device al ⁇ o maintains a permanent database of secured host ⁇ . If a reque ⁇ t for key arbitration arrives that conflicts with the database, that host is denied communication.
- the combination of the above two features creates a double authentication of the IP address.
- the inventive security device creates a physical barrier between the client and the network. Thu ⁇ , preventing attempt ⁇ to bypass by direct Ethernet communications.
- the inventive security device encrypts all communication to the network, including the exchange of dynamic public keys.
- FIG 1 schematically illustrate ⁇ an internet network.
- FIG 2 ⁇ chematically illustrates the architecture of a host in the network of FIG 1.
- FIGs 3A and 3B illu ⁇ trate the format of a packet tran ⁇ mitted in the network of FIG 1.
- FIG 4 illu ⁇ trates a network security device for use with a host in the network of FIG 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG 5 illustrate ⁇ an entry in a static database maintained by the network security device of FIG 4.
- FIG 6 illustrate ⁇ an entry in a dynamic database maintained by the network security device of FIG 4.
- FIG 7 is a flow chart which illustrate ⁇ a key exchange algorithm utilized by the network security device of FIG 4.
- FIG 8 is a flow chart of an ARP handling algorithm utilized by the network security device of FIG 4.
- FIG 9 is a flow chart of an IP packet handling algorithm utilized by the network security device of FIG 4.
- FIG 4 schematically illustrates a network security device in accordance with an illustrative embodiment of the invention.
- the security device 10 comprises a first interface 0 which is connected to the client host 12. Specifically, the interface 0 i ⁇ connected to a network interface in the client ho ⁇ t 12 (e.g., an interface 13 of Fig. 2) via a cable or wire 13.
- the security device 10 comprise ⁇ a second interface 1 which is connected to a portion of a network 100.
- the interface 1 is connected to an Ethernet so that the interfaces 0,1 are Ethernet interfaces such as SMC Elite Ultra Interfaces.
- a CPU 14 is connected to the interfaces 0,1.
- the CPU is for example an Intel 486 DX 62-66.
- a static memory 16 e.g. fla ⁇ h EEPROM
- i ⁇ connected to the CPU 14 and a dynamic memory
- An optional encryption module 20 perform ⁇ encryption and large number arithmetic operations.
- the encryption unit may be implemented as a programmable logic array. Alternatively, the encryption module may be omitted and its function may be carried out using a software program which is executed by the CPU 14.
- the interface 0 is put in a promiscuous mode. In this mode, the interface 0 pas ⁇ es all communications from the client host 12 that is sensed on the cable 13 to the CPU 14.
- the network connection is via the interface 1 which is set to the same IP addres ⁇ a ⁇ the client 12.
- the network security device 10 responds to the Address Resolution Protocol by ⁇ ending its own
- the CPU 14 maintains two databases.
- One database is a static database stored in the Flash ROM 16.
- This database contains permanent information about secured nodes in the network, i.e., the node IP address, time entered into the database, the nodes permanent public key.
- the structure of an illustrative record for a node in this database i ⁇ ⁇ hown in FIG 5.
- a second database is a dynamic database.
- the dynamic database contain ⁇ information about secured and unsecured node ⁇ , i.e., the node IP address, time last updated, a flag indicating whether the node is secured (e.g., has its own network security device) , a flag indicating whether the node is in tran ⁇ ition (i.e., in the middle of a key exchange) , a pointer to a common secret key with that node.
- the structure of an illustrative record for a node in this database is shown in FIG 6.
- the transition flag ha ⁇ three po ⁇ ible values, 0- not in transition, 1-pending reply from remote host, and 2- pending computation of common key.
- the software executed by the CPU 14 has three components: (1) operating system, (2) networking sy ⁇ tem, (3) key computation algorithms.
- the operating system and the networking sy ⁇ tem are both part of a Unix like kennel .
- the key computation algorithm re ⁇ ide in memory and are signalled into action by the networking system
- the operating sy ⁇ tem is a lobotomized Linux ⁇ ystem with all drives taken out except the RAM, disk and Ethernet interfaces
- the networking system is for communication, key exchange, encryption, configuration, etc .
- the key exchange algorithm is illustrated in Fig 7.
- the dynamic data base DDB
- the dynamic data base is checked to determine if there is an entry for node A m the dynamic data base (step 61) . If there is an entry for node A in the dynamic data base, a check is made to see if a common se ⁇ ion key for node A and the protected client has expired (step 62) .
- IDEA encipherment function
- the host client i.e., the source
- sends lt ⁇ dynamic public key and IP addre ⁇ s to the node with IP A (the destination)
- step 65 and waits five seconds for a reply (step 66) .
- the ⁇ teps 65 and 66 are repeated three times. If no reply is received (step 68) from the destination, the source network security device marks the transition off (step 67) in the DDB entry for the destination. If a reply is received the transition flag for the destination in the DDB of the network security device of the ho ⁇ t i ⁇ ⁇ et to 2 ( ⁇ tep 69) .
- a common session key for the source and destination is calculated by the network security device of the source (step 70) using for example a Diffie- Hellman technique as described above.
- the common se ⁇ sion key is then entered into the DDB of the source network security device (step 71) and the transition flag for this DDB entry is marked 0 (step 72) .
- the steps 84 and 85 may be repeated several, e.g., three times.
- the network security device is a sealed box which cannot be logged into.
- the network security device 10 senses the IP (and/or MAC) address of the client host 12 and locks itself to it. Once the network security device is locked to the addres ⁇ , the client i ⁇ presented by the network ⁇ ecurity device from changing its IP (and/or MAC) address.
- the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is the protocol which is used to resolve an IP address into a matching Ethernet machine (MAC) address which is the actual addres ⁇ to which the network interface re ⁇ pond ⁇ .
- the inventive network security device uses ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) to configure itself and hide the client host .
- ARP Address Resolution Protocol
- the reque ⁇ t may arrive from the ho ⁇ t at interface 0 or form the network at interface 1 (step 100) .
- the network ⁇ ecurity device determines if it is configured (step 102) . If the network security device is not configured, it configures itself ( ⁇ tep 103) . Configuration involve ⁇ ⁇ toring in a permanent memory, the IP address and/or the MAC address of the host. After configuration, the CPU in the network security device replaces the MAC addre ⁇ of the source with the MAC addres ⁇ of interface 1 ( ⁇ tep 104) and sends the request to interface 1 (step 105) .
- the request is then tran ⁇ mitted to it ⁇ destination via the network.
- the host's network security device is already configured (step 102) , it is determined if the reque ⁇ t i ⁇ a reply ( ⁇ tep 106) . Thi ⁇ is done by checking the destination MAC field. In a reply this field is not zero. If the reque ⁇ t is not a reply, MAC addres ⁇ tran ⁇ lation take ⁇ place according to ⁇ tep 104 and the reque ⁇ t i ⁇ ⁇ ent to interface 1 ( ⁇ tep 105) for transmission into the network. If the request i ⁇ a reply, it i ⁇ determined if the ⁇ ource IP address in the request matches the IP address now permanently stored in memory (step 107) .
- the system is shut down (step 109) . It the request arrives via the network at interface 1, the request is pas ⁇ ed to interface 0 ( ⁇ tep 111) . If the request is a reply (step 112) , pa ⁇ s the request to the interface 0 (step 113) . If the request is not a reply, the request i ⁇ an ⁇ wered u ⁇ ing the MAC addre ⁇ s of interface 1 (step 114) .
- Fig. 9 illustrates a packet handling algorithm utilized by the inventive network security device.
- the packet may arrive from the ho ⁇ t at interface 0 from the network at interface 1.
- Fir ⁇ t consider the case where the packet arrives from the host at interface 0. If the packet carries an ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) or IGMP (Internet Gateway Mes ⁇ age Protocol) identification (step 201) , the packet is pas ⁇ ed to the interface 1 without encryption. However, the ⁇ ource MAC addre ⁇ s in the packet i ⁇ tran ⁇ lated to the MAC address of interface 1 (step 202) . ICMP and IGMP Packets are not addressed to a destination host. Rather these packets are utilized by intermediate entities in the network, e.g., routers, for various functions.
- ICMP and IGMP Packets are not addressed to a destination host. Rather these packets are utilized by intermediate entities in the network, e.g., routers, for various functions.
- the packet is dropped ( ⁇ tep 203, 204) .
- the device may be in a secured/unsecured mode (special order) . In such case the packet will be ⁇ ent unchanged.
- step 205 it i ⁇ determined if the packet contains a part of a message that has been fragmented. If the packet contains a fragment, the fragment ⁇ are collected (step 206) and the message is encrypted (step 207) . The encryption takes place using the common session key and an encipherment function. If the encrypted message is too long for the particular LAN ( ⁇ tep 208) , it i ⁇ fragmented ( ⁇ tep 209) . An encrypted packet i ⁇ then tran ⁇ mitted to interface 1 for transmission into the network (step 210) . An encrypted packet carries a signature in the protocol IS part of the IP header. This indicates that the packet is encrypted. The IP address of a packet i ⁇ not encrypted, otherwise the packet could not be routed through the network.
- the packet arrives via the network at interface 1 is now considered. If the packet is an ICMP or IGMP packet (step 220) no decryption is neces ⁇ ary and the packet is sent to interface 0 (step 221) . If the packet is a key exchange packet (step 222) the packet is processed according to the key exchange protocol (step 223) . If the packet is not encrypted (step 224) the packet is dropped (step 225) . The device may be in a secured/unsecured mode (special order) . In such cse the packet will be sent to the client unchanged.
- the packet is encrypted but the network security device doe ⁇ not have the key ( ⁇ tep 226) , the key exchange protocol i ⁇ carried out ( ⁇ tep 227) and the packet is dropped (step 228) . If the key i ⁇ available in the dynamic data ba ⁇ e of the network ⁇ ecurity device, the packet i ⁇ decyrpted ( ⁇ tep 229) and ⁇ ent to interface 0 (step 230) .
- the MAC addre ⁇ s of the network security device is translated into the MAC addres ⁇ of the client .
- the MAC addre ⁇ of the client is translated into the MAC addres ⁇ of the network security device.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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CA002211301A CA2211301C (en) | 1995-09-18 | 1996-09-06 | Network security device |
EP96932962A EP0872074A1 (en) | 1995-09-18 | 1996-09-06 | Network security device |
AU71548/96A AU725712B2 (en) | 1995-09-18 | 1996-09-06 | Network security device |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US08/529,497 | 1995-09-18 | ||
US08/529,497 US5757924A (en) | 1995-09-18 | 1995-09-18 | Network security device which performs MAC address translation without affecting the IP address |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO1997013340A1 true WO1997013340A1 (en) | 1997-04-10 |
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ID=24110154
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/US1996/014285 WO1997013340A1 (en) | 1995-09-18 | 1996-09-06 | Network security device |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
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US (2) | US5757924A (en) |
EP (1) | EP0872074A1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN1173256A (en) |
AU (1) | AU725712B2 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2211301C (en) |
IL (1) | IL121416A (en) |
SG (2) | SG96185A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO1997013340A1 (en) |
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GB2317792A (en) * | 1996-09-18 | 1998-04-01 | Secure Computing Corp | Virtual Private Network for encrypted firewall |
GB2318031A (en) * | 1996-09-13 | 1998-04-08 | Secure Computing Corp | Network firewall with proxy |
US5867647A (en) * | 1996-02-09 | 1999-02-02 | Secure Computing Corporation | System and method for securing compiled program code |
US5913024A (en) * | 1996-02-09 | 1999-06-15 | Secure Computing Corporation | Secure server utilizing separate protocol stacks |
US5915087A (en) * | 1996-12-12 | 1999-06-22 | Secure Computing Corporation | Transparent security proxy for unreliable message exchange protocols |
US5918018A (en) * | 1996-02-09 | 1999-06-29 | Secure Computing Corporation | System and method for achieving network separation |
US5950195A (en) * | 1996-09-18 | 1999-09-07 | Secure Computing Corporation | Generalized security policy management system and method |
US5968133A (en) * | 1997-01-10 | 1999-10-19 | Secure Computing Corporation | Enhanced security network time synchronization device and method |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1173256A (en) | 1998-02-11 |
US6151679A (en) | 2000-11-21 |
SG96185A1 (en) | 2003-05-23 |
AU7154896A (en) | 1997-04-28 |
IL121416A0 (en) | 1999-10-28 |
US5757924A (en) | 1998-05-26 |
SG92687A1 (en) | 2002-11-19 |
EP0872074A1 (en) | 1998-10-21 |
CA2211301A1 (en) | 1997-04-10 |
CA2211301C (en) | 2006-01-24 |
IL121416A (en) | 2001-09-13 |
AU725712B2 (en) | 2000-10-19 |
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