WO2014168406A1

WO2014168406A1 - Apparatus and method for diagnosing attack which bypasses memory protection mechanisms

Info

Publication number: WO2014168406A1
Application number: PCT/KR2014/003052
Authority: WO
Inventors: 임차성; 이주석
Original assignee: 주식회사 안랩
Priority date: 2013-04-09
Filing date: 2014-04-08
Publication date: 2014-10-16
Also published as: KR101311367B1

Abstract

Disclosed is an apparatus for diagnosing an attack which bypasses memory protection techniques, the apparatus comprising: a function detection unit for detecting whether a specific program function, which can alter the attribute information of a memory area, is called; an attribute inspection unit for inspecting whether the attribute information at the corresponding location of the memory area corresponds to an execution attribute when the called specific program function is detected by the function detection unit; an attribute changing unit for changing the attribute information such that an access violation occurs at the corresponding location of the memory area when the execution attribution is identified by the attribute inspection unit; an event detection unit for detecting whether the access violation occurs in the memory area; and a malicious determination unit for determining whether a shell code, which causes the access violation, is malicious when the access violation is detected by the event detection unit.

Description

Memory protection function bypass attack diagnosis device and method

The present invention relates to an apparatus and method for diagnosing a memory protection method bypass attack for determining whether a malicious code is targeted to a shell code that causes an attack that bypasses a memory protection function, that is, an attack that bypasses a memory protection method.

In recent years, the spread of malicious software or malicious code has been diversified with the widespread spread of Internet and wireless communication devices, and the damage caused by this has been increasing every year. Malware is software that is intentionally designed to perform malicious activities, such as destroying the system or leaking information, contrary to the user's intentions and interests. Such malicious code types include hacking tools such as viruses, worms, trojans, backdoors, logic bombs, and trap doors, and malicious spywares. spyware and ad-ware. Through self-replicating or automatic propagation function, malicious code can leak personal information such as user ID and password, control target system, delete / change file, destroy system, denial of application / system, leak of key data, It is causing problems such as installing other hacking programs, and the damage is very diverse and serious.

In order to solve this problem, a malicious code treatment system (vaccine program) for detecting and treating malware has been developed. Most of the malware detection systems (vaccine programs) known to date use file-based diagnostics. This is due to the fact that most malicious codes are executed in the form of files that can be executed on a specific system. For example, in order for malicious code to run on a Windows system, the malicious code usually has a format of an executable file (PE). File extensions with PE format include exe, cpl, ocx, dll, vxd, sys, scr, and drv. In order to diagnose malware in the form of an executable file (PE), the malware treatment system also needs to have a signature of a specific type that can recognize the file type and determine it as malicious code. These diagnostics are the same as the signature-based or string-testing methods used by most malware treatment systems. This signature-based diagnostic method targets specific or unique parts of a file classified as malicious code, enabling accurate diagnosis that minimizes false positives and false negatives. The advantage is that fast scanning can be achieved by comparing only the characteristic parts of the files. However, the signature-based diagnostic method cannot detect a new file that has been changed by only a few files since the malicious code does not diagnose even if the file itself changes only a few hundred bytes. In addition, since it can only respond to known malicious code, it cannot cope with new and unknown malicious code.

On the other hand, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack, which is an issue recently, utilizes various types of malware continuously by applying advanced attack techniques to target specific targets and extract targeted information. In particular, APT attacks are often undetectable in the early stages of intrusion, often using non-portable Executable (Non-PE) files containing malicious code. Not only does a program that runs a non-executable file (such as a document or image program) have some security vulnerabilities by default, but if you include malicious code in a non-executable file, you can easily create variant malware as the file changes. Because it can. Here, the term "non-executable file" refers to a file that is not executed by itself as opposed to an executable file or an executable file. For example, the non-executable file may be a Korean file, a document file such as a word file, an image file such as a JPG file, a video file, a Java script file, an HTML file, or the like.

Such a conventional countermeasure against malicious code using a non-executable file includes a region in which a malicious shellcode is located in memory that is moved by an exploit during execution of a non-executable file in a malware detection engine. It checks whether it is set to determine whether it is malicious code and block it.

However, recent malicious files have been found to bypass malicious behavior detection using Return Oriented Programming (ROP) technology. Such malicious behavior detection bypass attacks have a characteristic of making malicious behavior after making the memory area like a normal memory area, and the function of making a normal memory uses malicious ROP chain inside the normal module. Diagnostic techniques have been unable to detect these malicious behaviors.

An embodiment of the present invention provides an apparatus and method for diagnosing a memory protection method bypass attack for determining whether a malicious code is targeted to a shell code that causes an attack that bypasses the memory protection method such as an ROP attack.

As a first aspect of the present invention, a method for diagnosing a memory protection technique bypass attack includes: a function detector for detecting whether a specific program function capable of modulating attribute information of a memory area is called; and the specific program function by the function detector. A property checker that checks whether the property information is an execution property with respect to a corresponding position of the memory area when a call is detected; and if an execution property is confirmed by the property checker, an access violation occurs at the corresponding location of the memory area. An attribute change unit for changing attribute information, an event detector for detecting whether the access violation occurs in the memory area, and a shellcode for generating the access violation if the access violation is detected by the event detector; It may include a malicious determination unit for determining whether or not malicious.

The memory map generation unit may further include a memory map generation unit configured to generate a memory map in which address information of a location where the property information is changed by the property change unit is stored, wherein the malicious determination unit includes the address information of the location where the access violation has occurred. In the case of the address information stored in the map, it can be determined whether the malicious information.

The malicious determination unit may determine whether malicious by comparing an entropy value of the memory area with a preset reference value.

The malicious determination unit may set a target memory area for calculating the entropy value by using a start address and a size of the memory area allocated by the specific program function.

The malicious determination unit may calculate an entropy value for codes except for “0” among codes recorded in the memory area when the entropy value is calculated.

The apparatus may further include a pattern storage unit in which pattern information is stored, and the malicious determination unit may determine whether malicious by comparing the shellcode with the pattern information.

The attribute changing unit may restore the attribute information to a state before the change so that the access violation does not occur after the shell determining unit determines that the shellcode is not malicious.

When the call of the specific program function is detected, the apparatus further includes an infection checker that checks whether the register is infected. The malicious determination unit may determine that the shellcode is malicious when the infection checker detects the infection of the register. .

The infection checker may compare the stored value of the register with the shellcode to check for infection.

The infection inspecting unit may identify an infection based on a matching ratio between at least one or more stored values of the general registers constituting the register and the shellcode.

In accordance with a second aspect of the present invention, a method for diagnosing a memory protection method bypass attack may include detecting whether a specific program function capable of modulating attribute information of a memory area is called, and when a call of the specific program function is detected, the memory area. Checking whether the attribute information is an execution attribute with respect to the corresponding position of, changing the attribute information so that an access violation occurs at a corresponding position of the memory area when the attribute information is identified as an execution attribute, and the memory The method may include detecting whether an access violation occurs in an area, and determining whether the malicious code is targeted to the shellcode that caused the access violation when the access violation is detected.

The method may further include generating a memory map in which address information of a location where the attribute information is changed is stored, and determining whether the malicious information comprises address information of a location where the access violation occurs is address information stored in the memory map. In this case, it can be determined whether the malicious.

In the determining of whether malicious, the entropy value of the memory area and the predetermined reference value may be compared to determine whether malicious.

The determining of the malicious status may include setting a target memory area for calculating the entropy value by using a start address and a size of the memory area allocated by the specific program function.

In the determining of the malicious status, when calculating the entropy value, the entropy value may be calculated for codes except for “0” among codes recorded in the memory area.

In the determining of whether malicious, the shell code and the previously stored pattern information may be compared to determine whether malicious.

In the changing of the attribute information, if it is determined that the shellcode is not malicious, the attribute information may be restored to a state before the change so that the access violation does not occur thereafter.

The method may further include checking whether a register is infected when a call of the specific program function is detected, and determining whether the register is malicious may determine the shellcode as malicious when the infection of the register is confirmed.

The checking of the infection may include detecting the infection by comparing the stored value of the register with the shellcode.

In the detecting of the infection, the infection may be confirmed based on a matching ratio between at least one or more stored values of the general registers constituting the register and the shellcode.

According to a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method of detecting whether a specific program function capable of modulating property information of a memory area is called, and when a call of the specific program function is detected, the property of a corresponding location of the memory area is detected. Checking whether the information is an execution attribute, if the attribute information is identified as an execution attribute, changing the attribute information so that an access violation occurs at a corresponding location in the memory area, and the access violation occurs in the memory area Detecting whether the access violation is detected, and determining whether the malicious code is targeted to the shellcode that caused the access violation, and performing each step according to the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis method. A computer readable recording medium having recorded thereon a program is provided. .

According to an embodiment of the present invention, it is possible to determine whether or not malicious, that is, memory protection bypass attack, by targeting a shell code that causes an attack that bypasses a memory protection technique such as a ROP attack. Accordingly, it is possible to alert the malicious determination result so that an operator can recognize it, or perform a countermeasure such as deleting a shell code that causes an access violation.

1 is a block diagram of a memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus according to a first embodiment of the present invention.

2 is a flowchart illustrating a memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis method according to a first embodiment of the present invention.

3 is a block diagram of a memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus according to a second embodiment of the present invention.

4 is a flowchart illustrating a memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis method according to a second embodiment of the present invention.

Advantages and features of the present invention and methods for achieving them will be apparent with reference to the embodiments described below in detail with the accompanying drawings. However, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments disclosed below, but can be implemented in various different forms, and only the embodiments make the disclosure of the present invention complete, and the general knowledge in the art to which the present invention belongs. It is provided to fully inform the person having the scope of the invention, which is defined only by the scope of the claims. Like reference numerals refer to like elements throughout.

In describing the embodiments of the present invention, if it is determined that a detailed description of a known function or configuration may unnecessarily obscure the gist of the present invention, the detailed description thereof will be omitted. In addition, terms to be described below are terms defined in consideration of functions in the embodiments of the present invention, which may vary according to intentions or customs of users and operators. Therefore, the definition should be made based on the contents throughout the specification.

1 is a block diagram illustrating a memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus according to a first embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis method according to a first embodiment of the present invention. 3 is a block diagram of a memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus according to a second embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis method according to a second embodiment of the present invention. to be. Hereinafter, a first embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2, and then a second embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. 3 and 4.

As shown in FIG. 1, the memory protection technique bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 according to the first embodiment of the present invention includes a function detection unit 110, an infection inspection unit 120, an attribute inspection unit 130, and an attribute change unit ( 140, a memory map generator 150, an event detector 160, a malicious determiner 170, and the like.

The function detector 110 detects whether a specific program function that can modulate the attribute information of the memory area is called. For example, the function detector 110 may detect whether a virtual memory related application programming interface (API) is called through the kernel mode entry library file.

The infection checker 120 checks whether a register is infected when a call of a specific program function is detected by the function detector 110. Here, the infection checker 120 compares the stored value of the register with the shellcode calling a specific program function and checks for infection. For example, the infection inspecting unit 120 may identify an infection based on a matching ratio between at least one stored value and a shell code among the general registers constituting the register. The infection checker 120 may be included in order to quickly diagnose an attack state if the register is already infected, but may be excluded.

The attribute checker 130 detects that the register is not infected by the infection detector 120 after the call of the specific program function is detected by the function detector 110 or the call of the specific program function is detected. Check whether the attribute information is the execution attribute for the location.

The attribute changing unit 140 changes the attribute information so that an access violation occurs at a corresponding position in the memory area when the execution attribute is confirmed by the attribute inspecting unit 130. For example, the attribute inspecting unit 130 may not recognize the attribute information by deleting it, changing it to a non-executable attribute, or by modulating the stored attribute information. In addition, when the property determining unit 140 determines that the shellcode is not malicious by the malicious determining unit 170, the property changing unit 140 may restore the property information to the state before the change so that an access violation does not occur thereafter.

The memory map generator 150 generates a memory map in which address information of a location where attribute information is changed by the attribute change unit 140 is stored. This memory map is then used to determine if there is a need to determine whether the shellcode is executing at the location of the access violation.

The event detector 160 detects whether an access violation occurs in the memory area.

The malicious determination unit 170 determines that the shellcode is malicious when the infection checker 120 confirms that the register is infected. Alternatively, when the access violation is detected by the event detector 160, the malicious code is determined by targeting the shell code that caused the access violation. In this case, the malicious determination unit 170 may selectively determine whether the address information of the location where the access violation has occurred is address information stored in the memory map generated by the memory map generation unit 150. To determine whether this is malicious, the malicious determination unit 170 may compare the entropy value of the memory area with a preset reference value and determine whether the malicious is malicious according to the comparison result. For example, when calculating an entropy value, a target memory area for calculating an entropy value may be set using a start address and a size of a memory area allocated by a specific program function, except for "0" among codes recorded in the memory area. You can calculate entropy values for your code.

In the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis method by the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 according to the first embodiment of the present invention, as shown in FIG. 2, a specific program function capable of modulating attribute information of a memory area is provided. Detecting whether it is called (S201), and when a call of a specific program function is detected, checking whether the register is infected (S203), and when a call of the specific program function is detected or subsequently determined that the register is not infected (S205 and S207) checking whether the attribute information is the execution attribute for the corresponding position in the memory area, and if the attribute information is confirmed as the execution attribute, changing the attribute information so that an access violation occurs at the corresponding position in the memory region ( S209 and S211, generating a memory map storing address information of the location where the attribute information is changed (S213), and Detecting whether an access violation occurs (S215), and determining whether the malicious code is targeted to the shellcode that caused the access violation when the address information of the location that caused the access violation is the address information stored in the memory map. (S217 to S223), and if the infection of the register is confirmed, or if it is determined that the malicious range by comparing the entropy value of the memory area and the predetermined reference value (S225) and diagnoses the attack state (S225), and determines that the shell code is not malicious If so, a step (S227) of restoring the attribute information to the state before the change is performed so that an access violation does not occur.

Hereinafter, a process of diagnosing the memory protection method bypass attack by the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 according to the first embodiment of the present invention will be described in more detail with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2.

First, when a diagnosis of an attack bypassing a memory protection technique is started, such as a return oriented programming (ROP) attack, the function detection unit 110 of the memory protection technique bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 may modify attribute information of a memory region. Detect if a particular program function can be called. For example, the function detector 110 may detect whether a virtual memory related API is called through the kernel mode entry library file. For example, the function detector 110 may detect whether VirtualAlloc, HeapCreate, etc. are called in the virtual memory related API (S201).

Subsequently, when a call of a specific program function is detected by the function detection unit 110, the infection inspection unit 120 checks whether an infection is performed by targeting a register of a central processing unit (CPU) (S203). ). Here, the infection checker 120 compares the stored value of the register with the shellcode calling a specific program function and checks for infection. For example, the infection inspecting unit 120 may identify an infection based on a matching ratio between at least one stored value and a shell code among the general registers constituting the register. Among general purpose registers, the attack is when the stored code of Extended Accumulator Register (EAX), Extended Counter Register (ECX), Extended Data Register (EDX), Extended Base Register (EBX), Extended Stack Pointer (ESP) and shell code match. The condition can be diagnosed (S205 and S225).

Next, the attribute inspecting unit 130 checks whether the attribute information is an execution attribute for a corresponding position of the memory area. When the infection detection unit 120 is excluded from the memory protection technique bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100, the property inspection unit 130 inspects the property information immediately after the call of a specific program function is detected by the function detection unit 110. . However, when the infection detection unit 120 is included in the memory protection technique bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100, after the call of a specific program function is detected, the infection inspection unit 120 determines that the register is not infected, It is checked whether the attribute information is an execution attribute for the position (S207).

Subsequently, when the property inspecting unit 130 confirms that the location of the memory area is the execution property, the property changing unit 140 changes the property information so that an access violation occurs at the location. For example, the attribute inspecting unit 130 may delete the attribute information, change it to a non-executable attribute, or modulate the stored attribute information so as not to recognize the attribute information (S209 and S211).

In addition, the memory map generator 150 generates a memory map in which address information of a location where attribute information is changed by the attribute change unit 140 is stored (S213). This memory map is then used to determine if there is a need to determine whether the shellcode is executing at the location of the access violation.

At this time, the event detector 160 detects whether an access violation occurs in the memory area (S215).

Here, when the access violation is detected by the event detector 160, the malicious determination unit 170 determines whether the address information of the location that caused the access violation is address information stored in the memory map generated by the memory map generator 150. Check (S217 and S219). This is because, even if an access violation occurs, it is not necessary to diagnose whether there is a bypass attack if it occurs in a position where the attribute information is not intentionally changed in step S211.

Subsequently, if it is determined in step S219 that the address information of the location where the access violation has occurred is address information previously stored in the memory map, the malicious determination unit 170 calculates an entropy value of the memory area to determine whether malicious. For example, when calculating an entropy value, a target memory area for calculating an entropy value may be set using a start address and a size of a memory area allocated by a specific program function, except for "0" among codes recorded in the memory area. An entropy value can be calculated for the code (S221).

The malicious determination unit 170 compares the entropy value calculated in step S221 with a preset reference value and determines the current shellcode as malicious when the calculated entropy value is determined to be a malicious range (S223). . That is, it is determined that the shellcode is involved in a ROP attack or the like bypassing the memory protection technique (S225). In this case, the malicious determination unit 170 may alert the result of the malicious determination so that an operator can recognize it or perform a response such as deleting a shell code that causes an access violation.

On the other hand, if it is determined that the shell code is not malicious, the malicious determination unit 170 restores the attribute information to the state before the change so that an access violation does not occur thereafter. For example, if the attribute information is changed from the execution attribute to the non-execution attribute in step S211, the execution attribute can be restored to the execution attribute in its original state (S227).

Second Embodiment

As shown in FIG. 3, the memory protection technique bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 ′ according to the second embodiment of the present invention includes a function detector 110, an infection checker 120, a property checker 130, and a property changer. 140, the memory map generation unit 150, the event detection unit 160, the malicious determination unit 170, the pattern storage unit 180, and the like.

Compared with the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 ′ according to the second embodiment of the present invention, the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 according to the first embodiment of the present invention shown in FIG. It can be seen that the storage unit 180 is included.

The pattern storage unit 180 stores pattern information for determining whether a shell code for calling a specific program function capable of tampering with attribute information of a memory area corresponds to malicious shell code involved in a memory protection technique bypass attack. Such pattern information may be obtained and stored through a pre-collecting process or updated by learning after malicious determination.

In the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 ′ including the pattern storage unit 180, the malicious determination unit 170 may use the shell code and the pattern storage unit 180 to call a specific program function. By comparison, it is determined whether or not malicious based on the match.

The memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis method by the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 ′ according to the second embodiment of the present invention is illustrated in FIG. 4. Here, the same reference numerals are given for the same processing procedure when comparing FIG. 2 and FIG. 4.

As described above, the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis method according to the second embodiment includes detecting whether a specific program function that can modulate the attribute information of the memory area is called (S201), and a call of the specific program function is performed. If it is detected, checking whether the register is infected (S203), and if it is determined that a call of a specific program function is detected or the register is not infected thereafter, checking whether the attribute information is an execution attribute for a corresponding position in the memory area. (S205 and S207), when the attribute information is confirmed as the execution attribute, changing the attribute information so that an access violation occurs at a corresponding position in the memory area (S209 and S211), and the memory in which the address information of the position where the attribute information is changed is stored. Generating a map (S213), detecting whether an access violation occurs in a memory area (S215), and accessing If the address information of the location that caused the violation is the address information stored in the memory map, determining whether the malicious code is targeted to the shellcode that caused the access violation (S217, S219, S321, S323), and the infection of the register If it is confirmed or compared to the shellcode and the pre-stored pattern information is determined to be a malicious pattern according to the matching step (S325), and if the shellcode is determined to be not malicious to prevent any subsequent access violations Restoring the attribute information to the state before the change (S327).

Memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis method by the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 ′ according to the second embodiment of the present invention and memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 according to the first embodiment The following is a closer look at the differences from the technique bypass attack diagnosis method.

In operation S219, when the malicious determination unit 170 of the memory protection technique bypass attack diagnosis apparatus 100 ′ determines that the address information of the location where the access violation has occurred is address information previously stored in the memory map, the shell determines whether the shell is malicious. Identify the code patterns that your code has.

Then, the malicious determination unit 170 reads the pattern information previously stored in the pattern storage unit 180 and compares it with the pattern of the shell code identified in step S321, even if the patterns are not identical or completely identical to each other according to the comparison result. If the pattern matching ratio is high, the malicious pattern is determined, and the current shellcode is determined to be malicious. That is, it is determined that the shellcode is involved in a ROP attack or the like bypassing the memory protection technique (S325). In this case, the malicious determination unit 170 may alert the result of the malicious determination so that an operator can recognize it or perform a response such as deleting a shell code that causes an access violation.

On the other hand, if it is determined that the shell code is not malicious, the malicious determination unit 170 restores the attribute information to the state before the change so that an access violation does not occur thereafter. For example, if the attribute information is changed from the execution attribute to the non-execution attribute in step S211, the execution attribute may be restored to the execution attribute in its original state (S327).

Combinations of each block of the block diagrams and respective steps of the flowcharts attached to the present invention may be performed by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be mounted on a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing equipment such that instructions executed through the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing equipment may not be included in each block or flowchart of the block diagram. It will create means for performing the functions described in each step. These computer program instructions may be stored in a computer usable or computer readable memory that can be directed to a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to implement functionality in a particular manner, and thus the computer usable or computer readable memory. It is also possible for the instructions stored in to produce an article of manufacture containing instruction means for performing the functions described in each block or flowchart of each step of the block diagram. Computer program instructions may also be mounted on a computer or other programmable data processing equipment, such that a series of operating steps may be performed on the computer or other programmable data processing equipment to create a computer-implemented process to create a computer or other programmable data. Instructions that perform processing equipment may also provide steps for performing the functions described in each block of the block diagram and in each step of the flowchart.

In addition, each block or step may represent a portion of a module, segment or code that includes one or more executable instructions for executing a specified logical function (s). It should also be noted that in some alternative embodiments, the functions noted in the blocks or steps may occur out of order. For example, the two blocks or steps shown in succession may in fact be executed substantially concurrently or the blocks or steps may sometimes be performed in the reverse order, depending on the functionality involved.

The above description is merely illustrative of the technical idea of the present invention, and those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains may make various modifications and changes without departing from the essential characteristics of the present invention. Therefore, the embodiments disclosed in the present invention are not intended to limit the technical idea of the present invention but to describe the present invention, and the scope of the technical idea of the present invention is not limited by these embodiments. The scope of protection of the present invention should be interpreted by the following claims, and all technical ideas falling within the scope of the present invention should be construed as being included in the scope of the present invention.

Claims

A function detector for detecting whether a specific program function that can modulate the attribute information of the memory area is called;

An attribute inspecting unit checking whether the attribute information is an execution attribute with respect to a corresponding position of the memory area when a call of the specific program function is detected by the function detecting unit;

An attribute change unit which changes the attribute information so that an access violation occurs at a corresponding position in the memory area when the execution attribute is confirmed by the attribute check unit;

An event detector for detecting whether the access violation occurs in the memory area;

And a malicious determination unit configured to determine whether or not the malicious code is targeted to the shellcode that caused the access violation when the access violation is detected by the event detection unit.
The method of claim 1,

And a memory map generator for generating a memory map storing address information of a location where the attribute information is changed by the attribute changing unit.

The malicious determination unit, the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus for determining whether the malicious when the address information of the location that caused the access violation is the address information stored in the memory map.
The method of claim 1,

The malicious determination unit, the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus for determining whether the malicious by comparing the entropy value of the memory area with a predetermined reference value.
The method of claim 3, wherein

And the malicious determining unit sets a target memory area for calculating the entropy value by using a start address and a size of the memory area allocated by the specific program function.
The method of claim 3, wherein

The malicious determination unit, when calculating the entropy value, the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis apparatus for calculating an entropy value for the code except for "0" of the code recorded in the memory area.
The method of claim 1,

Further comprising a pattern storage unit for storing the pattern information,

The malicious determination unit, the memory protection method bypass attack diagnosis device for determining whether the malicious by comparing the shell code and the pattern information.
The method of claim 1,

And the attribute changing unit restores the attribute information to the state before the change so that the access code does not occur after the shell determining unit determines that the shellcode is not malicious.
The method of claim 1,

When the call of the specific program function is detected further comprises an infection check unit for checking whether the register is infected,

And the malicious determination unit determines the shellcode as malicious when the infection checker confirms that the register is infected.
The method of claim 8,

The infection detection unit, the memory protection method bypass attack diagnostic apparatus for comparing the stored value of the register and the shell code to check whether the infection.
The method of claim 9,

And the infection detecting unit checks an infection based on a matching ratio between at least one stored value and the shell code among general registers constituting the register.
Detecting whether a specific program function that can modulate the attribute information of the memory area is called;

Checking whether the attribute information is an execution attribute for a corresponding position of the memory area when a call of the specific program function is detected;

Changing the attribute information so that an access violation occurs at a corresponding position in the memory area when the attribute information is identified as an execution attribute;

Detecting whether the access violation occurs in the memory area;

If the access violation is detected, the method for diagnosing a memory protection technique bypass attack comprising determining a malicious target of the shell code that caused the access violation.
The method of claim 11,

Generating a memory map in which address information of a location where the attribute information is changed is stored;

And determining whether the malicious information is malicious when the address information of the location where the access violation has occurred is address information stored in the memory map.
The method of claim 11,

The determining of the malicious step may include comparing the entropy value of the memory area with a preset reference value and determining whether the malicious item is malicious.
The method of claim 13,

The determining of the malicious status may include setting a target memory area for calculating the entropy value by using a start address and a size of the memory area allocated by the specific program function.
The method of claim 13,

The determining of the malicious step may include calculating an entropy value for codes other than “0” among codes recorded in the memory area, when calculating the entropy value.
The method of claim 11,

The determining of the malicious step may include comparing the shellcode with pre-stored pattern information and determining whether the malicious code is malicious.
The method of claim 11,

In the changing of the attribute information, if it is determined that the shellcode is not malicious, the memory protection technique bypass attack diagnosis method of restoring the attribute information to a state before the change so that the access violation does not occur thereafter.
The method of claim 11,

If the call of the specific program function is detected, further comprising: checking whether the register is infected;

The determining of the malicious step may include determining that the shellcode is malicious when an infection of the register is confirmed.
The method of claim 18,

The detecting of the infection may include comparing the stored value of the register with the shell code to detect the infection.
The method of claim 19,

The method of claim 1, wherein the detecting of the infection comprises: detecting an infection based on a matching ratio between at least one or more stored values of the general registers constituting the register and the shellcode.
Detecting whether a specific program function that can modulate the attribute information of the memory area is called;

Checking whether the attribute information is an execution attribute for a corresponding position of the memory area when a call of the specific program function is detected;

Changing the attribute information so that an access violation occurs at a corresponding position in the memory area when the attribute information is identified as an execution attribute;

Detecting whether the access violation occurs in the memory area;

When the access violation is detected, a program including a command for performing each step according to the memory protection technique bypass attack diagnosis method including determining whether the malicious code is targeted to the shellcode that caused the access violation is recorded. Computer-readable recording medium.