WO2009086432A1 - Système et procédé de détection de la falsification d'un compteur d'énergie - Google Patents

Système et procédé de détection de la falsification d'un compteur d'énergie Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009086432A1
WO2009086432A1 PCT/US2008/088253 US2008088253W WO2009086432A1 WO 2009086432 A1 WO2009086432 A1 WO 2009086432A1 US 2008088253 W US2008088253 W US 2008088253W WO 2009086432 A1 WO2009086432 A1 WO 2009086432A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
utility
meter
circuit
detection circuit
tamper
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2008/088253
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Michael A. Murphy
Original Assignee
Elster Electricity, Llc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Elster Electricity, Llc. filed Critical Elster Electricity, Llc.
Priority to EP08866536A priority Critical patent/EP2232454A4/fr
Priority to CA2710919A priority patent/CA2710919C/fr
Priority to NZ586050A priority patent/NZ586050A/xx
Priority to AU2008345078A priority patent/AU2008345078B2/en
Publication of WO2009086432A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009086432A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
    • G01R11/00—Electromechanical arrangements for measuring time integral of electric power or current, e.g. of consumption
    • G01R11/02—Constructional details
    • G01R11/25—Arrangements for indicating or signalling faults
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01D—MEASURING NOT SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR A SPECIFIC VARIABLE; ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEASURING TWO OR MORE VARIABLES NOT COVERED IN A SINGLE OTHER SUBCLASS; TARIFF METERING APPARATUS; MEASURING OR TESTING NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G01D4/00—Tariff metering apparatus
    • G01D4/02—Details

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to power systems, and more particularly to a method and apparatus for detecting possible tampering with a utility meter.
  • Utility companies use utility meters to regulate and monitor utility usage.
  • Some exemplary utility meters include electrical power meters (also referred to in the industry as watt-hour meters), water meters, gas meters and the like.
  • electrical power meters also referred to in the industry as watt-hour meters
  • water meters water meters
  • gas meters gas meters
  • Early utility meters were mechanical in nature converting the flow of the particular utility resource through the utility meter into mechanical movement. The mechanical movement was used to turn a recording device which recorded the amount of resources being used.
  • the design of the utility meter incorporated new innovations such as increased processing capability within the utility meter, elimination of mechanical parts, better accuracy and the like.
  • the tampering consumer may be an individual who desires to alter the monitoring capabilities of the utility meter. By altering the monitoring capabilities of the utility meter, the tampering consumer may receive some or all of the utility resources at a significantly discounted rate. This presents a problem not only with the theft of the utility resource but also with the potential safety hazard that may be caused by the tampering consumer. The potential safety hazard may in turn affect other utility consumers connected to the power grid.
  • Previous utility meters may have had some means of detecting tampering with the utility meter.
  • a sensor may have been configured in previous utility meters to monitor the cover of the utility meter.
  • an alarm condition may have been generated by circuitry within the utility meter.
  • the alarm condition may then be reported in various ways to the utility company. Depending on the number of alarms, the frequency of the alarms and the like, the utility company may take any remedial action it deemed necessary in order to confirm and remedy the tampered condition.
  • Another example of previous ways to detect tampering with a utility meter was to employ a movable and conductive metal ball contained within a metal housing.
  • the metal ball was positioned to move from a resting position to an alarm position if the utility meter was physically moved. If the utility meter moved in a certain direction, the ball would roll from the resting position to an alarm position which may be on the opposite side of the metal housing.
  • the metal housing became conductive and the utility meter then detected the conductive change. After the utility meter detected the conductive change, the utility meter raised an alarm condition alerting the utility company of the potential tampered condition.
  • the previous method of detecting tampering using a mechanically moving conductive ball may not detect to certain types of movement of the utility meter.
  • the utility meter may be moved in such a way as not to activate the mechanically moving conductive ball tampering detection circuitry.
  • this type of detection circuitry may be costly to deploy within the utility meter.
  • this type of detection circuitry may not be mounted using surface mount technology and may have to be hand soldered within the utility meter.
  • the present invention utilizes the piezoelectric properties of a ceramic capacitor to detect movement of the meter. Circuitry associated with the present invention located within the utility meter monitors and detects when the ceramic capacitor experiences any mechanical strain, and provides a way for the utility meter to signal the utility company of possible meter tampering.
  • a tamper alarm circuit for detecting a tampered condition of a utility meter has a transducer coupled to an amplification circuit which is coupled to a detection circuit, the detection circuit generating an alarm condition when the detection circuit determines that a voltage signal generated by the transducer and amplified by the amplification circuit has reached a predetermined threshold.
  • a utility meter having a utility resource monitoring circuit, the utility resource monitoring circuit monitoring the amount of resources used by a consumer.
  • the utility resource monitoring circuit communicates with a tamper alarm circuit, the tamper alarm circuit having a transducer coupled to an amplification circuit which is coupled to a detection circuit.
  • the detection circuit generating an alarm condition when the detection circuit determines that a voltage signal generated by the transducer and amplified by the amplification circuit has reached a predetermined threshold.
  • a method for detecting a tamper condition in a utility meter is disclosed.
  • the method provides a transducer which is coupled to an amplification circuit which is coupled to a detection circuit.
  • the method determines that a voltage signal generated by the transducer and amplified by the amplification circuit has reached a predetermined threshold.
  • the method further generates an alarm condition when the detection circuit determines that the amplified voltage signal has reached the predetermined threshold.
  • Figure 1 shows a high level logic hardware block diagram of a utility metering device using one embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 2 shows a high level logic hardware block diagram of a power metering device using one embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 3 displays a tampering detection circuit in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 4 shows an alternate tampering detection circuit in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 5 displays a flow chart describing the processing of an electrical power meter using the detection circuitry of Figure 3 or Figure 4 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 6 displays a flow chart describing the processing of a water or gas utility meter using the detection circuitry of Figure 3 or Figure 4 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 1 displays a high level view of a utility metering device 100 utilizing one embodiment of the present invention.
  • the utility metering device 100 is designed to receive a utility resource at a source side 160 of the utility metering device 100.
  • the utility resource may be electrical power provided from the utility power grid, typically from a transformer near the consumer site.
  • the utility resource received is monitored by a utility resource monitor 120.
  • the utility resource monitor circuit 120 monitors the flow of utility resources through the utility metering device 100 to the consumer.
  • the utility metering device 100 may have a processor
  • the utility resource information may be communicated to the utility company via a communications module 105 which is coupled to the processor 110.
  • the communications module 105 may utilize two way radio communications to relay the utility usage information, hi another embodiment, the communications module 105 may utilize wireless communications to communicate within the utility monitoring network. In yet another alternative embodiment, the communications module 105 may use cellular radio communications to communicate with the utility company.
  • a tamper alarm circuit 115 Also coupled to the processor 110 is a tamper alarm circuit 115.
  • the tamper alarm circuit 115 may monitor the conditions at the utility meter 100 and when it detects a possible tampering condition, it notifies the processor 110 by raising a tampering condition alarm. After the processor 110 receives the possible tampering condition alarm from the tamper alarm circuit 115, the processor 110 may in turn notify the utility company. After the tampering alarm condition is raised, the processor 110 may continue to receive information from the tamper alarm circuit 115 to determine if the tampering condition alarm is a one time event or is a continuous event.
  • Figure 2 displays an electrical watt-hour meter 200 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
  • the watt-hour meter 200 is designed to monitor a source line voltage at LI 1N and L2 m at its source side 160.
  • the source voltage present at the source side 160 of the watt-hour meter 200 is typically one of the common electric utility service voltages and generally a maximum of 480 VAC.
  • the watt-hour meter 200 routes the electrical energy from the source side 160 to the consumer side contacts Ll out and L2 0ut of the watt-hour meter 200.
  • Also connected to the source side 160 of the watt- hour meter 200 is a power failure detection circuit 230 and a display 135.
  • the display 135 provides a visual display of the amount of energy used at the customer location.
  • the power failure detection circuit 230 monitors the voltage present at the source side voltage contacts LI 1N and L2 m . In the event of a power failure, the power failure detection circuit 230 communicates this condition to the processor 110.
  • the watt-hour meter 200 has a power metering circuit 220 which measures the amount of energy being used by the consumer.
  • the watt-hour meter 200 has a communications module 105 which allows the utility company to communicate with and gather information from the watt-hour meter 200.
  • the communications module 105 may utilize cellular telephone technology to communicate with the utility company service center or craftsperson.
  • the craftsperson may use portable computer with a cellular telephone to connect with the meter to retrieve status or other useful information from the watt-hour meter 200.
  • the communications module 105 may support other types of wireless communications
  • the watt-hour metering device 100 may be connected to a cable modem which in turn may be attached to the consumer's cable line.
  • the utility company may connect to the watt-hour meter 200 using TCP/IP or other networking protocols.
  • the watt-hour meter 200 has a tamper alarm circuit 215 which is coupled to the processor 110.
  • the tamper alarm circuit 215 monitors the conditions at the watt-hour meter 200 and determines if a tamper condition exists. If a tamper condition exists, the tamper alarm circuit 215 may send a tampering alarm to the processor 110 which in turn may assess the conditions at the watt-hour meter 200 to determine if the possible tampering condition warrants notification of the utility company. In one embodiment of the present invention, the tamper alarm circuit 215 may determine that a tampering alarm should be raised and reported to the utility company when physical movement of the watt-hour meter 200 is detected just prior to a power failure.
  • One such tampering condition may occur when the watt-hour meter 200 is removed from service by physically pulling the watt-hour meter 200 away from the source side contacts LIj n and L2; n and the consumer side contacts Ll out and L2 0ut .
  • the watt-hour meter 200 may be removed by an unauthorized person in order to access the internal components in an attempt to either bypass the monitoring sensors or disable them.
  • the tamper alarm circuit 215 may detect this tampering condition and generate the tampering condition alarm to the processor 110.
  • the processor 110 in turn may receive the tampering condition alarm and report the tampering to the utility company via the communication module 105.
  • FIG. 3 displays a more detailed view of an exemplary tamper alarm circuit 215 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
  • the tamper alarm circuit 215 is composed of an amplification stage 320 and a comparator stage 325.
  • the amplification stage amplifies a voltage generated by a transducer which in this embodiment is ceramic capacitor C t r a n- Those skilled in the art appreciate that the transducer may include but not be limited to any piezoelectric device that converts mechanical movement into energy.
  • the transducer voltage may be generated by vibrations experienced by the transducer (capacitor C t r a n)-
  • the comparator stage 325 then monitors the output of the amplification stage 320 and determines when the voltage from the amplification stage 320 reaches a predetermined threshold.
  • an inverting amplifier Ul Within the amplification stage 320 is an inverting amplifier Ul .
  • the negative terminal of the amplifier Ul is connected to R 5 which is in turn connected to the capacitor C tra n-
  • the other side of the capacitor C t r a n is connected to ground.
  • the gain of the amplifier Ul with respect to the piezoelectric voltage V tT3n developed by the capacitor Ctran is determined by the resistance OfR 6 and the reactance of C tra n (also referred to as Xtran in the formula below) as given by:
  • the circuit gain correspondingly increases with frequency.
  • a maximum is achieved at the frequency where the value of the gain expression and the amplifiers open loop gain are equal. At higher frequencies the circuit gain decreases with the amplifier's open loop characteristics.
  • the value for R 6 is 1.0 M ⁇ and C tra n is 22OnF. With these values, and a typical low cost operational amplifier gain-bandwidth product of 100,000, the maximum gain is approximately 1000 at about 85 Hz. Therefore, a 1 mVAC voltage signal generated by the capacitor C tran will result in about a 1.0 VAC output signal at 85 Hz from the output of the amplifier Ul
  • resistors R 1 , R 2 and R 3 which form a voltage divider that provides a DC bias to the voltage generated by the capacitor C tran as well as provides a threshold voltage used by the comparator stage 325. More specifically the total voltage drop across resistors R2 and R3 is used to determine the threshold of the comparator U2 within the comparator stage 325 and the voltage drop across resistor R3 provides the DC bias for the amplifier Ul . Adding the DC bias for amplifier Ul improves the transducer gain of the capacitor C tran - In one embodiment, resistors R 1 , R 2 and R 3 may be 232 k ⁇ , 20 k ⁇ , and 200 k ⁇ respectively.
  • the bias applied to the input side of the amplified Ul is about 2.2 VDC.
  • the amplified signal generated from the capacitor C tran will be an AC component on top of the 2.0 VDC bias.
  • the sum of the voltage drops across resistors R 2 and R 3 is about 2.4 VDC and is used for the threshold to determine if the voltage signal produced by the amplifier U 1 is at or above a predetermined threshold.
  • the predetermined threshold may correspond to a tampering alarm condition.
  • capacitors C 1 and C 2 provide filtering for noise components, while resistors R 4 and R 5 provide a buffer to limit the amount of current that may flow through the amplifier Ul .
  • the capacitors C 1 and C 2 may be 100 nF capacitors and resistors R 4 and R 5 may be 4.7 k ⁇ resistors.
  • Capacitor C t r a n may use barium titanate as a principal dielectric constituent.
  • the capacitor C tra n may range from 0.2 ⁇ F up to 1.0 ⁇ F and may have dielectric characteristics of Y5V or Z5U.
  • capacitors with dielectric characteristics similar to those previously mentioned typically exhibit the most prominent piezoelectric characteristics within the family of ceramic capacitors and are among the least expensive types.
  • the piezoelectric properties (also may be referred to as micro-phonic properties) of capacitor C tran allow the capacitor C t ⁇ m to function as a transducer converting mechanical strain into electrical signals.
  • Embodiments of the present invention take advantage of the piezoelectric capabilities of ceramic capacitors having barium titanate as a principal dielectric constituent.
  • capacitors using a different dielectric constituent other than barium titanate may exhibit similar piezoelectric properties and may therefore function as a suitable transducer.
  • any vibration imparting strain to the capacitor C tran may result in an AC signal being generated by the capacitor C t r a n-
  • the generated signal is directed into the input of the amplifier U 1 .
  • the generated signal is amplified as previously described and the output of the amplifier U 1 is directed to the positive input of comparator U 2 .
  • Comparator U 2 receives the amplified signal (the output of Ul) and compares the amplified signal to a predetermined voltage threshold present at the negative input. When the amplified voltage exceeds the predetermined threshold, the output of the comparator U2 is driven high and reaches the supply voltage V 8 . As displayed in Figure 3, the output of the comparator U2 may be directed to latching logic 315.
  • the latching logic 315 maybe a single flip-flop designed to clock in a logic "1" when the output of the comparator U2 is driven high. In this embodiment, the flip-flop is reset after being read by the processor 110. In an alternative embodiment, the latching logic 315 may be a series of flip-flops or possibly a counter that records the number of times the comparator U 2 output is driven high. The processor 110 may read the flip-flops or counter in order to determine how many times the predetermined threshold was met or exceeded over a certain period of time. In this embodiment, the flip-flops or counter may also be reset after the processor 110 has read them.
  • FIG. 4 displays another exemplary tamper alarm circuit 215' in accordance with an alternative embodiment of the present invention.
  • the tamper alarm circuit 215' has an amplification stage 420 connected to an analog to digital (AfD) converter 450. The output of the A/D converter is then sent to the processor 110.
  • AfD analog to digital
  • amplifier UlO amplifies the voltage signal generated by the capacitive transducer Qr a n-
  • the gain associated with the amplification of the generated AC signal with respect to the piezoelectric voltage V tra n developed by C tra n is determined by the resistor R 14 , the reactance of C tran and the open loop characteristics of amplifier UlO, similar to amplifier Ul in Figure 3.
  • the resistor R 14 may be a 1M ⁇ resistor. Similar to the voltage divider of Figure 3, the voltage divider consisting of resistors R 10 and R 11 provide a DC bias for the output of the amplifier UlO. In one embodiment, the values for resistors R 10 and R 11 may both be 233k ⁇ . Capacitor C 4 provides noise filtering while resistors R 12 and R 13 limit the amount of current that may flow through the amplifier UlO when the voltage supply V 8 is removed and capacitor C 4 discharges. In yet other alternative embodiments, the A/D converter 450 as well as amplification stage 420 may be performed by circuitry already contained within the processor 110.
  • Figure 5 displays a process flow 500 outlining steps the processor 110 may take in order to determine if a tamper alarm condition has occurred in the watt-hour meter 200 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
  • the process flow 500 begins at start block and proceeds to block 504.
  • the processor 110 monitors the conditions at the watt-hour meter 200 .
  • the processor 110 may utilize the power failure detection circuit 230 to monitor the power conditions at the source side 160 of the watt-hour meter 200 .
  • the process flow 500 continues on from block 504 to decision block 506.
  • the processor 110 determines if a power failure has occurred. If a power failure has not occurred, the process flow 500 continues back to block 504. If at decision block 506 a power failure has occurred, the process flow 500 continues on to decision block 507.
  • the processor 110 may receive a power failure indication from the power failure detection circuit 230. Even though a power failure may have occurred, the processor 110 may continue to operate if it receives power from an alternate power supply such as a battery, large discharging capacitor or the like. In this embodiment, the processor 110 may continue to operate and process the conditions at the watt-hour meter 200.
  • the processor 110 determines if the tamper alarm circuit
  • the tamper alarm circuit 215 has detected a tamper alarm condition. As discussed previously, the tamper alarm circuit 215 may generate a tamper alarm condition due to vibrations sensed by the capacitive transducer C tran - If at decision block 507 the processor 110 has determined that a tamper alarm condition exists, the process flow 500 proceeds to decision block 508. If no tamper alarm condition is detected, the process flow continues on to block 512. The tamper alarm circuit 215 may generate the tamper alarm condition if the conditions previously mentioned occurred either prior to or shortly after the power failure. This is described in further detail in the discussions of block 508.
  • the processor 110 determines if the tamper condition alarm has been generated within a predetermined period of time either preceding or following a power failure indication.
  • the tamper condition alarm may be the latched output of the latching logic 315 as shown in Figure 3. In an alternate embodiment the tamper condition alarm may be the digital output of the A/D converter 450 as shown in Figure 4. If the tamper condition alarm is within the predetermined period of time, the processor 110 proceeds on to block 510. If the transducer signal is not within the predetermined period of time, the process flow continues on to block 512. At block 512, the processor 110 continues with shutting the watt-hour meter 200 down as per a predetermined power failure process. After the processor 110 finishes processing the normal power failure at block 512, the process flow 500 ends at block 514.
  • the processor 110 may take the appropriate steps of notifying the utility company of the possible tampering condition as shown at block 510.
  • the processor 110 may communicate this information directly to the utility company via the communication module 105 ( Figure 2). This communication may be performed over cellular communications, two way radio communications or the like.
  • the processor 110 may activate a colored LED on the watt-hour meter 200. For example, the processor 110 may illuminate a red LED on the faceplate of the watt-hour meter 200 allowing the utility craftsperson an easy way of identifying any meter that may have been tampered with.
  • the processor 110 may continue to illuminate the colored LED until the utility company instructs the processor 110 to reset its tamper condition alarm, hi an alternative embodiment, an alert icon and a code number may be displayed on the LCD display of the watt-hour meter 200. In yet another alternate embodiment, the processor 110 may activate an auditory response such as an audible alarm.
  • the tamper condition alarm may be reset several different ways.
  • the processor 110 may require the crafts person to physically depress a particular switch on the watt-hour meter 200.
  • the processor may keep the tampering condition active until instructed via commands sent by the utility company to reset the condition.
  • the processor 110 may reset itself after another predetermined amount of time.
  • FIG. 6 displays a process flow 600 in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention.
  • the process flow 600 may apply to other types of utility meters such as water meters or gas meters which may utilize a tamper alarm circuit 215 as shown in Figure 3.
  • the first step in the process flow 600 begins at block 602.
  • the process flow 600 proceeds to block 604.
  • the processor 110 may monitor the utility usage.
  • the processor 110 typically monitors the conditions for any type of abnormality. Any condition that the utility company deems to be uncommon or unexpected may be considered abnormal for purposes of this example. From block 604, the process flow 600 continues to decision block 606.
  • the processor 110 may make the determination that an abnormal condition has occurred. If an abnormal condition has occurred, the process flow 600 continues to block 608. At block 608, the processor 110 may enable the tamper alarm circuit 215. hi one exemplary embodiment, the utility meter 100 may not have a constant and almost unlimited power source as is available in a power meter. In order to conserve power, the tamper alarm circuit 215 may only be turned on when an abnormal condition has been detected. Turning the tamper alarm circuit 215 on only when needed, the processor 110 may conserve operating power.
  • the process flow 600 proceeds from block 608 to decision block 610.
  • the processor 110 makes the determination if the tamper alarm circuit 215 has detected a tamper condition alarm. If a tamper condition alarm has been detected, the processor 110 notifies the utility company of the tamper condition alarm at block 612 and the process flow 600 ends at block 614. If the tamper alarm circuit 115 has not detected any tampering, the process flow 600 returns to block 604, and the processor 110 continues to monitor the utility usage.
  • the processor 110 may communicate the possible tampering condition directly to the utility company via the communication module 105 ( Figure 1). This may be done over cellular communications, two way radio communications or the like.
  • the processor 110 may activate a colored LED on the utility meter 100.
  • the processor 110 may illuminate a red LED on the faceplate of the utility meter 100 allowing the utility craftsperson an easy way of identifying any meter that may have been tampered with.
  • an alert icon and a code number may be displayed on the LCD display of the watt-hour meter 200.
  • the processor 110 may activate an auditory response such as an alarm.
  • the tamper alarm circuit 215 or 215' may be installed in a gas meter or a water meter that may have enough power to allow the tamper alarm circuit 215 or 215' to receive continuous power.
  • the tamper alarm circuit 215 or 215' may be used to determine the abnormal condition as described at block 606 of Figure 6. Receiving power continuously allows the processor to use the tamper alarm circuit 215 or 215' to continuously monitor the conditions at the utility meter for tampering.
  • the utility company may perform one of several different responses. For example, if a large truck should pass near a water meter, the tamper alarm circuit 215 may determine a possible tampering condition has occurred due to the vibrations induced by the truck. In this instance, the utility company may continue to monitor the particular utility meter 100 to see if the meter is still operating normally. If the utility meter is still operating normally, the utility company may simply reset the tamper condition alarm at the water meter.
  • the utility company may continue monitoring the meters in question to determine if there has been an event that does not correspond to tampering such as a thunderstorm, hail storm, sonic boom or other type of event not corresponding to a possible tampering condition.
  • the tamper alarm circuit 215 may be designed to be more or less sensitive to vibrations by adjusting the gain of the amplifier Ul ( Figure 3). Thus, if a water meter is always installed underground it may be more susceptible to vibrations from sources other than tampering and the gain may be reduced. Reducing the gain makes the tampering detection circuit 300 less sensitive to vibrations.
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • FPGA field programmable gate array
  • a general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine.
  • a processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing components, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.

Abstract

Cette invention se rapporte à un circuit d'alarme de falsification destiné à détecter un état de falsification d'un compteur d'énergie. Le circuit d'alarme de falsification est doté d'un transducteur couplé à un circuit d'amplification qui est couplé à un circuit de détection, le circuit de détection générant une condition d'alarme, lorsque le circuit de détection détermine qu'un signal de tension, généré par le transducteur et amplifié par le circuit d'amplification, a atteint un seuil prédéterminé.
PCT/US2008/088253 2007-12-26 2008-12-23 Système et procédé de détection de la falsification d'un compteur d'énergie WO2009086432A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08866536A EP2232454A4 (fr) 2007-12-26 2008-12-23 Système et procédé de détection de la falsification d'un compteur d'énergie
CA2710919A CA2710919C (fr) 2007-12-26 2008-12-23 Systeme et procede de detection de la falsification d'un compteur d'energie
NZ586050A NZ586050A (en) 2007-12-26 2008-12-23 An apparatus for detecting movement of a utility meter and generating an alarm
AU2008345078A AU2008345078B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2008-12-23 A system and method for detecting tampering of a utility meter

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US909607P 2007-12-26 2007-12-26
US61/009,096 2007-12-26

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2009086432A1 true WO2009086432A1 (fr) 2009-07-09

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PCT/US2008/088253 WO2009086432A1 (fr) 2007-12-26 2008-12-23 Système et procédé de détection de la falsification d'un compteur d'énergie

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Country Link
EP (1) EP2232454A4 (fr)
AU (1) AU2008345078B2 (fr)
CA (1) CA2710919C (fr)
NZ (1) NZ586050A (fr)
WO (1) WO2009086432A1 (fr)

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Publication number Publication date
CA2710919A1 (fr) 2009-07-09
EP2232454A1 (fr) 2010-09-29
EP2232454A4 (fr) 2011-01-05
CA2710919C (fr) 2013-08-13
NZ586050A (en) 2013-04-26
AU2008345078B2 (en) 2013-01-17
AU2008345078A1 (en) 2009-07-09

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