WO2016143043A1

WO2016143043A1 - Detection device and power meter

Info

Publication number: WO2016143043A1
Application number: PCT/JP2015/056860
Authority: WO
Inventors: 雅思佐藤
Original assignee: オムロン株式会社
Priority date: 2015-03-09
Filing date: 2015-03-09
Publication date: 2016-09-15

Abstract

This power meter (100) is provided with a first control device (108), which carries out signal transmission and reception with a display unit (104) and an external communication unit (105), as well as a security sensor (109). A second control device (207) of the security sensor (109) carries out sensor log generation processing for generating a sensor log showing an output value level history for a plurality of sensors (201)-(205). When a period during which communication with the first control device (108) is impossible occurs, the second control device (207) carries out action estimation log generation processing for generating an action estimation log showing a type of fraudulent activity estimated from the sensor log generated in said period of communication impossibility.

Description

Detector, watt-hour meter

The present invention relates to a detection device for detecting fraudulent acts on a watt-hour meter.

Conventionally, there are fraudsters who steal power (steal power) by cheating on electricity meters. On the other hand, various techniques for preventing theft of electric power have been proposed. For example, Patent Document 1 discloses a technique for reporting an abnormality when it is detected that a sealing screw for fixing a terminal cover to a watt hour meter is loosened.

Japanese Patent Publication “JP 2002-257862 A”

With the technology of Patent Document 1, it is possible to detect fraudulent actions (for example, formation of fraudulent bypass wiring) that involve an opening operation of a watt hour meter cover, but it is difficult to detect fraudulent actions that do not involve an opening operation of a power system cover It is.

As an illegal act not involving the opening operation of the cover, recently, an illegal act on a smart meter (digital watt hour meter) described below is a problem.

A smart meter is a device that measures and outputs (displays or transmits) electric energy in a digital manner, and includes a display unit, an external communication unit (optical port for infrared communication), and a processor. In the smart meter, the processor measures the amount of power supplied to the supply target based on a current sensor or the like, and displays (outputs) the amount of power by controlling the display unit. And the amount of power is transmitted (output) to an external device.

Therefore, in the smart meter, the processor that controls the display unit and the external communication unit transmits and receives signals to and from the display unit or the external communication unit. Here, in the smart meter, since the display unit and the external communication unit need to be visible from the outside, the display unit and the external communication unit are not protected by an electromagnetic shield. Therefore, although the smart meter processor itself is protected by an electromagnetic shield, it emits radio waves due to its large surface area and transmission / reception of signals to / from an external communication unit that is not protected by an electromagnetic shield. Or resistance to electrostatic discharge (ESD) is low.

Therefore, an unauthorized person may perform an illegal act of temporarily causing radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge to hang up the smart meter processor. In other words, while the smart meter processor is hung up, the amount of power is not measured even if power is supplied. If the processor is hung up only by a short period of time due to radio emission or electrostatic discharge, but the processor is operating normally without radio emission or electrostatic discharge during other periods, there will be evidence of fraudulent activity. Hard to remain. Therefore, fraudulent acts due to radio wave emission and electrostatic discharge are a problem.

In order to detect such fraud (in order to record evidence of fraud), a radio wave sensor and an electrostatic sensor are attached to the smart meter, and data on the output values (sensor values) of these sensors A method of saving logs can be considered. This is because such a log can be a sign (evidence) of fraudulent acts caused by radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge.

However, the log must be recorded by the processor. If the smart meter processor hangs up due to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge, not only the energy measurement stops, but also the log recording process stops. As a result, it is difficult to detect a log while the fraud is being performed, and it is difficult to detect the fraud.

An object of the present invention is to provide a detection device and a watt hour meter capable of detecting fraudulent acts on an ammeter due to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge.

In order to achieve the above object, the present invention includes a first control device that transmits and receives a signal to and from a display unit for outputting electric energy or an external communication port and measures the electric energy. A detection device that is housed in a watt-hour meter and detects fraudulent acts on the watt-hour meter, and a plurality of sensors including at least a radio wave sensor and an electrostatic sensor are different from the first control device. A second control device that is a circuit board and transmits and receives signals to and from the first control device, wherein the second control device outputs output information indicating a height of an output value for each of the plurality of sensors. When a communication disabled period occurs between the sensor log generating process for generating a sensor log indicating a history and the first control device, an illegal action estimated from the sensor log generated during the communication disabled period And executes a behavior prediction log generation process for generating the activity estimation log showing the kind.

According to the configuration of the present invention, the first control device transmits and receives signals to and from the display unit or the external communication port, while the second control device transmits and receives signals to and from the display unit or the external communication port. Since the signal transmission / reception is not performed, the second control device is more resistant to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge than at least the first control device. Therefore, even if radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt hour meter and the first control device hangs up, the hang up to the second control device is suppressed. Therefore, since the second control device can generate the sensor log while the first control device is hung up due to fraud due to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge, it is possible to leave a trace of fraud due to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge. The first effect is that the fraud can be detected.

Further, according to the configuration of the present invention, the following second effect is also achieved. The sensor log is generated not only while the first control device is hung up but also during normal operation. It is not easy to identify the person unless it is a skilled meter reader (log analyst). This is because (1) the sensor log is simply a history of output information (output value level, etc.) that indicates the height of the sensor output value. It is difficult to identify, and (2) the log of the period that combines the normal operation period and the hang-up period is enormous. This is because it is difficult for a meter reader who is unfamiliar with the analysis work. Therefore, according to the configuration of the present invention, when the first control device hangs up and a communication disabled period occurs with the first control device, the second control device generates the sensor log generated during the communication disabled period. A behavior estimation log indicating the type of fraud estimated from the above is generated. As a result, the meter reader need only analyze the behavior estimation log ignoring the sensor log when verifying the presence and type of fraud, and the behavior estimation log indicates the type of fraud. The second effect is that even an inexperienced meter reader can easily perform the analysis work.

It is a block diagram which shows schematic structure of the watt-hour meter which concerns on one Embodiment of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows schematic structure of the security sensor shown in FIG. It is a figure which shows the external appearance of the security sensor shown in FIG. It is the figure which showed the relationship between the threshold value applied to the sensor value of a radio wave sensor, and a level, and the figure which showed an example of the sensor log of a radio wave sensor. The amount of electric power measured by the first control device, the operating state of the first control device, the state of communication between the first control device and the second control device, and the log stored in the first storage unit It is explanatory drawing which showed this relationship. It is the schematic diagram which showed an example of the action estimation log. It is a figure which shows the sensor log recorded during the communication impossibility period. It is explanatory drawing which showed the process in which the action estimation log shown in FIG. 6 is produced | generated from the sensor log shown in FIG. It is the schematic diagram which showed the correction table used in an action estimation log production | generation process. FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram showing first to fourth behavior estimation tables used in behavior estimation log generation processing. It is a flowchart which shows the flow of the whole process of the 2nd control apparatus of a security sensor. It is a flowchart of the subroutine of the initialization process of S2 of FIG. It is a flowchart of the subroutine of the sensor process of S3 of FIG. FIG. 14 shows the first half of a flowchart showing a subroutine of the sensor log generation process in S57 of FIG. The latter half part is shown among the flowcharts which show the subroutine of the sensor log production | generation process of S57 of FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the subroutine of the action estimation log production | generation process of S62 of FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the flow of a process of a 1st control apparatus. 6 is a flowchart showing a process flow of a first control device according to a second embodiment. 6 is a flowchart showing a process flow of a second control device according to the second embodiment.

[Embodiment 1]
An embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a schematic configuration of a watt-hour meter according to an embodiment of the present invention.

(Whole configuration of electricity meter)
As shown in FIG. 1, the watt-hour meter 100 is a smart meter that measures the amount of power supplied to a power supply target (for example, a house) via a three-phase AC transmission line P1 to P3 by a digital method. is there.

As shown in the figure, the watt-hour meter 100 includes current sensors CT1 and CT3, a voltage dividing circuit 102, a power supply circuit 103, a display unit 104, an external communication unit 105, an RTC 106, and a first storage unit. 107, a first control device 108, and a security sensor 109.

The current sensor CT1 is a sensor that detects the current value IP1 of the power transmission line P1, and the current sensor CT3 is a sensor that detects the current value IP3 of the power transmission line P3. The voltage dividing circuit 102 is a sensor that detects a voltage value VP1 of the transmission line P1 and a voltage value VP3 of P3 of the transmission line. The power supply circuit 103 is a power supply that supplies power to each hardware included in the watt-hour meter 100.

The display unit 104 is a display device that is electrically connected directly to the first control device 108 and that displays and outputs the amount of power under the control of the first control device 108. As the display unit 104, for example, a liquid crystal display device is used. The display unit 104 is attached to the watt hour meter 100 so as to be visible from the outside of the watt hour meter 100. This is because the meter reader or the like visually recognizes the content displayed on the display unit 104.

The external communication unit (external communication port) 105 is a light receiving / emitting element (optical port) that is electrically connected directly to the first control device 108 and performs infrared communication by being controlled by the first control device 108. . The external communication unit 105 is attached to the watt-hour meter 100 so as to be visible from the outside. This is because the infrared communication device possessed by the meter reader is arranged opposite to the external communication unit 105 so that infrared communication can be performed between the infrared communication device and the watt-hour meter 100.

The first storage unit 107 is a storage area for storing information. In this embodiment, an EEPROM (registered trademark; Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory) is used. In addition, reading / writing of the information with respect to the 1st memory | storage part 107 is performed by the 1st control apparatus 108. FIG.

The first control device 108 is a control circuit board that controls each hardware of the watt-hour meter 100. Specifically, a processor (for example, a CPU (Central Processing Unit)) that executes processing according to a program is used.

As shown in FIG. 1, the first control device 108 includes a power calculation unit 111, a display control unit 112, an external communication processing unit 114, and a first log processing unit 113. The first control device 108 is hardware, but the blocks 111 to 114 included in the first control device 108 are functional blocks that indicate software functions executed by the first control device 108.

The power calculation unit 111 uses the detection values of the current sensors CT1 and CT3 and the voltage dividing circuit 102 to calculate (measure) the amount of power supplied to the power supply target via the transmission lines P1 to P3. It is a block that performs.

Specifically, the power calculation unit 111 obtains the instantaneous power amount of the transmission line P1 by multiplying the current value IP1 and the voltage value VP1, and multiplies the current value IP3 and the voltage value VP3 to obtain the instantaneous power value of the transmission line P3. The amount of power is obtained by time-integrating the sum of the instantaneous power value of the transmission line P1 and the instantaneous power value of the transmission line P3.

The power calculation unit 111 calculates the amount of power in the predetermined period every time a predetermined period (for example, 10 minutes) elapses, stores the amount of power in the predetermined period in the first storage unit 107, and stores it in the display control unit 112. introduce.

In addition, the power calculation unit 111 obtains a monthly or daily power amount (or a total power amount) by integrating the power amount for each predetermined period, and stores the power amount in the first storage unit 107. Let

The display control unit 112 is a block that controls the display unit 104. The display control unit 112 causes the display unit 104 to display the amount of power transmitted from the power calculation unit 111 for a predetermined period. The display control unit 112 displays the daily power amount and the monthly power amount stored in the first storage unit 107 on the display unit 104 in accordance with a command (operator command) input from the outside. It may be like this.

The first log processing unit (unauthorized control unit) 113 refers to data (sensor value) sent from the security sensor 109 described later, and a sensor log (abnormality detection log) indicating a history of sensor value (output value) level ) Is generated and recorded in the first storage unit 107. Processing for generating a sensor log (see FIG. 4B) will be described later.

The external communication processing unit 114 is a block that controls the external communication unit 105. When the meter reader of the watt-hour meter 100 places the infrared communication device close to and opposite to the external communication unit 105 and operates the infrared communication device to transmit the data extraction command to the external communication unit 105 by infrared, the external communication processing unit 114. Receives the data extraction command via the external communication unit 105. When receiving the data extraction command, the external communication processing unit 114 reads the data stored in the first storage unit 107 and transmits the data to the infrared communication device via the external communication unit 105 by infrared. . The data transmitted to the infrared communication device by the external communication processing unit 114 is data related to the amount of power, a sensor log (see FIG. 4B), and an action estimation log (see FIG. 6). As a result, the meter reader can periodically extract data and logs (sensor log, action estimation log) regarding the electric energy stored in the watt-hour meter 100. The sensor log and behavior estimation log will be described later.

The RTC 106 is a real-time clock that outputs time information indicating the current time including the date and time and the hour, minute, and second. Note that the RTC 106 is always connected with a backup battery (not shown), and therefore does not stop due to a power failure or the like, and always outputs accurate time information. The first controller 108 recognizes the current time based on the time information of the RTC 106. A second control device 207 (see FIG. 2) of the security sensor 109, which will be described later, acquires time information of the RTC 106 from the first control device 108 when the security sensor 109 is activated, and the acquired current time is a timer (not shown). The current time is recognized based on this timer.

(Configuration of security sensor 109)
Next, the security sensor 109 will be described. FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing hardware included in the security sensor 109 shown in FIG. FIG. 3 is an external view of the security sensor 109.

3 (a) is a perspective view showing the front of the security sensor 109. FIG. FIG. 3B is a perspective view showing the back surface of the security sensor 109. FIG. 3C is a top view of the security sensor 109. FIG. 3D is a front view of the security sensor 109. FIG. 3E is a side view of the security sensor 109. FIG. 3F is a rear view of the security sensor 109. FIG. 3G is a bottom view of the security sensor 109.

The security sensor 109 is a detection device for detecting an illegal act on the watt hour meter 100 and is attached to the inside of the watt hour meter 100. The security sensor 109 is detachable from the watt hour meter 100.

As shown in FIG. 2, the security sensor 109 includes a radio wave sensor 201, an electrostatic sensor 202, a magnetic sensor 203, an acceleration sensor 204, a temperature sensor 205, a second storage unit 206, and a second control device 207. The security sensor 109 has a resin package (housing) 109a shown in FIG. 3A, and the package 109a accommodates the members 201 to 207 shown in FIG.

The radio wave sensor 201 is a sensor that outputs a sensor value AD1 that correlates with the amount of radio waves in a frequency band that causes radio interference (EMI) with respect to an electronic device. Specifically, when an illegal act of emitting radio waves is performed in order to hang up the processor that measures the amount of power (the first control device 108 in this embodiment), the sensor value AD1 output from the radio wave sensor 201 becomes high. Become.

The electrostatic sensor (ESD Surge sensor) 202 is a sensor that outputs a sensor value AD2 corresponding to an increase in charge when a charge surge phenomenon occurs in the watt-hour meter 100. Specifically, a charge surge phenomenon occurs in the watt-hour meter 100 when a fraudulent act of discharging static electricity is performed to hang up the processor (first control device 108 in this embodiment) that measures the amount of power. The sensor value AD2 becomes high.

The magnetic sensor 203 is a sensor that outputs a sensor value AD3 correlated with the magnitude of the magnetic field. Specifically, when an illegal act of bringing the magnet close to the watt hour meter 100 is performed for the purpose of stopping the functions of the current sensors CT1 and CT3, the sensor value AD3 output from the magnetic sensor 203 increases. Note that if the current sensors CT1 and CT3 stop functioning, the power calculation unit 111 cannot measure the amount of power, resulting in theft.

The acceleration sensor 204 is a sensor that outputs a sensor value AD4 that correlates with the acceleration of the security sensor 109. Specifically, when an illegal act of applying an impact to the watt-hour meter 100 with a drill or the like for the purpose of breaking the cover of the watt-hour meter 100, the sensor value AD4 output from the acceleration sensor 204 becomes high. Become.

The temperature sensor 205 is a sensor that outputs a sensor value AD5 correlated with the ambient temperature. Specifically, when the cover of the watt hour meter 100 is ignited for the purpose of breaking the cover of the watt hour meter 100, the sensor value AD5 output from the temperature sensor 205 increases.

The second storage unit 206 is a storage area for storing information, and a flash memory is used in this embodiment. Reading and writing of information with respect to the second storage unit 206 is executed by the second control device 207.

The second control device 207 is a control circuit board separate from the first control device 108, and is a processor (for example, CPU) that controls each hardware of the security sensor 109.

The second control device 207 receives the sensor values of the sensors 201 to 205, refers to the sensor values, generates a sensor log (abnormality detection log) indicating the history of the sensor value level, and generates a second storage unit. Save to 206. The second control device 207 transmits (transfers) the sensor values received from the sensors 201 to 205 to the first control device 108.

As described above, on the first control device 108 side, the first log processing unit 113 receives the sensor value sent from the security sensor 109 (that is, the second control device 207), and based on the sensor value. The sensor log is generated and stored in the first storage unit 107.

Here, the processing content of the sensor log generation processing in the second control device 207 and the processing content of the sensor log generation processing in the first control device 108 are the same. Therefore, while both the first control device 108 and the second control device 207 are operating normally, the first control device 108 and the second control device 207 perform the process of generating sensor logs having the same contents as each other. A sensor log with the same content is generated. Therefore, the sensor log stored in the first storage unit 107 and the sensor log stored in the second storage unit 206 during the normal operation of both the first control device 108 and the second control device 207 are the same. It is.

(Resistance to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge)
Next, the resistance to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge of the first control device 108 and the second control device 207 will be described.

In general, watt hour meters must be designed so that the operator can visually recognize the display unit and external communication unit (optical port) from the outside. It has not been. Since the display unit and the external communication unit are hardware with a large surface area, when radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt hour meter, control is performed to transmit / receive signals to / from the display unit or external communication unit. Radio waves or static electricity is easily transmitted to the circuit (processor) via the wiring between the display unit and the external communication unit. Therefore, a control circuit that transmits and receives signals to and from the display unit or the external communication unit is likely to hang up and has low resistance to radio waves or static electricity.

That is, also in this embodiment, the first control device 108 that transmits and receives signals to and from the display unit 104 or the external communication unit 105 of the watt hour meter 100 has low resistance to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge, and If radio waves are emitted or electrostatic discharge is performed, hang-up is likely to occur.

In contrast, the second control device 207 of the present embodiment does not transmit / receive signals to / from the display unit and the external communication unit, and the first control device 108, the second storage unit 206, and the sensors 201 to 205 It is designed to send and receive signals between. Therefore, the second control device 207 is highly resistant to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge (at least higher than the first control device 108) and hangs even if radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt-hour meter 100. It is hard for an up. The reason is as follows.

Generally, the wiring that connects circuit boards such as control devices and storage devices is designed to suppress the transmission of radio waves and static electricity, so the display unit or external communication unit and circuit that are not protected by electromagnetic shielding The influence of radio waves and static electricity is suppressed compared to the wiring connecting the substrate. Therefore, even if radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt-hour meter 100, radio wave or static electricity is easily transmitted from the display unit 104 or the external communication unit 105 to the first control device 108. It is difficult to transmit from the control device 108 to the second control device 207. The second control device 207 transmits and receives signals to and from the sensors 201 to 205. However, the sensors 201 to 205 are extremely small in size and surface area compared to the display unit 104 or the external communication unit 105. Very small. Therefore, even if radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt-hour meter 100, radio wave or static electricity is easily transmitted from the display unit 104 or the external communication unit 105 having a large surface area to the first control device 108. In addition, it is difficult for radio waves or static electricity to be transmitted from the sensors 201 to 205 having a small surface area to the second controller 207. Therefore, the second control device 207 is highly resistant to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge (at least higher than the first control device 108) and hangs even if radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt-hour meter 100. It is hard for an increase to occur.

That is, even if there is a period in which radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt hour meter 100 and the first control device 108 is hung up, the second control device 207 can continue normal operation. During this period, the first control device 108 cannot generate the sensor log because it cannot receive the sensor value from the second control device 207, but the second control device 207 can generate the sensor log.

(Details of the second control device 207)
Next, details of the second control device 207 will be described. As illustrated in FIG. 2, the second control device 207 includes a sensor value acquisition unit 301, a communication control unit 302, and a second log processing unit 303. The second control device 207 is hardware (CPU), but each of the blocks 301 to 303 included in the second control device 207 is a functional block indicating a function of software executed by the second control device 207.

The sensor value acquisition unit 301 is a block that controls each of the sensors 201 to 205 and simultaneously acquires the sensor values of the sensors 201 to 205 at regular intervals.

The communication control unit 302 is a block that performs communication with the first control device 108. Specifically, the communication control unit 302 transmits (transfers) the sensor values of the sensors 201 to 205 acquired by the sensor value acquisition unit 301 to the first control device 108.

In addition, the communication control unit 302 is configured to monitor the communication state of the first control device 108. Specifically, the communication control unit 302 detects (determines) the start time and the end time of the communication disabled period when a communication disabled period occurs with the first control device 108. Note that the communication disabled period is, for example, that the first control device 108 and the second control are performed when radio waves are emitted or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt hour meter 100 and the first control device 108 is hung up. Examples include a period during which communication with the device 207 is disabled.

The second log processing unit 303 refers to the sensor values of the sensors 201 to 205 acquired by the sensor value acquisition unit 301, and generates a sensor log (see FIG. 4B) for each of the sensors 201 to 205. Perform the generation process.

In addition, when a communication impossible period with the first control device 108 occurs, the second log processing unit 303 returns to a state in which communication with the first control device 108 is possible, and then from the sensor log in the communication disabled period. Action estimation log generation processing for generating an action estimation log is performed. Note that the behavior estimation log generated by the second log processing unit 303 is transmitted to the first control device 108 by the communication control unit 302.

Hereinafter, the sensor log generation process will be described, and then the behavior estimation log generation process will be described.

(About sensor log generation processing)
In the present embodiment, two threshold values, threshold value 1 and threshold value 2 higher than threshold value 1, are set for each sensor 201-205. Further, level 0 is initially set as the sensor value level for each of the sensors 201 to 205.

The second log processing unit 303 determines for each of the sensors 201 to 205 whether or not a change in the level of the acquired sensor value has occurred. When the second log processing unit 303 determines that a level change has occurred, the second log processing unit 303 records a sensor log indicating the correspondence between the recording time and the level information. The recording time is the time when the sensor log indicating the recording time is recorded. The level information is information indicating the type of sensor to be processed and the level after the change.

Hereinafter, the sensor log generation process will be described in more detail using the case where the processing target is the radio wave sensor 201 as an example. 4A is a graph showing the relationship between the threshold value 1 (Rad_Th1) and threshold value 2 (Rad_Th2) applied to the sensor value of the radio wave sensor 201 and the level, and FIG. 4B is the radio wave sensor. FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of a sensor log 201.

The second log processing unit 303 determines that the sensor value of the radio wave sensor 201 acquired by the sensor value acquisition unit 301 is level 0 (Lv0) when the sensor value is less than or equal to the threshold value 1, and the sensor value exceeds the threshold value 1 and is less than or equal to the threshold value 2 In this case, it is determined as level 1 (Lv1), and when the sensor value exceeds the threshold value 2, it is determined as level 2 (Lv2).

Then, the second log processing unit 303 determines whether or not the currently determined level of the radio wave sensor 201 has changed from the previously determined level (or the initially set level), and the level changes. If not, the sensor log is not recorded.

On the other hand, when the level is changed, the second log processing unit 303 records a sensor log indicating the correspondence between the recording time and the level information. The recording time is the time when the sensor log indicating the recording time is recorded. The level information is information indicating the type of sensor to be processed and the level after the change.

In other words, the sensor values of the five sensors 201 to 205 are simultaneously acquired by the sensor value acquisition unit 301. If it is determined that the sensor value level of the radio wave sensor 201 has changed, the sensor log of the radio wave sensor 201 is detected. As a result, the correspondence between the recording time and the level information is recorded.

(B) of FIG. 4 is an example of a sensor log of the radio wave sensor 201. For example, “2015.02.23 16: 03: 23.266” in the sensor log indicated by reference numeral 500 is the recording time of the sensor log. “Lv1 RadioWave” is level information, “RadioWave” is the type of sensor to be processed (radio wave sensor 201), and “Lv1” is the level after the change.

Although the sensor log of the radio wave sensor 201 has been described above, the second log processing unit 303 similarly creates a sensor log for each of the sensors 202 to 205 other than the radio wave sensor 201. That is, in FIG. 4B, the sensor log of the radio wave sensor 201 is shown as a representative example, but a sensor log similar to the sensor log shown in FIG. 4B is provided for each of the sensors 202 to 205 other than the radio wave sensor 201. It is to be created.

That is, when the sensor value acquisition unit 301 acquires the sensor values of the sensors 201 to 205, the second log processing unit 303 sets the sensors 201 to 205 as processing targets in order, and sensor values of the processing target sensors. It is determined whether or not the level has changed, and when it is determined that the level has changed, a sensor log of the determination target sensor is generated and recorded.

That is, when it is determined that the level of the sensor value of the electrostatic sensor 202 has changed, the recording time, the type of sensor to be processed (static sensor 202), and the level after the change (of the electrostatic sensor 202) are recorded as a sensor log of the electrostatic sensor. The correspondence relationship with the level information indicating the sensor value level) is recorded.

When it is determined that the level of the sensor value of the magnetic sensor 203 has changed, the recording time, the type of sensor to be determined (magnetic sensor 203), and the level after the change (magnetic sensor 203) are recorded as a sensor log of the magnetic sensor 203. The correspondence relationship with the level information indicating the sensor value level) is recorded.

When it is determined that the level of the sensor value of the acceleration sensor 204 has changed, the sensor time of the acceleration sensor 204 is recorded as the recording time, the type of sensor to be determined (acceleration sensor 204), and the level after the change (acceleration sensor 204). The correspondence relationship with the level information indicating the sensor value level) is recorded.

When it is determined that the level of the sensor value of the temperature sensor 205 has changed, the sensor time of the temperature sensor 205 is recorded as the recording time, the type of sensor to be determined (temperature sensor 205), and the level after the change (temperature sensor 205). The correspondence relationship with the level information indicating the sensor value level) is recorded.

As described above, the second log processing unit 303 creates a sensor log for each of the sensors 201 to 205 and stores it in the second storage unit 206.

That is, in the second storage unit 206, for example, as shown in FIG. 4B, for the radio wave sensor 201, each time a level change occurs, the level information indicating the type and level of the sensor is associated with the recording time. The attached sensor log is recorded. Also, in each of the sensors 202 to 205 other than the radio wave sensor 201, level information indicating the type and level of the sensor and the recording time each time a level change occurs, as in the sensor log of FIG. 4B. Are recorded in the sensor log.

Note that the sensor values of the respective sensors 201 to 205 acquired simultaneously by the sensor value acquisition unit 301 are not only used for the sensor log generation process in the second log processing unit 303 but also the first control by the communication control unit 302. Transferred to device 108. Then, the first log processing unit 113 of the first control device 108 acquires the sensor values of the respective sensors 201 to 205 transferred from the communication control unit 302, and uses the sensor values to use the second log processing unit 303. The same process as the sensor log generation process is executed, and the sensor log for each sensor generated in the process is stored in the first storage unit 107. Therefore, while both the first control device 108 and the second control device 207 are operating normally, the same sensor log is recorded in the first storage unit 107 and the second storage unit 206.

(About behavior estimation log generation processing)
Next, behavior estimation log generation processing will be described. FIG. 5 shows the amount of electric power measured by the first control device 108, the state (operation state) of the first control device 108, and the state of communication between the first control device 108 and the second control device 207. FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram showing a relationship with a log stored in the first storage unit 107.

As described above, when radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt hour meter 100, the second control device 207 continues normal operation, but the first control device 108 may hang up. . As shown in FIG. 5, while the first control device 108 is hung up, not only the amount of power is not measured, but also the second control device 207 cannot communicate with the first control device 108.

Therefore, during the hang-up of the first control device 108, the sensor values of the sensors 201 to 205 are not transmitted from the second control device 207 to the first control device 108, and the first control device 108 itself is operating normally in the first place. Therefore, the sensor log creation process by the first control device 108 is not performed. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 5, during the normal operation period of the first control device 108, the first control device 108 records the sensor log in the first storage unit 107, but the first control device 108. During the hang-up, the sensor log generation processing by the first control device 108 is not performed, and the sensor log is not recorded in the first storage unit 107.

That is, if the security sensor 109 is not attached to the watt-hour meter 100, a sensor log is not generated / recorded while the first control device 108 is hung up due to fraud (that is, while the power amount cannot be measured). , Information indicating that fraud has been performed cannot be left.

However, in this embodiment, since the security sensor 109 is attached to the watt-hour meter 100, the second control of the security sensor 109 is performed even while the first control device 108 is hung up due to an illegal act. Since the device 207 generates a sensor log, information (level change log while being hung up) indicating that the illegal act has been performed can be left.

However, simply leaving a sensor log during the hang-up period may prevent the meter reader from performing efficient work later when verifying the log. This point will be described below.

Temporarily, the sensor log memorize | stored in the 2nd memory | storage part 206 during the hang-up of the 1st control apparatus 108 is sent to the 1st control apparatus 108 after the 1st control apparatus 108 returns, and memorize | stores in the 1st memory | storage part 107, and a meter-reading It is assumed that a member regularly collects and analyzes sensor logs stored in the first storage unit 107.

In this case, the sensor log is analyzed for the period of the normal operation period and the hang-up period, but it is not a skilled meter reader to identify fraud from the sensor log of the period of the normal operation period and the hang-up period. Not as easy as possible. This is because (1) the sensor log is simply a history of sensor value levels, and it is difficult for meter readers unfamiliar with log analysis to specify from the sensor log to the type of fraud. (2) Normal operation This is because it is difficult for a meter reader who is unfamiliar with analysis work to identify a log suspected of fraudulent activity from the enormous log because the log of the period including the period and the hang-up period is enormous.

Therefore, in the present embodiment, when communication with the first control device 108 is disabled (when the first control device 108 hangs up), the second control device 207 is in a normal communication state from the communication disabled period. After returning to, the behavior estimation log is generated from the sensor log generated during the communication disabled period.

As shown in FIG. 6, the behavior estimation log is a log showing a correspondence relationship between the fraud information indicating the type of fraud estimated from the sensor log and the recording time. Note that the recording time is the recording time of the sensor log that is the basis for the estimation of fraud indicated in the fraud information associated with the recording time.

The second control device 207 returns to a normal communication state (a state in which communication with the first control device 108 can be normally performed) from a communication disabled period (a period in which communication with the first control device 108 is disabled), and then a communication disabled period. A behavior estimation log is generated from the sensor log generated in step (1). Then, the second control device 207 transmits the sensor log and the behavior estimation log during the communication disabled period to the first control device 108, and the first control device 108 records the sensor log and the behavior estimation log in the first storage unit 107. .

Thereby, as shown in FIG. 5, in the first storage unit 107, the sensor log of the normal period and the hang-up period and the action estimation log during the hang-up period are recorded.

Further, the meter reader can periodically collect the sensor log and the action estimation log stored in the first storage unit 107. Therefore, for the meter reader, when verifying the existence and type of fraud, it is only necessary to ignore the sensor log and analyze only the behavior estimation log. Therefore, even a meter reader who is unfamiliar with the analysis work can easily perform the analysis work.

Next, the processing content of the action estimation log generation process will be described. FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a sensor log recorded during the communication disabled period. FIG. 8 is an explanatory diagram showing a process of generating the behavior estimation log shown in FIG. 6 from the sensor log shown in FIG. FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram illustrating a correction table used in the behavior estimation log generation process. FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram showing first to fourth behavior estimation tables used in the behavior estimation log generation process.

First, in the second control device 207 on the security sensor 109 side, the communication control unit 302 monitors the communication state of the first control device 108. Specifically, when a communication disabled period occurs between the first control device 108 and the second control device 207, the communication control unit 302 detects the start time and end time (return time) of the communication disabled period. It has become.

The second log processing unit 303 of the second control device 207 starts a behavior estimation log generation process corresponding to the communication disabled period when the communication control unit 302 detects the end of communication disabled period (at the time of return). . In the action estimation log generation process, a collecting process for collecting sensor logs during a communication disabled period is first performed, and then a noise removing process, a correcting process, and a converting process shown in FIG. 8 are sequentially performed.

First, the collection process will be described. The second log processing unit 303 extracts (collects) sensor logs belonging to the communication disabled period whose recording time is detected by the communication control unit 302 from the sensor logs recorded in the second storage unit 206. In other words, the second log processing unit 303 uses a sensor log generated for each of the five sensors 201 to 205 between the start and end of the communication disabled period in which the recording time is detected by the communication control unit 302. Collect the logs to which it belongs.

FIG. 7 shows sensor logs belonging to a certain communication disabled period collected by the second log processing unit 303. As shown in FIG. 7, the collected sensor logs (sensor logs belonging to the communication disabled period) are not classified according to the type of sensor indicated in the level information, but are arranged regardless of the type of sensor. However, the recording times are sorted in order from the past.

In the sensor log level information of FIG. 7, “Lv1” indicates level 1 and “Lv2” indicates level 2. “RadioWave” indicates the radio wave sensor 201, “ESD Surge” indicates the electrostatic sensor 202, “Magnet” indicates the magnetic sensor 203, and “Acceleration” indicates the acceleration sensor 204.

After the collecting process is performed and the logs are collected as shown in FIG. 7, the second log processing unit 303 sets the highest level sensor log for each type of sensor indicated in the level information among the collected sensor logs. , And a noise removal step of deleting (excluding) other sensor logs is performed (see FIG. 8).

For example, a sensor log with level information “Acceleration Lv0”, a sensor log with level information “Acceleration Lv1”, a sensor log with level information “Acceleration Lv2”, a sensor log with level information “RadioWave Lv0”, and level information “ If there is a sensor log for RadioWaveWLv1 and a sensor log for which level information is “RadioWave Lv2”, leave the sensor log for level information “Acceleration2Lv2” and the sensor log for level information “RadioWave Lv2”. to erase.

Further, for example, when there is a sensor log with level information “Magnet Lv0” and a sensor log with level information “Magnet Lv1”, but there is no sensor log with level information “Magnet Lv2”, the level information is “MagnetvLv1”. The sensor log of “Magnet Lv0” is deleted, leaving the sensor log of “”.

When there are two or more highest level sensor logs for the same sensor type, all the highest level level change logs are left. Further, when there is only a level 0 (Lv0) sensor log among the same sensor type, the level 0 sensor log is not treated as the highest level but is deleted.

FIG. 8A is a schematic diagram in which the sensor logs (sensor logs belonging to a certain communication disabled period) A to L shown in FIG. 7 are arranged along the time axis of the recording time. FIG. 8B shows that the sensor logs B, C, E, G, H, K, and L remain after the noise removal processing is performed on the sensor logs A to L shown in FIG. FIG. In the drawings, “Acc” is an abbreviation for “Acceleration”, “Mag” is an abbreviation for “Magnet”, “Rad” is an abbreviation for “RadioWave”, and “Sur” is “ESD Surge”. Is an abbreviation.

As shown in FIGS. 8A and 8B, among the sensor logs belonging to the communication disabled period, the highest level sensor log is left for each type of sensor indicated in the level information. Erased (excluded). This noise removal process is a measure for compressing and compacting the action estimation log that is finally generated by deleting in advance the sensor log that is considered to be noise (that is, the sensor log that is not related to fraud). .

The second log processing unit 303 performs a correction process using the correction table of FIG. 9 after the noise removal process shown in FIG. Hereinafter, the correction process will be described.

Usually, the level change of the sensor value of the radio wave sensor 201 indicates radio wave emission, and the level change of the sensor value of the electrostatic sensor 202 indicates ESD. However, when the time of the sensor value level change of the radio wave sensor 201 is very close to the time of the sensor value level change of the electrostatic sensor 202 and the level of the sensor value after the change is the same, rather than radio wave emission or ESD. High possibility of jamming emission. In addition, when the time of the level change of the radio wave sensor 201 and the time of the level change of the electrostatic sensor 202 are very close and the sensor value level of one sensor is different from the sensor value level of the other sensor, the higher level Although the sensor value is highly accurate, the sensor value with the lower level is likely to be noise.

Therefore, in the present embodiment, the correction table shown in FIG. 9 is stored in the second storage unit 206 in advance, and the second log processing unit 303 performs the correction process using the correction table.

The correction table is a table showing the correspondence between the correction target sensor log pair and the corrected sensor log. Here, in each row of the correction table of FIG. 9, the correction target sensor log is shown as a pair, while the corrected sensor log is shown as a single, but this is corrected to a single corrected sensor log. It means that.

That is, the row 401 in FIG. 9 indicates that the pair of “Sur Lv2” and “RadvLv2” is corrected to “JamvLv1”, and the single “Sur Lv2” is corrected to “Jam Lv1”. It does not indicate that “Rad“ Lv2 ”alone is corrected to“ Jam Lv1 ”. Also, for example, row 402 in FIG. 9 indicates that the pair of “Sur Lv1” and “Rad Lv2” is corrected to “Rad Lv2”, and the single “Sur Lv1” is changed to “Rad Lv2”. It does not indicate that it is corrected, and it does not indicate that a single “Rad Lv2” is corrected to “Rad Lv2”.

Note that “Jam” is a symbol indicating an interference wave. That is, “Jam Lv1” or “Jam Lv2” shown in FIG. 9 in the sensor log indicates not the type of sensor but the content of fraud (disturbance wave is emitted to the watt-hour meter 100). The first control device 108 hangs up as in the case of electromagnetic wave emission and electrostatic discharge).

Further, the conditions for establishing a pair of correction target sensor logs in each row of the correction table of FIG. 9 are as follows. On the time axis of the recording time in FIG. 8B, the left log of the correction target sensor log pairs in each row of the correction table of FIG. 9 is located at a point in time earlier than the right log, and both logs are adjacent to each other. It is a condition that the difference between the recording times of both logs is within a first predetermined time (for example, within 1 sec or 500 msec).

Then, the second log processing unit 303 searches for a pair of correction target sensor logs shown in the correction table of FIG. 9 from all the sensor logs arranged on the time axis shown in FIG. 8B. When the same pair as the pair shown in FIG. 9 is extracted, the second log processing unit 303 corrects the pair into a corrected sensor log associated with the pair in the correction table.

For example, the sensor log shown in (b) of FIG. 8 is corrected to the sensor log shown in (c) of FIG. 8 by performing a correction process using the correction table of FIG. That is, the pair of the sensor log indicated by reference sign G and the sensor log indicated by reference sign H is corrected to the sensor log indicated by reference sign H1.

Note that if the pair overlaps, the recording time is processed with priority from the past. For example, the first sensor log, the second sensor log, and the third sensor log are arranged on the time axis of the recording time shown in FIG. 8B, and the recording time is selected from the first to third sensor logs. Is the first sensor log, the second is the second sensor log, and the third sensor log is closest to the current time. In this situation, the first sensor log and the second sensor log satisfy the condition of the correction target sensor log pair shown in the correction table of FIG. 9, and the second sensor log and the third sensor log are corrected in FIG. When the correction target sensor log pair conditions shown in the table are satisfied, the pair is formed with the recording time prioritized from the past. That is, the first sensor log and the second sensor log are preferentially handled as a pair, and the second sensor log and the third sensor log are not handled as a pair.

Further, for example, the first sensor log, the second sensor log, the third sensor log, and the fourth sensor log are arranged on the time axis of the recording time in FIG. Of the sensor logs, the one with the oldest recording time is the first sensor log, the next past is the second sensor log, the next past is the third sensor log, and the fourth sensor log is Assume the situation that is closest to the present time. In this situation, the first sensor log and the second sensor log satisfy the conditions of the correction target sensor log pair shown in the correction table of FIG. 9, and the second sensor log and the third sensor log are in the correction table of FIG. When the correction target sensor log pair condition shown is satisfied and the third sensor log and the fourth sensor log correspond to the correction target sensor log pair shown in the correction table of FIG. 9, the recording time is given priority from the past. A pair is formed. That is, the first sensor log and the second sensor log are preferentially handled as a pair, and the second sensor log and the third sensor log are not handled as a pair. The third sensor log forms a pair with the fourth sensor log.

The second log processing unit 303 performs the conversion process using the four behavior estimation tables shown in FIG. 10 after the correction process shown in FIG. Hereinafter, the conversion process will be described.

There is a relationship between each fraud performed on the electricity meter 100 and the sensor log pattern. Specifically, in each row of the first to fourth behavior estimation tables in FIG. 10, the correspondence relationship between the sensor log pattern and the fraud information is shown. This indicates that there is a high possibility that the fraud shown in the fraud information associated with the pattern has been performed.

Note that the fraud information in FIG. 10 indicates the fraud and the level indicating the accuracy of the fraud. For example, in the row 501 of the first behavior estimation table of FIG. 10A, the fraud information “Impulse wave emission after impact is applied Lv4” is shown. Indicates fraud, and “Lv4” indicates accuracy. The higher the level, the higher the accuracy.

For example, in the row 501 of the first behavior estimation table in FIG. 10A, a pair of “Acc Lv2” and “Jam Lv2” and “jamming wave emission 後に Lv4 after application of impact” are associated. Therefore, when there is a pair of “Acc Lv2” and “Jam Lv2” on the time axis of the recording time shown in FIG. 8 (c), “jamming wave emission after impact is applied” at the recording time of the pair. The accuracy is level 4.

As described above, since there is a relationship between each fraud performed on the watt-hour meter 100 and the pattern of the sensor log, in this embodiment, each behavior estimation table shown in FIG. The second log processing unit 303 converts the sensor log into the behavior estimation log shown in FIG. 6 using the correspondence relationship between the sensor log pattern and the fraud information shown in each behavior estimation table. A conversion process is performed.

First, each behavior estimation table in FIG. 10 will be described. Of each row of each behavior estimation table in FIG. 10, a row in which a sensor log pair is shown as a sensor log pattern indicates that the pair is converted into fraud information. For example, row 501 of the first behavior estimation table shown in FIG. 10A indicates that the pair of “Acc Lv2” and “Jam Lv2” is converted to “jamming wave emission Lv4 after application of impact”. It does not indicate that a single “Acc Lv2” is converted to “jamming wave emission 後に Lv4” after an impact is applied, but a single “Jam Lv2” is “jamming wave emission Lv4” after an impact is applied. It is not shown that it is converted to.

In addition, among the rows of each behavior estimation table in FIG. 10, the row in which the sensor log is shown alone as the sensor log pattern indicates that the single sensor log is converted into fraud information. For example, the row 502 of the first behavior estimation table in FIG. 10A shows that “Jam Lv2” is converted to “jamming wave emission Lv2”.

Note that, unlike the other sensor logs, the sensor log in which “Jam” is shown indicates an illegal act instead of the type of sensor (“Jam” indicates the meaning of the jamming wave). That is, the

rows

502 and 503 of the first behavior estimation table in FIG. 10A are merely converted from information indicating fraud to information indicating the same fraud, and the level value itself also changes. As a result, the actual contents are not converted. However, for other lines, the sensor log pattern indicating the sensor type has been converted into fraud information, or the sensor log indicating the sensor type and the sensor log indicating the fraud (Jam) Since the pair is converted into fraudulent information, it is accompanied by substantial conversion of contents.

Also, the conditions for establishing a pair of sensor logs shown in each row of each behavior estimation table in FIG. 10 are as follows. On the time axis of the recording time in FIG. 8C, the left log of the pair of sensor logs shown in each row of each action designation table in FIG. The condition is that they are adjacent to each other and the difference between the recording times of both logs is within a second predetermined time (for example, within 15 minutes). Note that the second predetermined time is set longer than the first predetermined time (for example, 1 sec or 500 msec) which is a condition for establishing a pair shown in the correction table of FIG. The first predetermined time is a time set for detecting a situation in which the radio wave sensor 201 and the electrostatic sensor 202 are changing levels almost simultaneously, whereas the second predetermined time is determined by the same unauthorized person. This is because the time is set for detecting a series of frauds (for example, an act of emitting radio waves after applying an impact with a drill).

That is, “disturbance wave emission after application of impact”, “electrostatic emission after application of impact”, “radio emission after application of impact”, “magnetic emission after application of impact”, and “application of impact after magnetic emission” shown in FIG. Refers to cheating.

Further, as shown in FIG. 10, the first to fourth behavior estimation tables are prepared, but the conversion process is not performed using all the behavior estimation tables at the same time. They will be used in order. The highest priority is the first behavior estimation table in FIG. 10A, and the second highest priority is the second behavior estimation table in FIG. The third action estimation table in FIG. 10C has a higher priority, and the fourth action estimation table in FIG. 10D has the lowest priority.

That is, the second log processing unit 303 first selects the first behavior estimation table from the first to fourth behavior estimation tables, and performs processing for converting the sensor log into fraudulent information. Specifically, the pattern shown in the first behavior estimation table in FIG. 10A is searched from all the sensor logs arranged on the time axis shown in FIG. When the pattern shown in the behavior estimation table in FIG. 10A is extracted, the second log processing unit 303 identifies the pattern as the fraud information associated with the pattern in the first behavior estimation table. Convert to

The second log processing unit 303 performs the same processing as the processing by the first behavior estimation table using the second behavior estimation table after finishing the processing by the first behavior estimation table as described above. . Moreover, after finishing the process by the 2nd action estimation table, the 2nd log process part 303 performs the process similar to the process by the 1st action estimation table using a 3rd action estimation log. Furthermore, after finishing the process by the 3rd action estimation table, the 2nd log process part 303 performs the process similar to the process by the 1st action estimation table using a 4th action estimation log.

When the conversion process using all the behavior estimation tables is completed in this way, each sensor log shown in (c) of FIG. 8 is converted into each fraud information as shown in (d) of FIG. become. Specifically, the pair of the sensor log indicated by reference sign B and the sensor log indicated by reference sign C is converted into fraud information indicated by reference sign B1, and the pair of the sensor log indicated by reference sign E and the sensor log indicated by reference sign H1 is The sensor log indicated by reference sign K1 is converted into the fraud information shown by reference numeral L1, and the sensor log indicated by reference sign K1 is converted by the cheating information indicated by reference sign L1.

The second log processing unit 303 generates, as an action estimation log, a log indicating a correspondence relationship between the fraud information generated in this way and the recording time indicated in the sensor log corresponding to the fraud information. FIG. 6 is an action estimation log created from the fraud information of FIG.

After the behavior estimation log is generated as described above, the communication control unit 302 transmits the sensor log during the communication disabled period and the behavior estimation log generated from the sensor log to the first control device 108.

(Processing flow of the second control device 207)
Next, an example of the processing flow of the second control device 207 of the security sensor 109 will be described.

FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing the overall processing flow of the second control device 207. FIG. 12 is a flowchart of a subroutine of the initialization process in S2 of FIG. FIG. 13 is a flowchart of the sensor processing subroutine of S3 of FIG. 14A to 14B are flowcharts showing a subroutine of the sensor log generation process in S57 of FIG. FIG. 15 is a flowchart showing a subroutine of action estimation log generation processing in S62 of FIG.

First, the flowchart shown in FIG. 11 will be described. When the power is turned on (S1), the second control device 207 performs the initialization process of FIG. 12 (S2), and then repeats the sensor process of FIG. 13 (S3).

Next, the flowchart of the initialization process shown in FIG. 12 will be described. First, the second control device 207 sets two threshold values (threshold value 1 and threshold value 2) for each of the sensors 201 to 205 (S21 to S25). In S21, Rad_Th1 is the threshold value 1 of the radio wave sensor 201, and Rad_Th2 is the threshold value 2 of the radio wave sensor 201. In S 22, Sur_Th 1 is the threshold value 1 of the electrostatic sensor 202, and Sur_Th 2 is the threshold value 2 of the electrostatic sensor 202. In S23, Mag_Th1 is the threshold value 1 of the magnetic sensor 203, and Mag_Th2 is the threshold value 2 of the magnetic sensor 203. In S24, Acc_Th1 is the threshold value 1 of the acceleration sensor 204, and Acc_Th2 is the threshold value 2 of the acceleration sensor 204. In S25, Tem_Th1 is the threshold value 1 of the temperature sensor 205, and Tem_Th2 is the threshold value 2 of the temperature sensor 205.

After S25 in FIG. 12, the second control device 207 resets the sensor value level to zero for each of the sensors 201 to 205 (S26 to S30). Note that Rad_Dtct of S26 is the level of the radio wave sensor 201, Sur_Dtct of S27 is the level of the electrostatic sensor 202, Mag_Dtct of S28 is the level of the magnetic sensor 203, and Acc_Dtct of S29 is the level of the acceleration sensor 204, Tem_Dtct in S30 is the level of the temperature sensor 205. Although not shown in the flowchart, the second control device 207 resets the level to zero for each of the sensors 201 to 205 and displays the level 0 level information in S26 to S30. Is stored in the second storage unit 206.

After S30 in FIG. 12, the second control device 207 resets the transmission failure measurement counter used in the sensor processing of S3 to zero (S31), and sets a transmission failure threshold that is a threshold of the transmission failure measurement counter. (S32). Note that SendNgCnt in S31 is a transmission failure measurement counter, and SendNg in S32 is a transmission failure threshold.

After S32 in FIG. 12, the second control device 207 resets the transmission success flag used in the sensor process of S3 to zero (S33), and sets the host stop flag used in the sensor process of S3 to zero. Reset (S34). Note that SendOk in S33 is a transmission success flag, and HostStop in S34 is a host stop flag.

12, the initialization process of S2 of FIG. 11 ends, and then the second control device 207 executes the sensor process (S3).

Next, a flowchart of sensor processing shown in FIG. 13 will be described. The sensor process shown in FIG. 13 is a subroutine of S3 in FIG.

First, the second control device 207 acquires sensor values from each of the radio wave sensor 201, the electrostatic sensor 202, the magnetic sensor 203, the acceleration sensor 204, and the temperature sensor 205 (S51). In S51, RadAD indicates the sensor value of the radio wave sensor 201, SurAD indicates the sensor value of the electrostatic sensor 202, MagAD indicates the sensor value of the magnetic sensor 203, AccAD indicates the sensor value of the acceleration sensor 204, and TemAD indicates the temperature. The sensor value of the sensor 205 is indicated. AD1 to AD5 are values output from the sensors 201 to 205 as shown in FIG.

Next, the second control device 207 transmits the sensor values of the sensors 201 to 205 acquired in S51 to the first control device 108 (S52). In addition, although “host” is indicated in S52, “host” indicates the first control device.

After S52, the second control device 207 determines whether or not the transmission process of S52 is successful (S53). If second control device 207 determines that transmission is successful (YES in S53), it sets a transmission success flag to 1 (S54), and the process proceeds to S57.

In contrast, if second control device 207 determines that the transmission has failed (NO in S53), it increments the transmission failure measurement counter by 1 (S55) and sets the transmission success flag to zero (S56). The process proceeds to S57.

In S57, the second control device 207 executes a sensor log generation process. The sensor log generation process is a process for generating a sensor log as shown in FIG. 4B for each of the sensors 201 to 205 as described above. The flowchart of the sensor log generation process will be described in detail later.

After S57 in FIG. 13, the second controller 207 determines whether or not the host stop flag is 1 (S58). When determining that the host stop flag is not 1 (NO in S58), second control device 207 determines whether or not the transmission failure measurement counter exceeds the transmission failure threshold (S59). If the transmission failure measurement counter does not exceed the transmission failure threshold (NO in S59), the second control device 207 repeats the sensor process of FIG. 13 from the beginning (S3 of FIG. 11). On the other hand, when the transmission failure measurement counter exceeds the transmission failure threshold (YES in S59), the second control device 207 sets the host stop flag to 1 (S60), and then performs the sensor process of FIG. Is repeated from the beginning (S3 in FIG. 11). Note that the second control device 207 stores the time when the host stop flag is set to 1 in S60 as a memory (not shown) as the start of the communication disabled period (see FIG. 8).

If it is determined in S58 that the host stop flag is 1 (YES in S58), the second controller 207 determines whether or not the transmission success flag is 1 (S61). If the transmission success flag is not 1 (NO in S61), the second control device 207 repeats the sensor process of FIG. 13 from the beginning (S3 of FIG. 11).

On the other hand, if the transmission success flag is 1 (YES in S61), the second control device 207 performs an action estimation log generation process for the communication disabled period (S62). A flowchart of the action estimation log generation process will be described later.

The second control device 207 detects the time when YES is determined in S61 as the end of the communication disabled period. Further, when the host stop flag is set to 1 in S60, the start time of the communication disabled period is recorded. Thus, the second control device 207 detects the start time and end time of the communication disabled period.

After S62, the second control device 207 resets the host stop flag to zero (S63), and repeats the sensor processing of FIG. 13 from the beginning (S3 of FIG. 11).

Next, a flowchart of the sensor log generation process shown in FIGS. 14A and 14B will be described. The sensor log generation process of FIGS. 14A and 14B is a subroutine of S57 of FIG.

14A and 14B, first, sensor log generation processing of the radio wave sensor 201 is performed (S101 to S111), then sensor log generation processing of the electrostatic sensor 202 is performed (S201 to S211), and then the magnetic sensor 203. Sensor log generation processing is performed (S301 to S311), then the sensor log generation processing of the acceleration sensor 204 is performed (S401 to S411), and finally the sensor log generation processing of the temperature sensor 205 is performed (S501 to S511). ) Is performed.

Here, sensor log processing (S101 to S111) of the radio wave sensor 201, sensor log generation processing (S201 to S211) of the electrostatic sensor 202, sensor log generation processing (S301 to S311) of the magnetic sensor 203, and sensor log generation of the acceleration sensor 204 The processing (S401 to S411) and the sensor log generation processing (S501 to S511) of the temperature sensor 205 are the same as each other, except that the processing target sensor and the threshold used are different. Therefore, hereinafter, sensor log generation processing (S101 to S111) of the radio wave sensor 201 will be described, and description of sensor log generation processing of other sensors will be omitted.

14A, the second control device 207 determines whether or not the sensor value of the radio wave sensor 201 acquired in S51 of FIG. 13 exceeds the threshold 2 (S101). If the threshold value 2 is exceeded (YES in S101), it is determined whether the sensor value level has changed (S103). In S103, since the level when the threshold value 2 is exceeded is 2, the level change is determined by determining whether the current radio wave sensor level (Rad_Dtct) is not level 2. ing.

When determining that the level has not changed in S103, the second control device 207 ends the sensor log generation processing of the radio wave sensor 201, and proceeds to the sensor log generation processing of the electrostatic sensor 202 after S201 (NO in S103). ). On the other hand, when determining that the level has changed in S103 (YES in S103), the second control device 207 records a sensor log indicating that the processing target is the radio wave sensor 201 and is level 2. (S106). The sensor log also shows the recording time. FIG. 4B is a sensor log of the radio wave sensor 201. After S106, the second control device 207 sets the level (Rad_Dtct) of the radio wave sensor 201 to level 2 (S109), ends the sensor log generation processing of the radio wave sensor 201, and the sensor log of the electrostatic sensor 202 after S201. Transition to generation processing.

If it is determined in S101 of FIG. 14A that the threshold value 2 is not exceeded (NO in S101), the second control device 207 determines whether the sensor value of the radio wave sensor 201 exceeds the threshold value 1 (S102). ). If threshold value 1 is exceeded (YES in S102), second control device 207 determines whether the level of the sensor value has changed (S104).

If it is determined in S104 that the level has not changed (NO in S104), the second control device 207 ends the sensor log generation process of the radio wave sensor 201 and proceeds to the sensor log generation process of the electrostatic sensor 202 after S201. To do. On the other hand, when determining that the level has changed in S104 (YES in S104), the second control device 207 records a sensor log indicating that the processing target is the radio wave sensor 201 and is level 1. (S107). After S107, the second control device 207 sets the level (Rad_Dtct) of the radio wave sensor 201 to level 1 (S110), ends the sensor log generation processing of the radio wave sensor 201, and the sensor log of the electrostatic sensor 202 after S201. Transition to generation processing.

In S102 of FIG. 14A, when it is determined that the threshold value 1 is not exceeded (NO in S102), the second control device 207 determines whether the level of the sensor value has changed (S105).

If it is determined in S105 that the level has not changed (NO in S105), the second control device 207 ends the sensor log generation process of the radio wave sensor 201 and proceeds to the sensor log generation process of the electrostatic sensor 202 after S201. To do. On the other hand, when determining that the level has changed in S105 (YES in S105), the second control device 207 records a sensor log indicating that the processing target is the radio wave sensor 201 and is level 0. (S108). After S108, the second control device 207 sets the level (Rad_Dtct) of the radio wave sensor 201 to level 0 (S111), ends the sensor log generation processing of the radio wave sensor 201, and the sensor log of the electrostatic sensor 202 after S201. Transition to generation processing.

The above S101 to S111 are sensor log processing of the radio wave sensor 201. Then, sensor log generation processing (S201 to S211) of the electrostatic sensor 202 is performed after the sensor log processing of the radio wave sensor 201, but the parameters (sensor value, threshold value, level, etc.) used are merely replaced with those of the electrostatic sensor 202. The processing contents are the same for the sensor log processing of the radio wave sensor 201 and the sensor log processing of the electrostatic sensor 202. That is, S201 to S211 are the same processes as S101 to S111, respectively.

In addition, the sensor log generation process (S301 to S311) of the magnetic sensor 203, the sensor log generation process (S401 to S411) of the acceleration sensor, and the sensor log generation process (S501 to S511) of the temperature sensor are also used for each sensor. The processing content itself is the same as the sensor log processing of the radio wave sensor 201 only by replacing it. That is, S301 to S311 are processes similar to S101 to S111, S401 to S411 are processes similar to S101 to S111, and S501 to S511 are processes similar to S101 to S111, respectively. It is.

Therefore, by performing S101 to S511 shown in FIGS. 14A and 14B, a sensor log for each of the sensors 201 to 205 is generated. 13 including the sensor log generation process of S57 is repeated (FIG. 11), the sensor log for each of the sensors 201 to 205 is accumulated in the second storage unit 206.

Next, a flowchart of the action estimation log generation process shown in FIG. 15 will be described. The action designation log generation process of FIG. 15 is a subroutine of S62 of FIG. A communication disabled period occurs with the first control device 108, and immediately after the communication disabled period ends, the process proceeds to the action estimation log generation process of FIG.

First, when the second control device 207 proceeds to the action estimation log generation process shown in FIG. 15, the recording time is between the start point and the end point of the communication disabled period before S <b> 701, although not shown in FIG. 15. Is collected (see FIG. 7).

In S701, as shown in FIG. 8, the second control device 207 performs a noise removing process that leaves the highest level sensor log for each of the sensors 201 to 205 among the collected sensor logs. Subsequently, in S702, the second control device 207 performs a correction process for correcting the sensor log using a correction table (see FIG. 9) as shown in FIG.

Subsequently, in S703, the second control device 207 performs a conversion step of converting the sensor log into fraudulent information using the first behavior estimation table of FIG. 10A, and in S704, the second control device 207. Performs a conversion process of converting the sensor log into fraud information using the second behavior estimation table of FIG. 10B, and in S705, the second control device 207 performs the third process of FIG. In step S706, the second control device 207 uses the fourth behavior estimation table of FIG. 10D to convert the sensor log into a fraudulent act. A conversion process for converting to information is performed.

The second control device 207 generates, as an action estimation log, a log indicating the correspondence between the fraud information obtained in this way and the recording time indicated in the sensor log corresponding to the fraud information, The sensor log during the communication disabled period and the behavior estimation log are transmitted to the first control device 108 (S707). Thereby, the action estimation log generation process ends, and the process proceeds to S63 in FIG.

The second control device 207 transmits the sensor log and the behavior estimation log during the communication disabled period to the first control device 108, and then deletes the sensor log during the communication disabled period from the second storage unit 206, and the behavior estimation log. May be stored in the second storage unit 206. In this case, the storage capacity can be saved. However, the behavior estimation log may be stored in the second storage unit 206 while the sensor log of the communication disabled period is left in the second storage unit 206.

(Flowchart of first control device 108)
Next, an example of the processing flow of the first control device 108 of the watt-hour meter 100 will be described. FIG. 16 is a flowchart showing the overall processing flow of the first control apparatus 108.

First, when the power is turned on (S11), the first control device 108 performs an initialization process (S12). The initialization process in S12 has the same contents as S21 to S31 in FIG. Here, S32 to S35 are not performed.

After the initialization process of S12, the first control device 108 receives the sensor values of the sensors 201 to 205 from the security sensor 109 (S13), and generates a sensor log based on the sensor values acquired in S13 (S14). ) And are repeated alternately.

Here, the sensor log generation process of S14 is the same process as the sensor log generation process (S57) of FIG. That is, the first control device 108 generates a sensor log by performing the same processing as the sensor log generation processing (FIGS. 14A and 14B) performed by the second control device 207. Note that the first control device 108 is configured to save information (such as a sensor log) generated in the sensor log generation process in the first storage unit 107.

Further, although not shown in FIG. 16, the first control device 108 hangs up to cause a communication disabled period between the first control device 108 and the second control device 207, and then the first control device 108. Is returned to the normal state and communication becomes possible, the sensor log and the behavior estimation log in the communication disabled period are transmitted from the second control device 207 to the first control device 108. The first control device 108 The estimation log is received and stored in the first storage unit 107.

(Advantages of this embodiment)
According to this embodiment, even if radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt-hour meter 100 and the first control device 108 is hung up, it is possible to prevent the second control device 207 from being hung up. The Therefore, since the second control device 207 can generate the sensor log while the first control device 108 is hung up due to fraud due to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge, it leaves a trace of fraud due to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge. And it becomes possible to detect the fraud.

Further, according to the configuration of the present embodiment, when the first control device 108 hangs up and a communication disabled period occurs with the first control device 108, the second control device 207 generates the communication disabled period. The behavior estimation log indicating the type of fraud estimated from the sensor log thus generated is generated. As a result, the meter reader need only analyze the behavior estimation log ignoring the sensor log when verifying the presence and type of fraud, and the behavior estimation log indicates the type of fraud. Even an inexperienced meter reader can easily perform analysis work.

Further, according to the configuration of the present embodiment, an action estimation log indicating a series of fraudulent acts by the same unauthorized person is generated from sensor values of different sensor pairs (FIG. 10). As a result, for example, an action estimation log indicating an illegal act such as “radiation of radio waves after applying an impact” can be generated from the sensor value of the acceleration sensor 204 and the sensor value of the radio wave sensor 201. It is possible to increase the types (variations) of possible misconduct.

In the sensor log ((b) of FIG. 4) of the present embodiment, the sensor value level is shown as output information indicating the height of the sensor value, but instead of the sensor value level as the output information. The sensor value itself may be indicated. However, in this case, it is necessary to appropriately modify each table so that the tables of FIGS. 9 and 10 can be used even with sensor values.

In addition, the sensor log (FIG. 4B) of this embodiment may include a sensor value in addition to the sensor value level. For example, when the level of the sensor value of the radio wave sensor 201 changes, the sensor value of the radio wave sensor 201 is included in addition to the recording time and level information shown in FIG. 4B, and the sensor values of the sensors 202 to 204 are also included. It may be included in the sensor log of the radio wave sensor 201 (that is, the sensor log of the sensor whose level has changed includes not only the sensor value of the sensor but also the sensor values of other sensors). The sensor value included in the sensor log may be the value acquired in S51, or the time when it is determined that the level has changed (S103 to S105, S203 to S205, S303 to S305, S403 to S405, S503 to S505). The value may be newly acquired from each of the sensors 201 to 205.

[Embodiment 2]
In the first embodiment, when the second control device 207 detects that the communication state with the first control device 108 has been restored, the behavior estimation log is generated from the sensor log during the communication disabled period. However, it may be in the form described below.

In this embodiment, when the first control device 108 returns to the normal operation state from an abnormal state such as a hang-up, the log request command is transmitted to the second control device 207, and the second control device 207 receives the log request command. Then, an action estimation log is generated from the sensor log during the communication disabled period, and these logs are transmitted to the first control device 108. Hereinafter, a flowchart of the embodiment will be described.

FIG. 17 is a flowchart showing a process flow of the first control device 108 according to the second embodiment.

When the first control device 108 returns to the normal operation state from the abnormal state where the normal operation cannot be performed (hang-up) (S900), the first control device 108 transmits a log request command to the second control device 207 (S901).

Here, the second control device 207 that has received the log request command creates a behavior estimation log from the sensor log when there is a sensor log that has been generated during the communication disabled period and has not been transmitted to the first control device 108. The sensor log and the action designation log are transmitted to the first control device 108.

Therefore, after S901, when there is a sensor log that has not been transmitted to the first control apparatus 108 (YES in S902), the first control apparatus 108 displays the sensor log and the action designation log as the first log. 2 Received from the control device 207 and stored in the first storage unit 107 (S903). After S901, the first control device 108 shifts the process to S904.

The first control device 108 skips S903 and shifts the processing to S904 when there is no sensor log that has not been transmitted to the first control device 108 (NO in S902).

Since S904 to S906 in FIG. 17 are the same processes as S12 to S14 in FIG.

FIG. 18 is a flowchart showing a process flow of the second control device 207 according to the second embodiment.

When the power is turned on (S951), the second control device 207 first performs an initialization process (S952). The initialization process in S952 has the same contents as S21 to S31 in FIG. Here, S32 to S35 are not performed.

Next, the second control device 207 acquires sensor values from each of the radio wave sensor 201, the electrostatic sensor 202, the magnetic sensor 203, the acceleration sensor 204, and the temperature sensor 205 (S953). Subsequently, the second control device 207 transmits the sensor values of the sensors 201 to 205 acquired in S953 to the first control device 108 (S954).

Next, the second control device 207 performs a sensor log generation process (S955) based on the sensor value acquired in S953. The sensor log generation process in S955 is the same process as the sensor log generation process (S57) in FIG. That is, FIG. 14A and FIG. 14B are also a subroutine of the sensor log generation process of S955.

After S955, the second control device 207 determines whether a log request command has been received from the first control device 108 (S956). If a log request command has not been received from first control device 108 (NO in S956), second control device 207 proceeds to S953 and repeats the processing from S953 onward.

If a log request command has been received from first control device 108 (YES in S956), second control device 207 is a sensor log that has been recorded during the communication disabled period and has not been transmitted to first control device 108. Is determined (S957). Although not shown in FIG. 18, also in the present embodiment, the second control device 207 starts and ends the communication disabled period when a communication disabled period occurs with the first control device 108. , So that the communication disabled period can be recognized. Then, the second control device 207 determines whether there is a sensor log that has been recorded during the communication disabled period and has not been transmitted to the first control device 108. If the sensor log transmitted to the first control device 108 is deleted from the second storage unit 206, the second control device 207 stores the sensor log recorded during the communication disabled period in the second storage unit 206. By simply searching, it is possible to determine whether there is a sensor log that has been recorded during the communication disabled period and has not been transmitted to the first control device 108. Further, even if the sensor log transmitted to the first control device 108 is continuously stored in the second storage unit 206, the second control device 207 can be provided by adding a flag indicating that the sensor log has already been transmitted to the transmitted sensor log. Can be determined whether there is a sensor log recorded during the communication disabled period and not transmitted to the first control device 108.

If the second control device 207 is a sensor log recorded during the communication disabled period and there is no sensor log that has not been transmitted to the first control device 108 (NO in S957), the second control device 207 proceeds to S953, and the processing after S953 repeat.

In contrast, if there is a sensor log that has been recorded during the communication disabled period and has not been transmitted to first control device 108 (YES in S957), second control device 207 performs action estimation log generation processing. (S958). The action estimation log generation process of S958 is the same process as the action estimation log generation process (S62) of FIG. That is, FIG. 15 is also a subroutine of the action estimation log generation process of S958.

Therefore, when the action estimation log generation process of S958 is executed, an action estimation log is generated from the sensor log during the communication disabled period, and the sensor log and the action estimation log are transmitted to the first control device 108.

When the second control device 207 finishes the action estimation log generation process in S958, the second control apparatus 207 shifts the process to S953 and repeats the processes after S953.

[Summary of Embodiment]
According to each of the embodiments described above, the watt-hour meter including the first control device that transmits and receives a signal to and from the display unit or the external communication port for outputting the power amount and measures the power amount. A detection device for detecting fraudulent acts with respect to the watt-hour meter, and a plurality of sensors including at least a radio wave sensor and an electrostatic sensor, and a circuit board different from the first control device A second control device that transmits and receives signals to and from the first control device, and the second control device shows a history of output information that indicates the height of the output value for each of the plurality of sensors. A line indicating the type of fraud estimated from the sensor log generated during the communication disabled period when a communication disabled period occurs between the sensor log generating process for generating the sensor log and the first control device. And executes a behavior prediction log generation process for generating an estimated log.

According to this configuration, the first control device transmits and receives signals to and from the display unit or the external communication port, but the second control device transmits and receives signals to and from the display unit or the external communication port. Since transmission / reception is not performed, the second control device is more resistant to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge than at least the first control device. Therefore, even if radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge is performed on the watt hour meter and the first control device hangs up, the hang up to the second control device is suppressed. Therefore, since the second control device can generate the sensor log while the first control device is hung up due to fraud due to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge, it is possible to leave a trace of fraud due to radio wave emission or electrostatic discharge. The first effect is that the fraud can be detected.

Also, the following second effect is achieved. The sensor log is generated not only while the first control device is hung up but also during normal operation. It is not easy to identify the person unless it is a skilled meter reader (log analyst). This is because (1) the sensor log is simply a history of output information (output value level, etc.) indicating the height of the sensor output value. (2) Since the log of the period of the normal operation period and the hang-up period is enormous, the log that is suspected of fraud is identified from this enormous log. This is because it is difficult for a meter reader who is unfamiliar with analysis work. Therefore, according to the configuration of the present invention, when the first control device hangs up and a communication disabled period occurs with the first control device, the second control device generates the sensor log generated during the communication disabled period. A behavior estimation log indicating the type of fraud estimated from the above is generated. As a result, the meter reader need only analyze the behavior estimation log ignoring the sensor log when verifying the presence and type of fraud, and the behavior estimation log indicates the type of fraud. The second effect is that even an inexperienced meter reader can easily perform the analysis work.

As in the first embodiment, when the communication impossibility period occurs between the second control device and the first control device, the communication impossibility period ends and the second control device communicates with the first control device. When it is detected that communication is possible, the behavior estimation log may be generated.

Further, as in the second embodiment, the first control device is configured to transmit a log request command to the second control device when returning from an abnormal state where normal operation cannot be performed to the normal operation state. The second control apparatus may generate the behavior estimation log when receiving the log request command.

The plurality of sensors may include a magnetic sensor, an acceleration sensor, and a temperature sensor.

Further, in each of the above embodiments, the second control device may generate a behavior estimation log indicating a series of fraudulent acts by the same fraudster from output values of different sensor pairs.

As a result, for example, an action estimation log indicating an illegal act such as “radiation of radio waves after applying an impact” can be generated from the output value of the acceleration sensor and the output value of the radio wave sensor. The types of possible cheating can be increased.

Further, the detection device (security sensor 109) described above is accommodated in the watt-hour meter 100.

The present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiments, and various modifications are possible within the scope shown in the claims, and embodiments obtained by appropriately combining technical means disclosed in different embodiments. Is also included in the technical scope of the present invention.

The present invention can be used for a watt-hour meter that measures the amount of power in a digital manner.

100 Electricity meter 104 Display unit 105 External communication unit (external communication port)
108 First control device 109 Security sensor (detection device)
201 Radio wave sensor 202 Electrostatic sensor 203 Magnetic sensor 204 Acceleration sensor 205 Temperature sensor 207 Second controller

Claims

A signal is transmitted / received to / from a display unit or an external communication port for outputting electric energy, and is housed in an electric energy meter including a first control device that measures the electric energy. A detection device for detecting fraud against a meter,
A plurality of sensors including at least a radio wave sensor and an electrostatic sensor, and a second control device that is a circuit board different from the first control device and transmits and receives signals to and from the first control device,
The second control device has a non-communication period between a sensor log generation process for generating a sensor log indicating a history of output information indicating a height of an output value for each of the plurality of sensors, and the first control device. And a behavior estimation log generation process for generating a behavior estimation log indicating a type of fraud estimated from the sensor log generated during the communication disabled period.
The second control device detects that the communication disabled period has ended and communication with the first control device is enabled when a communication disabled period has occurred with the first control device. The detection apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the behavior estimation log is generated.
The first control device is configured to transmit a log request command to the second control device when the normal operation state is restored from the abnormal state where the normal operation is not possible.
The detection device according to claim 1, wherein the second control device generates the behavior estimation log when receiving the log request command.
4. The detection device according to claim 1, wherein the plurality of sensors include a magnetic sensor, an acceleration sensor, and a temperature sensor.
The detection device according to claim 4, wherein the second control device generates a behavior estimation log indicating a series of fraudulent acts by the same fraudulent person from output values of different pairs of sensors.
A watt hour meter comprising the detection device according to any one of claims 1 to 5.