TUNISIA TRANSITION INITIATIVE FINAL EVALUATION

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TUNISIA TRANSITION INITIATIVE (TTI) FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

JUNE 2014

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Cover photo credit (7ème sens): FiHoumty Youth Dance Tour with the Youth Empowerment and Development Association (YEDA).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

CE	Civic Engagement
CIFEDA	Centre d'Informations, d'Etudes et de Documentation sur les Associations
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAI	Development Alternatives, Inc.
FER	Final Evaluation Reports
GOT	Government of Tunisia
ISIE	Tunisian Independent High Authority for Elections
M&E	Monitoring & evaluation
NCA	National Constituent Assembly
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PPR	Program Performance Review
QED	The QED Group
SMT	Senior Management Team
SOW	Statement of Work
SRS	Strategy Review Session
SST	Senior Strategy Team
STTA	Short-term technical assistance
TA	Technical assistance
TRG	Training Resources Group
TTI	Tunisia Transition Initiative
UGTT	Tunisian General Labour Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USG	United States Government
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The self-immolation of a Sidi Bouzid vegetable merchant in December of 2010 reawakened the generalized discontent of the citizens from Tunisia's interior regions. Though sudden, the Revolution was a response to long-simmering grievances, including inequality among regions, the marginalization of social groups (i.e. unemployed, youth, rural women), and the highly centralized state. Despite disappointment in the pace of reform, many citizens still see the transition as a real opportunity to promote social modernization and democracy, strengthen civil society, give greater voice to youth and women, and rebuild regional and local governance.

Against this backdrop, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) launched the Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI) in May 2011. With DAI as the implementing partner, the TTI program was designed to support Tunisians in their pursuit of a democratic society by creating viable space for the transition to succeed. In an effort to support the transition, activities focused on civic engagement, women and youth political participation, civil society organization capacity, and countering violent extremism, among others.

As the program approached closedown, the QED Group in partnership with Training Resources Group (TRG), initiated this external final evaluation in November 2013. The evaluation focused on assessing both TTI's strategic approach to programming, as well as its program performance and impact. In carrying out the evaluation, a team of three evaluators conducted an extensive document review, held interviews with relevant stakeholders, organized a series of focus groups, and visited program sites and events. Over the two trips to Tunisia (December 2013 and March/April 2014), the team conducted field research in the Greater Tunis area, as well as in Sbeitla, Kasserine, and Gafsa.

Findings on Strategy. From the very beginning, TTI targeted key strategic areas of programming. Perhaps the most strategic decision of the program was the deliberate and sustained focus on Tunisia's interior region. Addressing the disparities between Tunis and the Interior is widely regarded as a critical element of the transition, and one that TTI identified early and supported throughout the life of the program. In this context, it is difficult to imagine TTI's success without the investment in, and support to, the Interior. Prioritizing support to youth was another important strategic focus of the program. TTI recognized the critical role that youth played in the Revolution and their growing disillusionment with the pace of reform. Whether supporting youth in elections, countering violent extremism, or civic engagement, the sustained focus on this key demographic was strategically critical to the program's success.

The program was also strategic in recognizing that associations—particularly nascent ones—needed particular support to become more engaged and active in filling the space created by the Revolution. They needed an opportunity to learn by doing and to be seen as contributing to the transition. Supporting visible civic action (e.g. public art performances or clean-up campaigns) thus became a hallmark of TTI. The program also quickly identified the strategic value of demonstrating tangible gains (e.g. rehabilitation of schools or parks) of the transition. By helping to increase confidence in the transition through tangible benefit, the program offered hope and optimism to those disappointed with the transition's dividends.

Despite focusing on many of the key strategic issues of the transition, significant shortcomings of the TTI strategy were also evident. TTI staff recognized that the formal strategy for the first two years of the program was "not well articulated or understood." In early 2013, the incoming leadership sought to address the weakness of the strategy by creating a more robust strategic framework and providing further opportunities for staff to shape the direction of the program. In addition to establishing a Senior Strategy Team, the leadership introduced eight sub-objectives to support the program objective of creating space for the transition to succeed. The new architecture was important in laying out a more clearly defined path to meeting objectives and represented the first rigorous effort to link activities, clusters, and program objectives.

Yet, the new framework—and its implementation—was problematic in a number of ways. The framework itself includes indicators that often fall short of measuring outcomes, and those that do often relate only tangentially to activities conducted. More significantly, however, programming continued to focus primarily on achieving activity-level outputs rather than higher-level outcomes.[1] The program also lacked a rigorous feedback loop to assess and inform progress toward achieving the sub-objectives; further, data was documented primarily at the activity-level, with minimal qualitative assessment to contribute to analyzing higher-level outcomes. Thus, while continuing to address strategic elements of the transition, the new framework only impacted programming to a limited degree.

Findings on Program Performance. As a result of scant documented evidence and limited ability of staff to articulate higher-level outcomes, the Evaluation Team was unable to assess programmatic impact at the sub-objective level. Instead, the Team drew broader conclusions about the country objective based on recurrent themes that emerged in responses from staff, awardees, and participants. These promising signs of impact (beyond the activity level) demonstrate the meaningful contribution that the TTI program made to Tunisia's transition.

Particularly in the Interior, there was a widespread perception among awardees and participants that civil society had become more active and that there was a palpable, if undefined, change in their communities as a result of TTI programming. Nascent associations with strong youth leaders raised their visibility in their communities, increased their membership and grew their networks. For many youth, making a contribution to the transition, however small, engendered a sense of responsibility for, and optimism in, their country's future. In keeping with the OTI approach of learning by doing, awardee capacity benefited from the opportunities to put their ideas into practice. By supporting associations' use of new means of expression, the program enhanced their ability to reach a broader range of people, going beyond the conventional, civic-minded target audiences of CSO workshops and fora. Despite the overall positive impressions regarding the ease of access to TTI support, some awardees felt that the in-kind approach limited the transfer of skills.

TTI also helped provide needed opportunities for Tunisians from different backgrounds to discover "the other." Bridging the gap between the Coast and the Interior, between privileged and disadvantaged neighborhoods, or between younger and older generations was a recurrent theme in interviews and discussions. In Tunis, in particular, the program also afforded CSOs the opportunity for timely interventions to shore up their oversight role. The impact on the

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[1] Defined as all intermediate (sub-objectives) and programmatic level outcomes above the activity level.

Interior, namely Kasserine and Gafsa, where the final evaluation team was able to visit, stood out in terms of scale and in the program team's nuanced grasp of the context and its ensuing ability to identify windows of opportunity. The visibility of events and tangible gains, support by local authorities, and media coverage, among other factors, all contributed to a sense of change, even if awardees and participants found it difficult to define. To a lesser degree, the TTI program also helped increase citizen engagement with public institutions, including youth centers, municipalities and their elected National Constituent Assembly (NCA) representatives.

Maximizing Support to the Transition? As highlighted above, activities were innovative, strategic and responsive to the context. The vast majority of awardees were very positive and enthusiastic about the activities they had implemented. However, programming geared primarily to activity-level outputs hampered the potential impact of the program. Though TTI was successful in designing groupings of activities, some of which were linked and often built on one another, there is little evidence that activities were designed for *outcomes*. A more refined application of OTI's programming model, from design to monitoring outputs and outcomes, could have likely resulted in a more impactful program.

A notable challenge for TTI in designing for outcomes was the very short-term and dispersed nature of activities. Most of TTI's activities were only a few days in duration; as the norm, this made achieving higher-level outcomes very difficult. Another shortcoming was TTI's difficulty documenting results, analyzing findings and applying lessons to subsequent activities. By focusing overwhelmingly on collecting information on activity-level outputs, the program missed key opportunities to gather outcomes-related results. With relatively little meaningful qualitative information captured, the program also missed an opportunity to more systematically identify lessons and learn from past experience. In particular, it is not clear whether the assumptions on which each activity was based was ever tested or revised. Thus, although TTI struggled to program to cluster or sub-objective level outcomes, it did make significant contributions to the country objective of creating space for the transition to succeed.

Lessons and recommendations. Key lessons can be drawn from the TTI experience. In particular, the importance and value of:

> ➢ **Combating marginalization of the Interior.** OTI should not take it for granted that programming from the capital be sustained if traction elsewhere is greater. OTI's comparative advantages of in-kind support to nascent groups, rapid start-up and flexibility, and tailored interventions proved more effective in more marginalized areas.

> ➢ **Understanding youth engagement.** Use TTI's extensive experience supporting youth as a basis for compiling a "best practices" document on youth engagement across country programs. It is also recommended that OTI intentionally test the targeting and messaging assumptions to address the issue of "preaching to the choir."

> ➢ **Improving program learning.** TTI's experience demonstrates the importance of organizational learning to program success. The TTI experience suggests that despite having all the procedural PPMP mechanisms in place (i.e. PPRs, SRSs, etc), there were significant gaps in the learning that took place. OTI would, therefore, benefit from improved programming to outcomes, documenting success *and* failure, empowering national staff in a sustained manner.

I. INTRODUCTION

In response to the events of the Arab Spring, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) launched the Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI) in May 2011. With DAI as the implementing partner, the TTI program was designed to support Tunisians in their pursuit of a democratic society by creating viable space for the transition to succeed. In an effort to support the transition, activities focused on civic engagement, women and youth political participation, civil society organization capacity, tolerance, and countering violent extremism, among others.

The QED Group (QED), partnering with Training Resources Group, Inc. (TRG), initiated this evaluation of TTI programming in November 2013. As per the USAID/OTI Statement of Work (Annex A), the evaluation focused on assessing two primary aspects of the TTI program:

➢ *Strategy*: OTI Tunisia's strategic approach to programming, examining in particular OTI's adaptability to changes in the political landscape, relevance to critical issues or events of the transition, and overall strategic targeting.

➢ *Performance*: The effectiveness and impact (intended and unintended) of OTI's Tunisia program, primarily through the lens of TTI's four priority sub-objectives.

More specifically, the following sets of questions guided the evaluation research:

Strategy:
1. Did OTI identify, anticipate and/or respond to the most critical issues related to the success of Tunisia's democratic transition?
2. Were OTI's strategy (goal, objectives, and sub-objectives) and geographic focus relevant and appropriate given the political context in Tunisia and OTI's role within a larger USG assistance portfolio?
3. Were OTI's revisions to strategy appropriate, given shifting political realities and windows of opportunity? Was OTI flexible and able to respond effectively to the changes in the evolving political situation in Tunisia? Did OTI miss windows of opportunity to program effectively around particular issues or geographic regions?

Performance:
1. Did the program have a coherent and logically connected set of assumptions about how change will happen?
2. Did OTI contribute to its stated goal and objectives?
3. Did OTI implement its program according to the strategic design?
4. Did the program achieve the intended impacts? What effect did programming have on identified issues/problem sets? In particular, did activity outcomes contribute to programmatic impact on sub-objective and objective levels (clusters)?
5. Was there an effective allocation of resources (funding amounts, number of activities, and staff effort) in order to achieve the expected and desired impact?

To undertake this evaluation, QED assembled a three-member team: Oren Ipp, Senior Evaluation Expert and Team Lead, Amalia Prado, Evaluation Analyst, and Yosr Abid-Fourati, Tunisia-based Evaluation Analyst. In addition to meeting the OTI and DAI staff in Washington, DC, the Team conducted two field-research trips to Tunisia, in December 2013 and March-April 2014; both trips also included visits to the Sbeitla office. In conducting its research, the Team carried out an extensive desk review of available documents, interviewed a wide range of current and former staff, awardees and relevant experts; the Team also organized focus group discussions and conducted site visits in the greater Tunis area and in Sbeitla, Kasserine, and Gafsa.

The final evaluation report is structured as follows. Section II details the approach and methodology employed in the evaluation and highlights some of the challenges encountered by the Team. Section III provides a brief overview of the key elements of the transition since late 2010. Section IV presents the Team's findings on TTI's strategy, which is followed by the findings on TTI's program performance in Section V. The report concludes with lessons identified and recommendations for OTI's global programming.

II. METHODOLOGY

Overview

The evaluation methodology was developed in collaboration with OTI staff during a series of discussions and presented as a draft evaluation plan; this would later be revised after initial field work had begun. In November and early December, the Evaluation Team began its document review of relevant TTI program materials. Mr. Ipp and Ms. Prado traveled to Washington, DC, in early December to conduct interviews with DC-based staff and deepen their understanding of the TTI program. From December 5-21, 2013, Mr. Ipp and Ms. Prado traveled to Tunisia on a two-week scoping mission to ground-truth their assumptions and interview TTI staff and beneficiaries in Tunis and Sbeitla; the specific focus of the trip was to examine TTI programming on countering violent extremism (CVE). The team held meetings in Tunisia with DAI staff, USAID/Embassy staff, awardees and prominent experts, and conducted site visits. The evaluators provided OTI with an exit debrief prior to departure, and upon their return, the first major deliverable of the project – an evaluation brief on TTI's CVE activities (see Annex I).

In between field trips, the team worked closely with OTI to refine the methodology and produced a refined evaluation plan for the second trip. The Evaluation Team conducted the second round of fieldwork from March 28 to April 19, 2014; Ms. Yosr Abid-Fourati joined the team for this period. The full Team conducted fieldwork in Greater Tunis, Sbeitla/Kasserine and Gafsa. In addition to individual interviews, the second round of fieldwork included focus group discussions, group interviews and site visits (detailed further below).

Approach

The scope of the final evaluation comprised programming implemented between May 2011 and May 2014. In the lead up to the second trip, the Team developed a framework to help assess

the three years of programming: Stage I, which included activities from May 2011 to April 2013; and Stage II, which included activities from May 2013 to May 2014.[2] The introduction of the two-stage approach was helpful in reviewing and assessing TTI's strategy and its evolution over the years. This approach was less appropriate for assessing TTI's program performance. Although the Team planned to assess activities for the first two years of the program against an amalgamated objective (to support citizen engagement in the transition), a more in-depth review of programming rendered this distinction less relevant. As explained in greater depth in sections IV and V, the Team assessed program performance in the aggregate for its contribution to TTI's objective (creating space), rather than against stated sub-objectives.

In keeping with the evaluation questions above, the Team assessed the program's stated causal paths (theories of change), direct and indirect effects (on participants, as well as the wider target group), both intended and unintended.

Qualitative Data Collection Methods

The data collection tools for this evaluation included a mix of desk review, key informant interviews, focus groups, and site observations. Relevant information collected was organized into a matrix of evaluation questions by stakeholders, analyzed for patterns of commonalities and differences; it is included as Annex B.

Desk Review. The evaluation comprised a desk review of program literature and reporting, internal assessments, as well as the TTI database. The Team reviewed Strategic Review Sessions (SRS), Program Performance Review (PPR) documents, Management Review documents, OTI "Note To File," the TTI database, and other assessments/evaluation tools (for a full list of documents reviewed and references, please see Annex C). Available Final Evaluation Reports (FERs) were also reviewed, specifically to mine information they provided on activity-level outcomes as the building blocks for outcomes at the cluster level. The Team also accessed OTI data visualization tools for general information, graphing program evolution, speed, funding levels, and geographic targets, among others.

Though the Team was able to review most of the documents requested, quite a number of documents were acquired late in the evaluation process, and other potentially significant documents were not provided (i.e. on mini-SRSs or rolling assessments). The latter category includes documentation of mini-SRSs and annexes of SRS, among others; if these processes were not documented, it would have been helpful for the Team to know.

Key informant/stakeholder interviews. Key informant and stakeholder interviews were exploratory in nature, designed to enable in-depth responses to questions; interview questions were open-ended and guided by a semi-structured questionnaire instrument, providing the Team flexibility to explore new ideas and issues not anticipated during planning. Using this approach, the Team was able to capture recurrent themes across activities and identify higher-

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[2] The two stages were differentiated primarily by the introduction in Stage II of more precise and narrowly defined sub-objectives and accompanying indicators. In the two years prior, activities were designed to meet broad country-level objectives that essentially addressed civic engagement.

level outcomes. The standard list of questions posed to awardees, and the two sets of questions posed to staff are included as Annex D.

As called for by the Scope of Work, the Team was required to interview between 20 and 30 percent of awardees; the Team met this requirement, interviewing approximately 27 percent of awardees (45 in total); all OTI local program staff (in Sbeitla and Tunis); four people from USAID's Middle East Bureau and Embassy/Tunis; and all expatriate staff, OTI Washington staff, and relevant former OTI staff. To enhance the Team's contextual understanding of the transition, the Team also interviewed national and international political experts, members of the media, civil society groups not directly associated with the TTI program, and USG stakeholders. A complete list of interviews and focus groups is included as Annex E. The table below illustrates the distribution of interviews by category during both trips.

Table 1: Distribution of Interviews with TTI Awardees

	Countering Violent Extremism	Civic Engagement[3]	Marginalized Groups	CSO Leadership	Total
Tunis	3	12	2	5	22
Sbeitla	4	15	1	3	24
Total	**7**	**27**	**3**	**8**	**45**

It is noteworthy that OTI provided input into the selection of awardees the Team was to interview or invite to focus group discussions. As a courtesy, the Evaluation Team requested that OTI provide them a list of "best and worst" activities, from which it would select a number to interview; this was done both to better understand the more than 250 activities of the program, as well as to involve the program team in the selection process. Unfortunately, this turned out to be a very drawn-out process that slowed down preparations for the second trip.

The program team was similarly involved in developing a list of awardees to invite for focus group discussions. After a protracted exchange, a final list was agreed on; however, by this time it was too late for the Team to conduct more than three focus groups before the second trip (half of what the Team had planned). The prolonged process of finalizing the list also made it challenging for the Team to adjust and replace focus group participants when difficulties arose. This will be detailed further below.

Focus group discussions and group interviews. A total of 14 focus groups and group interviews were conducted immediately prior to and during the second field visit. Focus group discussions often comprise a larger number of participants than group interviews, and allow those present to respond, challenge, or question one another during the discussion. Group interviews often feature fewer participants and follow a more standard "question and answer" format with the moderator. Due to the fact that many of these activities were implemented up to three years ago and that many were short in duration, the Team organized focus groups for Stage 1 activities with awardees—rather than activity participants; the Team determined that this would provide the most informative outcome level information by thematic groupings. As such, three

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[3] Programming in the initial two years of the program are generally categorized as civic engagement, as described in the methodology section above.

focus group discussions were held with awardees from Stage I, and covered the areas of elections and Civic Engagement (CE).

For the more recent Stage II activities, focus groups were held with participants from all four sub-objectives, respectively. Participants and observers comprising homogeneous groups within each sub-objective were invited for specific discussions. In this way, the Team was able to delve deeper into outcomes than it would with a more diverse mix of participants. While focus groups provided in-depth insight into a small number of grants, the comprehensive desk review, complemented by interviews, ensured broader representativeness. The focus group questionnaire sought to identify patterns of commonality across activities rather than focus on individual activities themselves. This enabled the Team to draw conclusions as to higher-level outcomes. The questionnaire is included as Annex F.

The table below illustrates the distribution of focus group discussions and group interviews by topic.

Table 2: Breakdown of Focus Groups and Group Interviews with TTI Awardees and Participants

	Countering Violent Extremism	Civic Engagement	Marginalized groups (women)	CSO Leadership
Tunis	3	3	1	3
Sbeitla	2	2	-	-
Total	**5**	**5**	**1**	**3**

As highlighted above, the Team was unable to conduct as many focus groups as originally planned. The program team's involvement in the selection process took longer than anticipated and was only finalized a week before the Team was to travel. Prodata, the Tunis-based research firm that was contracted to conduct the focus group discussions, also encountered a number of challenges. Prodata found that few of the awardees who were supposed to be contacted by the program team in fact knew of the focus groups or why they were being conducted. Prodata also found that a number of the awardees struggled to get participants to attend the focus groups; several awardees indicated that they no longer were in contact with participants. Given these limitations, the Team decided to organize focus groups directly and arranged six discussions in the latter half of the trip.

Site Observation. The Team observed actual programming at selected sites, as well as completed tangible activities. These visits allowed the team to observe the implementation processes as well as activity benefits, thereby providing a richer understanding of the subject. Direct observation helped identify whether tasks were properly implemented and whether required inputs were present. As agreed with OTI, the Team visited five awardee events and 11 completed projects. The table below provides further detail:

Table 3: Awarded Events and Completed Projects Observed by the Team

Tunis Awardee Events	Tunis Completed Projects	Sbeitla Completed Projects
• YEDA FiHoumty Youth Dance Tour • Together Against Violence Football Tournament • CSO Partners Showcase Their Accomplishments • Sawty The Key to Engaging Youth • TEDx Spark	• Tahadi Manifesto Thakafa Festival • Forum Theater at Khaznadar Youth Center • Youth of Sidi el Bechir, Your Youth Center Belongs to You • Manouba Youth, Your Center is Back to You	• Ezzouhour Youth Center: Gran a Paddle and Join the Club • Ball's in Our Court: Building Trust & Rapport Through Teamwork • Spring Cleaning in Sbeitla's El Fatah Park • Street Art for Expression in Kasserine • Citizens of Gafsa Clean their City • Kasserine Municipality CSO House • Kasserine Skateboard Park

Social Media Analysis. The Team explicitly posed questions to grantees and participants in both interviews and focus groups on how they used social media and to what ends. Through background research, interviews with social media experts, and reviewing social media sources directly, the Team sought to collect information on how awardees tracked what they perceived to be evidence of impact of their social media complements. Both awardee reports of how they used social media and to what ends, and a systematic review of the online information were used for the analysis presented in Section V below.

III. BACKGROUND

Since January 2011, Tunisia has faced a unique period of social, economic, and political transformation. Though sudden, the Revolution was a response to long-simmering grievances, including inequality among regions, the marginalization of social groups (i.e. unemployed, youth, rural women, among others), and the highly centralized state. Despite disappointment in the pace of reform, many citizens still see the transition as a real opportunity to promote social modernization and democratization, strengthen civil society, give greater voice to youth and women, and rebuild regional and local governance. To this end, a wide range of stakeholders— in particular nascent and established civil society organizations—has contributed to the economic, social and political development of the country.

The self-immolation of a vegetable merchant from Sidi Bouzid in December of 2010 reawakened the generalized discontent of the citizens from the "Interior"[4] of Tunisia. The revolution that ensued was driven largely by disillusioned youth, many of who felt marginalized by society and victims of an unjust and inequitable socioeconomic system that prevented them from building a stable future. According to the National Institute of Statistics, the unemployment rate among graduated youth in 2010 was 23 percent, up eight points since 2005. Other groups quickly followed their lead: lawyers, intellectuals, artists, civil servants, workers,

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[4] The "Interior" refers to the governorates of the North-West (Kef, Jendouba, Siliana and Béja), Center-West (Kairouan, Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid) and South (Gafsa, Kebili, Tozeur, Medenine, Gabes and Tataouine). The "Coast" refers to the governorates of the North-East (Tunis, Ben Arous, Ariana, Manouba, Bizerte, Nabeul and Zaghouan) and Center-East (Sfax, Sousse, Monastir and Mahdia).

opposition parties and the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) gradually formed a social movement for change.

Collectively, these groups were protesting the historic disparities between the Coast and the Interior. For example, in the decade leading up to the Revolution, the coastal areas received the lion's share of public investment (i.e. approximately 65 percent). Additionally, in 2010, the poverty rate was 9.1 percent in the district of Tunis compared to 32.3 percent in the Center-West and 25.7 percent in the North West;[5] unemployment rates mirror this inequality[6]. Having originated as a socioeconomic movement in the Interior, it was only upon reaching the Coast that the movement became a political uprising, forcing President Ben Ali and his close family to abandon power and flee the country on January 14, 2011.

Two transitional governments followed the President's departure to prepare for the 23 October 2011 election of the 217-member National Constituent Assembly (NCA). The Ennahda Party, formerly banned under the Ben Ali regime, won a plurality of the vote with 90 seats. Though the constitution was to be completed by October 2012, it was not ratified until 27 January 2014. During this period, the country experienced significant political instability, marked dramatically by the assassinations of two leading political figures of the secular left—Chokri Belaid in February 2013 and Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013. The latter sparked massive protests against the Ennahda-led government. The killing of eight soldiers operating against terrorist groups in the Chaambi Mountains that same month heightened tensions even further.

The political crisis that ensued led to a National Dialogue among the leading parties; after reaching a compromise, the Ennahda government resigned in December 2013, paving the way for a technocratic government to take its place and prepare for parliamentary elections (mandated, though not expected, to be held in 2014). As a result of this compromise that ended the political crisis, the constitution was finally ratified, demonstrating that the country managed to find a compromise between secular-progressive views and conservative-religious positions.

The role of civil society organizations—and associations in particular—grew considerably during this period. According to the Centre d'Informations, d'Etudes et de Documentation sur les Associations (CIFEDA), the number of associations in Tunisia has doubled since 2011: from approximately 8,500 to 16,615 today. Many of these emerged in the interior regions of the country; a sample of the breakdown (by governorate) is given in Table 4 below. The thousands of associations operating in Tunisia today can be broadly categorized as follows: charitable and relief associations (representing 23 percent of all new associations); human rights associations; cultural and artistic associations (representing approximately 20 percent of new associations); and development associations (representing almost 19 percent of new associations).

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[5] African Development Bank and National Institute of Statistics,"Mesure de la pauvreté, des inégalités et de la polarisation en Tunisie 2000-2010" October 2010.
[6] According to data provided by the National Institute of Statistics in 2013, the unemployment rate ranges from 17.4 percent in Grand-Tunis to 25.7 percent in the Center West.

Table 4: Breakdown of new associations by governorate (number and percentage)

	Associations created in 2011-2012	Associations created in 2011-2012/ total number of associations (%)
Gafsa	229	49.5
Sidi Bouzid	184	28.7
Kasserine	223	35.6
Tunis	1260	48.4
National mean	--	33.5

Source: IFEDA and Foundation For the Future calculations

The dramatic change in the civil society landscape was not only a function of an increase in numbers and diversity. Given the systematic control of civil society under the Ben Ali regime, it is not surprising that the transition ushered in a new era for associational life in Tunisia. The new civil society landscape has been shaped from "above" by the promulgation of Decree-Law No. 88 of 24 September 2011, which created the space for associations to exist and thrive. From "below," citizen-led activism and the explosion of associations have helped civil society fill that space. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have helped advance institutional reform, mobilize public participation, and further the National Dialogue among the parties. The significance of the role played by CSOs in the transition was well captured by Yadh ben Achour, a leading political figure, when he recently noted that "the Tunisian revolution is firstly the civil society revolution."[7]

Having played a lead role in the Revolution, youth have struggled to find their place in the transition. Early in the transition, youth were keen to participate in the democratization process, but were skeptical of the structures available to do so.[8] Though no official figures exist for youth turnout for the NCA elections, survey data suggests that it was relatively low.[9] Youth's growing disillusionment with the pace of change is manifest in their lackluster participation in associational life. According to a nationwide survey of youth perceptions conducted by the UNDP in 2013, 58 percent of respondents claim no associative activities and only 6 percent report being active in CSOs.[10] Participation in political parties is similarly low, as evidenced by the dearth of youth nominated by their parties to lead electoral lists.

Though self-reported participation in associational life nationwide appears low, youth have been particularly active in certain sectors. This can be observed in the areas of citizen engagement and awareness, arts and culture and regional development. Critically, youth have used the mediums of art and culture to engage in the transition. Artistic Activism—also known as "Artivism"—is a relatively new phenomenon, in which different forms of art and music are used as platforms for youth to comment on, and raise awareness about, the poor social, economic,

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[7] Politique-ACTU.com. http://www.politique-actu.com/dossier/tunisie-manieres-etre-musulmans-nous-souvent-empeches-progresser-aller-avant/295575/

[8] National Democratic Institute (NDI). « Les voix d'une révolution : conversations avec la jeunesse tunisienne, » March 2011.

[9] According to a 2013 UNDP survey, 47 percent of youth reported voting in the 2011 elections.

[10] UNDP. "Enquête nationale sur les attentes des jeunes a l'égard du processus constitutionnel et de la transition démocratique en Tunisie," 2013.

and political realities of their lives. Today, Artivism represents an important channel for youth voices, combining cultural expression and political awareness.

Youth have also been a driving force behind Tunisia's well-established social media movement. Primarily, though not exclusively, through Facebook, youth have found a voice to express themselves on different aspects of Tunisia's economic, social, and political transition. Almost eighty-three percent of Internet users in Tunisia are connected to Facebook, accounting for almost three million registered users, the majority of whom are youth (18-35 years old)[11]. Sites count upward of 100,000 "fans," hundreds of thousands of "hits," and offer youth a space for dialogue and self-expression.[12] Youth have also chosen to participate in the transition through less formal mechanisms, including, for example, protests and demonstrations. Youth have organized nationwide sit-in campaigns—including two highly visible demonstrations in Tataouine in 2012[13] and Kef in December of the same year[14]—as well as a hunger strike started by 30 youth in Sidi Bouzid and joined by three deputies[15] in 2012.

A small, but growing group of youth have gravitated toward religious expression as a means of finding their place in the transition. One highly visible demonstration of this was the incident at Manouba University in 2012, in which a young man replaced the official Tunisian flag with that of the Salafist movement. A more threatening manifestation of this is the movement toward violent extremism, which can turn to violent forms of expression. As socioeconomic conditions worsen, regional disparities widen, and the future remains uncertain, a sense of exclusion and marginalization among many youth is evident. Religious extremism can prey on this vulnerability, offering these youth a sense of belonging they struggle to find elsewhere.[16]

Like youth, women have also played an important role in the Revolution and the political landscape. This should not be surprising given that Tunisian women have long occupied an important position in political life; the historic promulgation of the 1956 *Code of Personal Status* placed the country at the forefront of the Arab world in regard to women's rights.[17] Though Tunisian women enjoy significant legal protection, women face many of the same discriminatory practices found around the world, including, for example, in matters of inheritance. Tunisian women also face more severe social and economic conditions. In 2012, for example, the unemployment rate was 14 percent for men and 25.6 for women.[18] Similarly, in 2010, 41

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[11] Tunisia Facebook Statistics, SocialBakers, http://www.socialbakers.com

[12] Facebook. « 10 millions de politiciens » available at https://www.facebook.com/10Millions2Po, and « Je suis Tunisien » available at https://www.facebook.com/JESUISTUNISIENII.

[13] Tunisienumerique.com. « Les jeunes chômeurs de Tataouine entament un sit-in ouvert devant le siège du gouvernorat, » http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-les-jeunes-chomeurs-de-tataouine-entament-un-sit-in-ouvert-devant-le-siege-du-gouvernorat/141837, 04/09/2012.

[14] TAP. « Sit-in des sans-emploi devant le siège du gouvernorat du Kef », http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2012/12/20/tunisie-sit-in-dun-groupe-de-jeunes-sans-emploi-devant-le-siege-du-gouvernorat-du-kef/, 20/12/2012.

[15] Kalima-Tunisie.info. « 30 jeunes en grève de la faim », http://www.kalima-tunisie.info/fr/News-trente-jeunes-en-greve-de-la-faim-item-3446.html, 01/10/2012.

[16] For more information on violent extremism in Tunisia, see Navanti's 2013 "Youth and Extremism in Greater Tunis," and "Youth and Extremism in Kasserine."

[17] Charrad, Mounira M. 2007. "Tunisia at the Forefront of the Arab World: Two Waves of Gender Legislation," Washington and Lee Law Review 64: 1513-1527.

[18] Population and Employment National Survey, National Institute of Statistics, 2012.

percent of rural women were illiterate, compared to 19.5 percent of rural men.[19] Also, contrary to their urban counterparts, rural women have few opportunities to improve their economic and social circumstances and often work in the informal economy.[20]

Perhaps the most-high profile manifestation of the struggle to protect women's rights was the controversy surrounding Article 28 of the August 2012 draft constitution. This article placed a woman's role in the family as "complementary" to that of men. In response to this article, tens of thousands of women organized protests in Tunis, both to celebrate the 56th anniversary of the promulgation of the CPS and to contest Article 28. Women from diverse backgrounds and represented by dozens of associations expressed their opposition to the article. Opposition to the article finally prevailed and the "complementary" clause in the draft constitution was removed. This upswell of civic activism by and in support of women notwithstanding, the role of women in political life remains limited. With few women represented in political parties or in local or national government[21], increasing women's political participation remains a critical and unfinished component of the transition.

IV. FINDINGS: TTI STRATEGY

This section first outlines TTI's strategy as it evolved since May 2011. The report proceeds to detail the relevant and appropriate strategic programming pursued over the course of TTI. The third sub-section reviews the challenges and consequences of programming without a strong strategic framework during the first two years of the program. The last sub-section examines the strengths and limitations of the new strategic architecture introduced in the spring of 2013.

Evolution of the TTI Strategy

The TTI program comprised three principal phases (as identified by OTI's "Tunisia Strategic Refinement Notes" of August 2013). In addition to these three phases, the initial few months of the program were guided by a separate set of objectives. The timeframe and detailed objectives of each are outlined in the chart below:

Table 5: TTI Timeframe and Objectives

	Objectives
Spring/ Summer 2011	1. Encourage new and emerging groups to contribute to the democratic reform process 2. Help to build confidence in the transition through small-scale community development projects
Summer 2011	1. To encourage positive interaction between the government and citizens 2. To support constructive citizen engagement in the transition
August 2012	1. To buy time and create space for the transition to succeed 2. To foster constructive dialogue among Tunisians
June 2013	1. To create space for the transition to succeed

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[19] "Mohamed Kriaa, "Note de synthèse: le marché de l'emploi, Etats des lieux et perspectives 2012-2021," Idées pour la Tunisie.
[20] The Solidarity Center, "Tunisian Women: Sustaining the Fight for Equal Rights," Catalysts for Change Tunisia, 2013.
[21] Mounira M. Charrad and Amina Zarrugh. "The Arab Spring and Women's Rights in Tunisia," September 2013.

The strategy in the first few months of the program identified support to nascent civil society groups and tangible progress as key to helping support the transition. Though short-lived, these objectives highlighted strategic areas of programming that would feature throughout the life of TTI. The first formal phase of the strategy focused on "initial programmatic set up and identification of programmatic opportunities," as well as "responding the elections in October 2011." The strategy was subsequently redesigned in August 2012 to reflect the evolving transition.

Almost one year later, citing overlap between the two objectives, the strategy was simplified into one objective. At the same time, eight sub-objectives—i.e. Activism, Civic Engagement, CSO, Media, Information, Marginalized Groups, Tolerance, and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)—were introduced. Several months later, four of the sub-objectives were de-prioritized, leaving the Civic Engagement, CVE, CSO leadership and Marginalized Groups sub-objectives to guide programming for the remainder of the program. The program team also developed quarterly sub-strategies for each office, constitution and elections programming; this was discontinued after two quarters.

Strategic Programming: Relevant and Appropriate

The following section details the strategic areas of programming targeted throughout TTI. It is noteworthy that the program sustained these areas of programming despite a fluid and dynamic political environment. Though this is not uncommon in transition settings, numerous political developments made persistent strategic programming considerably more difficult; these include, for example, uncertainty regarding the dates and processes for holding presidential and parliamentary elections and ratifying the constitution, political violence and rising extremism.

Focus on the Interior. Perhaps the most strategic decision of the program was the deliberate and sustained focus on Tunisia's Interior region. There is little dispute in the literature on Tunisia's recent history of the economic, social, and political marginalization of the interior governorates by the capital. This historic trend, in which "vast expanses of the country had been systematically neglected by the regime,"[22] continues today and underlies many of the challenges facing the democratic transition. It is a theme identified repeatedly in political analyses, public opinion polls, interviews and discussions held in the last three years, and noted in numerous TTI program documents. Addressing the disparities between Tunis and the Interior is widely regarded as a critical element of the transition. In this context, it is difficult to imagine TTI's success without the investment in, and support to, the Interior.

The importance of establishing a program presence (i.e. an office in Sbeitla) in the Interior early in the life of TTI cannot be understated. Numerous interviewees outside the program commented on the dearth of donor support for, let alone permanent presence in, the Interior. The UNDP, which supports civil society organizations nationwide, was the only other donor mentioned as being active in the region; even the UNDP, however, does not have an office outside of Tunis. In this regard, the existence of the Sbeitla office, not to mention the program

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[22] International Crisis Group (2013). "Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia's Way," Middle East/North Africa Report N°106 28 Apr 2011, pp 1.

itself, reinforced the implicit message of TTI: the Interior matters.

The sustained programming of the Sbeitla office is further noteworthy given the challenges of establishing a US-funded program in the early days of the transition. According to Sbeitla office staff, considerable time and effort was spent building relationships and earning the trust of potential awardees and the larger community. To this end, the program recognized the need to "win the trust within communities […in order] to communicate with potential partners who may be hesitant to work with the program due to reluctance to associate with a USG organization." Several awardees, including the Municipality of Kasserine, spoke of how their acceptance of the program evolved over time, and in some cases, even agreed to USAID branding.

Throughout the program, focus on the Interior continued to be both dynamic and responsive to the political context. This was evident in the decision to narrow the scope of programming in the Interior to three governorates in mid-2012. Recognizing that the two principal challenges in the southeast— i.e. underdevelopment and cross-border trafficking—were beyond the scope of TTI, and that "multiple, often small, one-off projects dispersed throughout the northwest, south, Sfax, Sousse, Kef, and elsewhere appear to reduce the potential of a strong TTI impact," the geographic scope of the program was narrowed to Kasserine, Gafsa, and Sidi Bouzid.

The maps included as Figures 1 and 2 further illustrate the concentration of activities in the Interior before and after narrowing the geographical parameters of the program.

Figures 1 and 2: Programming by activity before and after the decision in Summer 2012 to concentrate programming in seven governorates.

It is noteworthy that even with a reduced geographic footprint, the program continued to prioritize the Interior. Over the course of the three years, 49.8 percent of activities were implemented from the Sbeitla office, accounting for 45.5 percent of program expenditures. Even after the refocus on Kasserine, Gafsa and Sidi Bouzid, 49.5 percent of activities were implemented in the Interior, for approximately 46.5 percent of expenditures.

Focus on Youth. Prioritizing support to youth throughout the program was another important strategic focus of TTI. The program recognized the critical role that youth played in the Revolution and their growing disillusionment with the pace of reform. The 2012 PPR found that "youth are aggrieved and restless: The Revolution has created more avenues for engaging youth in civil participation…Tunisian youth were very enthusiastic one year ago, but are now very frustrated with the unchanging situation"; the PPR also identified the "educated, unemployed, younger population" as a strategic target group to support.

Interviews with observers of the transition reinforced the importance of engaging youth. For some this was a matter of ensuring continued youth interest in the political process, fearing that delays in holding elections would result in young people choosing not to vote. Others expressed the need to engage motivated youth constructively in their communities to prevent them from the alternatives of drugs and crime. As one TTI trainer explained it: "If we do not give them the opportunity to be leaders in positive things, they will be leaders in bad things." Still others worried about the fringe of youth whose disenchantment with the transition would result in a movement toward extremism. Whether TTI supported youth in elections, countering violent extremism or civic engagement, the sustained focus on this key demographic was strategically critical to the program's success.

Focus on Visible Civic Action. As noted previously, there was little tradition of civic activism in Tunisia prior to the Revolution. The Revolution provided civil society with the space and opportunity to become more engaged and active in the subsequent transition. The TTI program was strategic in recognizing that associations—particularly nascent ones—needed more than traditional capacity building to fill that space; they needed an opportunity to learn by doing and to be seen as contributing to the transition. Supporting visible civic action thus became a hallmark of TTI.

OTI's in-kind mechanism enabled the TTI program to support a wide range of informal groups to play a visible role in the transition. Whether through clean-up campaigns, street theater, or public debates, many of TTI's beneficiaries were provided both training and a stage (in many cases literally) for their respective initiatives to be showcased. In this manner, capacity building for civil society actors was a byproduct of their civic action (this is further explored in section V). This was particularly important for nascent associations in the Interior that had limited capacity or experience. Providing these groups with the platforms to be seen by, or engage with, their communities, was likely much more effective than traditional institutional capacity building would have been.

Focus on Tangible Change. Recognizing the historic marginalization of the Interior and the growing public disillusionment with the pace of change after the Revolution, the program quickly identified the strategic value of "demonstrat[ing] tangible benefits" of the transition. In

fact, TTI's very first objectives included the need to "build confidence in the transition through small-scale community development projects." In this way, the program sought to increase confidence in the transition through tangible gain. This took the form of rehabilitating schools, youth centers, and parks, among other public spaces.

Reinforcing the importance of working in the Interior, the program called on OTI's global experience: "In areas which have been historically marginalized it seems clear that OTI's time-tested method of weaving investments in material needs with basic democratic practices may be [the] best way to support positive change and help manage expectations." Involving local authorities and civil society organizations in these projects offered opportunities for linking development with political change and for greater visibility. Numerous awardees also spoke of these activities as offering hope and optimism to those disappointed with the transition's dividends. Though the approach to tangible change was highly strategic, a number of program staff wondered why support in this area was not a consistent and sustained component of the TTI program.

Focus on the NCA Elections. TTI's initial focus on the 2011 elections was highly strategic, especially considering the climate of the immediate post-Revolution period. This was a time of great political uncertainty, reluctance to work with USG-supported programs, and a general lack of experience with the donor community more broadly. According to staff, making inroads with the Tunisian Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) and responding rapidly to fill gaps in support for the ISIE, was helpful in establishing the OTI program in Tunisia.

Nearly three years after supporting the election commission, a former ISIE official highlighted the program's quick turnaround, its openness to letting the electoral commission make its own decisions, and its flexibility in finding solutions when problems arose. While also noting the voter registration campaign was not the only factor at play, he cited an additional 150,000 citizens registered after it went on air.

Stage I: Challenges and Consequences of a Weak Strategic Framework

Despite focusing on many of the key strategic issues of the transition, TTI staff recognized that the formal strategy for the first two years of the program was "not well articulated or understood." This lack of strategic coherence was highlighted by the 2012 Management Review: the "overarching strategy is not clear and perhaps even more significantly, they [staff] do not know how to implement the strategy." This sentiment was echoed in interviews with former and current leadership and staff.

With the completion of the NCA elections in October 2011, the program lost its overarching strategic direction. A number of factors help account for this. Leadership at the time recognized that "none of us focused on it [strategy] as much as we should have." As the only USAID representative in country, high demands by the embassy on the Country Representative made it difficult to focus on the more abstract issues, such as the strategy. Further, slow periods of programming were met with intense pressure to increase the rate of implementation, and according to leadership at the time, the "go, go, go" approach made it "hard to be thoughtful." Though program objectives were revised during this period, suggesting

that some effort was dedicated to the strategy, several staff members suggested that these changes were semantic and "didn't go far into the strategy."

Perhaps the most significant factor detracting from the development of a clear strategy may have been the management and personnel problems that plagued the program for much of its first two years. Though the Evaluation Team explicitly sought to avoid a focus on internal management dynamics, it became clear that these issues had a significant impact on both programming and strategy. Once again the 2012 Management Review was instructive in recommending that leadership "spend more time developing and clarifying strategy with the team—there needs to be a better dialogue about what they are seeing out there and how the context relates to the OTI strategic planning process…Local staff also need a role in shaping strategy for this program."

It appears that staff were not, in fact, brought into the strategy development process to any significant degree in the months following the Management Review. So much so that the June PPR called for an "increase [in] sophistication of political analysis." So marginalized were staff from contributing to the strategy that a Senior Strategy Team was established in early 2013 to provide national staff with a voice in developing strategy.

Not surprisingly, limited engagement in developing the strategy left staff in the dark as to how activities fit into the program strategy. As one staff member commented, the team "struggled to define what the objectives meant in practice."

It is noteworthy that in early 2012, leadership introduced the concept of clusters, grouping activities into six themes: engage unemployed youth in productive activities; improve government-citizen relationship through focus on regional development; increase access to accurate and reliable information; increase understanding of and participation in the CA elections; manage expectations post-CA elections; and organize and empower civil society. The list went through revisions, but the cluster background narratives were never developed; this severely undermined their value in helping staff clarify strategy, identify outcomes, and begin to assess how the latter came together at the cluster level. The potential for overlap among clusters and with the country objectives presented additional complications; unclear on why certain activities belonged to particular clusters, staff assigned activities to more than one cluster, resulting in greater confusion over how activities related to the strategy.

With little encouragement or opportunity for staff to discuss and share whether and how programming contributed to meeting objectives, the program became largely activity-driven. Not surprisingly, an emphasis on activity-level outputs came at the expense of programming to higher-level outcomes. Without a voice in shaping how activities were collectively designed for impact, staff instead focused on activity implementation. As explained in greater detail below, this trend continued through the remaining year of the program despite a more robust strategic architecture.

It should be noted that many programs are effective even with a weak strategic framework. This is particularly true in transition contexts, which are often defined by fluid political and security environments that are initially poorly understood. In such circumstances, importing a

pre-determined strategy is likely to be counter-productive. It is therefore critical that national staff, in particular, are empowered to help inform and shape the strategy as political dynamics shift and staff better understand the role and potential of OTI. In such circumstances, revising the strategy is appropriate and necessary; revisions, however, must be accompanied by changes in how programming is designed to achieve higher-level outcomes. As described further below, this was not the case for TTI.

Stage II: The Strengths and Limitations of the New Strategic Architecture

In early 2013, the incoming leadership sought to address the challenges highlighted above. This included both creating a robust strategic framework and providing further opportunities for staff to shape the direction of the program. The Senior Management Team (SMT) was dissolved and a new structure—the Senior Strategy Team (SST)—was established to "address the perceived lack of Tunisian ownership and involvement in strategy discussions and decisions." According to August 2013 Tunisia Strategic Refinement Notes, this Tunisian-led unit was to represent staff in strategy discussions, provide input into key decisions and communicate strategy changes to the entire team.

The team was equally committed to putting in place a strategic architecture for the program. The two objectives were revised for clarity and simplicity; the overarching objective became to create space for the transition to succeed. More significantly, however, eight sub-objectives were introduced "*around which the program would design and implement activities* in order to support the program goal and objective." The sub-objectives included: Activism, Civic Engagement, CSO, Media, Information, Marginalized Groups, Tolerance, and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Each sub-objective had an outcome statement and indicators against which impact would be measured.

The new leadership also introduced the practice of creating sub-strategies for the seven target governorates, constitution, and elections. In an effort to provide staff guidance on programming, the Tunisia Strategic Refinement Notes explains that the "purpose of the sub-strategies was to provide a logical framework around which to identify activities that would contribute to the program goal and objective; identify a set of activities that could reasonably be implemented given team resources (time and money); and design and implement activities as a cluster so that they would achieve an impact." Several months after introducing the new framework, and in response to staff desire for greater clarity, four of the sub-objectives were de-prioritized and the practice of developing the sub-strategies was discontinued.

The new architecture was important in laying out a more clearly defined path to meeting objectives. Prior to this attempt, there had been no sustained effort to outline cluster-level outcomes. This was the first rigorous effort to link activities, clusters (i.e. sub-objectives) and program objectives. Yet, the new framework fell short of expectations in a number of important ways.

As a sign that perhaps the pendulum had swung too far, there was in fact considerable confusion among both national and international staff regarding the sub-objectives. A number of staff members expressed the same sentiment about the sub-objectives: that the difference

between them was a matter of "semantics, not design." It also appears that much effort was spent on ensuring that activities were written—as opposed to *designed*—according to the sub-objectives. It was thus suggested that while the language of the activities changed, programming itself did not.

The response to de-prioritizing four of the eight sub-objectives was also telling. According to leadership, the choice to reduce the number of sub-objectives was met by "people stampeding to say 'yes,'" and that the change "unshackled us." That four sub-objectives were no longer relevant for programming is a testament to the responsiveness of the program; that narrowing the sub-objectives to four still did not eliminate the confusion among them, however, raises questions about their utility. For example, on several occasions staff struggled to articulate a clear difference between civic engagement with youth, youth as a marginalized group, and CVE, which essentially targeted youth. Raising doubts about the usefulness of the new framework, senior staff acknowledged not programming to the sub-objective impact indicators. Even OTI staff in Washington, DC expressed some concern about the new framework, suggesting that the "sub-strategies helped the management team, [but] unclear how much it helped the program team."

An examination of the framework itself raises a number of concerns. Indicators, for the most part, fall short of measuring outcomes; those that do address outcomes often do not relate directly to the activities conducted. Moreover, as sub-objective assumptions were not revised during implementation, they remained generalizations of the context, thereby weakening the links between the interventions and the outcomes expected. The excerpt below offers a sample of the Team's assessment of the indicators and hypotheses that underlie the sub-objectives; the full analysis is included as Annex G.

Table 6: TTI Impact Indicators by Sub-Objective

Sub-objective theory of change: *if "x," then "y," because "z"*			Observations
Civic Engagement	*If* we increase citizen participation in political processes,	*then* • citizens vote • citizens attend/participate in political discussions • citizens share their opinions with their government representatives	• Civic engagement is traditionally defined more broadly than political participation. In line with this broader conceptualization, TTI supported numerous CE activities that did not directly address political processes, but did promote citizens' engagement in their communities. • "Citizens vote" suggests that relevant activities would increase voter turnout, even though it is not stated as such; even if this were the intent, the OTI model would have made this a very ambitious goal.
	because democracy is new to Tunisia, along with democratic principles and political processes. Citizens lack knowledge on general democratic principles, democratic citizenship, and means to participate, especially with the constitution, elections, and local governance structures.		• Participation in political discussions or sharing their opinions with government officials are outcomes more suited to the activity level, rather than the sub-objective level. • Many of the information dissemination activities are under CE, but increased knowledge is not one of the indicators.

Perhaps the most significant shortcoming of the new architecture was that despite the impressive efforts to create a more rigorous and inclusive strategic framework, one critical aspect of the program remained unchanged: programming to activity-level outputs. Though the sub-objective framework was helpful in categorizing activities, it did not appear to translate into programming to outcomes.

In this way, the new framework did little to introduce the much-needed programming to outcomes. The program not only required a (new) framework, which it sorely lacked. More importantly, it required a new approach to programming, one that emphasized activity design for higher-level outcomes. The implications for program performance will be addressed in greater detail below.

V.   FINDINGS: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

The Evolution of the TTI Program

As may be seen in Figure 3, while start-up speed was not remarkable, it was widely considered quite effective in its support for the elections. As one of the first donors operational in Tunisia, TTI was able to deliver critical support. Activity clearance and funding levels both dropped afterward the elections, until early 2012, when a Management Review recommendation that each office set a monthly target in terms of numbers of grants cleared and funding levels. The burn-rate thereafter steadily increased until the attack on the Embassy (and ordered departure). It further dropped at the time of the change in leadership in early 2013, as the strategy framework was revised. The new framework and structuring of the Senior Strategy Team then contributed to another sharp increase that remained high until the program readied for closeout.

Figure 3. Grants cleared by quarter over the life of TTI.

Summer – Fall 2011: Focus on NCA elections. The initial focus of TTI programming was on the 23 October 2011 NCA elections. Support for the ISIE (i.e. the temporary electoral commission) allowed it to cover critical information dissemination needs with regards to voter registration, voter education, and electoral results. In coordination with NDI and IRI, TTI also supported electoral observation efforts. Although the activity covered a little less than half the expected elections monitors because of insufficient time for recruitment, the awardee was nonetheless recognized by the ISIE as an official monitoring entity for future elections. Additionally, a sizable grant to a well-established network of women's organizations supported nationwide voter education for women; reflecting a strategic focus on the Interior, this activity explicitly sought to address CSO fears that lower education levels and cultural practices in the Interior could disenfranchise women.

Perhaps the most high profile activity of this time was the Bus Citoyen, a highly visible voter education endeavor by a Tunis-based association with strong networks nationwide. As one of its members explained, Bus Citoyen was the Tunis response to the early 2011 Kasbah sit-ins when waves of people from the Interior arrived in the capital on buses to demand that the transition government resign. The awardee sent buses of volunteers to all delegations in the 24 governorates[23] to distribute voter education materials. They reached approximately 220,000 people, far exceeding the original target of 32,000. The 2012 PPR recognized the strong sense of direction and purpose of this phase of programming, and praised it for being TTI's most consistently productive period.

Winter 2011 – Summer 2012: Civic Engagement Writ Large. The program struggled to maintain its momentum in the winter of 2012 after the intense focus on the elections had passed. This was due to a number of factors, not least of which were difficulties with management and personnel, lack of a clear strategic vision, and the uncertain political calendar. The 2012 Management Review concluded that staff attributed the slump to "a protracted activity development process characterized by a lack of strategic clarity, shifting parameters for activity approval, and a disconnect between an overarching strategy and how to implement the strategy." In contrast, former leadership suggested some of the deceleration may have also resulted from the program team's difficulties in drawing actionable items from their analysis of the political context. In agreement, several staff added that this was a more marked shortcoming for the staff in Tunis, at least compared to Sbeitla staff, who consistently displayed a more grounded grasp of local realities.

As the Management Review also noted, the extended activity development phase—with excessive attention to detail—often shortened implementation timeframes, something which several awardees noted as a challenge in working with the program: "It took six months to get an activity approved, then, once approved, we were rushed to implement," and, "Deadlines were a big problem; DAI was very late with the equipment delivery, but then there was still a lot of pressure on us to implement by a certain date."

Paradoxically, as was the case with the Bus Citoyen, activities implemented during the program's first year that were considered critical for success were only replicated sporadically

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[23] Of the 24 governorates, four were funded by the awardee, two with another donor, and 18 with TTI support –up from the 10 originally planned as MEPI could not move its funds quickly enough.

throughout the life of the program. These include clean-up campaigns, small-scale rehabilitation of public spaces, equipment for youth centers, and fora with Constituent Assembly representatives.

The one type of activity that was widely regarded as ineffective was the distribution of shirts, key chains, hats, shopping bags, and other tokens with slogans created by TTI aimed at supporting communities that had experienced some kind of conflict. This type of activity was a feature of TTI from the very beginning and continued through two years of programming. The assumption was that the messaging would encourage citizens to express their opinions peacefully and to engage their communities constructively. According to staff, however, this assumption was not tested internally at the time; unfortunately, only in hindsight did staff express serious reservations about this type of activity.

Summer 2012 – Spring 2013: Expanding the Breadth of Civic Engagement. Shortly after the July 2012 PPR, TTI laid out its revised strategy framework, which included references to balancing the "tangible" (small-scale community development) with the political, "pummeling" a more targeted geographic focus, greater efforts to collaborate with local government, and a continued emphasis on constructive dialogue between citizens, CSOs, government, and media. Though much of the programming remained the same, new types of activities were added. These include: strengthening media outlets, information dissemination through mainstream media, training for social media use, CSO exchanges on the Constituent Assembly, gatherings of political actors over meals, youth debates, dance events with civic-minded messages, celebrations of the anniversary of the Revolution, and media campaigns promoting tolerance (partly in response to increasing polarization of society and, in early 2013, to the first political assassination).

Looking back upon this first stretch of the program, most staff agreed that, aside from the elections, some of the more memorable programming included "tangible" activities (rehabilitation of public spaces and youth centers), equipment for, and training in, youth centers, support for nascent CSOs, and work on women's rights.

Spring 2013 – Present: Introducing Sub-Objectives. As highlighted in the previous section, 2013 brought both a leadership change for OTI and DAI, as well as a serious revision to the strategy framework. Leadership introduced eight sub-objectives in June 2013; several months later, four of the sub-objectives were de-prioritized, leaving CVE, Civic Engagement, Marginalized Groups, and CSO Leadership to guide the remainder of the program. Activities for each sub-objective were distributed as follows: one activity each for Media and Information, nine for Activism, 16 for Tolerance, 21 for CSO leadership, 26 for Civic Engagement, 28 for CVE, and 29 for Marginalized Groups.

Figure 4. Funding levels by sub-objective, by quarter (April 2013–present).

Given that the strategy revision sought to build on past success, it is not surprising that many of the types of activities remained the same. In terms of new programming, aside from the introduction of CVE as a sub-objective, there was a marked increase in the use of the arts for outreach to youth, the use of mainstream media for information dissemination and awareness raising, various activities to do with the Constitution (particularly after it was approved), as well as a renewed push to support youth centers. TEDx[24] events were also introduced under different sub-objectives.

Creating Space: TTI's Contribution to the Transition

Throughout the course of the evaluation, recurrent themes emerged in responses from staff, awardees, and program participants, suggesting promising signs of impact beyond the activity level. These promising outcomes, however, only partially correspond to the TTI strategic framework; that is, while some of the findings are in line with the spirit of TTI's sub-objectives, most of the findings lie outside the framework. Although the intention to program to these outcomes may well have existed, the Team found little evidence from staff interviews, activity documentation or the larger strategic framework to close the gap. Further, as these signs are based on qualitative, retrospective evidence, they may not necessarily be generalizable to the activities the Evaluation Team did not cover. Nevertheless, the findings presented below demonstrate the meaningful contribution that the TTI program made to Tunisia's transition. The matrix of evaluation questions, included as Annex B, contains the detailed references to support the findings below.

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24 TEDx was created in the spirit of the TED (Technology Entertainment Design) mission, "ideas worth spreading." It supports independent organizers who want to create a TED-like event in their own community.

Associations Take Action

Associations are perceived to be more active. Particularly in the Interior, there was a widespread perception among awardees and participants that civil society had become more active and that there was a palpable change in their communities as a result of TTI programming. This resonated with the rationale of TTI's leadership in helping associations move from "talking to doing." While programming had always focused on CSO action, more recent programming prioritized opportunities for hands-on skills development—notably the Artivist workshop. Even traditional CSO training offered awardees opportunities to apply newly acquired skills; over the course of the three years, action-oriented activities became a hallmark of the TTI program.

This dynamic role that associations assumed is even more significant in light of the ingrained passivity fostered by the dictatorship; as one interviewee put it, "There was a sense before that the state was in charge of everything and citizens had no role or responsibility." In addition, there was a growing post-Revolution disillusionment with the political class that stood in stark contrast with citizens' initially high expectations. Despite the rising frustrations, partner associations were able to build on a widespread conviction that it was a critical time for action, and managed to tap into citizens' curiosity and willingness to engage in the transition.

Associations assume a watchdog role. In Tunis, in particular, the program afforded CSOs the opportunity for timely interventions to shore up their oversight role. As one awardee commented, without sufficient formal checks, holding the transitional government and the NCA accountable was very much in the hands of civil society. This function was critical for women's organizations as they lobbied to change the "complementarity" article in the draft Constitution to "equality." Associations also addressed the dearth of communication from the government and the NCA during the Constituent Assembly process; as one awardee noted, "At the time one felt the need for opportunities for dialogue. One felt the lack of communication and that civil society had a role to play in order to balance things a little. One could not, however, benefit from dialogue without training on the subject matter; one needed the legal experts."

Youth engagement in the transition is valorized (by empowering their associative life). During the early stages of the program awardees tended to be led by older individuals; for the latter half of the program, the number of youth-led CSOs appeared to increase substantially. In the past, it was not surprising to have meetings with so-called youth organizations led by older men who, surrounded by younger members, would monopolize the conversation. Recent awardees showcased more active and vocal youth and/or were led by youth. This may have been a function of the OTI approach, as explained by an awardee: "the model is very simple and easy, they strengthened CSOs without capacity to propose and manage projects; they only needed an idea of a project."

Regardless, nascent associations with strong youth leaders raised their visibility in their communities, increased their membership and grew their networks. In a context where older generations monopolize the political sphere and the age prerequisite for working in the public sector is forty, associations that promote youth engagement in the public sphere may also serve as a launching pad for political activity.

Interestingly, this generational shift was first pointed out in Kasserine by a former awardee who commented offhandedly that the CSO House had been his idea, and though having proposed it to the municipality, had not been involved in what eventually became a grant. He further explained that the initial coordination challenges of the older CSOs faded away when the new (and younger) generation stepped in to move the activity forward. A small group of Kasserine awardees also reported they had noticed an overall change in CSOs' acceptance of youth and a greater willingness to involve both young men and women.

Another important aspect of youth empowerment was their visibility in the public sphere. This was very much the case for what awardees called "street arts." As the leader of one of the street theater troupes explained, there was a deliberate symbolism to performing in public spaces: with no other spaces for them to perform, they reclaimed public spaces as a right. Performing in public also bypassed theaters, which represented both an elite culture that did not reflect youth views and was a symbol of the former regime. In a context in which religious organizations were seen as displacing CSOs from public spaces, street art and public performance made a visible statement.

The emergence of youth leaders. As a former staff member insightfully pointed out, "youth were attracted by a sense that they could participate in decision-making, not just follow a path" set by others. This was evident in participants' explanations of what they had gained from the activities. On a personal development front, many felt that they had exercised skills, such as time management, planning, and organization that proved they were able to "motivate others to create a project that reflects our vision and to learn from our mistakes." The opportunity to meet new people through TTI activities helped numerous participants learn how best to express themselves, treat others with respect and acquire greater social ease. Frequent interaction in the framework of joint implementation, also led to increased group cohesion and trust: "All of us became friends, a sense of fraternity was created." In some cases, even stronger bonds were forged: "We are like brothers." In this manner, newly acquired leadership skills were further consolidated by their group's acknowledgement.

As trainers, mentors, and participants noted, the opportunity to address the social issues they confront in their daily lives was unique: "racism, poverty, religion are subjects we live with daily and we talked about that at the training." The prevalence of drug use and its consequences was another topic that was widely referenced: "for some youth there is nothing to do but drugs," and "dealing with some as peers, not addicts, encouraged them." There were also multiple references to participants' sense of pride that they had earned respect from the community and/or their peers as a result of their public performances. Being acknowledged as worthy of respect was extremely important for marginalized youth, especially as their artistic talents were not greatly valued by their communities in the past.

Though these testimonies are powerful, it remains unclear to what extent participation in a single activity would elicit such reactions. Naturally, only those youth who had remained in contact with the awardees of their activities were available to meet the Team. Most of these youth had participated in several activities, and their insights therefore may not necessarily reflect single-activity participants.

Increasing Sustained Action. Generally speaking, there were three conditions under which a TTI-supported activity was sustained in the longer-term. The first related to individual motivation for the arts activities: when asked to identify the difference between those for whom the activity elicited substantial change and the rest, one young woman in Kasserine explained that it was the passion for art that keeps the former motivated and constantly seeking new opportunities to engage and perform. In the same vein, a small group of young men from a marginalized neighborhood in Greater Tunis commented that they had been dancing for years, that while the training helped them improve their skills, they did not need a formal activity to keep them motivated.

Strong support from a mentoring figure was also critical to sustained action. Such was the case for some of the Kasserine slammers who are planning to participate in an international competition and are still in contact with the trainer and for the street theater group that set up a local branch in another neighborhood and continues to invite former trainees to perform. Awardees and trainers agreed that the mentoring role was particularly crucial in disadvantaged neighborhoods where multiple factors—i.e. the lack of infrastructure for constructive activities, the lack of supervision, poverty, and the poor quality of education—combine to limit the potential of youths' academic pursuits. As one trainer noted, "Many youth in my neighborhood could have gone down the wrong path, but when they see that someone takes an interest in them and really wishes to help them, they question their own choices."

The third condition that promoted sustained engagement was a connection to an institutional framework; such was the case for the program-supported youth centers and schools that received equipment and training from TTI. The equipment (and sometimes rehabilitation of spaces) allowed center staff to work in better conditions and offer activities that attracted more youth on a more frequent basis. A secondary school in Kasserine reported attendance at a back-to-school sports camp had been four times greater than expected. Almost all the youth centers that received equipment reported substantial and immediate increases in membership.

Promising Signs of a Strengthened Social Fabric

Building on the findings above, it appears as though the program may not only have had an impact on an individual level, but may have also laid the foundations for longer-term effects.

Increased sense of agency and commitment to community and country. Commenting on why he thought a clean-up campaign had attracted hundreds of volunteers and received strong support from local government officials in Gafsa, an awardee remarked: "During the dictatorship, there were no structured opportunities for people to contribute to their community; with the Revolution, people feel they have to engage and contribute to the transition, but often do not find how to do so." Participants at the youth center of Khaznadar in Greater Tunis reinforced this sentiment in explaining how they felt after their performance in a street carnival celebrating the third anniversary of the Revolution: "one felt proud of the carnival because it pleased people outside, on the streets, and they encouraged us, but also a strong feeling of citizenship and pride in our country."

Making a contribution to the transition, however small, engendered in some youth a sense of responsibility for their country's future. A discussion with a group of students at the University of Manouba provided further insight: "before this activity I would never have thought to have such a strong sense of nationalism. Being allowed to reflect on how we can build Tunisia had never crossed my mind, at least I never thought of becoming an actor to build my country. We did not have the opportunity to consider we could be actors to build Tunisia by coming up with a compelling strategic plan." This perception was generally shared by all nineteen youth in the discussion. Similarly, a TEDx participant remarked, "We learned how to build our future and the future of Tunisia."

Several participants added that the sense of responsibility for their country's future also elicited in them a more optimistic vision of the future: "The change this activity has brought about is commitment: we try to solve the challenges and contribute with solutions on the basis of our different points of view. You find yourself in a position to reflect and make a decision on behalf of others; the commitment grows larger." Reflecting on the experience of a TEDx event, a participant noted, "We have an impact on the whole country through showing positive experiences."

Discovering "the other." From Kasserine youth dazzled by the opportunity to perform alongside slam poets from other cities to the self-described Tunis bourgeoisie venturing to the Interior in buses prior to the 2011 elections, TTI seemed to have provided needed opportunities for Tunisians from different backgrounds to discover "the other." Bridging the gap between the Coast and the Interior, between privileged and disadvantaged neighborhoods in Greater Tunis, or between younger and older generations was a recurrent theme in interviews and discussions. In describing her experience with the TTI-supported campaign to increase female voter turnout, a CSO member explained; "Definitely, after the Revolution, it was a kind of discovery of each other, of the regions in the Interior, and even within Tunis of neighborhoods like Ettadhamen. These activities helped bridge the gaps between regions and we must carry on."

In a similar vein, a dance coach organizing artistic exchanges between "popular" neighborhoods traditionally in conflict with each other, remarked: "the negative response from some in the audience was a challenge for the dancers, particularly in some neighborhoods, and we felt all of us learned to be more flexible and manage conflicts." Despite these challenges, he concluded, "Now the atmosphere is cooler, and youth from these different areas learned to interact together." An inter-neighborhood soccer tournament organized by a youth center that promoted the concept "violence is weakness," elicited the following comment from a participant: "some concepts as no violence, tolerance, and peace are now important for me."

Strengthened CSO Capacity (Particularly for Nascent Associations)

Increased opportunities for associations to "learn by doing." In keeping with the OTI approach of learning by doing, it would seem that awardee capacity benefited primarily from the opportunity to put their ideas into practice. As one staff member noted in describing a nascent CSO that grew rapidly, "I do not want to take credit for what they achieved; they started with great potential."

This sentiment was repeated by numerous nascent awardees: "With the rhythm imposed by DAI, we could learn to work in a fast way;" "In the beginning, we had difficulties with administrative formalities, but now we don't have these problems anymore;" "We learned how to talk with media;" "We learned how to manage a project from A to Z;" "We learned how to discover our own skills;" "How to manage a team;" and "The activity we had with DAI helped us to have a UNDP project which is bigger."

Awardees generally agreed that staff support on planning, setting milestones, and abiding by a timeline helped them improve their implementation capacity. Even one of the more staid Tunis CSOs acknowledged, "As an association, we benefited from the pressure on the deadlines." Those organizations working to put together a performance also reported the pressure on the deadline as an additional motivation for participants.

Support to new means of expression. Aside from operational capacity, the program identified the value of supporting associations' use of new means of expression, including, for example, rap, slam poetry and breakdancing. This enhanced their ability to reach a broader range of people, going beyond the conventional, civic-minded target audiences of CSO workshops and fora.

Image 1. Participants of a TTI-funded youth dance group.

As a Kasserine awardee noted, "the traditional means do not work, creative ideas and means are needed. Direct action is more effective. DAI involved young local artists, gave everyone a sense of importance and allowed them to see themselves." An awardee in Gafsa echoed this sentiment as follows: "The arts were seen as an alternative means for people to have their voice heard. In Gafsa, the most common way to be heard is to block roads, burn things; but people know, because they tried, that peaceful protests do not help either." A donor validated

this point in commenting on the difficulties of election-related programming, "there is a need for innovative means for outreach because nobody is paying attention to traditional means anymore; more than two thirds of youth plan on not voting."

Less radically innovative, yet highly useful was the production of widely intelligible content on issues relevant to the political transition. For example, both the ISIE-generated comic strips to promote voter registration in 2011, and the Lahlouba civic education materials, were widely commended for their quality and accessibility. Likewise, the television capsules on the Constitution were deemed timely and relevant. One reservation of note was expressed by a constitutional law expert, however, who observed that it was unfortunate that the capsules were broadcast on a television station with a limited reach and a relatively liberal audience, thereby perhaps "preaching to the choir."

More broadly these non-conventional means to engage in political processes have evolved naturally outside donor-supported initiatives; even rap appears to have greater appeal to a more widespread audience because it speaks of real life issues. Whether the alternative and the more traditional civic engagement associations found common ground for collaboration, however, remains unclear.

The TTI approach left some institutional skills unattended. Despite the overall positive impressions regarding the ease of access to TTI support, some awardees felt that the in-kind approach limited the transfer of skills. For example, one awardee commented, "DAI did it all for you, even the administrative and the final reports." Some CSOs also warned that associations that had grown accustomed to working with TTI would have difficulties fulfilling the requirements of other donors. Additionally, one staff member noted the downside to "pummeling" was that it did not allow repeat awardees enough time to reflect on their performance, implement activities on their own, or seek other funding. It also appeared as though the TTI model may not have always contributed to CSOs' capacity. Numerous associations complained they had to make several requests for copies of administrative records (procurement and the like) for their own files before they received them.

Several awardees also noted the program's primary focus on the numbers of attendees and thus argued that "the activity met its objectives: DAI asked for 60 attendees and we gave them 60." One grantee regretted there had not been greater supervision of their activity, which resulted in there being very different understandings of the deliverables. They contrasted this experience with an ongoing project with another donor, which, in their words, was more demanding, requiring frequent reports and tasking them with more monitoring duties.

Putting the Interior on the Map

Over the course of the evaluation, the importance of having an office in the Interior and the greater concentration of programming on fewer governorates became evident. The impact on the Interior, namely Kasserine and Gafsa, where the final evaluation team was able to visit, stood out in terms of scale and in the program team's nuanced grasp of the context and its ensuing ability to identify windows of opportunity.

Increased opportunities for the Interior to be heard and seen (particularly regarding tangible change). Given the role marginalization and exclusion played in the Revolution, OTI's initial assessment correctly identified small-scale community development projects as a useful tool to bridge the divide between citizens in the Interior and the state. Staff considered these to be some of the most successful activities. They opened channels of communication between the citizens and the state, engaged youth in their immediate communities and, more broadly, addressed people's frustrations at a decades-long neglect by the capital.

One staff member reinforced this last point, noting that the clean-up campaigns in Gafsa were understood by the community as a response to popular demand for improving the environment and pollution. Though not planned, the program proceeded to replicate similar initiatives in surrounding delegations; some of the CSOs involved in organizing these activities were even requested to help. Program staff were emphatic in noting, however, that tangible projects, in-and-of-themselves, were not a guarantee of success. They stressed that success, at least in part, depended on ensuring community and youth engagement. They highlighted the perils of ignoring community engagement by pointing to a rehabilitated park in Sbeitla that was partially destroyed and otherwise barely used.

Other types of activities also generated visibility for the Interior. As a staff member pointed out, a "mid-size event in the Interior sounds like a big thing and echoes in Tunis. In Tunis, too many organizations are working on similar topics, so it is harder to stand out, get media coverage, and create an impact." The Municipality of Kasserine was one of the main beneficiaries of this trend; program support for a mayor-to-mayor conference garnered considerable media attention, raising the political stature of the mayor and deputy mayor vis-à-vis the central government. Additionally, the CSO-led fora with Constituent Assembly representatives, for example, managed to get media coverage that far exceeded their expectations, with local radio stations and branches of national outlets broadcasting several events live for free.

Image 2: Graffiti art outside a Youth Center, which received TTI support, in Ezzouhour neighborhood in Kasserine. The graffiti reads, "Free at last." (photo credit: Oren Ipp)

For arts activities, the initial trend was toward programming in the capital, with participants and awardees prioritizing Tunis as the location for their final performances. Only in the latter half of the program were there signs of a reversal, in which the Interior became the location of choice; this was most notable in the intentional choice of holding a four-day street festival in Kasserine.

Broadening horizons and "changing mentalities." Youth from the Interior reported an overall perception of change in their towns. As a repeat participant expressed: "Things you knew happened in the capital but never expected could happen here, have succeeded. Kasserine has changed." The visibility of events, attendance and support by local authorities, and media coverage, among other factors, all contributed to a sense of change, even if awardees and participants found it difficult to define. As a Sbeitla team member summed up, "the program created a 'buzz' from pummeling Kasserine…generally speaking, the cumulative effect does give the community a hope that things will change. Something is happening and it is probably related to what we are doing."

According to a number of awardees, the perception of change was not limited to program participants. Participants' parents, for example, reportedly became more open and accepting of youth interests. Reflecting a change in how community members perceived youth, one participant commented that "we became like little celebrities, people would recognize us on the street."

Preaching to the choir? Upon observing participants' passion for their art, their sustained engagement across activities and awardees, and their general distinction from the average youth in the Interior, the Evaluation Team was compelled to inquire whether the program was not "preaching to the choir;" that is, promoting alternative means of self-expression to alternative youth. One of the arts trainers, however, offered a perspective that demonstrated the potential value of targeting alternative youth:

> There is a risk of targeting only alternative youth, but this segment is exactly the active segment, those that will make a change in their community. They are the dynamic segment of youth. The others will stay in the café, but they will follow what the smaller group does. Maybe you can do other activities to save them from poverty, etc. For me the more important thing is to save the smart people because if we do not, they will be smart extremists or drug dealers, because they are leaders. If we do not give them the opportunity to be leaders in positive things, they will be leaders in bad things. If we do not have the resources to move all youth, it is worth saving those few who are leaders.

Increased Citizen Engagement with Public Institutions

While TTI faced multiple challenges in building relationships with the Government of Tunisia (GOT) at the national level, programming brought citizens closer to public institutions at the local level, and provided some of the first opportunities for citizens in the Interior to interact with their elected NCA representatives.

Increased engagement in youth centers. TTI supported a total of 17 youth centers in one or more of the following ways: small-scale rehabilitation, equipment, materials, training, and/or event organization. The dearth of alternatives for youth engagement in the program's target

areas made support for youth centers very important. This was particularly relevant given that limited budget allocations from the national government meant that several centers would have to wait until 2016 for any materials or equipment. As noted previously however, TTI support to youth centers fluctuated considerably. After some of the earlier grants to centers, they only regained priority in the last year of the program. Program staff commented they did not quite understand why youth centers dropped off the priority list, but recognized that perhaps leadership preferred to do more innovative programming rather than merely providing equipment and materials.

Illustrating the importance of youth centers, a member of a center commented, "There was nothing at the center before; only boys came to play soccer. After the work was done—the creation of the theatre hall—lots of youth came, new activities are proposed." For them, "the center is us, it is our second home." Positive and supportive relationships with committed center staff members further amplified the role of the youth centers: "At school, we cannot approach teachers for guidance, but at the center we can go to the director for guidance." As the Kasserine Regional Director of Youth and Sports concluded, "My aim was to reconcile youth and state institutions and we achieved it." As a result of this support, center staff reported immediate increases in membership ranging from 50 to 200 percent.

Members' appreciation for how TTI support had increased the centers' appeal, however, did not appear to translate into a perception that their relationships to the state had improved. Youth from different neighborhoods agreed that even though they knew the centers were run by the state, they did not perceive them as being political. This may vary according to the relationship communities had with their respective youth centers: some centers were burned or looted during the Revolution, while others were protected by members of the community. Thus, while participating youth were objectively drawn closer to the state, in this case perceptions did not accompany the objective reality.

Improved relationships with municipalities. Particularly in the Interior, the program helped bridge the divide between local authorities and CSOs and citizens. After the Revolution, municipalities faced a troubled reality: an immediate drop in revenues (due to lower tax earnings) and limited budgetary support from the national government. Additionally, many municipal and governorate authorities were changed without prior consultation with their communities. Fearing further marginalization, two municipalities in particular—Kasserine and Gafsa—took advantage of the opportunities provided by TTI to draw closer to their constituencies.

The Municipality of Kasserine itself was an awardee for eight activities supporting youth, a mayoral exchange, and rehabilitating and equipping a CSO House. This support helped the municipality take on a highly visible role—locally and nationally—and helped the municipality raise funds from other donors. The municipality also reportedly engaged communities in the governorate's first-ever participatory budgeting process. In Gafsa, collaboration was indirect: the presence of local authorities from the municipalities and the governorate bolstered support for TTI-funded activities.

Increased opportunities to discuss citizen priorities. In early 2012, TTI organized fora for citizens to interact with the NCA representatives they had recently elected. At the time, all of these events were the first of their kind in the Interior. Both NCA representatives and other local authorities made themselves accessible to their constituencies and strengthened communication channels with CSOs. Immediately following the second political assassination in mid-2013, the program also pioneered "reconciliation dinners," during which local partners convened a wide range of stakeholders over a meal to put forward a united front and a call to stop divisiveness and polarization. By all accounts, the dinners were well attended and the talks cordial.

More recently, as the draft Constitution was being finalized, TTI supported roundtables with NCA representatives on fundamental articles proposed by CSOs, in particular by women's organizations. As the leadership of one of these organizations reflected, it was not particularly evident at the time that NCA representatives were paying attention to civil society priorities. They were later surprised to see, in the final version of the Constitution, that much of what they had put forth had been taken into account.

Social Media Use by TTI Awardees: Expanding Reach

The Final Evaluation Team was asked by OTI to address the use of social media by awardees. Social media is pointed to in program documents, the TTI database, and in interviews with expatriate and headquarters staff as evidence of program success; in some instances, online audiences are even categorized as direct beneficiaries.

Despite this keen interest in social media, however, there was little systematic monitoring or evaluation by the program itself of measures of impact, especially above the activity level. Even the information on total numbers of "likes" on Facebook and views on YouTube was available only once the FERs were completed. In the absence of a TTI-generated source of information on social media, the Team collected its own data. The Team approached this task in two ways: first, the Team used awardees' own references to their use of social media to gather information. Relevant information was recorded in a table, which is included as Annex H. The information recorded allows for a cursory, cross-sectional review of online activity at a specific point in time (after the activities took place, between April 25 and May 7, 2014). The Team also questioned interviewees and focus group participants about their use of social media. These two complementary approaches allowed the Team to offer the following basic descriptive information on awardees' use of social media.

As can be seen in the table (Annex H), 18 of the 45 awardees the Team met with provided information on their online activity (nine from Tunis and nine from the Interior). The vast majority of them (16) used Facebook and more than half (11) also used YouTube. The use of other social media tools was more limited: three organizational websites, two blogs, and one Twitter account. Four also provided the links to mainstream media coverage of their TTI-supported events.

With regards to Facebook use, across awardees, there were almost 150,000 "likes," ranging from as little as 13 for the Youth Center of Khaznadar to over 50,000 for Sawty. The average

number of likes per Facebook page is 1,829. Probably due to higher Internet penetration and the larger youth population in the capital, the number of likes was nearly three times higher for Tunis awardees. The content was primarily news and pictures of the organizations' activities, including the program-supported events. Most of the information posted was also produced by the CSO itself; that is, with the exception of three awardees, they did not share others' online material.

YouTube videos collectively received nearly 123,000 views, of which approximately 103,000 were from Tunis-based awardees. The most prolific awardee was, by far, Wasabi, with the TEDx events. The two TEDx events listed in the table recorded a total of 18 videos with a total of 99,258 views (for an average of 3,487 per video). Interestingly, for such a young entity from Gafsa, the South School Group's rap videos ranked quite high in terms of views (over 13,000).

When asked about the purpose of their online activity, awardees invariably replied that social media was used to broaden their reach and gain visibility for their events and their message. Many also attributed large gatherings at events to "word of mouth" and Facebook. While comments on Facebook and YouTube could provide some measure of audience feedback or engagement, there were simply very few to be found; what could be found was mostly positive feedback (i.e. congratulations, encouragement, appreciation for the quality). There were virtually no exchanges on substantive matters. As such, Facebook and YouTube functioned primarily to increase awardee exposure, with "likes" demonstrating some immeasurable degree of support.

Social media use did seem to provide program participants with a strengthened sense of group identity. Social media outlets allowed participants to see themselves perform, and to make these images available to their communities and beyond. As for their perceptions of impact, one rapper stated, "It is not realistic to expect you can change perceptions with one video."

Maximizing Support to the Transition? Understanding Why TTI Programming Fell Short of its Potential

As highlighted above, TTI's higher-level outcomes are meaningful and important, and made a significant contribution to Tunisia's transition. At the activity level, programming was innovative, strategic and responsive to the context. The vast majority of awardees were very positive and enthusiastic about the activities they had implemented. Yet, programming fell far short of its potential. Limited programming to higher-level outcomes likely hampered the overall impact of the program. This section explains how a more refined application of OTI's programming model, from design to monitoring outputs and outcomes, could have improved programming and thus resulted in a more impactful program.

Programming to Outcomes. The report has already noted the contributions made by the program to the larger country objective of creating space for the transition to succeed. Whether in support of the constitution, women's political participation, or TEDx events, suites of activities were linked and often built on one another. There is little evidence, however, that activities were designed for *outcomes*. This is a subtle but critical difference: that activities lead to one another or that they are related is not the same as designing activities to cumulatively

achieve a common objective. In this manner, "clusters encourage clear and early articulation of the intentionality of activities beyond the desired outputs and even outcomes at the activity level, into effect and impact."[25]

Program Design. A notable challenge for TTI in designing for outcomes was the very short-term and dispersed nature of activities. The OTI model distinguishes itself from traditional development approaches by deliberately not designing multiyear, highly complex programs. To remain responsive and flexible, relatively short-term interventions are necessary. While a certain percent of programs may indeed only be several days in duration, it is difficult to achieve higher-level outcomes if this is the norm. Using a random sample generator, the Team calculated the average number of days a participant engaged in an activity,[26] and found that the average contact days was only 2.57.

Interviews with staff and awardees, as well as past program reviews, recognized the limited duration of activities, commenting that "youth capacity building does not happen in three days," and that "continuity and durability of activities are missing." Though several awardees recognized that the kind of emergency support from TTI was not possible from other donors, they did emphasize the brevity of the grants, describing them as "punctual" (i.e. merely in support of an event), and lamented the absence of more sustained engagement. A PPR team member remarked that programming was often "superficial and short-lived" and not connected enough to deeper issues. The 2012 PPR also commented on this: "Many of TTI's activities are short-term, event-oriented, reacting to security developments, and/or awareness raising. This appears to dilute the program's potential to influence real change and scatter the team's attention and resources." While it is a common OTI tenet that grants can catalyze longer-term processes, there was no record of which grants targeted more resilient processes or how they would do so.

Documenting Outcomes. As the M&E guide highlights, programming for outcomes also depends on a "process of continuous assessment, analysis, and refinement." TTI also experienced shortfalls in terms of documenting results, analyzing findings and applying lessons to subsequent activities. The program focused overwhelmingly on collecting information on activity-level outputs; this often came at the expense of gathering outcomes-related data. As one staff member clearly explained, "most of the time we measure success by the numbers (beneficiaries, direct and indirect), but that is, to me, not the best measure. You can have planned on 100 attendees, but there were only 40, but the event was a success, regardless. The qualitative information is the more important."

Though quantitative measures were useful in recording that the activity took place, they offered little on the substance or qualitative results of a given activity. Additionally, activity notes focused predominantly on process and implementation issues, and rarely captured the more meaningful results-oriented information. FERs also focused primarily on output reporting. Where outcomes were reported (i.e. indicators of the second-level objectives), they focused

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[25] Tunisia Overview of OTI M&E, Monitoring & Evaluation 101, p. 2.
[26] For example, a three-day training followed by a two-day performance would be the equivalent of five contact days. The Team selected 52 activities, 12 from each Tunis and Sbeitla, respectively, for both stages of programming. It is noteworthy also that the average increased by roughly 50 percent from Stage I (average of 2.07) to Stage II (average of 3.07).

largely on how activities were received or appreciated. FERs are replete with references to participants who "enjoy[ed] very much taking part of those events," or "Youth [who] had generally positive reactions to the event." The shortcoming of the FERs may have in part been due to the process in which they were drafted: according to a former staff member, it "didn't make sense that the PDO did it [FER]; the GM should have done it." The program also missed an opportunity to use the drafting of FERs as a learning tool by generating so many of them in the final months of the program.

A significant problem with the FER process was that the program did so little follow-up once activities had ended. A common theme heard often from staff was that there was scant monitoring of results once an activity was completed. As one staff member remarked, "we do not go look[ing] for information; if information comes, we know it." The lack of follow-up was also noted by a number of awardees, including for example, that "[I] don't understand why [the] donor [is] not interested in what happens next."

It is noteworthy that the new M&E officer in Tunis did help improve the analysis and rigor of reporting in the FERs toward the end of the program. The following example illustrates the kind of learning about causal hypotheses and the gaps between activities and expectations that would have been greatly beneficial for the program. This particular activity aimed at increasing "awareness of the importance of women's participation in the political process in order to increase the voice of marginalized groups, namely women, in the political process." After the one-day event on a main street in downtown Tunis, the FER included the following assessment:

> The vast majority of direct and indirect beneficiaries' reactions collected did not mention the theme of the activity (importance of women's participation in the political process). Instead, people expressed their satisfaction with the positive energy, good organization, good performances, etc. All the comments were very positive. Press articles presented the event as Tunisia's participation in an international event on women's rights in general, despite the grantee's efforts to present it as an awareness raising effort on the importance of women's participation in the political process. Objective 2 can be considered as partially achieved: the event attracted a large live audience and a lot of media attention, the grantee spoke publicly about the need to increase the voice of women in the political process, but beneficiaries' reactions focused more on women's rights at large and on the success of the event as a show. The specific message about women's participation in politics was mixed with a broader, less specific message about women's rights at large.

There were attempts to improve program learning, which at least demonstrates recognition of the need to strengthen the feedback loop. For example, regular implementation meetings provided an opportunity for the program team to discuss lessons; however, those meetings attended by the Evaluation Team focused almost exclusively on operational matters. Additionally, an elections cluster report and a mid-term evaluation could have provided further learning, yet in reality provided little usable information, as recognized by the DC and program teams. A number of studies were also commissioned, which appeared to inform elements of program design, but were less relevant for improving the feedback loop on program performance.

Testing Assumptions. With relatively little meaningful qualitative information captured, the program also missed an opportunity to more systematically identify lessons and learn from past experience. In particular, it is not clear whether any of the assumptions on which each activity

was based was ever tested, revised, or discarded. In the exceptional circumstance when assumptions were tested, it was still not clear that the results were used to inform future programming. The single largest grant throughout the life of the program was a media tolerance campaign predicated on the following: "OTI assumes that by supporting this activity, Tunisians will be more apt to embrace feelings of unity and tolerance and will, in turn, support a peaceful transition." In focus groups organized to glean information on the impact of this campaign, participants had a very weak recollection of the television spot, only one of them had seen the spot online, and several did recall the posters.

When given an opportunity to view these different formats, participants' reactions were mixed. They did not consider the TV message credible because it glossed over the very real divisions in Tunisian society; yet, they found the poster images attractive, and reported liking the online spot very much, despite its length. When asked about impact of the campaign, they agreed that, while it engendered positive feelings, they doubted it would change people's behavior. Given the number of tolerance activities in the program, such assumptions should have been tested before activities were replicated.

Recognizing the Challenge. TTI's struggle with program design, testing assumptions, and documenting outcomes made programming to outcomes a serious challenge – a challenge that did not go unnoticed. In response to a question about outcomes above the activity level, a PDO responded that, "My job is at activity level. Connection between activities is something that I rarely talk about or am asked about. Maybe that says something." Another staff member remarked that, "activities happen mostly as we designed them, but…[I] am a bit in the dark as to broader program impact." Leadership understood the problem as well, and, following guidance from the October 2013 SRS, planned for the Final Evaluation Team to identify cluster-level outcomes. Certainly final evaluators have a role to play in helping measure program impact. Ultimately, however, "final evaluations should summarize the outcomes the project has had…[and] [m]uch like outcome information, the principal sources for this information are the field teams themselves. They should be able to evaluate the relative success of the project in their own words."[27] As a result of scant documented evidence and limited ability of staff to articulate higher-level outcomes, the Evaluation Team was unable to assess programmatic impact at the sub-objective level; instead, the Team drew broader conclusions regarding the country objective that only partially corresponded to the sub-objectives.

A greater focus on programming to outcomes would almost certainly have facilitated cluster-level analysis. The perspective from Washington, DC was similar: "[I] don't know that staff do see it coming together…if the cluster approach was there, it was not strong." Former staff echoed the difficulties with cluster-level outcomes, suggesting that clusters were "not well developed," that they "tried and wanted to do it [clusters]," but that ultimately, they "didn't have a lot of success on clusters."

These findings suggest that TTI struggled to program to cluster-level outcomes. To illustrate this challenge further, the report now examines programming to the CVE sub-objective.

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[27] Tunisia Overview of OTI M&E, Monitoring & Evaluation 101, p. 3.

Challenges of Programming to Cluster-Level Outcomes: the Case of CVE. The Evaluation Team drafted a short brief following the December 2013 trip; the brief, which is included as Annex I, details the Team's findings regarding the CVE sub-objective outcomes. Though relatively early in the life of CVE programming, leadership requested that the Team focus on this pilot sub-objective. At the time, the Team concluded that:

> Assuming at-risk youth participated in TTI programming to some significant degree, it is reasonable to conclude that the program did in fact contribute to a sense of belonging to moderate Tunisian society. This sense of belonging is expressed by individual-level changes among participating youth that interviewees referred to consistently: an increase in self-confidence, improved communication skills, and a renewed sense of hope. The extent of this contribution, however, cannot be determined.

This finding was based on a number of caveats, made clear in the report. After conducting additional CVE interviews and focus groups during the second trip, the Team found that while activity-level outcomes were assessed accurately, the caveats were, in fact, more serious than previously understood. The following section details the challenges of programming to CVE outcomes.

Many participants in CVE activities spoke of the profound impact programming had on their respective lives. Having a greater sense of confidence was the sentiment expressed most commonly by participants. This was articulated in a variety of ways: "now we are confident in ourselves and we feel enhanced;" that "these activities allowed me to realize myself;" and, that participants could now "express our ideas." Numerous participants also spoke of the impact activities had on allowing them to further themselves personally: "my objective was to improve art," or "increase my skills" or "develop talents." Participants also expressed a greater sense of hope for the future, including, for example, the sentiment that "I can now dream." On a personal level, therefore, it would appear that CVE activities were meaningful to participants.

It is less clear, however, whether or how these activities "came together" at the cluster-level. Concerns raised during the December assessment regarding CVE program design and follow-up were equally relevant four months later. The December brief highlighted two design challenges in particular: targeting and sustained engagement with youth. The Evaluation Team recognized that identifying "youth at-risk of joining extremist efforts" (i.e. "undecideds") in the early days of the program was a significant challenge; eight months into the program, however, it seemed as though this challenge had still not been addressed.

Current CVE literature—including USAID Policy on "The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency," CGCC's "Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming," and Integrity Research and Consultancy's Evaluation of OTI Kenya's CVE programs—all offer similar guidance on CVE targeting: that targeting requires a strong evidence base, selectivity for maximum impact, and continued evaluation after activities are completed. Given the acknowledged difficulties of CVE programming, and these proposed approaches, ensuring that youth were, in fact, at risk of violent extremism should have been a primary feature of programming for this sub-objective. There was little evidence, however, that TTI improved its selection of participants and actually targeted at-risk youth. Instead, the program continued to work predominantly with youth who were at risk of either drugs or criminal activity.

The program team recognized the difficulty of targeting, explaining in a CVE FER: "BTD has struggled with focusing some of our grants more finely on the target demographic for our youth focused CVE programming." It remains unclear why the program defined this cluster by a target population without taking appropriate steps to ensure some degree of certainty as to who was actually participating in activities. It would appear difficult, therefore, to achieve higher-level outcomes for a target population that cannot be properly identified.

The second concern about the CVE program design related to the program's ability to sustain engagement with youth through dispersed and short-lived activities. The brief stated that, "while at-risk youth of Kasserine, for example, may have had up to two dozen events over the course of six months of programming, it is unclear how intensive or sustained programming was for each." Program staff and awardees echoed this sentiment in the second trip as well. While some activities were linked, it was not clear whether participants were engaged in programming in a sustained manner. One former staff member commented that CVE activities "were good, but not all of them…I don't see how that will counter extremism. Too brief. What happens after? A few days of soccer, after they can go back to Ansar Sharia meetings. Associations may commit to continue, but we don't follow on and as far as we know they don't [follow on]." From Tunis, a staff member remarked, "CVE activities…can draw at-risk youth, but the important thing is to retain them, to do follow-up. It is not enough to do one activity and two months later another one." OTI DC also appeared concerned about design and follow on issues, wondering "how to ensure CVE activities do not just come across as 'one-offs'?"

Important questions remain regarding outcomes of the CVE sub-objective. In particular, uncertainty about whether the target population was actually participating in the program and whether diffuse and short-term programming could sustain their interest cast doubt on whether activities were designed intentionally to achieve a common outcome. As an awardee in Tunis remarked, "effects do not add up across activities because they are not linked, not part of a process, each one has an effect at a different point in time."

Though the Team cannot draw conclusions about the impact of this sub-objective, *per se*, CVE programming certainly contributed to the program-wide outcomes in support of the transition (as described in section V). CVE activities, for example, featured elements of visibility, tangible benefits, support of alternative youth, discovering "the other," and shone a light on the Interior, among others.

Effective Allocation of Resources to Achieve Impact. One of the sub-questions in the SOW called for an assessment of whether "there an effective allocation of resources to achieve the expected and desired impact." To adequately address the issue of effective resource allocation, it is necessary to assess the management aspects of the program. Such an assessment would likely include an examination of management decisions and processes, leadership dynamics and team engagement, and OTI-implementing partner communication protocols, among other factors.

Given the history of TTI's management and personnel issues, the Team deliberately and explicitly avoided this line of questioning and investigation. As such, the Team is unable to comment on or draw conclusions about the effective allocation of program resources.

VI. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following section provides an account of the key lessons to be learned from the TTI experience. In particular, the importance and value of:

Combating marginalization of the Interior. A feature of many of the countries where OTI engages is a sizable rift between the capital and the rest of the country. Narratives of marginalization and exclusion abound, and initial assessments often correctly identify these as conflict "hotspots" for intensive program engagement. There was widespread agreement across stakeholders that TTI not only addressed the Coastal-Interior divide, but also that the Sbeitla office programming was particularly field-driven and impactful. The fact that many of the higher-level outcomes were more evident in the Interior suggests this was one of the key strength of the program.

 ➢ Recommendation: Programming in and from the capital is often the default option for most country programs; while likely necessary in the initial days of a transition, OTI should not take it for granted that programming from the capital be sustained if traction elsewhere is greater. OTI's comparative advantages of in-kind support to nascent groups, rapid start-up and flexibility, and tailored interventions proved more effective in the more marginalized areas.

Understanding youth engagement. Youth engagement has become a mainstay of OTI country programs. There are numerous noteworthy lessons in the TTI experience worth learning: the importance of achieving a group identity and cohesiveness in promoting engagement; the benefits of identifying the conditions that promote sustained engagement; the value of supporting CSOs' to provide youth with opportunities for decision-making (particularly in societies in which power is concentrated in the hands of older generations); the importance of visibility and public performance to further engagement; the value of supporting innovative arts forms for greater reach; and, the significance of self-perception to strengthening youth commitment to improving the future of their communities and country, among others.

 ➢ Recommendation: Use TTI's experience (outlined above) as a basis for compiling a "best practices" document on youth engagement across country programs. Such a compilation would also help shape more deliberate testing of hypotheses (i.e. does the sense of contributing to the community really make for stronger commitment to volunteerism or associative life across countries?)
 ➢ Recommendation: TTI's pioneering use of innovative arts forms allowed it to reach a more diverse range of youth, breaking the barriers of traditional methods that tend to reach the civic-minded and "ready-to-engage" youth. As other programs develop similar

approaches, it is recommended that OTI intentionally test the targeting and messaging assumptions to address the issue of "preaching to the choir."

Improving program learning. TTI's experience demonstrates the importance of learning to program success. From this experience, the following lessons can be drawn:

➢ Program to outcomes: Whether in TTI's "famine or feast" period of strategy, the lesson was the same: the perils of programming to outputs. Collecting relevant information and testing assumptions would have helped the team program to outcomes. While a mid-2012 M&E technical assistance report noted this shortcoming, there was no further follow up or documentation to this effect.
  ○ Recommendation: Employ a "whole-of-OTI-approach" to design for, and capture, higher-level outcomes. This includes ensuring that PPR teams systematically review M&E information in the database and other internal (or external) M&E products to ensure that outcomes are being designed for and captured.

➢ Documenting success and failure: The TTI experience suggests that despite having all the procedural PPMP mechanisms in place (i.e. PPRs, SRSs, etc), there were significant gaps in the learning that took place. A notable example was the program's difficulty in addressing the brevity of interventions issue, which was highlighted by PPRs, staff and the evaluation team.
  ○ Recommendation: Design and implement a follow-up tool that tracks PPR, MR, and TA recommendations to ensure that identified challenges do not go unattended.
  ○ Recommendation: Provide guidance on (and support to) the division of responsibilities for developing FERs, especially once there is a backlog.

➢ Empowering national staff: While the evaluation made a concerted effort to avoid the management and personnel challenges that plagued the program in its first two years, they were impossible to ignore completely.
  ○ Recommendation: Provide the space and develop the culture for staff to question, contribute and reflect on program outcomes. In particular, implementation meetings tended to focus exclusively on operational issues. Ensuring substantive programming discussions take place on a regular basis in this forum (or others) is advised.

ANNEX A

RFTOP ATTACHMENT II

SCOPE OF WORK

for

Tunisia Transition Initiative Final Evaluation Project

Period of Performance: November 1, 2013 - May 31, 2014

Introduction/Purpose and Goals of the Evaluation

USAID's Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) is implementing the Tunisia Transition Initiative in support of the U.S. Government's foreign policy priorities in Tunisia. Initiated in May 2011 in response to the events of the Arab Spring, OTI's Tunisia program seeks to support Tunisians in their pursuit of a democratic society by creating viable space for the transition to succeed. Activities are typically small, short-term, in-kind, and respond to emerging political issues, and are clustered together in order to achieve impacts on citizen activism, civic engagement, civil society organization (CSO) capacity, social and traditional media capacity, access to information, political participation by marginalized groups, tolerance, and countering violent extremism (moderation).

The objectives of this task order are to conduct an independent program performance evaluation of the OTI/Tunisia Transition Initiative program implemented between May 2011 and March 2014. The primary audience is USAID/OTI, other USG offices as appropriate and other local and international stakeholders involved in Tunisia's democratic transition. The evaluation should maximize the learning opportunities of TTI in the review of program achievements and challenges, monitoring, and strategic approaches. Under this task order, the contractor shall travel to Tunisia (two trips during the period of performance) to learn about TTI's programmatic and operational approaches to implementation and assess the program's impact. From this work, and from interviews and research done remotely, a final evaluation and other deliverables will be generated and delivered to USAID/OTI. All deliverables for this task order shall be delivered to USAID/OTI following the deliverable schedule as outlined in this document.

Background

In coordination with other USG entities including Embassy/Tunis and USAID/ME Bureau, OTI launched the Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI) in May 2011 to provide a fast and flexible mechanism for critical political-transition assistance. As the first permanent USAID program present in Tunisia since USAID's Mission closed in the 1990s, OTI served as a primary instrument for USAID assistance to the country

post-Arab Spring.   The strategic decision was based on the determination that OTI's four criteria of engagement were met:

- A peaceful, stable, and democratic transition in Tunisia was significant to U.S. national interests. Tunisia's role as the catalyst of the Arab Spring elevated the country's profile across the region and many believed that Tunisia could provide a model of democratic transition;
- The departure of Ben Ali and the near-term response from the interim Tunisia Government created an important window of opportunity for OTI to play a substantive role in supporting the political transition, particularly outside of the capital;
- USAID/OTI's comparative advantage, including the ability to respond expeditiously to unforeseen contingencies and rapidly unfolding events, would give the USG a capability to provide targeted assistance. Additionally, the mechanism's flexibility and entrepreneurial approach offered a way for the USG to work with new and emerging groups that otherwise would be unable to receive foreign assistance;
- Although undergoing significant turmoil and transition, Tunisia was sufficiently stable for OTI to operate.

A task order under the SWIFT III indefinite quantity contract (IQC) was awarded to DAI, Inc. in May 2011 to implement a two-year program with a ceiling of $24,979,620. In December 2012, the ceiling was raised to $29,979,620 and the end date extended to May 2014 to solidify gains made in the eighteen months of the program.

The program was funded from a variety of sources in addition to OTI's core funding (TI). USAID/Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau (DCHA) provided $5M from the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF); USAID's Center for Excellence on Democracy, Rights and Governance provided over $1.7M in Elections and Political Processes (EPP) funds; and the Embassy/Tunis and State Department provided OTI with $2.7M in ESF funds.

Program Theory & Strategic Approach

TTI supports U.S. policy and assistance priorities in Tunisia. TTI programming supports democracy and governance by ensuring that Tunisia's transition is transparent, inclusive, and credible, and supports the consolidation of democratic reforms. Activities contribute both to the strengthening of civil society and civic participation in the political process and supporting institutionalization of fair and competitive electoral processes. TTI is a flexible programming mechanism that can work with a wide variety of local partners and respond to strategic mission priorities, emerging issues, shifting political realities, and identified assistance gaps.

Although iterative and revised through the life of the program, TTI's current strategy centers around three key components: the program goal, one program objective, and eight sub-objectives which fit into two broad categories. These three parts are inter-related and interdependent. The highest order unit is the program goal which provides broad, overarching guidance for the program's activities. The program objective (effect) feeds into that program goal and is achieved by investing in the eight sub-objectives (impact).

Program Goal: TTI seeks to support Tunisians in their pursuit of a democratic society.

Program Objective: TTI creates space for the transition to succeed. *Space* is considered the democratic conditions necessary for citizen, civil society, and governmental engagement in the transition.

Sub-objectives

TTI creates *space* by programming around eight sub-objectives: activism, citizen engagement, CSO capacity, media and social media, information, marginalized groups, tolerance, and countering violent extremism (moderation). Each subobjective aims to create space by addressing issues and factors that inhibit that space.

- **ACTIVISM** – Promote citizen activism. ADDRESSES: Citizens are frustrated with the slow political processes (in particular the election and constitution) and local governance structures. Community leaders and activists lack the skills, networks, knowledge, and opportunities to advocate for change and accountability in a democratic manner.
- **CIVIC ENGAGEMENT** – Increase citizen participation in political processes. ADDRESSES: Democracy is new to Tunisia, along with democratic principles and political processes. Citizens lack knowledge on general democratic principles, democratic citizenship, and means to participate, especially with the constitution, elections, and local governance structures.
- **CSO CAPACITY** – Increase CSO leadership capacity. ADDRESSES: Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) multiplied due to new rules following the revolution that allowed greater political and social organization outside of the auspices of the government. These nascent CSOs lack the management and leadership skills, extensive networks, and democratic knowledge to support and lead civic engagement and activism.
- **SOCIAL MEDIA/MEDIA** – Increase social media/media's capacity to report objectively. ADDRESSES: Media and social media played a large role in the revolution, and continue to do so in Tunisia. Most Tunisians (over 50%) use Facebook as their primary news source. The prolific and nascent social media and traditional media structures suffer from a lack of knowledge, skills, and experience to report objectively, which leads to the spread of misinformation and rumors. Citizens, journalists, and bloggers lack a clear understanding of media's role in a democracy.
- **INFORMATION** – Increase citizens' access to and demand for information. ADDRESSES: There is no tradition of open and transparent communication in the government and there remains little dissemination of information on political processes (in particular the elections and constitution) and general governance, nor is that information widely available. This causes frustrations, spread of rumors and misinformation, suspicion, and lack of understanding. In addition, information based decision making is not well established. Citizens lack information about the political processes and key democratic principles that are necessary to make decisions and participate in a democracy.
- **MARGINALIZED GROUPS** – Increase the voice of marginalized groups (such as women and youth) in the political process. ADDRESSES: Women and youth played an important role in the revolution; however have been apathetic or unengaged since the revolution. Women and youth lack the leadership skills, networks, and access to information necessary to have a voice in the transition and participate actively in political processes.
- **TOLERANCE** – Increase the acceptance of the diversity of views. ADDRESSES: Post-revolution, Tunisia has struggled with its national identity and become increasingly polarized. Individuals

across the spectrum have tried to dictate what defines a Tunisian, despite a rich history of diversity. In some cases, frustrations with differences of opinions have resulted in political and tribal violence. Citizens lack the understanding of the role diversity plays in a democracy and the skills to be able to debate and discuss topics among individuals with different backgrounds and points of view.

- **COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE)/MODERATION** – Strengthen the sense of belonging to moderate Tunisian society for at-risk youth. ADDRESSES: Violent extremism has increased in Tunisia following the revolution. In particular young men, who are unemployed, apathetic, and unengaged, have been targeted for jihadist recruitment. A large portion of young men remain disengaged from the current political processes and transition in Tunisia and do not have a strong purpose or sense of belonging to moderate society. There are few attractive social network opportunities that offer an alternative to joining violent extremist groups.

The six sub-objectives primarily support the participation of citizens, media, government, and civil society in political processes, such as elections, constitution, and local governance. Two subobjectives primarily foster the development of democratic ideals and culture among citizens. The diagram below provides an overview of these elements of the TTI program strategy.

Given the nature of OTI's intervention, these sub-objectives have developed over time in response to the changing context, but continue to reflect a general programming hypothesis. They help the team draw logical relationships and linkages between the individual activities and the program's strategic objective. The emphasis on particular areas of intervention has varied over time, as has the approach that the program has taken when designing activities. Overall the program has worked to create a preponderance of activities and resulting outcomes that, when aggregated, can generate real impact and create a foundation on which government, civil society, and the international community can build on to create substantive change in the future.

Theory of Change

OTI's investment in the areas outlined above are gauged around the premise that:
If Tunisian citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs), media, and government officials advocate, engage, have capacity, report objectively, use information, lead, accept diversity, and have a sense of belonging,

then democratic space for the transition to succeed is created. If democratic space for the transition is created, then citizens are able to pursue a democratic society.

Program Design and Implementation

Sub-strategies

On a quarterly basis, activity teams develop substrategies for the two regional offices (Tunis and Sbeitla, Kasserine), constitutions, and elections. First, the teams identify emerging issues and factors that are inhibiting democratic space. Second, teams assess which issues to prioritize and where TTI has a comparative advantage. Based on this assessment, teams then select a subset of sub-objectives to guide programming over a three-month period. Finally, throughout the quarter, activities are developed in clusters under each selected sub-objectives. Individual activities aim to affect knowledge, networks, conditions, skills, and attitudes. When clustered together, the consolidated outcomes of the individual activities contribute to achieving measurable change (impact) on the sub-objectives.

ACTIVITY DESIGN

Activities are short, responsive to the current political context, flexible, and, most importantly, designed to contribute to programmatic goals. Activities typically last one to five months and funding is usually in-kind. Activities are prioritized based on the following factors:
- Fit within the substrategy, including targeted subobjectives and beneficiaries
- Link to prior and future programming
- Potential to inspire civic action
- Comparative advantage of TTI intervention
- Funding availability and prioritization
- Capacity to support implementation
- Innovation

LOCAL PARTNERS

TTI has the capacity to work with a variety of partners on activity implementation, including NGOs, INGOs, government officials, companies, civil society organizations, and groups of individuals. TTI selects CSOs and other partners to implement activities that align with the strategy and uses a collaborative approach with partners to design and implement the activities. TTI typically partners with change agents, such as:
- Government officials - progressive, amenable to program objectives, from across the political spectrum
- Community Leaders
- Youth – leaders, envelope pushers, trend-setters, artists, musicians, bloggers, activists
- Women
- Media/Social Media - objective, open to new concepts, approaches and receiving new skills
- Civil society - proactive, plugged-in, change agents
- Social entrepreneurs

BENEFICIAIRES

TTI designs activities to target individuals and groups who can positively impact the transition, including CSOs, citizens, artisans, government officials, etc. These individuals are typically either already actively engaged in their communities and political processes, or they are the "fence-sitters" and undecided. Both groups have the capacity to participate in and contribute to the democratic transition. Beneficiaries include:
- Government officials
- Community Leaders
- Youth
- Women
- Media and Social Media
- Civil society

LOCATIONS

TTI implements activities in seven governorates and nation-wide. Activities are designed out of two regional offices – Tunis in Greater Tunis and Sbeitla in Kasserine.
- Sbeitla Office: Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa, El Kef Corridor
- Tunis Office: Tunis, Ariana, Ben Arous, Manouba, National

DAI has been the sole implementing partner throughout the life of the TTI program. As of August 2013, 173 grants have been awarded to date totaling $6,336,597. Grantees have included local civil society organizations that work in the areas of community activism, governance, youth, women's rights, conflict resolution/nonviolence and media. Grantees have also included local and national government offices, production studios, media organizations, and occasionally international NGOs. DAI has offices both in Tunis and Sbeitla, Kasserine governorate with 31 national and four international staff that work in program development, procurement, logistics, finance, IT, and support. DAI also has a home office in Bethesda, MD that actively supports TTI's needs in-country.

Evaluation Plan and Questions

Drawing on the contractor's professional, country and thematic experience, the contractor shall develop and implement a detailed evaluation plan to gauge the relevance, effectiveness and impact of the TTI program. An evaluation plan will be created, utilizing primarily qualitative research methods, including but not limited to a desk review of program literature and reporting, internal evaluations, staff and beneficiary interviews, focus groups, and an independent evaluation of any studies conducted by OTI. The evaluation plan should be designed to:
1. In the context of Tunisia's political transition, examine and assess OTI Tunisia's strategic approach to programming, looking in particular at adaptability to changes in the context over the life of the program, relevance to critical issues or events of the transition, and overall strategic targeting.
2. Document the effectiveness and impact (intended and unintended) of OTI's Tunisia program, primarily through the lens of TTI's eight sub-objectives (listed above) and the respective level of investment in each area.

More specifically, the evaluation team will answer the following questions:

1. In the context of Tunisia's political transition, examine and assess OTI Tunisia's strategic approach to programming, looking in particular at adaptability to changes in the context over the life of the program, relevance to critical issues or events of the transition, and overall strategic targeting.

- Did OTI identify, anticipate and/or respond to the most critical issues related to the success of the Tunisia's democratic transition?
- Were OTI's strategy (goal, objectives, and subobjectives) and geographic focus relevant and appropriate given the political context in Tunisia and OTI's role within a larger USG assistance portfolio?
  - Were OTI's revisions to strategy appropriate, given shifting political realities and windows of opportunity? Was OTI flexible and able to respond effectively to the changes in the evolving political situation in Tunisia? Did OTI miss windows of opportunity to program effectively around particular issues or geographic regions?

2. Document the effectiveness and impact (intended and unintended) of OTI's Tunisia program, primarily through the lens of TTI's eight sub-objectives (listed above) and the respective level of investment in each area.

  - Did the program have a coherent and logically connected set of assumptions about how change will happen?
  - Did OTI contribute to its stated goal and objectives?
  - Did OTI implement its program according to the strategic design?
  - Did the program achieve the intended impacts? What effect did programming have on identified issues/problem sets? In particular, did activity outcomes contribute to programmatic impact on subobjective and objective levels (clusters)?
  - Was there an effective allocation of resources (funding amounts, number of activities, and staff effort) in order to achieve the expected and desired impact?

Evaluation Methodology

To systematically test and review lines of inquiry, indicators and/or standards of achievement will be developed by the evaluation team for all evaluation questions. These are the measures of success or benchmarks against which the final evaluation team will compare the data they collect throughout the evaluation and will be agreed upon with OTI.

Most methods to be applied in this evaluation will be qualitative in nature. Data collection instruments should include interviews, focus groups, observation, and document review. The evaluation team will also integrate the data and analysis from all TTI studies and analysis that OTI has commissioned throughout the life of the program (copies will be given to the team), including all Strategic Review Sessions (SRS), Program Performance Review (PPR) documents, Rolling Assessment documents, sector-specific external evaluations, and other assessments/evaluation tools.

An evaluation planning matrix should be devised within the final evaluation plan that will outline the indicators or standards of achievement against which questions are assessed, and detail the means of verification and sources of data. For these evaluation questions, OTI seeks data that is disaggregated and analyzed by key informants and stakeholders (age group, gender, rural/urban, etc.) in different regions and, when possible without raising suspicions, by confessional/focus groups.

The plan should include some combination of the following:

Interviews with Key Informants and Stakeholders. The evaluation team will meet with current and, when possible and at the direction of OTI, previous OTI and implementing partner international and local program staff. Interviews should also be conducted with relevant USG stakeholders and partners if possible, and selections of partner NGO leadership. The evaluation team should seek to interview 20-30% of NGO partners, all OTI local program staff, and other field staff such as grant managers, procurement specialists, etc., 5-10 people from USAID's Middle East Bureau and Embassy/Tunis to be identified by OTI, all expatriate staff (OTI Country Representative, Regional Program Managers, Chief of Party, Deputy Chief of Party), OTI Washington staff (Team Leader, Deputy Team Leader, Program Manager) and if appropriate former OTI staff. Interviews should also be conducted with an established number of external analysts as determined between the contractor and OTI, as appropriate, to gain a broader understanding of the contextual environment in which the USAID/OTI program was operating.

Review and analysis of existing documentation. Part of OTI's M&E methodology includes annual strategy review sessions and intermittent rolling assessments where the OTI team analyzes the current operating environment and justifies if programmatic focus is properly targeted and changes course if it is not. Annual Program Performance Reviews (PPRs) are conducted by OTI staff not connected to the Tunisia program to offer independent analysis of the status of the program. OTI also maintains a project database that documents the background, justification, and internal evaluations of every grant that OTI has supported during the life of TTI as well as provides the programmatic assumptions and collection of supporting evidence in meeting its objective and subobjectives. The Evaluation Team will review SRS and Rolling Assessment summaries (and detailed notes when necessary), all PPR reports, a partial but significant segment of the activity database, in addition to quarterly and annual reports, and M&E products produced by OTI and by external consultants.

Focus Groups and Key Informant Interviews. OTI's implementing partner in-country, DAI, is currently working with a local firm, ProData, to conduct a series of focus groups, key informant interviews and other M&E services to independently assess program impact. The Evaluation Team will utilize existing data collected through that group and may be required to provide technical support to strengthen the organizational and technical capacity of the local research firm, both in-country and remotely, during the design of the methodology, field implementation, and final analysis.

> *Analysis of Qualitative and Quantitative Survey Data and Results.* OTI is supporting external research initiatives of key activity types/approaches used by the TTI program and help to inform programming for the final year of the program and capture community level impact of TTI activities.

The evaluation team should be prepared to weave the provided analysis as well as its own analysis of the data into its final report.

- *Site Visits.* As part of its field work and data collection, the evaluation team must visit a minimum of 5-10 partner events or trainings, and 5 completed tangible activities (youth centers, school rehabilitations, parks, etc.) as available during the field visit period, with a fair distribution across types of activities, regions, and objectives. Specific visits and availability will depend on the timing of the field work. OTI will work with the evaluation team to compile a list of possible site visits that reflects the diversity of our work, from which the evaluation team will select. Site visits should include interviews with beneficiaries, partners, and other stakeholders.

- *Initial visit to Tunisia:* Best practices documented from past OTI final evaluations have shown that getting the final evaluation team to the field while activity implementation is occurring -- and getting involved in understanding and participating in a country program well before the formal final evaluation is commissioned at the end of the program -- is a great way for evaluation teams to understand the depth, day-to-day work, and analysis that goes into an OTI program. While the formal final evaluation field work is scheduled to take place in/around March 2014, USAID/OTI requests one shorter trip (2-3 weeks) to Tunisia for the final evaluation team to become better informed about the Tunisian context and TTI program, begin to analyze the impact of a selection of subobjectives, conduct key informant interviews and focus groups, observe on-going activities, and begin formal evaluation work earlier in the timeline. The Scope of Work for this trip includes small and targeted evaluations, likely around 1-2 subobjective activity clusters, that can assist the final evaluation and interviews with key stakeholders. Dates, timelines, and scopes of work for this-visit needs to be approved by USAID/OTI in advance. OTI anticipates one initial visit, approximately 2-3 weeks, between November 30 – December 22.

- *Geographic Component.* Where appropriate, the report should incorporate maps. OTI's Geographic Information Unit (GIU) will devote a reasonable amount of time, subject to approval of the Team Leader and depending on other commitments, to generating maps as requested by and with data provided by the evaluation team. The evaluation team should share its information, including the raw data, with the GIU team. Where applicable, information gathered by the evaluation team should be coded, using the geographic codes used in the OTI database, at the village level to coincide with language and spelling in OTI's Activity Database.

A draft detailed timeframe of the process must be included in the evaluation plan and will be finalized in close coordination with OTI.

Evaluation Team Composition

The contractor should be able to field the following positions for project management and monitoring teams within the specified times.

The contractor is strongly encouraged to suggest its own configuration that meets its proposed technical approach. Candidates for all positions shall possess fluent written and spoken English to prepare the written evaluation and present briefings. At least one team member must have professional experience in and exhibit knowledge of the key challenges to democratization in Tunisia such that they understand the intricacies of the political transition. It is a requirement that the same team is available for each of the field trips. Although there is some flexibility on the latter trip, the first trip remains relatively fixed for the first three (3) weeks of December 2013; the second will happen between February and March of 2014.

The following is an acceptable team structure that incorporates the required four key personnel and illustrative non-key personnel:

Key Personnel

- *One (1) Mid-level Project Manager:* Overall responsibility for the completion of the task order. The Project Manager is responsible for the submission of all deliverables, for regular communications with OTI, for identifying potential problems and possible solutions, financial reporting, and any other services necessary for the Task Order Scope of Work. At a minimum this position should be filled by someone with a Masters level education (or commensurate experience) and a minimum of five years of professional experience in a related field.
- *One (1) Senior-level Evaluation Expert*: A minimum of ten years of experience in the management of monitoring and evaluation programs and input into strategic planning, especially for conflict-sensitive, governance, and transitional programming and a Masters level education (or commensurate experience). Extensive experience evaluating programs in transitional environments, using qualitative, open-ended tools used to scan the context of social conflict, and with relating program interventions to that context. Experience using evaluative tools featuring quick execution and data turnaround. The evaluation expert should have experience working in areas where access is difficult.
- *Two (2) Field Worker/Evaluation Analysts:* A minimum of five years of related experience in the design, implementation and supervision of field monitoring and evaluation plans, or field-based research in transitional environments as well as a Masters level degree (or commensurate experience). At least one of the two analysts must demonstrate capacity to analyze data sets in SPSS, evaluate survey methodology, and clearly articulate results from quantitative surveys. English fluency required for both and strong preference for French fluency in at least one. At least one of the two analysts should have significant professional experience in and exhibit knowledge of the key challenges to democratization in Tunisia such that they understand the intricacies of politics. Incumbents will be responsible for participating in field research, reviewing and evaluating data collected to ensure information is accurate, complete, and relevant to the project, documenting findings and communicating.

Non-Key Personnel

The Offeror may propose additional or alternative positions as appropriate for the execution of the statement of work. The Offeror shall identify at least two illustrative candidates for each of the non-key personnel positions, including the following:

- ***One (1) Data Analyst:*** Familiarity or experience with data collection and accurate data entry using intermediate computer skills. Incumbent will be responsible for compiling data, entering data electronically, assisting the team in generating information products, and other duties as assigned.

Schedule

Illustrative Timeline (to be finalized between OTI and evaluation team):

Phase 1: Planning (10% of LOE)

- Consultations with OTI
- Document analysis/background reading of materials provided by OTI
- Methodological framework presented to OTI and feedback incorporated

Phase 2: Research and Field Work (60% of LOE)

- Design data collection instruments
- Conduct field work (two visits)
- OTI feedback and incorporation

Phase 3: Analysis and Reporting (25% of LOE)

- Analysis of fieldwork data
- Draft report
- Program recommendations
- OTI concurrence and feedback incorporated
- Finalize draft report for final OTI concurrence

Phase 4: Submission and Presentation of Findings (5% of LOE)

- Submission of final report and raw data
- Submission of final power point presentation
- Presentations in Washington, DC to OTI Senior Leadership, OTI Tunisia team, IP staff, and other relevant USG personnel. Presentations to other, non-US government audiences as appropriate as identified by OTI.
- Publishing, online posting, submission to DEC, and other standard report distribution processes.

Logistics

The contractor is responsible for securing all logistics and arrangements for the evaluation team. TTI may help provide logistical recommendations (in-country housing, transportation, etc.), but the contractor is responsible for all payments and reservations. The Project Manager is responsible for all scheduling, arranging meeting locations, and confirming times/dates/locations with the team and interviewees (though OTI can facilitate assistance from TTI's IP). TTI will make available a conference room in each of its offices for use in Tunis and Sbeitla, however, meetings offsite are sometimes preferable and the evaluation team will be responsible for securing these locations. OTI will facilitate access to the Embassy for meetings with Embassy officials and will arrange meeting space in the Embassy.

The contractor shall arrange and purchase all international and US travel.

The contractor shall provide per diem (lodging and M&IE) for the evaluation team in both the U.S. and in the Tunisia, and shall procure and fund in-country air travel and ground transportation.

The contractor will submit required documentation, to the OTI Country Representative, via the OTI Program Manager in Washington, D.C. as requested. The contractor will be responsible for procuring relevant visas and other travel documents.

The contractor and the evaluation team will work with OTI and implementing partners to arrange interviews in Washington, DC and in Tunisia.

Deliverables

All deliverables will require OTI concurrence prior to deliverable finalization.

1. An evaluation plan for the TTI program based on the guidelines provided in this document, including the data collection methodology. This deliverable will allow for OTI and the evaluation team to make final decisions on the questions for inquiry and the focus given to the agreed upon questions. Due to OTI for review and comment in November 2013.
2. Detailed scopes of work for the proposed pre-visit to Tunisia as described under the 'Evaluation Methodology' section of this SOW.
3. An draft evaluation report from the pre-visit, specifically focused on impact within 1-2 programmatic clusters by a TBD date in January.
4. A final evaluation report from the first visit by a TBD date in January.
5. While in the Tunisia, weekly meetings as needed to brief OTI on progress.
6. A draft evaluation report. The draft evaluation report should include findings, conclusions, recommendations, and key lessons from the program. OTI will provide feedback on this report to the evaluation team. Due on or about April 1, 2014.
7. A second draft evaluation report, incorporating (as appropriate) feedback from OTI on the first draft report. Due on or about April 21, 2014.

8. A briefing to staff in Tunisia, including OTI and DAI staff, key personnel at the US Embassy. Exact timing to be determined.
9. A teleconference with OTI leadership. Due on or about April 25, 2013.
10. A final evaluation report of no more than 40 pages, excluding annexes but including findings, conclusions, and recommendations for OTI programming more broadly. Forty (40) copies due on or about May 2 (final determination of the number of French and/or Arabic language translations to be decided in consultation with OTI).
11. A final Power Point presentation summarizing key findings, conclusions and recommendations, to be presented by evaluation team Evaluation Expert in Washington, DC to OTI Senior Leadership and relevant OTI Tunisia staff. Due on or about May 9, 2014.
12. A presentation to OTI, DAI, and other USG personnel in Washington due on or about May 9, 2014.

The draft and final evaluation reports should be structured as follows:

- **Cover Page**
- **List of Acronyms**
- **Table of Contents**
- **Executive Summary:** up to five (5) pages. The summary should be a clear and concise stand-alone document that gives readers the essential contents of the evaluation report, previewing the main points in order to enable readers to build a mental framework for organizing and understanding the detailed information within the report.
- **Program context**: Briefly discuss the country situation, what the TTI program set out to do, and other essential background information.
- **Methodology:** Discuss the sampling method, including strengths and weaknesses, inclusion of stakeholders and staff, rough schedule of activities, description of any statistical analyses undertaken. The section should also address constraints and weaknesses of the evaluation process, including a description of data collection techniques utilized.
- **Limitations:** Spell out what can and cannot be concluded from the evaluation.
- **Findings:** The evaluation team should determine how to best organize the results based on the evaluation questions. The findings should include both data and data analysis, and should be directly based on the data gathered.
- **Conclusions/Recommendations/Lessons Learned:** Map how findings link to conclusions and then to recommendations. This is also the space for the evaluation team to think about the data and results, and make concrete recommendations for future project improvements/changes, pulling out organization lessons learned, and commenting on the data and results. Everything presented in this section must be directly linked back to the information presented in the Findings section of the report. There should not be any conclusions that do not link to findings, or any recommendations that don't link to conclusions.
- **Annexes:** Annexes should include maps, data collection instruments in English and translation, list of stakeholders interview (including number and type of interactions), the SOW, qualitative

protocols developed and used, any data sets that can be provided in the electronic format, and any required photos, participant profiles, or special documentation needed.

TTI Final Evaluation: Matrix of Evaluation Questions

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
USG/ USAID	• OTI responsive to Bureau requests, close relationship w/ Bureau and Embassy, worked very well. • "Of all the groups on the ground, OTI the most effective at adapting to changes." • "All of us have suffered from a lack of strategy to help the transition." • Presence of program and team very important.	• More work at local level, in coordination w/ municipalities. • Work w/ CS to prioritize reforms • Run up to elections critical work w/ women, youth, illiterate population. Example Bus Citoyen targeted very marginalized areas where even the government could not access.	• Achievements: run up to elections; support for CA process (civic ed); tolerance campaign; daily engagement w/ groups in the interior; outreach to nascent groups (no ability to do that from other USG prog); focus on youth • Extensive and well coordinated activities on elections (voter education, get out the vote, support for the electoral board). • Voter education bus was very innovative, mobilized interest & excitement • Program w/ CSOs, nascent orgs w/ innovative ideas, bringing communities together • Flashpoints on women´s rights.		• CVE: do you address the · structural challenges of economic & political system or all short-term work? Where are the real reforms needed?	• High expectations for country "Tunisia best case for success of a peaceful transition." • Not enough staff inside the wire (1 person); not having regular TDY access; IP increased staff, making oversight even more difficult. • Unclear what will happen as OTI phases out and DRG does not have a follow-on program. • Insufficient staff for coordination w/ other donors • Lack of USAID staff in country drew on CR time; Embassy extremely involved • Skeptical about absorptive capacity of CSOs.		• USG priorities: 1) security, 2) job creation (EG). • Operations curtailed after Embassy attack. • After Embassy attack, no new funds; shift in USG focus, from democracy and transition to security. • Embassy very cautious after attack. • Embassy likes OTI programming, frustrated w other programs (but have not allowed them to have staff in country) • Target governorates are key, where instability arises.
OTI DC	• First 18 months w/o real strategy, testing what works. • W/ sub-objectives, staff much clearer sense of what they should be doing; strong push to build on previous activities. • Divergent views of level of ownership by	• From start-up, OTI DC interested in a more robust M&E, was a challenge throughout (mid-term evaluation took 11 months to procure).	• Pivot to CVE was on target; disenfranchised youth the most vulnerable to recruitment, if program slows this process down or allows them to stay in a forum where they can think & make up their own minds, succeeded."		• CVE focus on secular organizations. • Difference between CVE and youth engagement in constructive activities: based on targeting. • Difference between CVE and tolerance: former focused on audience, latter on the	• Intense focus on strategy came too late and took too long. • Four Corners communications did not work well. • Funding uncertainties made it hard to plan, staff & manage. • From policy perspective: absence of AID mission,		• Social media: use for context analysis. • Complexity of grants picked up in the last stretch. • Very expensive ratio program-operations platform. • Changed COP twice, dissatisfied w/implementation.

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	local staff. • Strategy did not really change, just staff understanding and implementation of it. • Sub-strategies helped the management team, unclear how much it helped the program team • Fantastic relationship w/ Embassy; despite which there has been very little talk about what follows after closeout. • Program very responsive to political process, providing people w/ space to express themselves. • First PPR highlighted that program didn't have a "robust strategic framework." • Now the strategy is "very clear."				content of the message.	weakness of political analysis. • High turnover & uncertainty in context combined for a very tumultuous program. Plus, risk aversion. • Unclear how DDGS came together. • Efficiencies did not seem to be in place. • Program team in Tunis seemed to have networks w/ particular views of the context. • Only in last year increased communication between offices to share knowledge. • M&E insufficient time and experience to deliver on expectations; people left to their own devices; baselines in last stretch. • Local staff did not know how to program to political changes/ uncertainty. • Team did not feel like they could develop ideas & find partners to implement (CSOs would feel like they were implementing for OTI); Tunis PDOs seemed trapped in elitist CSO circles. • Team focused on high level politics, hard to bring down to how you program to it. • Ordered departure was very disruptive; afterwards, limited slots for OTI staff. • Remote mgmt: restricted access in latter stretch to IP and field.		• Did programs empower Tunisian staff?

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
						• USG not able to consistently focus & engage on Tunisia. • How to ensure CVE activities do not just come across as "one-offs"? • W/o USAID presence, difficult for CR to deal w/ Embassy demands on time; also difficult to provide the needed support, guidance and communication w/ IP. • Turbulence in the program that leadership unaware of (tension between the corners). • Program goal may have been too ambitious, could have been more targeted, compressed to manageable interests.		
Former Staff/PPR/ SRS Members	• Blunt: strategy not a focus enough. Not for lack of wanting to – rather, no capability. Staff not encouraged to ask: "What do we need to do? Where is OTI going?" Those issues were not well discussed at any level. • Former CR was pulled by embassy, but anyway, her thing was "making stuff happen." Didn't have time for bigger picture. Not her forte. • Lack of big picture political hat; leadership was outside the program and should have had a	• Probably missed opportunity in programming locally in Tunis. Staff were focused on FB campaign. Big and complicated. Buy in and dialogue were missed in Tunis. • Weekly political meetings – focused nationally. Nothing really tracking real time. • Geography – spread was a head game – a little here and a little there. Lost momentum that came from those most engaged in revolution. Too much	• Protest that happened able to quickly respond, tap into, t-shirts. Deeply into Sbeitla in Kasserine. Small things, moved fast. • Quick impact – "rare could do things very quick." • Interior: first ones to get CA members to Kasserine to address those who elected them. • First thing that comes to mind is activity level stuff. Frustrating. • Elections: get more people to polls? Don't know. But, only nationwide campaign for women to vote. Need no one else doing that. Filled a critical need. ISIE – exploited contact	• Overall sense: worked better in center than in northern Tunis areas. • Tunis: expected bigger things. Sbeitla focused more locally. Tunis: not much affected. Tunis didn't really get there; never got it. • Higher impact, ad hoc. What went well? Harder to say. • I did not see much impact from Tunis level activities. • Buying time and dialogue – fairly good job at localized level. Helped hearts and	• Women's events – don't know if had an impact. • Elections programming – great because real motivation. First election, focused, knew role, personal-professional motivation, clear target. Very tangible. Concrete. Easier to grasp. Time sensitive.	• -Geographically too spread out. Should have cut Medinine's cord earlier. • Learning sacrificed for doing. • Youth center in Medinine was a nightmare. • Gut instinct of a program more than anywhere else. • Implementation challenges – Former CR and I anal. Held things up, asking for things that may not needed to be there. • GOT-OTI weak because of logistics/bureaucracy, not a bad relationship. Turmoil at MOF and MOI – we were not sure how to engage. • Reluctance to work with USG in the beginning, but it	• Pummeling – during their time. Start with X then move on to working up the chain. Created types of activities (entry level, hitting our stride, pushing the envelope). Find a good mayor or awardee, still need to find new ones, but still let's let it roll and run with it. • Programming "superficial and short-lived" – not connected enough to deeper issues. Group think around things that are successful	• Sbeitla office did more repetitive ideas –something worked well and tried it in new places. Tunis reinvented same ideas. • OTI global: OTI wants sexy – within 48 hours. Such a disservice. Let's be realistic. Calm down. Take time in the beginning to set up operations. No M&E plan for 7 months. Fundamental things that are non-negotiable. Initial strategy. Security plan. Operations. Come at cost of programming

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	long-term view of what Tunisia will look like. • Programming was not strategic. • Primary focus on "go go go" – accomplishing a lot in short time period. "Hard to be thoughtful in that approach." • By summer of 2013, better understanding of the strategy, but not better programming • In the first year, the team "avoided the political " – didn't understand political. • Managed to change the language of the objectives, but "didn't go far into the strategy." • Job (DCR) focused at the activity level. Somewhat involved in program-level analysis, remote. None of us focused on it as much as we should have. • Not apparent that anyone was continually reviewing politics and what was being done and pulling it back into the program. • Debate: 1000 points of light vs. focused strategy. Former to latter. My job to lead on this. Make sure it's happening. Consumed with management/personnel.	spread. Not enough juice in specific people. • Management and personnel issues came at an opportunity cost to programming and strategy. Can't do accurate representation of the program without noting this.	that no one had access to. Got content onto to TV and radio. • Distribution: Best one came out of Sbeitla – puzzle. Piece of the solution. "Brilliant, catchy, smart, says so much." • Impact of distribution? If people ask, "What does it mean in my context? Stop and think for a few minutes. Yes, that impact. • Every grantee had different messages – pick one or two and blanket certain areas. Not one off message – mass appeal, common message. If we could have driven it home. Not sure. Changing attitudes – not sure. Hope so. • Hood clean up – very tangible and visible. Pride in it – very effective. T-shirt – could have done it more places. No cost.	minds. • Cluster – talked about a lot. What did it all add up to? All a jumble; we didn't know about the country. • People were barely using it (clusters). Not well developed. Didn't do a great job. Tried and wanted to do it, but needed help. No one knew what to do with it. Need a mass of activity to learn from. Didn't have a lot of success on clusters. Tried to show higher-level activities. Intention was there. • Biggest frustrations: How build on that (elections) success? What to dig into more? How deeply? How many follow ups? Hitting same community same message – should be able to get at it. Not sure how well we did that. Can't do one offs. Same grantee, same community, same theme. Need to be deliberate about it.		did change. Didn't want to acknowledge US funding. Changed after Clinton visit (Feb 2012). Her visit made an impact that trickled down. • Embassy attack: changed back – more nervous working with American again. Lost a few grantees. • Measuring indirect beneficiaries? Surveys. Talking to the crowd. Struggle how to capture broader community – OTI general problem. Informal polling in the crowd at the time. • Control from above (leadership) so heavy, oversight so heavy, micro managing that people were scared. Staff – sitting together without competition and freedom to explore.	(info campaigns). Staff didn't probe outsiders. • Stock pile so could hand out – try to establish unity around a message. Did it work? Hard to say. • Who cares about a key chain? Smart, educated population. Wordsmithing and use of Arabic, time to craft message "means a lot to Tunisians." Words mean a lot. Value of the message – more significance than elsewhere. Wanted things that would be used, not shelved. Visible. Experiment with message in a form that others can see/use; constant reminder of being more tolerant. • On short-term: I don't know. Certain amount of experimenting. PDOs didn't feel comfortable w more expensive commitment. Some of the activity rationale lent itself to short things – one night march. Tunisians liked to do	at the beginning. • Really good embassy support (2011-2012). • FERs: didn't make sense that PDO did it; GM should have done it. FERs not shared as well. • Needed iterative approach. Reflect. Lessons. Learn. Better define the box. Everyone needs structure and framework. Needed more structure. • Very different types of projects in two offices. Different relationships with grantees. Two different programs. Sbeitla: more creative, staff out on the street and in cafes. Tunis: so many issues, blinding. Less creativity.

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	Didn't get to articulate strategy as early as I should have. Support structure outside (OTI DC) – where is your strategy. Could have used push from outside. • Strategy didn't come until late. Team needed clarity on what we were open to doing. Not open enough to being creative; too open to trying things that were not worth investment. • Early in the program didn't do tangible things. Focused on elections so didn't do tangible. Ambassador wanted to do more of these. Last 5-6 months. • Not in the beginning. Critical programming strategy.						these events: Sbeitla – panels, loved to do them. Sometimes PDOs would make things so complex. Five phase activity. Let's try first one. Needed to experiment. On tangible: Obsessed with CSO House. Rehabing space with local government. Agree to certain rules. Cooperate, use the space together. Democratic process on how to use it. Common decision making, accountability. Repurposing regime space.	
DAI HQ	• Team hit its stride early 2013. • On strategy fit to evolving context: "we were behind things by a little", struggled to define what the objectives meant in practice.	• More room for digital activism (lot of youth online, doing nothing). • Coordination w/ government had to be driven from the top, local government officials needed top cover so delayed things. • Too much focus on national-level activities that took away from smaller groups, nascent orgs, that were bubbling w/ ideas. • Could have done	• Social media: hundreds of thousands of views; maximized, amplified impact; feedback on social media; got the buzz going w/ youth groups through SM. • Tolerance campaign resonated w/ people; events related to Tunisian identity. • Women´s leadership, elections, Mon 14 film. • Staff gradually better able to id activities. • Local fora w/ CA representatives. • Social media and flashmob activities.	• "Don´t know that staff do see it coming together." • Phase I: "if cluster approach was there, it was not strong."	• Mid-2012 moving towards cluster approach.	• Uncertainty as to political calendar, how to program to it? • First half LOP: from team's perspective, aside from elections, program full of "start & stop." • Local staff skilled at working around systems, not used to solving issues. • Staff "wary of anything political," no experience w/ donor assistance; mostly young & inexperienced. • Monthly quotas per office for grant clearances initially motivated people, then		• From DC, strive to communicate w/ OTI as often and early on as possible.

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
		more w/ new media, training for it.	• Reaching out to nascent groups. • In the beginning, were the only ones working in the Interior.			became a burden. • Dramatic in country situation, difficult to manage very emotionally charged staff. • Tension between Tunis and Sbeitla offices: a microcosm of coast/interior divisions (ex: contention around date to celebrate Revolution, Mar 14 vs. Dec 17). • Needed more in-depth info on activities for cluster evaluations, but it takes a lot of work. • "Lot of pressure to get it done." • "As Revolution started turning sour, weren´t able to move ahead."		
Program Team	• Unspoken assumption that if people like our activities, we have had an impact (in first stretch). Also, that keeping people busy is the same as getting them engaged. • In CVE, at the heart of conflict are divergent position on the legitimacy of democracy in Tunis. • Strategy "a little bit simplistic." Predicated on idea of doing stuff…Generating a lot of activity without defining what we want to do with it on the assumption that if	• Missed opportunity to do more outreach to potential partners, prove our transparency in partner selection • Youth unemployment left unaddressed, but it was the number one priority for the transition and the challenges the program was trying to tackle • Tried to work w/ GOT, but dropped it too easily. On GOT side, there was not a full understanding of what the transition required of them: responsiveness,	• I work in Haitadam, w/ marginalized groups, I think these projects are better, not so much the nationwide. • Close to Sbeitla office, the program made a community park w/ a playground, basketball court. Now, across the street from the park, there are three new cafes. Economic benefit had not been planned for. There probably have been other instances. • Success measured in terms of attendees. • It is working, working w/ young potential leaders if we really find the marginalized group. Working very well	• "Very mixed results, some activities very successful, others failed. What is left is we empowered civil society." • We did contribute to change, but if we had focused more could have been the change-makers. • Contributed to pursuit of a more democratic society. • Contributed to giving youth a voice. • Significantly contributed to modifying article in Constitution on	• CSO leadership: focus on action: training for women activities and debate training needs to culminate in something; not just a weekend or two. Put together an activity for women's day. Action: making speeches, inviting people. Debate training in Interior (Munathara model), to build network and then held debate. Linking SBT148, 126, TUN190. • CVE activities "were good, but not all of them… I don't see how that will counter extremism. Too brief,	• CSOs in the Interior do not have the resources to go to Tunis to present proposals. • We can't, however, do CVE activities in the poorer neighborhoods, we don't have access to them –linkages to them. For ex, in Haitadam it was a successful activity, but there were a lot of people who attended for the food so they could take to their family. • Pummeling did not work all the time. Sometimes a source of disturbance: same grantees stands out too much and we lose others. Also, we don´t give repeat grantees time to stand back	• Tolerance campaigns tapped into a strong sense of identity at critical points, but had become a little bland. • Could have coupled tangible grants w/ the other types of activities, so we did not have a small, simple event for 1-2 days and then it is over • Activities for youth gave visibility to some activists, like revealing talents. • Quick response after security incidents in Chambi,	• In fact, we realize that we are doing capacity building whereas it is not in the plan of the activity, essentially because we check all documents and we help our grantees to have a comparative advantage. • Learned we need to choose partners who can have multiplier effects and reach smaller associations (to avoid dispersing efforts). • Mid-sized event in interior sounds like a big thing and echoes in

59

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	people are engaged and busy and focusing on democracy [that] would carry us through until government got itself together. • On SST: process of soliciting input of team was done by SPDO (Tunis) and Head of Office (Sbeitla) – painful and creative. Very well done. SST picked sub-objectives from that. • SST was a shift, but the process was very slow. One shortcoming is that the rest of the people felt excluded. It was the responsibility of the SST member to keep the rest informed. There was a big positive change, at least now local staff understands the strategy, feel comfortable with participating. Since new CR arrived, there has been more mentoring and sharing of information. • Some sub-objectives were handed down (could not remember which ones). • Didn't anticipate how prescriptive and rigid leadership could be in ensuring that activities were written according to the 8 sub-objectives.	commitments, timeliness. -Sbeitla: would have wanted a greater focus on tangible activities in the interior because more lasting impact. • Could have worked more w/ youth from political parties (because the parties themselves do not do enough) • After second assassination, could have done something to help advocate for stakeholders to dialogue, but considered risk of partisanship too high • Late start on tangible projects (very small), which were a major success w/community buy-in, building relations between community and government, between neighborhoods • The few tangible projects missed an opportunity to mobilize greater community participation • Could have done more tangible projects, had big impact, last longer than events (related to big frustration because	because it is on artists' point of view, we are building capacity, dreams, the possibility to do something else. • Not realistic to expect you can change perceptions w/ one video. • Second phase complements what went before, builds in a more structured way on foundations laid. • Small infrastructure out of Sbeitla office had greater impact • Run up to elections was fantastic, tough, but very successful. Everyone heard of Bus Citoyen, every week 3 buses full of volunteers left Tunis; women´s organization put together a school kit; TV spot, radio; work w/ electoral board. • For the indirect effects, we don't conduct FGs. We follow the broadcasted events, as for instance the song of Bendir Man (Ghnaya Lik). But the activity is ended, it is considered as completed for us and we don't follow up anymore on social media. • We were good at messaging, our slogans were adopted by all. • Sbeitla: women´s sports tournament successful in that women were not allowed to play in stadiums, w/ tournament & attendance by Ministry of Youth & Sports	complementarity of women (in favor of equality). • Run up to elections: multiple simultaneous interventions added up. • Activities happen mostly as we designed them, but impact should be found at the cluster level, bur frankly, am a bit in the dark as to broader program impact. • Sbeitla: lot of collaboration between CSOs & government through our activities. • Generally, cumulative effect does give community a hope that things will change, something is happening and it is probably related to what we are doing. • "Created a tradition of strong CSOs w/ initiative and creativity." • Most concrete outcome is the indirect capacity building for CSOs so they improved their performance. Example, in Sidi	what happens after? A few days of soccer, after they can go back to Ansar Sharia meetings. Associations may commit to continue, but we don't follow on and as far as we know they don't." • CVE identified at-risk by relying on local partners, who knew youth by name. • CVE: we can report whether the activity deterred an individual, but not on impact on the community. • CVE will have effects through repeat activities, test interventions & repeat the successful ones. • CVE: before starting w/ sub-objective heard from partners that some at-risk youth who attended their centers were being recruited right in front of the center. • CVE participants selected by awardee and youth center administrator, who the community knew very well. • CVE activities do not address things head on. • Extremists also have activities, but not in open places like we do,	and think and do activities by themselves, or look for other funding. • Did not work a lot in Sidi Bouzid, majority not very engaged, not ready for transition, plus security reasons. • Gafsa: very engaged. • Geographically dispersed programming was tough; the recommendation (PPR) to narrow the focus was good. • Hard to program fluidly and achieve objectives w/ all the mgmt problems. • SMT all expats, little ownership of strategy by rest of staff (until SST). • Move to higher level M&E in last stretch resulted in significant loss of information as no one gathered it during that period. • Reluctance by some CSOs to receiving USG funds. • Too much influence from other country programs' types of activities. • Frank discussion of problems in meetings not encouraged. • Difficulties w/ attribution, to what extent were we the reason things improved? • Management problems made it difficult to keep team together. • Staffing was a problem and sometimes left w/ too few people in critical positions. • Grant closeouts delayed	developed simple messaging campaign (because workshop, forum or other meeting could get problematic because of polarization). Three days of messaging, saw even political parties distributing materials. • Cleanup campaigns in Gafsa were seen by community as connected to address pollution, but we had not planned it that way. • Doesn't matter what type of activity CSO or marginalied or CVE. Foster follow on. • Tangible projects as a tool to address people´s frustrations, opened channels of communication between citizens & govt, engaged students in their neighborhoods. Success helped some new authorities remain in their positions, other mayors asked CSOs to show them how to organize. • Duration of activities was	Tunis. In Tunis, too many organizations working on similar topics, so harder to stand out, get media coverage, create an impact. • Try new activities with good grantees as much as possible. Sbeitla office tries always to do follow on. Grantee demonstrated ambition, went well, will try build on that. • Prosaic process, but it [learning] works. Implementation meetings – how it's going and quick response to how it is perceived. No need to systematize learning. • Learning comes step by step. We document best practices and lessons learned, we also use the site visits reports. For the budget, the more we manage, the more we know to evaluate. We also replicate good activities. • "Youth alienated from politics, think all politicians are liars, so extremism is one way to become engaged in

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	• No one fully understood distinction; the 8 overlapped so much. About semantics, not design. • Next SRS (in country), left it open to cut down sub-objectives and people stampeding to say yes. "Change unshackled us." Four sub-objectives "de-prioritized." Moved away from info, media, tolerance, activism – not collapsed or integrated. • Lack of coherent vision in Fall of 2012. Two objectives, anything qualifies (too broad/vague) • Sub-strategies: semantic differences, not meaningful distinctions • First 18 months, no strategy or guiding framework; each office working independently • Strategy was not well articulated or understood. • Not really a strategy if always changing. • Always part of the strategy to pummel. • CSO leadership rationale in Tunisia: something happens and people sit around – who will do something about it? Passive. What is the role of CSOs to link	nothing changed after the Revolution, nothing happened in the Interior) • Given coast/interior division, could have done something w/ student exchanges • Limited understanding of CE: should have supported CSOs who wanted to work on entrepreneurship • Would have wanted to start w/ regional-level dialogues (when National Dialogue was to start). • Working with the GOT (walked away too easily) and working with unemployed. • Punctual short-term program could not afford to take time, get more info, more meetings. GOT Too slow. • Local authorities? Youth centers. Did not invest 100% time in specific municipalities. Unemployed: too big, how much could we do? • Virtual platform for CSOs – wished we had done. • It is working, working w/ young potential leaders if we	and Ministry of Women, that changed. Now associations in Maghreb Championship. • Indirect effects: during the activity, we look for articles, information… • For me the indirect effects are based on good advertising, as for instance for TEDx: all 1000 places have been sold in 4 minutes. • To monitor indirect effects, the media agency sends us everything. We invite the maximum of journalists, but there is still a problem of monitoring. • Youth debates in Gafsa, Kasserine & Sidi Bouzid increased political engagement by youth, mobilized a strong CSO network, got a lot of media coverage • SBT111 real impact on CVE • "Youth attracted by sense that they could participate in decision-making, not just follow a path" • Tangible projects in the Interior were some of the most successful, but also the most challenging. • Grantee from mountains did a lot w/ community contributions, even took their performance to Tunis. • One Billion Rising for women's empowerment. [State] couldn't do it, so OTI did (two weeks). Not the deepest impact; not drastically	Bouzid, could not write an action plan, objectives, use participant lists, present their concepts. Started w/ simple activities and built up. • Sbeitla program team intentionally works w/ awardees: "they don't know how to do these things, please take them as your younger brother, teach them." • On CE: we will have left behind strong CSOs, who will be much more equipped to deal w/ electoral violence, for example." • Repeat participants across activities developing skills that allow them a leadership role. Citizens' positive perceptions were evident in media & bloggers´ coProgram successes not being captured well by database (example of the popular song). • verage • Violent reaction against government switched, to some extent, to positive	nor do they help youth become leaders in their communities. • Important to do CVE because no spaces exclusively for youth. • CVE very important objective, for near future, the most important one. CVE activities are good activities, but do they really get at CVE? Maybe they are too soft and cautious. Kenya CVE programming, for example, works w/ mosques. • CVE activities can draw at-risk youth, but the important thing is to retain them, to do follow-up. It is not enough to do 1 activity and 2 months later another one. • CVE takes time, we want to work in tough neighborhoods & target at-risk youth, but in those places people are wary of outsiders, need to establish relationship w/ grantee. • Done a lot w/ CVE, don't think we've really measured what we did. In the interior they really stand out because there's no other stuff for youth.	since the beginning of the program. • Too many responsibilities to GMs, could not cover M&E surveys as well • "We do not go look for info, if info comes, we know it." • Grantees are very demanding but we are very limited in the capacity of our team to meet their expectations given we have so many things on our plates. Grantees have some unrealistic expectations. Also have difficulty understanding the in-kind nature. I try to be flexible, but am limited to how much can execute when there are changes. Grantees, after signing agreement, become like "it's my right," and if something is not working, they threaten to call the PDO. • FER based on grantee report and other information already in the database, not the most objective. • Implementation of grants was (sometimes/often) compressed, with program setting dates for events, made it difficult for procurement. • "Heard three months is the maximum grantees should take." • M&E notional ideas of sub-objectives, not clear exactly what should be	explained as "MEPI does one year stuff, we support activities." No formal monitoring of what happens w/ CSOs or youth after activity over • Length of engagement not enough. • Arts activities were good, but limited in reach. Small groups that participated were happy. • Some of the reasoning behind the distribution grants was how to address people's growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment w/ Revolution. Thought slogans, t-shirts, light stuff, would help. • If we don't go direct to the goal, to the disease… I was against the marginalized groups objective and the CVE objective because we cannot have the impact that is necessary because of the way we do things. We can't impact people in some neighborhoods w/ cultural activities.	politics "w/o the stain. • Concepts developed in partnership w/ associations also improved their capacity. • Social media allow people from Interior to see themselves, their neighbors, performing and hope that someone elsewhere in the country is watching. • Background: All new associations had not worked on community projects before. Had a name and participated in a forum. Never organized anything themselves. • Discuss what to do with TV. Focus groups like post tolerance campaign to see what people have seen/thought, linked to change in understanding, motivated to work differently. • Graffitti video reached many more people online. • Big survey on youth with Prodata. We use it to show there is a problem: 40% didn't know what

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	people to government? Carry message. Advocate. This was idea behind sub-objective. Help create linkages. Action is key. • Pummeling and what we wanted to achieve was not clear in strategy. Were told "just to move people to be active, sleeping community to be active;" was not clear why. • Strategy was so broad, any activity could link up to it, so strategy changes did not impact programming too much. • CE and CSO training – what is the follow on? How do we know this worked? Did it inspire action? Leaders in community? Action. Leadership role in the community. • Marginalized women/youth is about developing skill set of active leaders. CE more passive, and all encompassing: violent extremism, civic education, elections, democratic principles… Empowering is something different; the next step. How do they become leaders and empower others? That is the focus.	really find the marginalized group. Working very well because it is on artists' point of view, we are building cap, dreams, the possibility to do something else. We can't, however, do CVE activities in the poorer neighborhoods, we don't have access to them – linkages to them. For ex, in Haitadam it was a successful activity, but there were a lot of people who attended for the food so they could take to their family. • We could probably have done more for women. The activities were adapted but probably not sufficient. • I would have wanted to work more on the constitution, but there have been many changes. Now that the constitution is ready, we will organize many round tables. • We could have done more in terms of civic engagement in relation to the constitution, but the constraints wWe should do deeper things like the more recent speech given by a Tunisian actor who	changed views on women, but those who worked on it will see mechanism to realize their vision. • TV shows: how is this engagement? Passive and active – what you do with it is engagement. Did you track? Extremely hard. • Including participants as members as a sign of impact; "good enough job to become peers." • Cannot measure the impact of activities. • The activity held by coalition of women of Tunisia had a great impact: 70 women were trained on leadership and how to speak to the general public GM: was present the first and last days and saw the difference. A woman wrote a poem on the training. We did a pre and post test. March 8th activity, there were around 600 participants. • We reached our objectives in terms of the number of participants to the activities and the capacity building of grantees. • Debate grants: people surveyed informally reported feeling better able to debate.	energy as a result of our programming. • Impactful programming when youth group dynamic created among them. Not main objective, but it happens. • Some CSOs began w/ no experience, now able to do their own activities (own resources or w/ other donors): Sawty Gafsa, 1000 Volunteers, Al Fikra. • Helped build relationship between local government and CSOs. • More generally, succeeded in linking up actors in the area (Sbeitla) • "Achievement of the program goal and objective is closely tied to how we developed the capacity and space for CSOs and other activists and government officials throughout all of our programming." • Development of certain CSOs/organizations over time… crosses different groupings – tells the story of the larger impact on the	Ex. skatepark for youth. Also the squares for people to take their children, but also talk. • In the interior, CVE through support for public spaces for youth. • Marginalized groups: defined as marginalized from political process, support them taking on leadership roles in public/political life. • Marginalized groups sub-objective: reinforced visibility of youth-led CSOs, increased their membership/ network, ennabled them to work w/ other donors. • Activities w/ women in Gafsa very successful because targeted the right women, very marginalized, who wanted their voices heard and had never had the opportunity. • Training component for arts activities was the most important part; this allowed some to continue on their own. • CVE activities are the least effective: providing lot of spaces for sports outside of target area. Target populations were not directly addressed.	looking for as evidence of outcomes. • Scarcity of relevant info in database for cluster or mid-term evaluations. • In Tunis some activities could not break the bubble and gathered elite audiences, for example TEDx. Before elections, political parties had the same problem: held events & thought they were popular, but did not even get one deputy elected. • Turn-over in government offices made coordination, which was already difficult, even harder. • Do those kids who saw this do something? How do they take away the buzz? Don't know how to do that. Reporting through informal anecdotes basic survey good indication of thinking differently on role. • Across the two offices, PLOs felt they provided more feedback than was included in the database. • Working w/ government at national level did not work (bureaucracy, turn-over). • Division of roles (PDO, GM, M&E) did not produce enough information. • W/ new CR, no M&E at activity-level; moved to program level, including baselines. But told them that would require good activity-level. Loss of data.	We don't do the right activities for them. Really marginalized groups we cannot impact them through arts. Our target is people who still haven't decided on becoming a Salafist. We should do focus groups. With that map we use of neighborhoods, it hasn't been updated. You could go and do focus groups, have that as background and use it for activity design. And after implementation it is really important to observe. For ex, not all youth ask questions in forums, we must go to them and ask why they did not comment or ask questions. These are the things we should explore more for what is left of the program. • Democracy dividends activities, tangible ones, were very successful. For tangible projects, critical to make sure the community is engaged & youth are involved.	"association" meant; 40% think it's negative. • Priority for M&E officer is the activity level (monitoring and FERs); if time, look at cluster level.

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	• Target for marginalized groups: all women and all youth are marginalized. Don't have equal say; older men dominated political space. • Difference between marginalized groups youth vs. CE youth: marginalized is explicitly about political process. Civic engagement youth is engaging community. It is blurry. For me, youth civic engagement is SBT128. • CSO leadership: focus is on action. Weakest sub-objective as a sub objective (in interior). • Every three months revised strategy for the governorate, looking at political context and choosing 2-3 sub-objectives to focus on, but then locked us in for three months. Good decision to cut back to 4 sub-objectives. 8 was unmanageable. • Social media and media – lots of donors doing this and have technical expertise. Was not competitive advantage for OTI. • It's an OTI strategy. An American strategy adapted to the context,	talked about trust, a recounting of religion, its role in politics, what happened in Iraq, and then brought it back to what Tunisia is going through now. Doing a content analysis of this speech, for example, would give us better clues as to what topics resound with people, how to go about CVE because all the audience was impacted, many people were crying, it was very engaging. But we are doing soft things, we don't address these deeper issues. If we wanted to do CVE we could organize a debate and invite a moderate Islamist and a Salafist. • ere external. • During the national dialogue, we would have wanted to do something on TV, but things were changing very quickly. • We should have focused more of freedom of expression (for example for the singers who risk prison). • We didn't work enough with decision makers from the government who are		program objective and goal, as well as how we have developed capacity of CSOs over time through implementation (rather than just through CSO capacity building). • CSO development over time is the objective of the program to achieve. • 150 activities in Interior – not all of the CSOs are the better for it. 30% have carved a space in their particular area/CS landscape. 30% have done good activities, but not grown as associations. • Program guidance from the past: we don't do capacity building. Changed. Now we do. Building up a CSO sector that will be credible after we leave. Everything that we do has to have follow-on effects. CSOs standing on their own – success. They are leading, which is the sub-objective. • Most impact have been youth, anything	• It is working, working w/ young potential leaders if we really find the marginalized group. Working very well because it is on artists' point of view, we are building capacity, dreams, the possibility to do something else. • We can't, however, do CVE activities in the poorer neighborhoods, we don't have access to them. For example, one successful activity, a lot of people who attended for the food so they could take to their family. • We should do deeper things like the more recent speech given by a Tunisian actor who talked about trust, a recounting of religion, its role in politics, what happened in Iraq, and then brought it back to what Tunisia is going through now. Doing a content analysis of this speech, for example, would give us better clues as to what topics resound with people, how to go about CVE because all the audience was impacted, many people were crying, it was very	• Emergence of terrorism, situation the same, standstill between Islamists and opposition. There isn't much we can do in this context. Doing something coherent implies doing something against Islamists and the government. • Program successes not being captured well by database (example of the popular song). • No follow on activities. The problem here is that activities are approved, implemented, but there is no follow on, no monitoring following on. • I don't think we were able to adapt; the program approach was to copy and paste from other country programs. Substantial differences between Tunisia and other places. We heard, "We did this in Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc." Here the academic level is much better, government different, institutions, too. We are more a civil society program than a political transition program. It was also not well understood from the beginning that there would be such reluctance to be associated with USAID funds. Proposed more Constitution-related activities in the Sbeitla office, do not know why they were	• Until this year, hadn't seen it (impact of pummeling in Sbeitla). Some wasn't linked to us. • Hallmark of OTI programming – not just one way, change and adapt; one grant youth center, one conference, quick messaging. All of these things together make space; feel like there is a civic response to a political transition. See others participating. Space is available. Catalyst for other things to happen. • Don't have big activities over 6-7 months. Grantee not burdened with 7-month program. • On capacity building as activity type: How do you measure? Skills change? Don't have baseline with grantees, and don't measure after. Tunis more elite so would not recognize difference or say so (i.e. increased capacity). • One type of activity not more or	

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	but not the resolution to how we can help solve the problems in Tunisia. As a Tunisian, I think how can the program strategy meet the Tunisian needs for the transition. • Marginalized group/CVE/civic engagement overlap. Last time we didn't delete, but are now more focused on some sub-objectives, which are I think are the same thing: working on marginalized groups, doing capacity building, information.... • So, the strategy, I don't know, I don't want to think about the strategy, what will be left after the program. I am working my best. • Reacted a lot, could have perhaps gotten ahead of the game. We do this more in the last stretch.	not used to democracy. But it is not in our strategy, we do not have a sub-objective.		involving public performance. Using art and music and culture. Exciting. Buzz generated. Public makes them perform better. • TTI program supported CSOs as the bridge between citizens and government. Did it through NCA support and elections in the early days. • Impact with Youth Centers as a block: Not only at level of each one, but among them. One is now establishing partnerships with other Youth Centers and with CSOs. Huge obstacles initially, now much easier and coming together. • Outcomes above the activity level? Bit complicated to move away from activity. My job is at activity level. Connection between activities is something that I rarely talk about or am asked about. Maybe that says something. • Outcomes on Tunis/greater Tunis? Not sure I can speak	engaging. But we are doing soft things, we don't address these deeper issues. If we wanted to do CVE we could organize a debate and invite a moderate Islamist and a Salafist. • Although after the Rev, women might feel their status was threatened, we are not working w/ marginalized women. • Football tournament of the youth center of Sidi el Bechir did not reach the objectives of CVE as many youth only came for the sport. • CSO capacity-building: CSOs w/o experience designing activities, staff provided TA, also learned by doing. • When I arrived, no idea what program was doing. Developing the 8 sub-objectives was to gain understanding. • Most successful sub objectives – CE with a tangible component in particular. • CE objective was to get people more engaged and have space to express themselves. Sometimes succeeded. • CE can be	not accepted. • In the last year, some staff changed, team really came together. Still a little disconnect between offices. A little competition, don't understand the other, misunderstanding why the programming is different (target audiences). • In Sbeitla everyone knew what a GM had to do. There it was never an issue. In Tunis it was not clear, not only for me, but for others. • Most of the time we measure success by the numbers (beneficiaries, direct and indirect), but that is to me not the best measure. You can have planned on 100 attendees, but there were only 40, but the event was a success, regardless. The qualitative information is the more important. • We should have M&E interviews, asking participants a week after the forum, pick up on what the participant learned, what he is thinking. At an event, I play an observation role, don't correct grantee even if they make a mistake because the event is theirs. I like watching even people's faces, the questions they ask, those things. All these things are the way I measure success... • We don't have a platform	less effective. It's how they are tied. Follow up. Youth centers: rehab is fine, but not much impact. Need longer time. But these are stepping stones. How are they linked and used together? • Light messaging. Not tangible equals democracy. Get involved and make a change; not explicitly good governance. • CSO strengthening: it's not through CSO training/ leadership. It's working with us. Done some trainings, don't think it resulted in powerful CSOs that change the world. • Suites? Designed and responsive. Constitution: brainstormed different activities. Five or six – deliberate. Sometimes suite from activity that comes from success. Art, music, hip-hop culture really resonating – not by design, but worked. • Youth center membership	

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				to that. • Working with established associations had national impact; smaller associations impact in their own neighborhoods and communities.	information/ awareness or activism. • Marginalized groups: amplifying the voice of youth in the political process. • CE, the outcome depends on the follow-on with the partners, it is those grantees that come back. It is difficult to talk about outcomes. We can only talk about outputs. • CE outcome for the young associations: When the associations develop and know for instance how to write reports. • CE outcome for the big associations: extent to which they reach people, how people talk about these associations. • Sbeitla office priorities were CVE and marginalized groups, not so much on CSO leadership.	to record this information. How to share this? Site visit report, activity notes but they are more interested in tangible things, but your observations, interpretations, there is no way to share this. • If we will do a big get out the vote campaign, we must be sure how to attract youth to vote. This a problem for all donors. If you did a successful activity in one governorate, we replicate, but we don't know how the context varies. • We don't do any kind of political analysis of the situation. We are not experts, we do political update meetings, but we don't necessarily get to the key issues. We would need to engage with political experts. We don't attend conferences, meet with politicians, nor do we ever acknowledge we are not up to it. • Sometimes there are divergences between the grantees' proposals and the execution or the respect of the deadlines. • If we stop the activities, it is because of internal problems of grantees. • Little ownership by grantees of ideas developed by us, learned to expect less control of activity. • One project that didn't	increased, lot of youth and children signed up for clubs. • Activities related to fora and workshops fall short on convening all stakeholders, often end up w/ a political bias among attendees • We always find the same people at workshops, they are already engaged and ready for the transition. • One-day conference or workshop that was our idea "did not have an impact." So stopped doing them. Distribution of stuff – stopped. Program development team sees things similarly – not a specific moment, but all got it. • Tangible activities: nothing negative to say. Memberships increase. Wish we could have done more. • In Tunis a lot in strengthening Youth Centers, helped make them more of community centers. Impact, a lot of it difficult to measure,	

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						work. Discussed the need for buy in. Bring together stakeholders in a meeting, present it as their own, talk about why it's important, solicit input, then more likely to have success. Did not do communication piece for that grant. Learned over the course of programming – more communication on tangible component the better. • One of the things is branding –when you can't brand for security. Especially for the interior, OTI has a hard time counting what was not branded. • If there are failures, this is essentially because of the grantees. • Learning by doing: if we organize an event on Saturday and nobody comes, then we don't organize anything on Saturday anymore. We also take lessons from the past activities. For instance, we should automatically have a project coordinator.	time to actually come to fruition. Government-owned, run by community, government funds basic running. We've put in IT centers, video equipment, music equipment, dancing carpets. • Suites of activities: we start with a small activity and then it becomes bigger and bigger or we do several activities at the same time. • Social media helpful, but the most known activities are the tangible ones & those involving youth.	
Awardees: CSOs/ government/ media	• I went through three different interviews when approached DAI with my idea, the questions they asked were so different that I really did not understand what their strategy was. I still don't, but the important	• Context: NCA agreed on decentralization, but no specifics. CSOs lack relevant technical knowledge. No political party has a proposal for local governance. Central gov't does not provide foundations for	• Support to ISIE: DAI responded very quickly to a very simple concept. Impact was that voter education campaign contributed to the increase of 150 thousand voters registered. When had problems with the vendor for 2nd activity, DAI willing to change concept.	• Lack of visibility/wanting to be included was important in the Interior. Partners wanted 4-meter high billboard to advertise Lahlouba. Wanted visibility and legitimation in their	• Youth isolated from their environment, problems with drugs or extremists, get them to interact, accept diversity & plurality; attract them with means that will appeal to them.	• DAI takes time to respond to grant proposals (1-3 months). • Were told that there could be maximum 4 months between concept approval & activity. • No continuity in activities. • Youth capacity building	• Short-term activities: DAI funded training for women's association; organization on its own, provided mentoring and coaching, following up on FB and e-tools, tracking use of skills,	• ISIE: other donors at the time had their own proposals & experience, they tried to influence your choice & options. w/ DAI, we proposed… DAI "followed us"; not like other donors. But projects too

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	thing is the activity met its objectives. • I don't see a clear strategy in the program. Unqualified human resources, with a couple of exceptions, resulted in wasted funds. • Don't know DAI objectives, we didn't discuss this. • Activity successful, training well received (have our own evaluation), event well covered by media, but don't understand why donor not interested in what happens next. We don't know their strategy, how they approach work on citizenship. No clear vision of program. • DAI has two big advantages: listening and being field-oriented. • There is a risk of targeting only alternative youth, but this segment is exactly the active segment, those that will make a change in their community. They are the dynamic segment of youth. The others will stay in the cafe, but they will follow what the smaller group does. Maybe you can do other activities to save them	wider debate. Local administration officials unqualified. • Context: nationwide, more than 80% CSOs do not have own office space. • Context: older generations monopolized political sphere. • Context: youth seek means to generate income. Very active informally, less so in associative life. • Context: religious organizations have been displacing CSOs in public spaces. • Context: stability prioritized above all other issues by both political sides. Need widespread consensus for all the necessary (economic) reforms. • Context: CS will play an important role for next 10 years. Did not exist before Rev, so hard to talk about improvements. 16% of youth do not know what CS means. • Level of academic achievement in public schooling has collapsed. For the most marginalized, hope of success is tied to the	• Speaking of the Bus Citoyen, "the answer to the regions coming to Tunis." During the Kasbah sit-ins in Tunis, they saw people they had never seen before (marginalized from outside Tunis) – "the nation of Tunis in actuality." • Distributing comics to "empower local actors" and have a longer-term impact. They know the people, the economic and social situation and they know which tool and how to use them best. • Impact: "I don't know. I couldn't know." Short-term impact – if they ask for more, it's a good sign. • Reports on Lahlouba materials' impact: 18 of 20 partners participate actively or 10 participants have been able to reformulate the lessons in a way to show they understand it. • Social media components important because there really is nothing else for youth to do in spare time. • Everyone pitched in, municipality, police, governor, deputies, for the success of the event (K graffiti). • When wall painting was done, youth came to municipality & asked to do more, did more cleaning, now want to place lighting & flags. • CSO House allows mayor	region. • Visibility of events gives youth a sense of importance, increases their self-esteem; also visibility for the Interior. • Before first grant, impossible to make connection with Ezzohour; afterwards, youth even went to see the governor. • Now have fewer associations, but they know how to work, before they just talked, now have plans, papers. • Before we, in the municipality, did everything by ourselves, our budget, plans, no relationship with citizens. Now we start plans with citizens, have committees, they give us ideas for future, talked of participatory budget. We didn´t have this culture. • Mayor-to-mayor activity gave us great visibility and sparked concrete discussions on decentralization. For ex, 2012	• CVE identified at-risk youth through local coaches. Also identified through school records. (Risk of dropping out). • On CVE targeting: we get a mix, some actually walk out of training, but most come back. Have to select participants so we can train them more intensively. The more we go, the better the results. • On sustained engagement: We brainstorm with CSO leaders on plans. Coach youth on Fb, online group discussions. • Role of Youth Centers: Staff need a lot of training, had to convince one director to let the youth in because he feared they would vandalize the center. Now, some of the staff are drawing up proposals so as to get government funding for activities. • After media coverage, got requests from parents in interior to train their youth. • We ensure continuity by steps: 1. workshop, 2. personal	does not happen in 3 days. • Political parties have also started creating their own associations. • Working in only 7 governorates is a big limitation. • Tunisians do not understand two-way communications, everything is top-down. Limited capacity of media to transmit information in an intelligible way. • One-offs with DAI. • Management difficulties: payment for experts at an event was so low, slow & unclear, experts refused the payment. • Took 6 months to get an activity approved, then, once approved, were rushed to implement. • Deadlines were a big problem, DAI very late with equipment delivery, but still lot of pressure on us to implement by certain date. • While citizens in Interior had become very active with Revolution, they shortly after withdrew again from public life. • Local government practices set in former regime, with people making very low salaries & not working; also age prerequisite for working in public sector is 40; excessive	encouraging them to run for office, etc. • On t-shirts, bags, key chains: can be very useful tool. For example, media coverage often headlines using slogans from these materials; easy to remember. • Debate between y from political parties, some parties struggled to find a representative; all political parties sent one, at a time when there were a lot of debates around the Constitution being drafted. • Also important because many political parties do not want to participate in CS activities. Goal: increase political awareness among citizens. Youth took it seriously, many of them became more involved w/ their parties because they had to get the party line in order to speak for it. Many participants came back to ask for more activities, some	short, only short-term projects… DAI not directive. • Religious/ secular divisions started after Revolution & continue growing. • Looking to follow up calligrafitti with Youth Center of Kasserine. • Sustained engagement: that is why I always ask for more grants, to link them. • DAI team very professional, prioritize their job all the time. • DAI excellent, good listeners, ready to help. • No cordiality by DAI staff member dealt with most. • DAI: not just about proposal on paper, lots of exchanges re: targets, planning, milestones. • DAI more dynamic and less bureaucratic than other donors. • Context: on NCA process, dearth of technical input on some counts is really the government's fault because there are no interlocutors. Because it is a provisional

67

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	from poverty, etc. For me the more important thing is to save the smart people because if we do not, they will be smart extremists, drug dealers, because they are leaders. If we do not give them the opportunity to be leaders in positive things, they will be leaders in bad things. If we do not have the resources to move all youth, it is worth saving those few who are leaders.	spiritual realm. Hard to fight this in the short term, when education & occupation are the keys. Absence of vocational schools. • Context: with new CS, donors should have exercised more oversight (speaking to value of in-kind mechanism). • Context: no check on NCA other than Admin Tribunal (limited to admin matters, not political decisions), hence greater importance of CS (ex. appointment of ISIE). • Symbolism of street arts for youth: no spaces for them, reclaim public spaces as a right, not only in gyms. Theaters seen as elite culture, also in previous regime controlled by government. Elite arts do not express youth views. • Practicing in youths' neighborhoods helps them become active citizens. Our understanding of citizenship is that you understand different perspectives, classes, and communicate with	to communicate w/ associations. • We also learned from observing all the visitors, watching how the experts do things, organize the room, talk to the people. • Sports activities: increased membership in sports clubs, official participation in teams, full training schedule. Visibility of event motivated many. • Back-to-school sports camp had 4 times more participants than expected. High engagement continues into school term, with students coming to school after hours to practice. • Forum on local governance: representatives from 3 ministries attended, 5 mayors, no political parties. PM attended by chance. • Mass outreach through activities like Bus Citoyen. • Mon 14 screened in 51 towns, participated in 15 international festivals. • TV station received a lot of positive feedback on broadcast of Constitution capsules. • Responded to RFP for activity on political violence with a Conference, association involved in topic so were prepared & followed up with stakeholders. Lot of media coverage, published recommendations.	Supplemental Budget decided without consultation, now that changed, had an event & agreed to draw up our own budget (mayor of Tunis helping us negotiate with Ministry of Finance). • Cumulative effects: pushed associations to do something & engage youth, so city seeing changes. • Shocking to see such loss of hope among the more marginalized youth, even heard ¨my life is over already¨ from a teenager. A lot of them have quit school. We help them re-engage. • There's a different mindset now in Kasserine, more interaction between people, although poverty has not changed; new media outlets established, the number of activities changed the way people interact, lot of institutions opened after Revolution, CS more effective & active. All	production, 3. create branches of association in neighborhoods, 4. participate in festivals. • Ouardiya group, for example, put on 4 shows (2 on streets, 1 with our association, 1 at Carthage Theatre Festival). • Sustainable because with street theater we teach them "use what you have." • We think there is extremism on both sides (religious & secular), we want to provide a safe space here to practice & develop. • Through activity we increased number of regular attendees by 50%. All participants who had dropped out of school have gone back to finish their baccalaureate. • Teachers & school supervisors on association's Board, this created a network between our center and the parents. This network has observed changes, the simultaneous monitoring at school & home creates a circle of change (and we	centralization, everything has to go Tunis. • Not happy with detailed content review by DAI, strong influence. • Initially difficult relations between CSOs because everyone wanted to lead, also many associations linked to political parties; with new generation of CSOs led by youth, these problems were mitigated. • Big challenge in Gafsa is that CSOs do not work together or with municipality, DAI could have helped strengthen these links. • Our association wanted activities not to be isolated, but to have continuity. • Negative aspect of work with the program was that they do no capacity building, just implementing activity (they do all the financial & administrative work, so no transfer of skills). • Turnover in municipality officials presents a big challenge for associations looking to build up collaborative relationships, improvement in relations during DAI activities does not last beyond the event, does not change the municipality's mentality. • Planned screening of a documentary did not take	remain active in CS activities. • Debates: very engaging for participants, many ask for more activities, others form their debate clubs. Good participation by audiences. Youth from different political parties, who did not speak to each other before, remain friends. • One of the activities was not our association's idea, until now I don't know how the idea came about. DAI proposed everything, everything, where, even our assoc members who should participate. Lot of confusion and disorganization, it seemed like there was a lot of funding wasted. There was no impact that we could see, only that we became better known. This activity was activity's sake. • As association, benefited from pressure on deadlines and	government, feel no responsibility, it is weak & has no funds. • Kasserine Municipality working on participatory budgets with Dutch and GIZ. • Young women's debate got funding from Sbeitla Municipality, presented proposal to EU. Head will participate in training herself, in Europe. • DAI model very simple and easy, strengthened CSOs without capacity to propose and manage projects. They only needed an idea of a project. Also more directly benefited citizens (other donor large funding, but little participation by citizens). • Art as an alternative means for people to have their voice heard (Gafsa the most common is road block, burn things, but people know that peaceful protests did not help, either) • Gafsa: those associations that worked with other

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		them. • We don't believe in a selective approach, we attract youth based on their hobbies, ambitions, skills, hopes. It is this motivation that creates continuity. • Debates with youth from political parties was a daring step for our assoc because CSOs have a bad impression of political parties. • Cumulative effects could have been greater if had shared more information about activities with other CSOs, promoted more collaboration. • DAI have the "listening," but they don't follow through, there is no continuity. I would have wanted them to keep contact and at least participate in our ceremony. • They have not been present enough at the round tables in order to measure achievement of the objectives. • Joussour: even if the event is a good idea, we observed poor organization. • Joussour: there has	• Lahlouba materials were very good & led to other associations applying for it to conduct activities in schools. • Fb attracted so many, had to turn away some (from youth & arts citizenship training). • New activity developed out of one trainee´s idea (campaign against violence in marginalized neighborhoods). • Cafés Politiques very interesting experience in exchanging views with youth. • Constitution capsules very useful, station had very high ratings and lots of positive social media feedback. Clear it was not a political message. Unfortunately, there was no presence of associations close to the other side, who refuse to be at the table. While mass media are critical, important to think of additional ways to reach a more grassroots level. • After Belaid assassination, dinner in Kasserine brought together Niida Tounis & An Nahda, who were not even talking to each other. • Helped reverse people's negative attitudes at Revolution's 1st anniversary (lot of negative graffiti) with messaging. • Forum with CA representatives & citizens helped break down obstacles between gov't & citizens, gave	this is broadening horizons, opening minds. • All changes in Tunisia & Kasserine were pushed by CS. • Several references to the importance of doing things that people can see, as opposed to events in hotels. • Cannot speak of cumulative effects because activities not comparable. Would be more feasible if projects or associations had the same goal. • To change the population's impression that CSOs do nothing, it would take more time to achieve greater effects. • Impact of rap video: people liked watching their city for the first time on the screen. Arts a better medium to promote change. • Active participation by Municipality in forum, but no follow up. • Overall, lot of funding coming in, but in terms of	avoid giving them the impression that they are monitored). • Impact on audience of performances: Through our citizen journalists, informally surveyed women present, who said they wished their children were participating. Have had requests from 25 neighborhoods to replicate experience. • Perform downtown because of symbolism of Bourguiba Ave. as origin of Revolution. During previous regime, people were harassed there. They now go there to say, "This street is ours." To break stereotype of youth from this neighborhood as low class & violent, with citizenship & arts. • Youth change through shared responsibility in preparing event. Integration into group for many youth is very difficult, requires changes in attitudes & behaviors. • Context: lack of infrastructure for youth who are left alone a lot, poverty, poor quality of	place, grantee was informed that DAI had changed its focus from youth to the Constitution. • Another donor requires more reporting, which was a shortcoming with DAI, plus they give you enough time for each activity. • Difficult for CSOs to counteract forces that on both sides (drugs & extremism) have greater financial means, materials, & spaces. • Sbeitla: municipalities have no resources, main source of revenue (house tax) no longer there after the Revolution, plus high expectations (especially with regards to employment opportunities). Relations with the communities improved when started with general meetings. We stayed away from people for one year. • Program measure of success was the numerical target set for participants, attendees, trainees; was not clear that the program thought about what happened afterwards. • DAI interfered with our slogan. We are a network of CSOs, it takes a lot of work to agree on a slogan & discredits the network when it is changed because the	planning milestones. • Extremely short timeline, lot of pressure. • Arts advocacy training in Gafsa: deadlines for presentation at the end of the training helped participants be ready to perform. • We learned we needed to improve our pedagogical approach to training youth and our planning skills. • We did things little by little, building up expectation. Set up partnership with private sector, other associations, & government authorities, visited media, set up Facebook page, exhibited the materials we would use for the cleanup campaign, distributed flyers. Objective was to gather CSOs around 1 goal, create a new generation of volunteers. Facebook is good to motivate people, but requires a lot of work to manage content (we	donors will continue, but what will happen with those that only received DAI support? • DAI very easy to work with, only need 1 paragraph on your idea. The downside is there is no transfer of capacity, knowledge of indicators, not even a final report. • Our role as associations is not to make people happy or rid them of their frustrations." • Have 2,000 Facebook fans, 600 views on Youtube of our activity video. • Have 1200 followers on Facebook. • In-kind is great, facilitated the work. • DAI great working relationship, could call him anytime, helped solve a big problem right away, an hour before event. • Collaboration with DAI was great, but a few technical issues were opaque & association decided never to work with them again. We did not know how their procurement took

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		not been preparatory work to explain to grantees how they can take advantage of the event and improve networking.	a new image that politicians are accessible. 1st time unemployed could meet NCA deputy. The problem was parties did not want to listen to each other, just to speak, and there was no follow up. • Young women's debates had fantastic results, participants changed throughout the activity. Training was well structured. Formed debate clubs. Continue coaching on how to participate effectively in political life. Impressive attendance & support by parents. Doubled association membership with activity. Implemented in partnership with Sawty Gafsa. • Before debate, young women had a lot of ideas, but very unstructured. With training gained in techniques, structure, effective argumentation. Participants arguing against women's participation in politics had a very hard time because did not agree with their own position. Very important that they did not use religion as an argument to argue against. The group arguing for women's participation did use religion. • No response from political parties for young women's debates. • CSO capacity-building for	achievements, it is limited. Majority of CSOs work on training, but no concrete projects. • On program contribution to overall change in Kasserine: whatever the project was, they did have an impact, they added something. For ex., CSO House benefitted a lot of people (simple procedures to submit request to Municipality). • Events that brought together CSOs & gov't officials important because the latter are generally not accessible. • Kasserine: in the aggregate, program gave us an opportunity to express ourselves. We are still learning and because of that we still need that space. • Increased sense of pride in the community, our identity. Youth not restricted to school & the coffeehouse,	education. • CVE sports activity by Youth Center: most youth were regular attendees. • CVE: music training with very good (mostly girls, 8-18, all students at music conservatory). • Gafsa events for women called governor's attention, who intervened to help find solutions.	donor interferes. • Despite requests, program did not fund short-term studies. With little quantitative data, association programming would benefit from rapid baseline studies to help highlight "measurable ratios of improvement." • The role of the communication agency was not clearly defined and not accessible for us as a partner association of the activity. • Associations cannot understand well the role of the communication agency. • TV channels might not be very receptive, apart from Nessma, where we can negotiate. • The two only challenges are: DAI never provided us with the film and with the financial reporting that is necessary for our accounting purposes. • We have participated in a call for proposals with DAI, we have been selected, we have signed the contract, but the activity never took place for reasons that are not clear for us. • The communication channel was too long. • DAI never provided us with the final report. • For DAI, it is about one-time events, whereas for us it is a strategy.	posted each step of the activity). • I would prepare the budget differently to take into account broadcasting costs. • For a private company like us, doing this kind of activity is very time consuming. If we do it in the future, it really needs to be worth it. • CA Forum: citizens had had much difficulty in contacting CA representatives & did not view new mayor or governor as the real power. 4 deputies, 250-300 in audience, was 1st meeting between citizens & deputies. Objective was to help stabilize situation (roads blocked, strikes). Were fearful could lead to confrontation, but citizen needs & demands were directly presented & it went well. A good network of CSOs came out of this activity, too, communications	place, asked for information, got it in the end & association president thought costs were too high. Aside from that, technical support great, young team, very helpful. • Social media: bloggers in uncertain legal status. Blogs as source of information on local matters (mainstream media focus on bigger issues). • Praise for program's rapid and effective response; recognized urgent activities and supported quickly and thoroughly. No interference in activities: association left to "shape the idea, put in action and follow outcomes." • Program's approach is "adaptive to the context today." • Program had a "large indirect contribution" to their capacity. • DAI quick to respond, better than other funders. • Now, we have another project with

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			10 Gafsa CSOs & 1 network, 7 days. After training, ran survey & found that 4 CSOs had replicated training internally for other members. • Cleanup campaign: citizens, Municipality, CSOs interacted, phosphate company also contributed. Replicated by another CSO in neighboring delegation. • Cleanup campaigns' objective: not hygiene, build citizen awareness that a lot was burned & destroyed, time to rebuild. Impact: 80% of trash cans installed still in place. Plus, people call the municipality to demand they remove the trash when they fill up. People feel there is a lot of centralization & do not participate in decision-making, so even just decorating the trash cans feels like contributing. Focused on action as citizenship. Had agreement with schools to recruit volunteers. Then, we just started and passersby volunteered to help. • Cleanup campaign: governor requested a meeting, association & volunteers got awards & recognition. • CSO fair for university students increased CSO membership (for organizer & others). • School theater show on	now have many means for self-expression. • Most of youth participating in rap & graffitti are from difficult neighborhoods; seeing their work exhibited is what motivates them. There is a new culture, a new mindset; creativity of new generation & of CSOs has provided room for this. • Kasserine aggregate effects: new opportunities to train in things never before seen here. Impacted everyone psychologically, motivated to replicate. • Kasserine: improved public spaces in popular neighborhoods. • Kasserine: dealing with some youth as peers, not addicts, encouraged them. • Kasserine: traditional means do not work, creative ideas and means, direct action is more effective. Involved young local artists,		• We had difficulties with the DAI requirement of a project coordinator that could not be a member of the association. • The timing was too short. • There have been delays in delivering posters...we received them just the day before and it was too late to correct mistakes. • We started negotiating with people that later left DAI and the handover didn't take place correctly. • No capacity building. • Youth participation in the forum on decentralization was low. • We had delays in signing the contract. • We could only broadcast one spot (of 3) on one TV channel. • We didn't budget the fees for TV broadcasting. The episodes have consequently only been broadcast online, which is not enough for a large diffusion. • There was reluctance from TV channels because of the funding source. • We had a problem with DAI concerning the advance payment. • We didn't reach our objective of a large broadcasting • We presented three films ideas to DAI and they chose	improved between citizens, CSOs & government. Afterwards, at any problem, citizens would seek out CSOs to explain conflicts & demands. Deputies could not follow up, had too many limitations.	the Danish cooperation. • Now have funding from UNDP. • We are still waiting for the film of the round tables from DAI. • Now I continue with UNDP through youth awareness (who are vulnerable) about the constitution. For this, I use what I learned during DAI activity. • Selection criteria for slam training: talent, availability, discipline. • One day, when we had to do payments to kids (parents) and parents, 5 studio managers had to stop them given the crowd and disorganization. It was completely in contradiction with the values we tried to transmit through our film. When it is about payments, all values disappear (even though it was in Sidi Bousaid). • Response deadlines are quite fast, which is very important during film-making. • Confidence has

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			voting: youth visited radio stations to explain "must vote in order to get the type of life you want." • Women's activity increased organizing association's visibility, got other funding, increased membership. • We received full support for our song & video, but one alone is not very effective. Our message was that people have to solve problems on their own, cannot wait for the government to do it...we expressed their feelings, so now it is like they count on us & expect great things from us. • I participated in graffiti, training for bloggers, for rap, for videography. • Intellectual stimulation, pushing the boundaries of what you see in Tunisia, build hope. We put out the message & audience takes it from there. Don´t have a target audience, don´t know whether they already believed our message before attending. • The film has been screened in several youth centers, followed by debates. • The result of the activity has been in two newspapers, on the front page for Women's Day. • The activities gathered communication experts and associations to work together.	gave everyone sense of importance, allowed them to see themselves. • Kasserine: if program continued with more monitoring, could have greater impact. • Kasserine: overall change in CSOs' perspective, now they accept youth & get involved with them, before they did not. Now engage both young men & women. • Municipality helped youth who were stopped by police for filming without authorization. • Experience with DAI was great, but good for activities, not for CSOs –does not give them the tools to become independent. • New groups came out of activities & became very active (like Sana Sufeitla). Biggest outcome is that CS is achieving a balance so youth don't go to religious extremism or to drugs & violence,		the one which was the most difficult to realize in 3 months.		been built quickly… After each activity, we evaluate the impact together and DAI gives its feedback. • DAI presents the objectives of the program and we take care of the field work, but DAI team is always present with us. • DAI team is accessible, an exchange is installed right away, no protocol, no administrative concerns... • They are present at all levels for the evaluation. • There is "loyalty" and they are always pleasant. • There is a GM for each project: a good thing. • The team is really involved, they understand problems and try to find solutions with us. • Approach is easy (no narrative reporting, no financial reporting...). • DAI gave us everything and more, maybe that was not so good. Gave us large

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			• We spark curiosity in regions when we present our activities, which is positive. • The films reached marginalized groups, either during the film- making or the projections. • Youth of the youth center benefitted from the training first technically and second it allowed them to get away from delinquency. • When we (youth center) have new equipment, members naturally increase. • Some equipment (for the youth center) allowed us to train women in handicrafts so that they can work on their own. • We helped other associations become aware of the content of the Constitution. • The series of recommendations has been signed by 70 associations. • The activity allowed us to know about what was happening in the NCA and to exert a certain pressure on deputies. • The event gathered different stakeholders: CSOs, ministries, political parties from different sides, municipalities, international organizations. • We popularized the concept of governance. • The forum allowed us to	able to keep youth in the middle. • Gafsa is like a turtle, slow to change, not open-minded. New associations created, lot of activities that, though very small, mobilized a lot of people. • Program helped reconcile youth & state institutions. • Effects do not add up across activities because they are not linked, not part of a process, each one has an effect at a different point in time. • Capacity building happened as a result of implementing activities, even when it was not a success. • DAI is considered the savior of CSOs that don't have access to other funding because it is quick and easy. Helped make environment richer in terms of associations in Greater Tunis and even more so in the governorates around Sbeitla.				numbers of posters, we had limited human resources to pin them up. Did not have the posters on time, had to post them the evening before. Word of mouth was the most important, but the first day there were not a lot of people at the workshop. • The PR agency from DAI, I thought they themselves did not believe it would be a success. • Very disappointed with Jabbari festival, very bad organization, nothing was like we expected…everyone knows that it was a big failure. At the very last minute, no agenda. He told us in October that it was going to happen, but until November no plan. Last minute changes in venues. No chairs for audience, in different venues, poorly set up. Many people say he did not want to do things, economized on small things, but one could not understand why. • It is clear that DAI

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			reach different categories of the population, even though the majority was educated. • During the casting... people have been reached by the objectives of the film and the approach and kids have also appreciated it. • The spots were broadcast on Mosaique FM webpage (ranked No. 1 in Tunisia according to awardee). • I think the change is durable, not in all, but there are some people whose vision of life has completely changed. Young woman from "dark city" was like a diamond among the trash. I feel, almost, that we saved them. In some youth, with an inner fire... she, only at 17, dances, raps, is a poet, slams. • Now six of the Kasserine youth chosen for an international competition (18 cities around Mediterranean from 15 countries). Deputy mayor contacted me to train them. • Thanks to DAI equipment, the number of our members has more than doubled.					will leave a void when it closes. It will be up to the youth to take the initiative. Some might have become spoiled by large amounts of money. But that is a problem the individual youth have. • We asked for a 2-star hotel, but DAI gave us a 5-star hotel. It was a very big shock for these youth, made it very difficult for us to manage them. Spoils youth.
Program Participants		• Unfortunately the program has not reached yet some of the more marginalized youth in some neighborhoods."		• I participated in 10 activities. DAI implemented many things no one thought would ever happen here (K), maybe in the capital, but not here. This	• Elections outreach to encourage women to vote: Worked with their nation-wide network of ENDA branches (micro-finance institution) to distribute all the			• Kasserine repeat participants: 10-15. • On social media: "when a video is transmitted and then shared, that leads people to contact us & ask how to

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				pushed people to engage w/o prejudice that blocks them." • "The program created a cultural revolution in K in a short period." • "Of course the municipality played a role, for 2-3 activities they helped w/ what was needed (electricity, trash cans, authorizations)." • Kasserine: we are a small group, we now know each other. Before we didn't, met at activities…some are rich, some poor, open-minded, close-minded, but now we are a group. We are in K, mindsets very limited to very conventional views, especially for women. Now people accept arts, even graffitti. • Aggregate effects of program in bringing people from different backgrounds: "Yes, definitely. After the Revolution, it was a kind of discovery of each other, of the regions in the	materials (flyers, etc.) and held discussion groups to increase awareness of the electoral process and encourage women to register to vote. Given that they worked with their clients, they reached the average woman in the interior. Working with the most disadvantaged is their priority. When asked about impact, with several caveats as to the example not being representative, the woman noted that she had led 6 discussion groups, with 15 women each, and that approximately 20 or so had called her on election day (not required, just on their own initiative) to let her know they were at the polling center. • Leadership training for women: Main effect was an increase in self-confidence (coming out of the personal development module) in public speaking, some trainees are planning to replicate within their organizations, and the group of 40-45 women really came together			participate." • "When you do traditional stuff, people don´t react. W/ innovative things, people from different classes are more motivated. • Kasserine: difference between youth who stay amd those who leave is the passion for art, for being a slammer. • Kasserine: in my neighborhood (very marginalized), it would be impossible that an activity take place, people would not accept. • Social media? We became famous, like little celebrities, people recognize me on the street. • For some youth, there is nothing to do except drugs.

75

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				interior, and even within Tunis of neighborhoods like Ettadhamen. These activities helped bridge the gaps between regions and we must carry on."	and they stay in touch and meet often. • Leadership training for women: a school supervisor for English teachers said she had considered herself a leader, but given the quality of trainers and the curricula, she had realized she had a lot to learn. All of them agreed there were big changes in trainees´ attitudes about their personal and professional lives and said they heard several women say "It is high time I changed my life, look at me now carefully because I won´t be the same from now on." Several called to ask about more training opportunities.			
Focus groups (grantees)	• When we approached DAI to fund equipment for the theatre club, not only did they accept, but they also proposed to form a group of youth and train them in theatre. DAI gave the group of youth the opportunity to learn more about leadership. • With DAI, procedures were simpler than with other	• Several Youth Centers had already started activities with youth (essentially since 2011) through leadership trainings, carnivals...DAI took advantage of these ongoing processes to build on new activities and reinforce Youth Centers. • Several DAI activities in Youth	• Some of the kids are disadvantaged and come from poor neighborhoods. Even though exceptional, some of them have been trained and even became volunteers for other activities taking place in the same Youth Center. • For the Youth Centers, staff had a good contact with youth that participated in activities and gained insight into how to approach them. • With the training activity, I	• Theatre trainings allow one to deal with all kinds of issues: elections, environment, relationships, drugs... • More cooperation between Youth Centers, notably implementation of competitions. • Several Youth Centers built up on the activities	• We played here the role of coordination between a public institution and DAI. As an association, we supported the Regional Office to have funding and to implement the activity. • For the Youth Centers, youth trust in the institution increases with the activity and the center	• One of the main concerns of Youth Centers is to have the activities funded with DAI to continue in the future. • Some challenges were related to the equipment and work support (for the event's day) and a few things were missing in the decor, make up, costumes. • We had delays in equipment delivery that we would have wanted to use	• DAI supported many Youth Centers with equipment, leadership trainings, different activities for youth. • Youth Center: providing equipment is equivalent to more youth members, more messages transmitted and consequently a chance for some	• The youth are always waiting for an activity at the Youth Center, otherwise they get bored. • "I am almost at the retirement age; I am going to leave a sustainable theatre, a space for shows, and a festival: the doors are open." • It is a target area for us for several

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	donors, DAI is also more flexible. • DAI allowed us to reach the objectives that we have set up because they are quick and flexible. • The contract with DAI was very clear. • DAI accepted not to appear on the campaign. • The activity was serious, DAI participation aimed to make the event succeed, we proposed the idea and DAI supported us: no intrusion and not politicized. • DAI accepted our independence charter. • DAI is flexible in negotiations. • DAI and other German foundations are open to nascent associations. • The advantage of DAI funding is that it allows us to engage many youth in our activities. • We worked hand in hand with DAI and it was very well set up. • Once the agreement is set, we have free choice and DAI is flexible. • DAI was present from A to Z, from the preparatory phase until	Centers allowed to reach youth from disadvantaged areas in the Greater Tunis. • Very few donors work with Youth Centers, which is a strength of DAI. • DAI activities with Youth Centers matched the latter's expectations (leadership...). • DAI built on former trainings undertaken to reinforce with an additional training with the same group of youth. • There is a lack of continuity in these types of activities. • Many participants asked for a new activity of the same type, but it is not possible with DAI anymore. • I am very disappointed to learn that DAI is closing. • We could have worked more on the preparatory phases. • The activities are positive, but we need more continuity to have a real impact. • It is negative that DAI imposes its axes of intervention. • The initiative of DAI	learned how to deal with the public sector, how to allocate the budget. • With the rhythm imposed by DAI, we learned to work in a fast way. We learned how to talk with media. We learned how to manage a project from A to Z. • Youth expressed themselves concerning social and political affairs. They understood the definition of citizenship. They also learned about the Constitution. • We learned how to discover our own skills. • We learned about teamwork; doing things perfectly, to manage a team. • I learned how to manage several projects at the same time. • We reached self-confidence. • After the implementation of the activities, almost all Youth Centers saw the membership increasing. • We learned how to manage projects in the field. • Thanks to some activities with Youth Centers, the inhabitants also benefitted from a renewed community space. • At presentation by Prodata on youth survey results, young woman: "all society & throughout life everything is led by older people;" very	undertaken with DAI to program future activities. • Equipment provided to Youth Centers will last and will be used for other activities.--- Activities undertaken in Youth Centers have sometimes spread to other Youth Centers (even without DAI support). • In the beginning, we had difficulties with administrative formalities, but now we don't have these problems anymore. • Leadership is automatically important in any activity involving groups of youth. • With our activities, we worked on the durability of relationships. We could work with the same group of people since our first activity, this is how we construct efficiently. The activity we had with DAI helped us to have a UNDP project which is bigger. • Lessons learned from the round	consequently becomes their refuge. • The training has been replicated in other delegations. In the end, 8 associations will be created thanks to these trainings. • Trainings allowed to put together many organizations (CSOs and public administration) and hopefully the private sector will join in the future. • There is a certain kind of solidarity between associations in Kasserine. • We were able to work on reducing the feeling of regionalism. • Some of our participants created their own associations, others art clubs, others did the same activity in Kasserine, Sfax, and Monastir. • It has been possible to orient public opinion towards less violence.	during holidays. • A general challenge is that the program is ending. • There were many more young men than women for the training because parents are more restrictive regarding their daughters. • Election: the monitors were infiltrated and it was necessary to change the team very quickly. • Elections: we had some difficulties because we were not covered by media on the field. • We had difficulties to recruit people to participate in the tournament. • Youth Center: even if the equipment was good, there were delivery problems and delays, thus, we were obliged to postpone activities. • It was easy to evaluate those that we reached in closed places, but more difficult outside. • The main challenges were the lack of security to go to Chaambi and a last minute change because of a protest in Sbeitla. • It is difficult for people initially to accept activities that were not related to their direct daily concerns. Generally, we met difficulties to target more people. • First, the school director refused to sign the contract	youth to avoid drugs, alcohol, and smoking. • At the Youth Center, we always organize sport and cultural activities, because through them, we try to transmit messages as "no to violence." • The most that we used to inform about the activity is the "word of mouth." • Participants were mixed: those who study and those who do not. • The fact that this activity was in an open air area makes it more effective. It was open, and those working in the close-by cafés were wearing our T-shirts. • We want to guide youth to constructive activities and we want to change behaviors and mentalities. • We had more girls than boys, participants had almost the same standards of living. • Our objective is to structure culture in Tunisia and to make it progress at	reasons, first because it has the highest population density in the governorate and the highest poverty rate, the highest unemployment rate: this is related to marginalization and exclusion and consequently extremism. • We need to count on ourselves to implement activities with donors' support. • "When I saw a young delinquent embracing the flag, I understood that youth felt the meaning of citizenship." • Even if the trainees do not create an association after the training, it is still useful, at least in their relations with the family. • Concentrate on leadership training for youth, ensure the follow up after the trainings, creating more networks with other associations (fora, meetings). • We selected participants for the music training based on their skills. There

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	the last day. • Contrary to other donors, when DAI promises something, it realizes it. • With DAI, we could go further than what we could do with other donors. • DAI trusted us even though we are young. • DAI gives money, but doesn't intervene in the project. • We developed friendship with DAI staff and we work together with trust. • DAI would always give good quality stuff. • They believe in youth capacity. • As a Youth Center, we have been solicited by DAI who asked about the type of activities that would be useful for our youth. • We had very good advice from DAI.	was good, the problem however is the organization and the signing for the workshop rooms. • The bad signing made us lose a lot of time and the workshops' contents were not always in accordance with what we would expect.	aggressive reaction from a mostly young audience. • Gafsa: theater show on voting process at one school replicated by another school; got students & parents motivated, asking "what next?" • Went to Youth Center for first slam poetry activity then DezzThour. Show in Tunis was wonderful... my goals in life changed, I wanted to be a doctor before, now I want to be an artist. Now I have confidence in myself, because when someone like our trainer says you can be something, you can... Being an artist, now I feel like I am really alive... • "We don't get jobs, we create jobs." • On how the activity leads to more engagement: "We feel more responsibility about our Tunisia." • "Being active is not a choice." • It was difficult to reach a disadvantaged target, living in remote areas. However, in all governorates, we covered all delegations. • The activity allowed us to involve many youth who developed skills and learned the meaning of engagement. • Activities are covered by media (TV, newspapers, facebook...), which allows for	tables served us for our current project with UNDP about the popularization of the constitution besides vulnerable youth. • Youth Centers gained value thanks to these activities. • Youth who participated in the field activity have been able to create their own associations. • We have many activities planned for the future, all around "no to violence." • With these activities, there is now less violence in protests in Kasserine. • Our activities have been decentralized at the regional level. • We brought together people from Sidi Hassine and from Gammarth and drew them closer. • The majority of participants continue to be part of our activities. • Despite the differences among participants, they were able to work		with DAI because of his political orientations, I signed it instead of him and the director that came after congratulated me. • The lack of means doesn't allow us to continue these types of activities on our own. • The budget is sometimes very high in relation to the association size (there is a disproportion, which spoils organizations). • For the tour, attendance was low at the Houses of Culture because of the negative view people had about these centers. • Moving around the country was exhausting. • There was no way to measure impact and we had no feedback from the communication agency that was supposed to be our partner (neither from DAI).	the national and international level. • We wanted to set up a leadership mentality that doesn't exist in Tunisia. • We didn't have difficulties to convince and make people involved in our activities. • Distributing tee-shirsts, flyers...was a good thing because we were targeting women to go for the elections, but also their children, so the latter consider those as gifts.	were as many female as male. However, they are differentiated by their socio-economic class. • Apart from studying, I think that youth should be involved in CSOs. • Some money is wasted, as for instance in hotels (no efforts to save money, for example by giving one room for two persons). • Sometimes the funding is high and could be used for other more impactful purposes. • Of course there is an impact, but very few are involved in associations. • Our website is the most important vehicle of information about our activities. • It is difficult to measure the impact of our activity. We can however highlight the attempt to regulate things and our will to change the situation. • It is difficult to measure the impact because "it is about smoke, not crystal" what we do has no

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			a broader impact. • Part of the group of youth who benefited from the training on leadership has created their own association on leadership and entrepreneurship • The tournament gathered youth from many neighborhoods. • After 20 hours of training, participants were able to develop very strong relationships: they think together, they create together. • We have initiated the capacity and are very motivated. Now it has to be generalized to all Tunisia so that youth become involved in social life. • The activity allowed us to reach more regions and consequently more citizens, essentially because at the beginning we didn't have enough means to implement actions at the national level. • Our work increased awareness about the importance of elections. We reached approximately 250,000 people. • We participated to the creation of the dynamics of discussion about elections. • Through convincing people to vote, we were reviving their sense of citizenship and we reached all groups:	together. • Thanks to our website, we could reach the population through posting the videos of the round tables about the constitution. • As members of associations, we became much more pertinent in our defense. We were equipped for political debates.				contour. We can only say that we reached our objectives of an important attendance rate. The real impact is in the long run, and I hope that we will say "we were right." • The day of the elections, some women called me to say "I am at the election bureau and I am going to vote." • It is difficult to measure the impact of awareness campaigns to vote.

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			women, youth, students, illiterate, men… • Thanks to the equipment provided (computers, sound system…) our membership increased from 20 to 100. This means that we will reach more youth and transmit more messages. • The tournament helped to decrease violence among players. • With the equipment provided to the Youth Center, we could target new people such as women and young unemployed ladies. • With the new equipment we could enter in a new dimension and reach some of our objectives. • The activity could pull together youth from several socioeconomic classes. • People's mentality has changed: they now accept different kinds of actions and we are successful besides kids and youth. • DAI activity represents a great change for the Youth Center, the number of members has really increased. • The activity allowed me to discover real talents. • Youth are at a crossroads: either they take the right way or the wrong one. With these activities, youth concentrate on art. • We could occupy youth to					

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			do positive things; they learned both organization and persistence. • With this activity, we avoided tension and all the damages that could have occurred on October the 23rd. • Before, activities such as flash mobs were not common, now it is accepted. • Many youth were spending their free time in cafés, cigarettes, and soccer, now they are interested in theatre, music, and painting. • After the rehabilitation of the sport space in the high school, mentalities have changed: kids take pleasure in sport activities and don't think about damaging public goods. • The image of the association evolved in a short period. • The round tables ended up with a list of recommendations that we gave to the president of the NCA and to all commissions. These same recommendations have then been presented at the Social Forum held in Tunis. • Before the round tables, I didn't understand anything about law, now I discovered many things and I feel that I am a useful citizen. • The round tables allowed me to play my role as a					

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			member of an association to promote citizenship besides a high number of the population. • We could be informed about the constitution which was not the case before. • We had the opportunity to increase dialogue and to clarify many of our ideas as associations. We could also reach a consensus on the list of recs. • Women (active in CSO) that were present at the training were lacking insurance and audacity at the beginning, but then this has changed. They also enlarged their knowledge about women's rights. • Women learned how to take responsibilities, in their associations and their personal life. • Even if the number is not high, it was possible to reach less educated women to convince them to vote: these women didn't even know about the utility of voting.					
Focus groups: participants	• DAI was the only donor that accepted to fund us, so we did not hesitate a lot. • This is the first time such an activity takes place in Tunisia with university students.	• We would have wanted DAI to support us in extending the activity outside Kasserine, to become a national project. • Donors have to be involved in the more disadvantaged neighborhoods (as Hay	• The training activity in which I participated has been very beneficial for people living in my neighborhood because we talked with them a lot. • Now I want to participate in other trainings that might be interesting for me. • It was very easy to enter	• The graffiti is something that lasts, it is there thanks to the quality of the painting, and this represents a long term impact. • After the music training with DAI, we decided to set up an	• Even without the support of an association, we will continue. We learned a lot from the last activity (how to organize) and that motivated us to continue. We want to spread this art in other regions and change	• The concept of associative actions is not understood yet in Kasserine. • For the graffiti, we were more than 25 at the beginning and we ended up with only three persons, probably because it was during Ramadhan and the conditions were difficult for	• The activity duration (9 days) was long enough to learn things. • The themes have always been adapted to the Tunisian context. • The duration of the activity doesn't	• Associations play an important role in the construction of the state; they can save youth from taking the wrong directions. • Before January 2011, people would spend time in cafés, now people

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		Eddhalam). There, we find everything: drugs, alcohol... and there is a risk of pollution. It is there that associations have to be encouraged. • If I have the opportunity to work again with donors as DAI, I will concentrate my efforts on disadvantaged areas in Kasserine. • People from ordinary neighborhoods heard about our activities in Kasserine, except for those living in the most disadvantaged areas. • I suggest to target better actions for youth in particular and to train them more. • I suggest to implement activities with a broader impact in Kassrine (more people reached). • An activity as this one must be replicated to other places. • There are not enough events taking place in our poor neighborhoods. • It would be good to focus more on rehabilitating the Youth Centers in Kasserine.	the activity: the main point was to be passionate about art. They didn't turn away anyone who wanted to participate in the activity. • Some of us (trainees) have taken advantage of the training and created our own association. • I learned a lot in the training, the trainers were very close to us, we could make our suggestions and evaluate the training. • We learned how to work with a team, how to manage stress. • With the training, I am more confident in myself, I know that I can change things in my neighborhood. • Not only I learned about communication techniques... but this also encouraged me to create an association, something which was not one of my objectives. • After the training, we could present our performance at a festival. • We learned how to organize ourselves and we adopted the idea of "no violence." We could also develop relationships with the members of the different teams. • We perfectly learned the message "violence is weakness." • I could have new friends,	orchestra composed of kids about elections, to convince people to vote. • After participating in all these activities in Kasserine, I got convinced that associations can change things. • I participated in many of the DAI activities and brought my friends to participate with me. • Kasserine: I participated in 3 activities. • Gave the audacity to express themselves. Now with associations, they are more confident and dare doing things. • Even though participants are from different social classes, once in the activity, we are all the same. • As active members of the Youth Center, we will contribute to Tunisia's progress much more than those who are not active in CSOs • I am convinced	people's mentality and perception of this art.	us. Others realized that they would not be paid and quit the activity for this reason. • We did the graffiti during the month of Ramadhan, it was difficult, and we worked in the morning and in the evenings. • Kasserine: I had to face up to my parents. • In Kasserine, one of the challenges is people's mentality with regards to art. • Once we had the opportunities to have funding to develop our activities, we could do important things... now we cannot go back in the past anymore. • We had some difficulties transporting the equipment. • We had difficulties getting information from the public administration. • The timing of the activity was not adequate: during the exams and not long enough to do a real comprehensive work. • Some women had a lot of work and couldn't attend all the training sessions. • This kind of events is for the moment reserved to a certain category of the population, first because many people might have not heard about the event and second, because many Tunisians don't have the culture of participating to this	allow to visit some interior governorates (even though one of the objectives is to propose measures to develop the interior regions).	understood the role of associations. • Kasserine: mentalities have changed, even the parents want their children to participate in activities. • Our only experience with international donors has been with DAI, and the activities have been amazing. DAI allowed that the events were very high level. • In the current period, one cannot be ordinary, we need to distinguish ourselves and, to attain this goal, I am always looking for trainings. • I am sure that youth and CSOs will help change things. • Normally, we stay at the café, or we play Play Station. • There is a huge lack of spaces to dance. This is all the more true in disadvantaged areas where youth centers lack a lot of equipments. • I first had doubts as to who was behind the activity.

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
			people I would never have been friends with otherwise. • The round tables gave us the opportunity to go the NCA and to discuss directly with the deputies about some articles of the constitution. • Next time, there will be less violence in our behavior and we will use less swear words. • Some concepts as no violence, tolerance, and peace are now important for me. • Until now, we try to use only decent words. • Thanks to this, I learned the art of graffiti. • At the graffiti activity, we could know new people from other places (Sidi Bouzid, Sbeitla...). Our relationships lasted; we even created a Facebook page for another festival. • Now we are confident in ourselves and we feel "enhanced": we made the longest graffiti in Tunisia. • With the graffiti, people's views and perceptions have changed; some of them would bring us to eat and to drink to encourage us. • Theatre activities helped youth in Kasserine to be involved in arts. • In almost all areas of Kasserine, there is some anarchy, but despite that, nobody tried to touch our	that our recommendations had an impact on the content of the constitution, but as complementary to other CSOs work and the street. • We knew people from Sidi Bouzid, and we made friends from Kasserine. • These activities allowed us to know new persons, new regions, and even well-known persons. • Art is against violence, it helps communication and acceptance of different ideas. • Before, it was difficult to find someone to guide us through ways to practice dance, but now things have changed. • The carnival allowed us to work with other Youth Centers. • Our impact has been continuous and positive as people continue coming to the Youth Center thanks to our performances. • I used to smoke a		kind of events. But the reputation of the concept is growing. • The most difficult is the period post event where you fall under depression because you spend 3 or 4 months of hectic rhythm and then nothing. • The continuity and durability of activities is missing. • It is more difficult to mobilize young women to dance in the poor areas. • In the very disadvantaged areas, people look for direct assistance; it is thus very difficult to attract them to our activities.		• I didn't hesitate as I saw my friends participating, I also convinced other friends to participate. • "I was looking for the first opportunity to get involved in associations' activities." • We were questioning DAI funding. Who is behind it? Why? • I hesitated because it was a US funding, but when I saw my friends participating, I followed them. • To realize our dreams, we could not count on Youth Centers or the House of Culture. The only way to realize our dreams was through associations. • Today, I am doing things that I like, before all I had was school and home. • My objective was to improve art. • My objective was to develop talents. • It is a form of self-realization. • Art is also a strong way of expression. People listen more to messages produced by

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
			graffiti, people would just look at it and admire our job. • Now, we can do graffiti on our own. • "These activities allowed me to realize myself." • We were able to show that Kasserine is rich in talents. • The mentality is improving in Kasserine. • DAI allowed us to increase our capacities and to reach a certain level, to increase our confidence, in a way that we cannot go down anymore. • Now, I can dream... • We discovered that Kasserine offers some horizon and that we can do everything in Kasserine. • Today, we know that we can change mentalities. • The training allowed to bring different neighborhoods closer. Now the atmosphere is cooler, and youth from these different areas learned to talk together. • During the training, friendship has developed and our motivation increased. • I learned about new mentalities and other ways of behaving. I learned team spirit, friendship and respect. • The training in has been very beneficial as it helped us playing comedy better, being less shy, have more confidence and have less stage	lot (drugs), but now I stopped, and this is thanks to associative activities. • Now, we have to go beyond this activity in order to realize the vision we have about Tunisia. • After participating to the first event, I wanted to organize one and make people see what I had the opportunity to see throughout my tiny community. • We also use the event as a platform for associations who need assistance to implement some projects. • The greatest advantage is the community we are building. Now we participate together to many other activities. • We built an important network, also with speakers, sponsors...the whole team. • One of the participants wanted to follow his brother in Syria and I could convince him not to. • This activity				art. • To develop my network. • To know new people. • To increase my skills. • I would like to continue this type of activities, but I prefer to do it within the same group. • We are happy to see people dancing break dance in Kasserine, it is as if we were in New York. • If things change in Kasserine, it will be thanks to CSOs and youth. • During the last 3 years, everything has changed, except for Kasserine. I don't know why we are moving backwards. Our own solution is to get involved in associations. • If I had to make a choice between dance and school, I would choose dance. • I am 17 years old, second year high school. I followed dance training at the Youth Center of Ibn Khaldoun. I essentially dance on the street.

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
		fright. • The carnival took place in the street at the same time as the end of the preparation of the Constitution; many people from the neighborhood were in the street with us. • Through the theatre training, we learned about freedom. • "Personally, before the training, I used to hit my sister, now I try to communicate with her. I also think before judging my friends at school." • We learned communication, even with people older than us. • The rehabilitation of the theatre room at the Youth Center allowed us to have more members and activities. • The activity allowed more implication of the youth from the university. • We could provide our ideas and point of views about Tunisia's future (let's hope they will convince). • The majority had a pessimistic idea about the future of Tunisia, the activity made this perception changing into positive views. With this activity, we (youth) discovered that we have the potentiality to be active members of the society and to take part into the Tunisian political life.	helped us to be more integrated into society and avoid delinquency. Dance is a medicine that helps us feel free. • We became friends with the other members of the Youth Center, a sense of fraternity was created. Youth that followed the training in theatre forum are more and more interested in theatre in general. • After the training, a network of women has been created. They often meet to discuss how they use what they learned. • The events changed our vision, we were passive before, now we know that we can and we must do things, we have an objective in our lives. • Thanks to these events, our high school became among the most active in organizing events. • Other schools are inspired by us. Even the administration changed and is now				• If I didn't have the passion for dancing, I would certainly have been in prison. Indeed, there are many temptations leading to delinquency. • Salafists participated in the dance training. • I went on TV and I feel proud of my neighborhood. It also allows me to improve technically. • My parents changed their view about my passion (dancing). • "I always come to the youth center.'' • Racism, poverty and religion are the kinds of themes we worked on in the theatre forum. • Youth Centers allow us to behave better, to be more sociable. • Parents accept more and more that their children exercise art in the Youth Centers. • The training made me certain I want to become a theatre actress. • We felt proud, united during the

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
			• We learned how to express our ideas and manage opinion conflicts at the same time. • The round tables gave us (the associations) the opportunity to discuss around the constitution with different stakeholders, including experts. • The round tables allowed for more dialogue between associations, and between associations and deputies. It increased communication and made us understand our role to balance things. • I feel "superior" to those youth who didn't participate in the theatre training, because I learned a, I am more respectful of people, I am more sociable. I learned about the history of Tunisia. • Thanks to this activity, my knowledge increased. • Knowledge is the most important reward from this activity. • We learned how to obtain information. It is important for our studies. • ...to better manage our time, to learn from our mistakes, to know new persons, to learn how to "think", to express my ideas... • The training allowed us to discover ourselves, for instance that we have the capacity to speak publicly.	encouraging us. In the first edition, they took off the posters, for the second one, the administration is looking for sponsors... Other schools seem to follow the same path. • We are encouraging the organization of the same events in the interior				carnival. • Tunisian youth are not leaders yet. • "The Youth Center is us, it is our second home." • During the carnival, I felt a lot of pride and a strong feeling of citizenship. • "We consider the Youth Center as a non-state organization, which doesn't have any political orientation, even under Ben Ali." • Before this activity, I didn't know I had as much feeling of nationalism. • It is flattering to think that I am an actor for the future. • Many students from different nationalities participated into the activity. • With this activity we got closer to our teachers and to meet important persons. • The youth center saves youth from delinquency; my friends who don't want to come don't know what they are missing. • One of our activity

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
			• It is about exchanging ideas and experiences: This what has been achieved with these events. • It changed my way of seeing things. • When I participated to the first event, I was really inspired, the message reached me. • It is an original activity, it lasts one day and gives us the opportunity to listen only (more than speaking). Even when we criticize some speakers, it is learning in itself. • We made people happy when organizing our events. • In Tunisia, as students, we always feel that there is nothing to do, that we cannot reach anything. The events showed us that people can succeed, can do things other than only studies. • After an event, we go out saying: look at them, they succeeded, why not me? • We have an impact on the whole country through showing positive experiences. • We learned how to build our future and the future of Tunisia. • Small events in high schools and universities helped students to orient and see their future. • These events gave me a new life, we try to be perfectionist, we learn how to					contents is to think about solutions to develop the interior areas of the country. • What we did is huge, but the most important is what is coming. • Before, I thought I was a leader, but with the training, I learned a lot of things. • Some women changed their behaviors. • After the revolution people really discovered Tunisia. • When I first participated to this event, it was a lightening for me and I wanted to participate to the others. • Once we enter in the community, we continue. • Before, apart from studies we had nothing to do. • It is for me a refuge to optimize human values: giving without waiting something in return. • Our priority is the development of Tunisia. • "Can you tell USAID to continue

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
			grow up, especially for me who am 17 years old (how to talk to people, media, sponsors...). • Before, we had nothing to do, no social life...we were not advancing, after this experience you feel you did something. • With the workshops, we learned how to move forward. Further, these workshops helped us know how to organize events. Without them, we could have never organized the events. • We have been touched by many speakers' experiences. • We could identify ourselves to many of the speakers. Sometimes, you feel a speaker is talking about us, this allow us not to feel alone when we are in a certain situation in our lives, you remember the speaker and you say: I will not give up. • We achieved an important goal: bring a new mentality to our high school, a mentality of community work. • For me, it was the first time I work within a group, I didn't accept criticism... Now, I learned how to accept different views, to exchange ideas. • At 17 years old, I learned how to speak with different kinds of people. • We learned to exchange					their program in Tunisia?" • What we essentially retained are the meetings we made and the community. • Of course we will continue... as the concept has been a success, I am sure we will find sponsors easily; they will even fight to fund us. • Now when we don't have an event to organize, our life is empty, we don't know what to do. • It is important to make people aware about the importance to know about Tunisia's history. • Today, there are not enough means and places to allow young dancers to express themselves.

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
			with different age groups: no hierarchy. • We learned management, leadership… • I learned that we can be a good student and at the same time excel in other areas.					
Other donors, programs	• Context info: enormous increase in funding and donors, new ones leaving late 2013. • Economic situation in 2014 bound to worsen. • Great pride in freedom of expression, questioning decisions, and also proposing projects and investments. • Political actors do not seem to be interested in solutions (extending stalemate). • Youth among the most disillusioned, pulling out of politics, except for fringe y who are moving towards extremism. • -Tunis youth seem never to have had the intention of organizing themselves collectively or engaging w/ political parties; then caught by surprise when saw Islamists were well organized & led by older men • Only party w/ youth wing is Enahda.				• At-risk youth vulnerable to recruitment: unemployed, male, military-age, some education, broken homes, early drug users. Often siblings or friends of those humiliated/affected by police or government; direct contact. • Recruitment: hyperlocal at the neighborhood/community level. Mostly person-to-person. Social media not the tool. • Not ideological appeal. Rather, a sense of belonging. An identity movement. Something to set them apart, to be different, superior to peers. • Violent extremists do not have a presence in civil society as organizations, per se. Rather networks. • Addressing CVE: giving them a future beyond just hanging out. Employment			• Social media: reflecting or influencing? Difficult to answer – don't know. OTI – more of an influence thing. Measurable? Yes, in terms of exposure. • High internet penetration in Tunisia. 3000 hits is good figure for local event. 300K is impressive for Tunis. Advanced use of FB: Graphics are much more advanced. Local Islamist groups know what they are doing. AST – audio/visual, pretty impressive

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	• Vocational training is critical; development of the interior (infrastructure, education, jobs); democratic education of youth, especially on elections. • Potential of cultural activities to tap into youth interests • On decentralization: regions self-organized immediately post-Revolution, but the transition government then reversed it completely and appointed posts all the way down to school directors. • Very little programming by most donors outside Tunis. • 1.7 million illiterate, 70% of which are voting age. • No discussion on Constitution, not part of political culture; NCA no outreach, people on the street thought they were doing nothing (only deadline they met was their budget proposal). • CSOs very motivated, but do not feel there is an audience. • CSOs have limited absorptive capacity.				needs to be explored. Training for jobs, but where are the jobs going to come from? • Hip hop culture appeals to some youth; even Salafists using same recruiting tactics. Zemecktou – Tunisian martial arts – Salfist kung fu. • But also some vulnerable to recruitment who aren't into pop culture. They are less visible, but certainly exist.			

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	• Need for innovative means for outreach, nobody paying attention to traditional means anymore (more than 2/3 of y plan not to vote). • Political culture always top-down, few opportunities to decide for themselves (CSOs). • M&E did not exist before, transparency and accountability under-developed, so now reporting on outputs and income is really new for CSOs. • Too many parties, too many CSOs, too few coalitions. • Reaching out to under-served communities, whatever you do, is the right thing. • UNDP prioritized work w/ youth & women, through young organizations in interior. Building include platforms, pairing young organizations w/ more established ones. Taking a risk in working w/ nascent orgs. Do a pre-selection & train and mentor CSOs to finalize their proposals. • Big problem is that there is no interaction between CS and government (national &							

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	local), mistrust on both sides. Government has no policy on civil society. W/o decentralization, there are no local counterparts to engage CS in policy-making. • More coincidence than synergies between donors. There isn´t yet a real framework for coordination to avoid duplication. On the other hand, given context, there cannot be too much support. • Regional disparities (a key priority for youth) are the roots of political violence.							
SRS 2011	• Recommendations: Ways to bring more team focus on the Interior—i.e., site visits, a venue for next rolling assessment/SRS, inviting grantees from the Interior to present… • Recognized early the need to "win the trust within communities" - on how to communicate with potential partners who may be hesitant to work with the program due to reluctance to associate with a USG organization							

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
Management Review 2012	• Key issues identified by the staff include: a protracted activity development process characterized by a lack of strategic clarity, shifting parameters for activity approval, and a disconnect between an overarching strategy and how to implement the strategy. • The overarching strategy is not clear and perhaps even more significantly, they do not know how to implement the strategy. • Sense that the program is neither fast nor flexible in its ability to see and respond; losing the initiative. • Many of the challenges currently facing the program stem from a tension between a lack of strategic clarity post-elections… • Spend more time developing and clarifying strategy with the team—there needs to be a better dialogue about what they are seeing out there and how the context relates to the OTI strategic planning process. • Local staff also need a role in shaping strategy		• TTI's activities to date have been very successful and some have had substantial impact, particularly in the lead up to the October 23 elections.				• Low risk, low cost projects intended to experiment with a new idea, test a new partner or enter a new area should be quick and easy to construct, approve and ideally implement at a relatively low cost and low risk. • Activity type: Don't be afraid of equipping public facilities or rehabbing buildings.	• Good selection/relationship with partners. • Increase the latitude for programmatic experimentation with a focus on learning by doing. In order to stimulate the strategic and creative processes in both the local staff and potential grantees, greater emphasis should be placed on encouraging experimentation with a range of project types, emphasizing after-action learning while reducing the current emphasis on front-end project identification and process heavy approach to concept development and grant clearance.

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	for this program. • The window of opportunity is still open…the TTI program needs to move swiftly to help manage those expectations, engage people constructively in the transition and demonstrate tangible benefits. • Currently, many of TTI's systems and processes are hindering as opposed to aiding a fast and flexible program. • Projects which increase public participation and constructive engagement, government responsiveness and accountability, are all needed and possible. In areas which have been historically marginalized it seems clear that OTI's time-tested method of weaving investments in material needs with basic democratic practices may be best way to support positive change and help manage expectations.							
PPR 2012	• Key aspect of context: coast/interior, secular/religious divisions.	• Recommends a more sustained effort at building links to ruling	• The program experienced its most consistently productive period in which the team felt a strong sense of			• Dispersed geography reduces impact: Recognizing the impetus behind the reach out to many areas, the	• Activity type: Many of TTI's activities are short-term, event-oriented,	• It's the why that is most important, not the what.

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	• Youth growing frustration at persistent eco crisis. • Weak CS "clear need for cap-building & networking to enable it to facilitate discussions as elections near." • Tangibles in the interior makes sense because people want to see change/lives improving. • Link tangible (development) change with political change: link the political with the tangible wherever possible by, for example, inviting local representatives of government to discuss, support, visit, open, get their picture taken with the project.	party/government officials • -ID weak info flows on CA process, no participatory processes (no capacity/ willingness on government side, no capacity on CSO side) • Debate crucial • ID target groups: government officials, educated and unemployed youth in cities & large towns • Rec strat comms for govt, citizen connection w/ govt, media (mine Facebook for info on perceptions). • Get ahead of issues (beyond reacting), synergies between activities, vertical links to national level discussion. • -Link tangible changes to political changes. • Gap-filling function on elections & CA referendum.	purpose and direction during the lead up to the elections. • The program has made strides in the areas of civic engagement, governance, and message campaigns through the following types of activities: Government-to-citizen interactions, • Tangible benefits • Message Campaigns • The TTI program effectively contributed to the success of Tunisia's first real democratic elections by raising citizens' awareness and encouraging them to participate in selecting their government.			multiple, often small, one-off projects dispersed throughout the northwest, south, Sfax, Sousse, Kef, and elsewhere appear to reduce the potential of a strong TTI impact. • The greatest issue in the southeast is under development followed by cross-border trafficking, which are beyond the scope of TTI. • Rec dissolving expat SMT. • "Contextual nuances are missing for lack of knowledge of deep-rooted issues under-pinning the transition." • Disperse geographic spread (rec Kasserine, Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid).	reacting to security developments, and/or awareness raising. This appears to dilute the program's potential to influence real change and scatter the team's attention and resources. While the reasoning is understood, the team has the opportunity to get ahead of the transition and increase the number of tangible projects that help the citizens contribute constructively to the transition process. • Go deeper, compound activities: Build on the momentum and increase the impact at every turn…Build upon and connect previous activities with follow-on activities. • There is also a view that OTI generated activities have worse delivery with slower response times and less ownership. • Following the strategy exercise, the team expressed that	

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
							the types of activities and partners have not changed as compared to before. • The current guiding activity types ("trust building," "pushing the envelope," and "because we have to"), while providing initial guidance to some, are not entirely understood and/or utilized across the team and still lack that tangible direction in supporting the Tunisian transition; they are at the program rather than strategy level.	
BTD's Strategic Framework Aug 2012	• Work with Tunisians at the community level to demonstrate post-revolution progress, to attempt to abate some of the existing frustration, through small-scale community-driven projects and information dissemination initiatives • The program will focus on stakeholders' ability to speak to each other, to share information, to provide feedback effectively and to advocate for							

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	solutions.							
PPR 2/2013	• The interviews reflected that program stakeholders feel the strategy is appropriate and is broad and flexible enough to adapt to the dynamic political environment of Tunisia.					• Activity generation relies on partner proposals (limitation in interior). OTI-gen ideas slower & less ownership. • Since strategic review (Mar-May) types of activities and partners did not change, but tweaks made for better fit to program rationale. • Management: PDOs continue to hand off to GMs • Closeout delays (32 FERs overdue at the time) • Recs: Combine sub-objectives, M&E mgr go back to activity level.		
Tunisia Strategic Refinement Notes Aug 2013	• Team reduced the program objective from two to one and refined the one objective to: TTI creates space for the transition to succeed…Why? "There was lack of clarity on the difference between the two objectives." • CVE was identified as a new area of programming after the program received specific funding from the State Department's Counter Terrorism Bureau, and the team identified it as a programming							

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
	opportunity.							
SRS 8/2013	• The strategy exercise has brought clarity, precision, and prioritization to how the team understands program objectives and how to program strategically. • Consider combining sub-objectives for greater flexibility while allowing the same breadth of activities.							
TTI M&E 101	• It is critical to have a concise analysis of the operating environment and to update those observations regularly.		• As a major component of how OTI measures success, Program Performance Management (PPM) is used to ensure that *intentional programming* is shaped by a process of *continuous assessment, analysis, and refinement.* • Activity notes: In addition to implementation tracking this field should capture *outcomes* and *process* related notes that paint a more complete picture of the relationship between the activity and the objectives.	• OTI's program objectives should define a problem that is *manageable and in some way measurable* or 'knowable'. Broad and overly ambitious objectives are problematic for the development of an effective M&E plan. • 'Program level' often presents the greatest challenge to measuring impact for OTI programs. • Program level impact can be arrived at by aggregating evidence of lower level impact to draw some generalizable conclusions about the 'plausible				

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
				association' between targeted program-level engagements and observable changes in the operating environment associated with the program's overall objective. • Cluster: As a program design tool they [clusters] are a means for developing intentional, targeted suites of activities in the activity development phase and as an evaluation tool, Clusters provide a bundle/unit of analysis for determining and evaluating program-level impact. • Clusters can be developed around a particular problem/issue, a geographic area, a significant event, or an intended/desired outcome. • Clusters are specifically aimed at identifying and articulating the development hypothesis of a set of activities *cumulatively*. These may be very				

Stakeholders	Strategy	Opportunities (missed/ capitalized)	Activity-level Outcomes	Higher-level Outcomes	Sub-objectives (clusters)	Challenges	Activity Type	Other
				different types of activities but they essentially share the same justification and purpose and are undertaken with the intention of having a collective effect. • The capturing of outcomes is going to rest largely with the field teams because they are the ones with the insights into those developments. • Much like outcome information, the principle sources for this information are the field teams themselves. They should be able to evaluate the relative success of the project in their own words.				

ANNEX C

TTI Final Evaluation: Program Documents Reviewed and References

General USAID/OTI Program Documents
- USAID OTI Tunisia One Pager, October 2013
- Bridge to Democracy Activity Cycle, Version 5.0, November 8, 2013
- USAID OTI Tunisia Elections Programming
- OTI Governorate Spotlight Gafsa, November 2012
- OTI Governorate Spotlight Kasserine, September 2012
- Branding Guidance, November 2013
- BTD Talking Points, November 2013
- BTD Local Activity Database Guide, October 2013

USAID/OTI M&E
- Mid-Term Evaluation Final Report, May 2013
- OTI Tunisia M&E 2 Pager, March 19, 2013
- Section C-SOW for Mid-Term Evaluation
- Tunisia June 2012 M&E Report
- Tunisia M&E Report Annex A Cluster Framework
- Tunisia M&E Report Annex B Site Visit
- Tunisia M&E Report Annex C Activity Participant Survey Analysis
- Tunisia M&E Report Annex D Review of Elections Cluster Study
- Tunisia Overview of OTI M&E, Monitoring & Evaluation 101
- TTI M&E Strategy, October 2013
- BTD Elections Cluster Analysis
- USAID OTI Tunisia Elections Activities Preliminary Results, October 2011
- Cluster Analysis, Peaceful Expression, October 2012
- Key Ingredients for Realizing Success
- TTI Gafsa Impact Assessment, August 2013
- TTI Quarterly Report Q1 (May-June 2011) through Q10 (June-Sept 2013)

CVE
- Youth and Extremism in Greater Tunis Revised, August 26, 2013
- Youth and Extremism in Kasserine-Final Revised, September 23, 2013
- A Snapshot of the Salafist Appeal Among Tunisian Youth, August 16, 2013
- Navanti Report 1 Querries Comments
- Tunisia CVE Desk Study Final, May 2013
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- Bridge to Democracy (BTD) Strategy Review Session (SRS) Report, February 2013
- OTI Tunisia DAI Retreat Final Report, October 2012
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- Elections Substrategy, July 24, 2013
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ANNEX D

TTI Evaluation Questions: Awardees

- Please tell us a about the activity(ies) that you implemented with DAI? How did the idea come about?

- What impact do you think the activity(ies) achieved? Was it what you expected?

- Do you think there was a change for the community as a result of this/these activity(ies)?

- What challenges did you face in implementing the activity?

- How did you target participants for this/these activity(ies)? Were you successful?

- Did the capacity of your association increase as a result of implementing this activity? If so, how?

- What role, if any, did social media play in your activity or after?

TTI Evaluation Questions: Staff (Generic)

Initial Round of Interviews

General

- In what capacity have you been involved in the program? What is your role in the activity cycle?

Strategy

- How would you assess the democratic transition thus far?

- How did the program adapt to changes in the political landscape? Did it adjust? Responsive?

- What would you say were the main shifts in strategy? Can you tell us about the changes in objectives and subobjectives/clusters? In particular, can you speak to the "Countering Violent Extremism" cluster? How did the cluster originate?

- In hindsight, would you say the program missed any key opportunities? Made the most of those that came up?

- What was the program's approach with regards to targeting? How did it evolve over time?

Program Performance

- What would you say are the program's main achievements? What are the program's outcomes? How do cluster outcomes contribute to the overall objective/goal?

- How would you rank the clusters in terms of success? How do you measure this?

- What are its outstanding challenges?

- How would you describe the coordination with national counterparts at the different levels? Coordination with other USG actors? Other donors?

- What lessons have been learned and applied throughout the program? Have there been any lessons learned that would apply elsewhere? (Overall/by sub-objective/target geographic area/target population group)

- Have there been any unintended effects, either positive or negative?

TTI Evaluation Questions: Staff (Follow-up)

Sub-objectives:

For civic engagement, marginalized groups and CSO leadership:

- What activities or suites of activities stand out as particularly effective?

- What activities or suites of activities did not work out as well as expected? Why do you think that was so?

- What types of outcomes can you identify for this sub-objective?

For civic engagement, what areas (youth, links to government authorities, etc) stand out as particularly effective?

For CSO leadership:

- How does this sub-objective build on (or differ from) previous CSO capacity building efforts?

- Aside from the explicit capacity-building activities, there have been references to indirect capacity building of awardees by staff. What do you think have been the main achievements of this capacity building?

What area(s) of programming do you wish you had focused on more/less?

Activity type:

If we look at activities over the course of the program, we are interested in learning more about what *types* of activities were most/least effective. What did each type of activity achieve? By "activity type", we mean the following, among others:

- Rehab/equipment provision
- Quick response
- Media
- Training (plus showcase)
- Forums
- Other?

With regards to activity design, there is an assumption that for many events, visibility expands activity effects beyond direct participants. Can you explain the rationale behind this? Has this assumption been tested (focus groups, etc)?

How do "suites of activities" come to be labeled as such?

Political context: We'd like to hear about how programming was linked to the evolving political situation.

Given the uncertainty with the elections and constitution, how did you approach developing the eight sub-objectives and subsequently the four sub-objectives?

How were decisions made about combining or dropping sub-objectives? How were the indicators for the sub-objectives that were folded up into others dealt with?

The OTI model—fast, flexible, purposeful, etc—depends largely on learning about works and what does not. Can you describe your approach to learning in this program? How were successes/failures documented? How was that knowledge integrated into the feedback loop?

Even after being revised, the strategy remains quite broad – has this been helpful in your approach to programming?

ANNEX E

TTI Final Evaluation: Interviews

Name	Organization	Category
Tunis		
Sana Ghenima	Women and Leadership	Awardee
Aida Ben Chaabene	Coalition for the Women of Tunisia	Awardee
Zaki Rahmouni	ISIE: Independent Electoral Commission	Awardee
Samira Torjemen	Mouwatana &Tawassol	Awardee
Walid Massoudi	Tunisian Association for Creative Youth	Awardee
Sihem Bouazza	Association Tunisienne de Droit du Développement ATDD	Awardee
Amin Bashallah	Sawty Association	Awardee
Salah Hammouda	Massart Association for an Alternative Culture	Awardee
Zouheir Hamdani	Youth Center of Khaznadar	Awardee
Amira Mimouni	New Age	Awardee
Houssem Aoudi	Wasabi	Awardee
Lorand Revault	Association Touensa	Awardee
Asma Cherifi	TACID	Awardee
Mohammed Torgeman	Prodata	Awardee
Ahlem Ben Othman	YEDA	Awardee
Atef Hamdani	Fanni Raghmani Anni	Awardee
Adbelwahab Ben Hafaiedh	Social Science Forum	Awardee
Fatma Jegham	Association Tahadi	Awardee
Chawki Gaddes	Tunisian Association of Constitution and Law	Awardee
Feiza Elleuch	ACT	Awardee
Lotfi Achouri	Artistes Producteurs Associes	Awardee
Sbeitla/Kasserine		
Ali Zouaoui	Association of Culture and Development	Awardee
Mahem Hamessi	Radio Chambi	Awardee
Raja Yahyaoui	Andalus Institution for non violent studies	Awardee
Kais Missaoui	Center of Strategic Research to Promote Development and Democracy	Awardee

Hatem Karoui	Group of youth artists	Awardee
Nawfel Ichaoui	Hope Association	Awardee
Walid Farjani	Consortium of Associations of Kasserine	Awardee
Sonia Rachdi	Sana Suffetula Association	Awardee
Nader Guesmi	Kasserine International Festival Association	Awardee
Ali Zouaoui	Municipality of Sbeitla	Awardee
Mejdi M´Nasrya	Kasserine El Fatah School	Awardee
Nawfel Ichawi	Amal Association	Awardee
Karim Jabbari	Development without Borders	Awardee
Rochdi Idoudi	SSK Basketball Club	Awardee
Mohammed Zarrouki	Group of videographers	Awardee
Saadaoui Seif Eddine Houssem Hermassi	Municipality of Kasserine	Awardee
Gafsa		
Talel Iili Maher Hermassi Ouled Bahia Haithem Laacheb	Sawty Association of Gafsa	Awardee
Aymen Chwaya	Radio and Journalism Club of Lycee Pilote of Gafsa	Awardee
Oussema Rajb	Mashhed Association	Awardee
Abdelkader Bormi	1,000 Volunteers Association	Awardee
Ousseman ben Mansour	South School Group	Awardee
Adel Kilani	Association Mouwatinoon	Awardee
Jamel Fatteh	Irada Association	Awardee
Kelani Adel	Association Citoyens Gafsa	Awardee
OTI DC		
Stephen Lennon	OTI DC	Staff DC
William Hyde	OTI DC	Staff DC
Justin Sherman	OTI DC	Staff DC
Gretchen Murphy	OTI DC	Staff DC
Kim Maynard	OTI DC	Staff DC
Beth Dunlap	OTI DC	Staff DC

USG		
John Crawford	Department of State	Government
Summer Lopez	USAID	Government
DAI HQ		
Bruce Spake	DAI HQ	Staff DC
Jacquelyn Duclos	DAI HQ	Staff DC
Barbara Lauer	DAI HQ	Staff DC
Albert Cevallos	DAI HQ	Staff DC
Daniel Shaul	DAI HQ	Staff DC
OTI Leadership Tunisia		
Molly Byrne	OTI Country Representative	OTI
Karen Kaplan	Former OTI Country Representative	OTI
Naomi Wachs	Former OTI Deputy Country Representative	OTI
TTI Team Tunisia		
Michele Piercey	DAI Chief of Party	Staff Tunisia
Nadia Blackton	DAI Program Manager	Staff Tunisia
Wissem Missaoui	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Ousama Dahmani	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Halima Mrad	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Nessim Ghroum	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Jamel Rhimi	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Maher Brahmi	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Chiraz Rabhi	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Zied Amami	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Zouhair Bouallagui	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Nadia Labidi	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Azza Sebai	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Fedia Chabbeh	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Najem Salhi	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Nizar Ghodbani	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia
Bilel Arfaoui	DAI Tunisia	Staff Tunisia

Other		
HeinWinnubst	German Embassy	Diplomat
Adrian Seufert	German Embassy	Diplomat
Khalid Derbel	US Embassy	Diplomat
Wajih Hammami	MEPI, Tunis Regional Office	Diplomat
Bertran Effantin	Mercy Corps	INGO
Kate Cummings	Democracy International	INGO
Nicolas Kaczorowski	International Foundation for Electoral Systems	INGO
Nicole Rowsell	National Democratic Institute (NDI)	INGO
Mohammed Aafa	Agency for the Promotion of Industry and Innovation	Local Government Gafsa
Dorra Bouchoucha	NOMADIS	Private Company Tunisia
Riadh Ferjani	HAICA	Independent Expert Tunisia
Mohamed El Mounir	UNDP	Multilateral, Tunisia

TTI Final Evaluation : Group Interviews

Name(s) of Organization(s)	Type (Awardee/Participants)	Category	Organizer
Association of Free Art Urbain Regional office of Youth and Sport of Manouba	Participants	CVE	Prodata
Fikra Association (Sbeitla) Youth Center of Kasserine	Participants	CVE	Prodata

TTI Final Evaluation : Focus Group Discussions

Name(s) of the organization(s)	Type (Awardee/Participants)	Category	Organiser
Tunis			
YEDA UTIL ATIDE Act	Awardee	CE (Elections)	Prodata
Youth Center of Manouba Youth Center of Sidi el Bechir	Participants	CVE	Prodata
Art Solution Young Leaders Entrepreneurs	Awardee	CE (Youth)	Prodata
YEDA	Participants	CVE	QED
University de Manouba	Participants	CSO Leadership	QED
Youth Center of Khaznadar	Participants	CSO Leadership	QED
Women and Leadership	Participants	Marginalized Groups (women)	QED
Mouwatana & Tawassol	Participants	CE	QED
TedX (Wasabi)	Participants	CSO Leadership	QED
Sbeitla/Kasserine			
Al Farabi Association Development without Borders	Participants	CVE (Art)	Prodata
Sbeitla Secondary School Chanbi Association	Awardee	CE (Sports)	Prodata
Group of Amateur Videographers in Kasserine Group of local Artists	Participants	CE	Prodata

ANNEX F

TTI Final Evaluation: Focus Group Questionnaires

CVE Focus Group Questions [*FG held with participants*]

1. Tell us a little about yourself and how you came to participate in these associations' activities. What was your role in the activity itself?

   [*We would want to probe on whatever details on the participants' backgrounds could uphold claims as to them being "at risk" or not; if yes, understand what they were at risk of. We also want to know how youth participants were recruited for the activities. If possible, it would be good to know what they did in their spare time before participating in the activity. Also, were they in a leadership role for the activities?*]

2. Were there differences in backgrounds among participants in these activities? If so, how did this affect implementation of the activities? Were new relationships/friendships struck? Do they last?

3. Do you continue to be involved in similar types of activities or with the same group?

4. What would you say were the main achievements of these activities? Do you find these types of activities help one express oneself?

5. Would you say participating changed your perspective on your role in your community/society? The role of youth?

6. What were the reactions from other youth, your families, or other members of the community to the activities?

7. What were some of the challenges or shortcomings of these activities? Were you able to overcome them?

8. Do you have any suggestions as to how to improve these types of activities in the future? [*We would want to probe their suggestions regarding points that came up in foregoing answers.*]

Elections Focus Group Questions [*FG held with awardees*]

1. What do you think was achieved by the OTI programs you carried out?

2. What were the major challenges you faced in carrying out the activities?

3. Were these programs effective in reaching out to less educated populations in the interior (for example, women and youth)?
4. What do you think is the value added (benefits) of the OTI model?
5. What lessons did you learn in carrying out these activities?
6. What was unique (if anything) about these activities at the time they were carried out?
7. Building on their experience with the Bus Citoyen, what (if anything) did the organizations involved go on to do?
8. Are you planning on conducting activities for the coming elections? If so, please describe.

Women Focus Group Questions [*FG held with participants*]

1. Tell us a little about yourself and how you came to participate in these activities. What was your role in the activity itself?
2. Do you think that the impact of these activities was beneficial?
3. What were the main challenges of the training in leadership for women?
4. Do you think that these activities had a larger impact?
5. Do you think that it brought inhabitants of the capital to better know the other regions and their problems?
6. Do you think that it had an impact on other women in Tunisia?
7. Let's take the example of "complementarity," how do you think women/rural women were impacted by this, if at all?
8. What were the challenges of the round of "Mon 14?"
9. How did you personally benefit from this activity?

CE Focus Group Questions [*FG held with participants*]

1. Tell us a little about yourself and how you came to participate in these activities. What was your role in the activity itself?
2. The roundtables have been beneficial for those who attended; how, if at all, do you think they benefited the population in general, directly or indirectly?
3. Did those who benefited from the roundtables represent different targets populations?
4. How do you think you contributed to improving dialogue between deputies?

5. Do you think that associations in general had an impact on the content of the constitution? If so, how? If not, why not?

6. Do you think that associations that are based in Tunis can influence other regions?

7. As a young person, have you been able to transmit what you learned to others around you?

8. How did you benefit from this activity, personally and as an active member of civil society?

CSO Leadership Focus Group Questions [FG held with participants]

1. Do you often come to the youth center? How long do you stay, and what are your specific activities? After these activities, do you feel more engaged in society?

2. Why did you decide to join this club? How long have you been member, and did you feel a change in yourself?

3. What is the difference between those youth who frequent the youth center, and those who do not?

4. What were people's reaction about your activities at the youth center?

5. Can you tell us more about the carnival? What did you feel during the parade?

6. According to you, what is the role of youth in Tunisia today?

7. What does the youth center represent for you? What did this activity bring to the youth center? What are the challenges that you met? How did you overcome them?

8. What is your involvement on Facebook? Social media in general?

9. What the general impact of this activity on you and your close friends?

10. The youth center is a public institution, and many youth have a negative opinion of the government. Did these activities change your views about the government?

Leadership Focus Group Questions [FG held with participants]

1. Tell us a little about yourself and how you came to participate in these activities. What was your role in the activity itself?

2. What are the themes that you worked on?

3. Did this activity change your vision of the future? After this activity, will you continue your involvement?

4. Apart from this activity, are you involved in other activities with other associations?

5. What does this activity bring to you? Did you convince other people to be involved as you are in this type of activities?

6. What are the challenges that you met?

7. What is the target population of TEDx? And how do you plan to broaden it to other categories of the population?

8. Did this activity (TEDx) in fact became an opportunity for you to contribute to the transition in Tunisia?

9. What was unique (if anything) about these activities at the time they were carried out?

ANNEX G

TTI Final Evaluation: Detailed Analysis of the Sub-Objectives Framework

The table below presents the Team's observations on the indicators and hypotheses that underlie the framework's sub-objectives; this is drawn from OTI's 2013 "Program Document."

TTI impact indicators by sub-objective

Sub-objective theory of change: *if "x," then "y," because "z"*			Observations
Civic Engagement	*If* we increase citizen participation in political processes,	*then* • citizens vote • citizens attend/participate in political discussions • citizens share their opinions with their government representatives	• Civic engagement is traditionally defined more broadly than political participation. In line with this broader conceptualization, TTI supported numerous CE activities that did not directly address political processes, but did promote citizens' engagement in their communities.
	because democracy is new to Tunisia, along with democratic principles and political processes. Citizens lack knowledge on general democratic principles, democratic citizenship, and means to participate, especially with the constitution, elections, and local governance structures.		• Without elections, the first indicator cannot be used; however, if there was an expectation that pertinent activities would increase voter turnout, then that should have been the measure. • Participation in political discussions or sharing their opinions with government officials are outcomes more suited to the activity level, rather than the sub-objective level. • Many of the information dissemination activities are under CE, but increased knowledge is not one of the indicators.
CSO Leadership	*If* we increase CSO leadership capacity,	*then* • CSOs mobilize citizens around an issue • citizens engage with CSOs	• The two indicators are redundant in that they mirror each other. • The activities mostly focus on providing CSOs with practical, hands-on skills, substantive knowledge of specific issues, and, to a lesser extent, materials/equipment.
	because CSOs multiplied due to new rules following the revolution that allowed greater political and social organization outside of the auspices of the government. These nascent CSOs lack the management and leadership skills, extensive networks, and democratic knowledge to support and lead civic engagement and activism.		• If the expected mobilization/engagement is that required for the punctual event, it does not speak to more than the CSO's capacity to organize an event. • If the expectation is that the CSO will continue to mobilize/engage with citizens, then there are no relevant measures.

Sub-objective theory of change: *if "x," then "y," because "z"*			Observations
Marginalized groups	*If* we increase the voice of marginalized groups (women, youth) in the political process,	*then* • youth become active political leaders • women become active political leaders	• This sub-objective is predicated on the assumption that *all* women and youth are marginalized from the political process. There was no deliberate testing of this assumption and several of the national staff expressed reservations in this regard.
	because women and youth played an important role in the revolution; however they have been apathetic or unengaged since the revolution. Women and youth lack the leadership skills, networks, and access to information necessary to have a voice in the transition and participate actively in political processes.		• The work with women's organizations was for the most part on explicitly political matters, but it is not clear that the women involved were not already active political leaders. Despite the fact that there was some leadership training for women, the more significant outcomes these partners cited was on the drafting of the pertinent article during the Constituent Assembly. • There are no measures of whether youth went on to become political leaders.
Tolerance	*If* we increase the acceptance of the diversity of views,	*then* • peaceful expression during public events/discourse (observed/perceptions) in particular women and youth • level of tolerance to cultural/political/religious differences (perception) • level of acceptance of different viewpoints (perception) • violence around political expression/events (perception of and actual reports of)	• What measures there are of these indicators at the activity level have to do with positive feelings about the messages conveyed. • Even if some of the activities did increase participants' awareness of the diversity of Tunisian history, there were no measures of a subsequent change in levels of tolerance or acceptance of differences. • The targeted and very short-term nature of the activities makes the last indicator an unrealistic standard.
	because post-revolution, Tunisia has struggled with its national identity and become increasingly polarized. Individuals across the spectrum have tried to dictate what defines a Tunisian, despite a rich history of diversity. In some cases, frustrations with differences of opinions have resulted in political and tribal violence. Citizens lack the understanding of the role diversity plays in a democracy and the skills to be able to debate and discuss topics among individuals with different backgrounds and points of view.		
Countering Violent Extremism	*If* we strengthen the sense of belonging to moderate Tunisian society for at-risk youth	*then* • increased participation in moderate youth organizations • improved use of nonviolent means of expression on issues of concern • increased leadership capacity of youth leaders • expanded reach of moderate youth leaders	• The assumption of the second indicator that the messaging from nonviolent means of expression would not convey extremist views needs to be tested; extremist groups also use non-violent means of expression to recruit. • The last two indicators seem to be more a function of CSO leadership or marginalized youth.
	because violent extremism has increased in Tunisia following the revolution. In particular young men, who are unemployed, apathetic, and unengaged, have been targeted for jihadist recruitment. A large portion of young men remain disengaged from the current political processes and transition in Tunisia and do not have a strong purpose or sense of belonging to moderate society. There are few attractive social network opportunities that offer an alternative to joining violent extremist groups.		

ANNEX H
TTI Final Evaluation: Social Media Use by Local Partners

Tunis Awardees	Facebook							Youtube		Other SM tools
	Likes	# of funded events online	Types of content	Source	Videos	Comments	Frequency of posting (x week)	Views	Comments	
Artistes Producteurs Associés	2220	1	Own activities	Self	16	-	2	128	0	Link to online radio coverage
TACID	1,503	1	Own activities, RFPs	Self, others	-	-	1	-	-	Website
New Age	258	2	Own activities	Self	-	-	.25	203	0	-
Sawty[1]	50,028	1	Own activities	Self	17	-	7	-	-	-
Mouwatana & Tawasol	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	830[2]	0	Website, Twitter
Youth Center of Khaznadar	13	4	The YC	Self	-	-	-	724[2]	0	Links to media coverage of event
Fanni Raghman Anni	15,682	-	Own activities, media coverage	Self, other	20	Few	7	2,255	1	-
Massart	1,849	-	Own activities	Self	-	1	7	-	-	-
Wasabi (TEDx)[3]	39,380	4	Own activities	Self	17	Several	5	39,384[4] 59,874[5]	Several	Blog

[1] Two Facebook pages ("likes" are summed up).
[2] Two Youtube videos (views are summed up).
[3] Six Facebook pages ("likes" are summed up).
[4] Six Youtube videos of TEDx Carthage Women (views are summed up).
[5] Twelve Youtube videos of TEDx Trust the New Currency (views are summed up).

| Interior Awardees | Facebook | | | | | | | Youtube | | Other SM tools |
	Likes	# of funded events online	Types of content	Source	Videos	Comments	Frequency of posting (x week)	Views	Comments	
1,000 Volunteers	2,787	1	Own activities	Self	-	Few	7	-	-	
Mouwatinoun	1,035		Own activities	Self	-	Few	2	-	-	
Development without Borders[6]	1,348	1	Event	Self	4	-	1	305	0	Links to media coverage
Rocking Steps Crew	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,439[7]	10	Link to media coverage
Young Leaders Entrepreneurs	5,224	4	Own activities	Self, others	-	Few	5	0	0	Blog, Website
Jaw Gsarnia	22,862	-	News items on Kasserine	Self	35	Few	3	-	-	-
Association Fikra	2,643	1	General	Self	-	Few	7	-	-	-
South School Group**	2,569		Music videos	Other	29	Few	5	13,375[8]	53	-
Mashed	- (event page)	1	Event	Self, others	-	Few	3	-	-	-

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[6] Not an organizational Facebook page, but the page for the Streets Arts Festival in Kasserine.
[7] Three Youtube videos (views are summed up).
[8] Two Youtube videos (views are summed up).

ANNEX I

TTI Final Evaluation: CVE Brief

OTI TUNISIA TRANSITION INITIATIVE (TTI): CVE EVALUATION BRIEF DECEMBER 2013

I. INTRODUCTION

At the request of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the QED Group initiated an evaluation of OTI's Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI) in November 2013. The Evaluation Team, composed of Oren Ipp, Senior Evaluation Expert, and Amalia Prado, Evaluation Specialist, arrived in Tunis on December 5 and departed on December 21, 2013. The team met with OTI Country Representative Molly Byrne early in the process to discuss the parameters of, and deliverables for, this initial trip. It was agreed that the Team would interview DAI staff, grantees and external analysts to complement the desk study and Washington, DC interviews already conducted. It was also agreed that the team would draft a brief detailing preliminary findings of an evaluation of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) sub-objective; this document is that brief, submitted to OTI shortly after the conclusion of the visit.

Mirroring the broader final evaluation, this brief addresses two key aspects of program: strategy and performance. More specifically to the strategy, the brief addresses to what extent the choice of CVE programming was appropriate for the evolving political landscape. The evaluation also assesses CVE activity outcomes (i.e. the short-term results of activities), and CVE sub-objective outcomes (i.e. the collective results of the CVE "cluster").

II. METHODOLOGY

This preliminary CVE evaluation comprises a desk review of program literature and reporting[1], internal assessments, staff and beneficiary interviews, studies conducted by OTI, as well as OTI's TTI database. The initial trip to Tunisia included a four-day visit to the Sbeitla office. Interviews were held with all Program Development Officers (PDOs), Grant Managers (GMs) and Procurement and Logistics Officers (PLOs) in both the Tunis and Sbeitla offices. Fourteen grantees were interviewed, most of whom (8) had conducted CVE activities. Several activity site visits were also conducted, including to Maktub High School in Kasserine, the public park in Sbeitla, the soccer tournament in Tunis, and a dance performance in El Hrayria, among others.

Definitions In refining the Evaluation Team's approach to this exercise, it was important to explicitly define certain key terms. As such, the Team uses OTI's definitions[2] for the following key terms. Outputs are defined as the immediate results (goods, processes, events, services) of an activity and records lessons learned during the implementation process. Outcomes are defined as the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an activity.

The term "at-risk youth," as used and understood in the context of the program, has broad parameters.

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[1] More specifically, the Team reviewed Strategic Review Sessions (SRS) from September 2011, February 2013 and October 2013, Program Performance Reviews (PPR) from July 2012 and August 2013, Tunisia Management Review of February 2012, the M&E Advisory Report of June 2012, the Navanti studies, and a host of other relevant documents.

[2] It is worth noting that OTI definitions do not necessarily reflect common usage of these terms; nevertheless, because these definitions were used by staff in designing their M&E system they are also used in the evaluation. These definitions can be found in OTI-Tunisia Monitoring and Evaluation October 2013 document.

"At-risk" are those youth who are or may become involved with violent extremist groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia. This population also includes youth who are vulnerable to drug and alcohol abuse and to joining criminal gangs who traffic contraband. Unemployed and out of school also qualify some youth as at-risk. Although not explicit, it appears as though the program's main defining characteristic for at-risk is belonging to poor, lower class neighborhoods. Given this broad range, there may be a dissonance between the theoretical objective of countering violent extremism (i.e. religious extremism) and the reality of who participates in program activities; this will be discussed further below.

Data Limitations The Evaluation Team encountered a number of data collection challenges in conducting this exercise. Although these difficulties did not prevent the evaluation from taking place, they do pose the following data limitations on the findings.

The absence of baseline information is a significant challenge to conducting any final evaluation. Reconstructing baselines is not methodologically sound, as it relies on staff, grantee and participant memories that introduce biases, which frequently result in over-estimations of change and cannot be independently verified. Without an explicit and defined starting point against which to measure progress, findings from the exercise suggest a relative change in the indicators, though a precise measure of that change cannot be determined. Further, the information contained in the database on CVE activities is of varied usefulness for evaluation purposes. While there is extensive information on quantitative outputs at the activity level, there is much less qualitative information on outputs, and even less on Objective 2 outcomes. That activities were conducted is well documented, replete with quantitative details on participants (often disaggregated by gender and age), and events. What are often missing are both qualitative accounts of outputs (e.g. what topics were discussed and to what effect in a roundtable event), as well as qualitative results of grantees' activities.

As indicators for this level of analysis, Monitoring and Evaluation Plans commonly cite criteria that do not reflect outcomes, and which rely on pre- and post-activity informal interviews that rarely occur. Consider, for example, the objective to "increase youth engagement with and connection to their school community," by measuring "positive interactions between and among at risk youth and teachers during the sports camp, attendance and participation of youth from different neighborhoods, attendance and participation of youth who are not the usual attendees at cultural events, Facebook chatter on youth focused pages, response of community elders and family members to the role that youth play during the actual tournament." Not only is the list of indicators quite ambitious, but it is not clear how, for example, attendance by youth from other neighborhoods is a measure of engagement with their school community.

It is also noteworthy that no Final Evaluation Reports (FERs) were available to the Team for this component of the evaluation. The Team, therefore, had to rely to a large extent on the database for information on outcomes, which, as highlighted above, has its shortcomings. Additionally, CVE activity notes, which could offer important information on outcomes, focused largely on operational issues, and rarely identified programmatic challenges, how they were resolved or what learning took place as a result.

Program Design Challenges Two additional challenges relating to the design of CVE activities further complicate the task of evaluating this sub-objective. First, with very few exceptions, targeting at-risk youth was a major challenge for staff and grantees[3]. While TTI program leadership explicitly discussed the intention to integrate at-risk youth into moderate groups, the distinction between the two, in practice, is not clear. Both geographic targeting and personal identification were used to locate at-risk youth. Geographic targeting—i.e. neighborhoods known to be recruiting grounds for extremist

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[3] Given the sensitivities of CVE programming, the Evaluation Team was asked not to discuss this sub-objective explicitly with grantees; the Team therefore pursued a line of questioning on targeting, but was careful not to link it to violent extremism.

groups—was recognized as an imprecise methodology. Numerous grantees explained that many of the youth who participated in program activities were not at-risk; though many activities deliberately sought to integrate at-risk and "regular" youth, there was little verifiable or documented evidence of who belonged to each category. As a result, there are serious limitations to drawing conclusions about at-risk youth affected by the program. Grantees also targeted at-risk youth who they knew personally. Though precise criteria for being "at-risk" were often lacking, this approach takes advantage of local knowledge and ties to the community. Nevertheless, even if at-risk youth comprised a high percent of activity participants, it was not documented. In either case, it is important to note the limits on extrapolating individual-level results to larger geographic/population targeted areas without consideration for scale; given the relatively small penetration of activities in large target populations (i.e. Ettadhamen), outcomes speak to those directly affected by the program, rather than the larger target geographic are or population.

A second, and related, challenge is the program's level of sustained engagement with at-risk youth. Staff and grantees noted that while some participants may have attended more than one event, given the diverse nature of activities (from soccer to hip-hop to caligraffiti), it was unlikely that the same population was exposed to repeated programming. Thus, while at-risk youth of Kasserine, for example, may have had up to two dozen events over the course of six months of programming, it is unclear how intensive or sustained that programming was for each. This is compounded by the generally short duration of CVE activities. For example, of the five grantees reviewed in Kasserine, activities consisted of a one-night street fair, a four-day festival, a one-day youth obstacle course, a one-week sports camp, and one day of street basketball. Although minor rehabilitation projects were associated with some of these, in general, activities for at-risk youth have been limited in duration. The notion of "pummeling" can apply, though only when intervention targets are a defined and sustained "bombardment" of a geographic area or population group at a commensurate scale; neither of which are the case for CVE. Finally, sustained impact for CVE implicitly assumes that grantee engagement will continue beyond the life of the program; though preliminary observations suggest that grantees are strongly committed to their work, this assumption should be verified and made explicit.

Challenges to targeting, activity duration and sustained engagement of at-risk youth limit the conclusions the can be drawn in terms of the aggregate impact on achieving this sub-objective. These challenges also raise questions about the difference between CVE and civic engagement programming. According to staff, the distinction between the two is the target beneficiary; that is, an art workshop for youth would be considered civic engagement, while an art workshop for youth from target neighborhoods would be considered CVE. Similarly, a sports activity promoting non-violent approaches to resolving differences would be CVE if the emphasis is on the target neighborhood, rather than on the message itself.

III.   PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Program Strategy: CVE

Recent studies, news reports, and interviews with country experts, staff and grantees point to a rise in extremist violence throughout Tunisia, including in areas where TTI programming is being implemented. Aside from the pull factors, there is a growing concern among civil society organizations regarding what they perceive as increasing levels of anti-establishment beliefs and attitudes among youth. These beliefs include an alienation from the political and economic system that took over "their Revolution" and that has not addressed corruption or unemployment. This dynamic speaks to cognitive radicalization processes referenced by the CVE Desk Study and Framework for OTI/Tunisia (CVE Desk Study) and further validates CVE programming. As such, the Evaluation Team found that the program is responding to an evolving context of a growing social dynamic that poses a serious threat to the political transition.

There is, however, one important caveat with regards to strategy as it relates to program design. As the CVE Desk Study notes, a central challenge for programming is deciding whether to "focus on the overall enabling environment (the conditions that allow VE drivers to thrive) or on determining the profile of at risk or vulnerable populations to better intervene in recruitment." Based on TTI's CVE Programming Plan and the numerous references to at-risk youth in activity backgrounds and summaries, it would seem that the program nominally prioritized recruitment. Yet, the Team found that, in practice, programming essentially addresses the enabling environment in key geographic areas. The dearth of information on profiles of at-risk youth or targeting criteria, as well as the sensitivities involved in tackling these issues directly with some staff and grantees, have made it difficult for the program to be more intentional about addressing recruitment. These limitations will likely continue to constrain more nuanced targeting beyond geographic areas.

Program Performance: CVE

The TTI program goal is to support Tunisians in their pursuit of a democratic society. The objective, which was revised in August 2013, is to create space for the transition to succeed. In October 2013, eight sub-objectives were reduced to four, including the most recent addition, Countering Violent Extremism. The CVE sub-objective is designed to strengthen the sense of belonging to moderate Tunisian society for at-risk youth. Activities conducted under this sub-objective target at-risk youth, and include holding arts and music workshops; organizing festivals and street fairs in which workshop participants showcase their talents and others observe; organizing sports workshops and tournaments; and holding related roundtables and discussion fora. Activities have been held in/around Kasserine and target municipalities in the Greater Tunis area. The four stated impact indicators for this sub-objective are:

➢ Increased participation in moderate youth organizations
➢ Improved use of nonviolent means of expression on issues of concern (i.e. for youth to discuss sensitive topics and express themselves)
➢ Increased leadership capacity of youth leaders
➢ Expanded reach of moderate youth leaders

Though no formal baselines exists for these indicators, interviews with staff, grantees and outside analysts, as well as the desk review[4], suggest that prior to the revolution, few opportunities existed for youth to participate in moderate organizations or platforms through which to express themselves in nonviolent means. It is also evident that the revolution brought with it an explosion of civil society organizations, many emerging in the immediate post-revolution period; by some estimates, of the 24,000 CSOs that were created in the last three years, as many as 6,000 are active. Numerous interviewees agreed that CSOs, particularly those in the interior, started with little capacity and a limited reach. In the absence of baseline figures, these estimates can serve as a comparison against which change can be measured.

➢ *Increased participation in moderate youth organizations*

It appears that TTI programming did serve as a catalyst for increasing participation of youth in moderate organizations; it is also clear that some fraction of those youth were at-risk. A number of grantees reported an increase in membership in their organizations of youth who participated or observed sponsored activities. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that several program participants initiated their own activities or formed their own groups, clubs or organizations.[5] For example, a number of trainees

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[4] In particular, the two Navanti "Youth and Extremism" reports from August and September 2013 and OTI's "Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Desk Study and Framework for OTI/Tunisia."

[5] It is understood that many more similar examples took place. Without a systematic approach to gathering this information, however, the Team could only offer a few illustrative examples.

and participants of the mural in Kasserine later formed the first calligraphy club in the region; one used his own resources to create a rap video clip and post it on YouTube. As a result of the street basketball activity—which was attended by a number of league and federation representatives—the Center West League established a Kasserine chapter and the Federation of National Basketball promised to create a team in Thala. Both of these outcomes point to an increase in youth participation in moderate organizations. A smaller number of participants launched their own initiatives and became OTI grantees, demonstrating greater impact in terms of both stronger individual effects among some and an increase in the number of moderate organizations.

A couple of grantees stand out in their ability to both demonstrate success *and* provide evidence for it. In July 2013, a group of teachers came together and were funded to organize a one-week sports camp for at-risk youth in Kasserine, and rehabilitate minor parts of the school they were associated with. Many of their students were vulnerable to extremism, criminality, violence and drug and alcohol abuse and addiction; in this respect they were all at-risk. The teachers decided to use one measurable criterion in particular: school attendance. Believing that students who attend school are less vulnerable to these threats, they reviewed three years of attendance records to identify the 150 students with the worst attendance records. The teachers actively recruited them for the activity, including visiting them at their homes and speaking to their parents. The sports camp was held only a few weeks before the new school year began in September. The teachers monitored school attendance for the semester and noticed a significant increase[6]; they are hoping for additional funds to organize more events and sustain this success. Likewise, a little more than half the Board Members of Tahadi in Ettadhamen are teachers in the neighborhood and were able to identify youth participants who had dropped out of school. After engaging with them and their parents throughout the course of the activity, all 20 (approximately one third of all participants) went back to school. These are excellent examples of activities that are designed to measure results and do not require outside (program staff) assistance to monitor. If documented properly, it is also quite easily replicable.

Finally, there are promising signs of program outcomes on strengthening of moderate social networks via face-to-face and online interaction within youth groups. To the extent activities promote exchanges among youth (competitions, performances), network are created that have the potential to extend beyond their immediate neighborhoods. There were several references to participants functioning as a family, resolving serious differences amongst themselves, and forming and maintaining inter-neighborhood friendships. It is quite possible that these social networks—built on a recently developed or acquired affinity for moderate platforms—can mitigate the pull of more primary networks (family, childhood friends, charismatic religious leaders) towards extremism. As one grantee noted, this is a long process that requires gradual changes in youth attitudes and behaviors, particularly in how they communicate with others and resolve differences.

It is important to note that while grantees' activities might appear similar, they are taking diverse approaches to programming: some are cultivating core members to be leaders while also looking to increase their members; others engage in very close mentoring with a more limited number of youth; several have had requests by other neighborhoods to expand activities and are considering opening local branches. Arriving at a better understanding of CVE programming and its impact requires these different approaches and their results to be well documented.

➢ *Improved use of nonviolent means of expression on issues of concern (i.e. for youth to discuss sensitive topics and express themselves)*

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[6] Collecting such data—i.e. an increase in school attendance of program participants—would more clearly point to program outcomes and enrich the information available for the final evaluation.

An *improved use* of nonviolent means of expression presupposes greater exposure and access to platforms for nonviolent means of expression. While database outputs track numbers of participants, it is not clear what proportion of these participants had prior exposure to alternatives for self-expression. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that TTI activities increased youth exposure and access to a range of nonviolent means of expression. Among such means of expression are the mediums of hip-hop, rap, calligraphy, calligraffiti, dance, slam poetry, blogging, basketball, and other sporting activities. Given that so little apparently existed in this regard prior to the revolution, all youth engagement in these activities can be considered an improved use of nonviolent means of expression. There was also remarkable resonance among grantees on the value of "street arts" for their inclusiveness, potential for attracting youth, and as statements to counter a strong perception of exclusion from the "fine arts" and their enclosed and costly spaces.

It also appears that many of the activities not only provided a venue for youth to express themselves, but also integrated messaging of moderation and discussions of sensitive topics into those activities. For example, Karim Jabbari used the painting of the mural on the Kasserine prison wall to formally and informally engage youth (and other members of the community) in discussions on civic activism, artistic expression of personal frustration, and national identity.

➢ *Increased leadership capacity of youth leaders* and *Expanded reach of moderate youth leaders*

These two indicators appear too similar to warrant measuring separately. In fact, it is difficult to see how youth leaders could expand their reach without an increase in leadership capacity. Whether measured together or apart, no completed or ongoing CVE activities have addressed these yet.[7] As discussed below, however, programming did appear to have an indirect impact on youth CSO capacity (as opposed to youth leadership capacity).

Assuming at-risk youth participated in TTI programming to some significant degree, it is reasonable to conclude that the program did in fact contribute to a sense of belonging to moderate Tunisian society. This sense of belonging is expressed by individual-level changes among participating youth that interviewees referred to consistently: an increase in self-confidence, improved communication skills, and a renewed sense of hope. The extent of this contribution, however, cannot be determined.

Program Performance: CVE Unexpected Outcomes

Even if not intentional, unexpected outcomes are valuable contributions to changes in the operating environment. This is particularly relevant for this program, as national staff and grantees highlighted a number of outcomes that seemed important even if they did not appear in any of the program literature. Focus group research could test, probe and further measure these unexpected outcomes.

The Interior Matters The Tunis-Interior divide—based largely on the disparity in economic development of the two regions—has a long history in Tunisia. It is also a theme identified repeatedly in political analysis, public opinion polls, interviews and discussions held in the last three years, and noted in numerous TTI program documents. This divide speaks not only to the disadvantaged position of the interior vis-à-vis Greater Tunis and the coast; it also relates to a palpable need for recognition of the interior by Tunis, a need exacerbated by a widespread perception that interior youths' role in the revolution is not appropriately acknowledged. It also speaks to a sense of belonging and importance that has traditionally not been offered the interior. A particularly striking reflection of this need for acknowledgement as equals is the recurrent choice by workshop participants to perform their finales in downtown Tunis, not in their respective communities. As one grantee explained, there are several factors at play in this choice: the symbolism of Avenue Bourguiba as a centerpiece for the Revolution;

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[7] Recently cleared activities for web radio (for expanded reach) and leadership training have not begun yet.

the desire by youth from the interior and outlying municipalities to reclaim both the public space and their leading role in the Revolution; and, ending prevailing stereotypes of their communities as uneducated and violent.

The December arts festival was held in Kasserine—not Tunis—as a deliberate message by the organizer to the effect that the interior matters. The sense of pride in being from the interior can be seen spreading: groups of youth initiated a cleaning campaign in collaboration with the municipality in the days leading up to the festival to ensure that visitors would see the best face of Kasserine. This aspect of recognition can also be seen in other non-OTI programming, such as the Mayor-to-Mayor exchange program, which marked the first time the mayor of Tunis had ever paid an official visit to Kasserine. In this way, though seemingly unintentional, and therefore difficult to measure, the program did appear to contribute to strengthening the sense of belonging to moderate Tunisian society for youth, including at-risk youth.

Public Demonstration of Belonging Virtually all interviewees—not to mention recent research—have noted the rise in violent extremism in Tunisia since the revolution took place. The two political assassinations in July and February of 2013, the attack on the US Embassy in Tunis and the government showdown with Ansar al-Sharia in Kairouan and Ettadhamen were among the more high profile manifestations of this trend. Though TTI program literature does not refer to the public dimension of VE, CVE programming may be playing a role in promoting a sense of belonging through its public-oriented activities. If there has been a "religious invasion of public space"[8] associated with VE, activities that bring at-risk youth together in public may offer them more than engagement in nonviolent means of expression. These activities—street festivals, the prison mural, sports tournaments, and the like—may also offer at-risk youth an opportunity to express public solidarity in the face of VE and in so doing, gain a greater sense of belonging to moderate Tunisian society. This builds on the recommendation of the CVE Desk Study, which suggests that "the creation/rehabilitation of public space [may serve] as one activity to encourage young individuals to engage in positive forms of social interaction."[9]

CSO Capacity Building Though the program has not yet directly addressed the capacity or reach of youth leaders, the program does appear to indirectly build the capacity of youth CSOs. The in-kind nature of grants, as well as the relative inexperience of many of the grantees (most of which are youth CSOs), offer these CSOs an opportunity to learn by watching program staff develop, implement and monitor project activities. Both staff and grantees highlighted the latter's improved capacity in many areas, including proposal development, administration, financial reporting, communication, and logistics. Though not formally measured, the improved capacity of youth CSOs is a noteworthy unexpected outcome of the program, and speaks volumes about the professionalism of the program staff.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS

The findings detailed in this brief highlight two complementary conclusions. The first is the value of qualitative information in conducting final evaluations. The second is the limitations on the rigor of an evaluation with limited results-oriented data. This brief demonstrates the value of analysis that can be drawn from appropriate data, as well as the limits of the conclusions that can be reached without them. The section that follows offers recommendations on steps to help ensure a more robust evaluation can be conducted upon the Team's return. The recommendations are made with the full recognition that staff are working at full capacity and will likely be pushed even further as the program winds down and closes out.

Proposed Final Evaluation Methodology The Evaluation Team will assess the TTI program in two phases:

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[8] OTI. "Countering Violent Extremism: Desk Study and Framework for OTI/Tunisia," May 2013, pp 8. See also Marks, M. (2013): Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current, *Mediterranean Politics*, 18:1, 104-11.
[9] Ibid, p 15.

Phase I (May 2011 – April 2013) comprises activities designed to broadly achieve an objective of citizen engagement. Phase II (May 2013 – present) comprises a much clearer vision for the program in which activities were designed according to eight, and subsequently four, sub-objectives. Phase I activities will be evaluated against an amalgamated country-level objective that places citizen engagement at its core (to be refined at a later date); for conceptual coherence, the Team will group activities according to targeted topics, including, for example, on elections, the constitution, women, youth, decentralization, and other OTI priorities. For Phase II, activities in all four sub-objectives will be evaluated against the impact indicators outlined for each; marginalized groups and CSO leadership will likely receive a less in-depth treatment due to the relatively small number of grants conducted in each.

The Evaluation Team recommends that Prodata be contracted to expand the research capability of the DAI office. Before the Team returns, it is recommended that Prodata conduct focus group research on CVE and civic engagement in both Tunis and Sbeitla. This research will help the Team draw conclusions about contributions made by the TTI program to changes in targeted areas. Prodata should also assign one or two researchers to help solicit outcome-oriented information from staff. The Evaluation Team can provide Prodata technical assistance, as needed. In the coming weeks, the Evaluation Team will submit a detailed planning document for OTI's review; this document will outline next steps in terms of a revised timeline, research to be conducted before the Team's return and a proposed schedule for the second trip.

ANNEX J

Statement of Differences

USAID/OTI thanks the Tunisia Final Evaluation team for their significant efforts to evaluate the Tunisia Transition Initiative program. The report provided strong findings articulating the program's impact in Tunisia, however, there were areas of the report that OTI did not feel correctly assessed key components of TTI. These are outlined below.

Programming to higher level outcomes

OTI disagrees with the statement that TTI programming focused on achieving activity-level outputs rather than higher-level outcomes, particularly in the last 12 months of programming. Since mid-2013, every activity was designed to achieve activity outputs and outcomes, as well as contribute to a higher level objective at the sub-objective level. This link to a "higher-level outcome" or "subobjective" was explicitly discussed in relation to all activity concepts, and was explained in the design of each activity, including in the activity summary, objectives, background, M&E plan, and DAP. OTI understands that the final evaluation team found some program staff challenged to articulate how particular activities fed into higher-level outcomes or identify impact, but does not agree with the conclusion that therefore activities were designed without higher-level considerations.

Short-term Programming

OTI disagrees with the finding that it was difficult to achieve higher-level outcomes because activities were short-term and disbursed. Most activities were clustered within seven target governorates and were not geographically dispersed. Additionally, the data on the number of participant days as an indicator of activity length does not adequately take into account the process or linkage between activities. Most activities built on previous programming and were deliberately linked together – either through participants, awardees, tangible support to institutions, clustered topics, and/or target populations. In addition, process is just as important as the output of an OTI activity, and the process TTI used, from clearance to completion, was designed to maximize impact. This included activity design components such as pre-event awardee capacity building, social and traditional media outreach, interactions between communities, CSOs, and government officials before/during/after an event thatwere part of each activity and cannot be discounted as irrelevant to activity outcomes. Therefore, even if the final events themselves were sometimes brief does not mean that the activities themselves were brief and, as a result, many of the higher level outcomes that the program aimed to achieve through programming, including from activities with short-term components, were identified and highlighted in the report.

CVE

OTI does not dispute that proving a particular individual would have joined an extremist group if not for a certain intervention is quite challenging, if not impossible. However, OTI disagrees with the statement that TTI inaccurately or inadequately targeted the demographic population for the CVE sub-objective. The target population was identified based on USAID guidance which states, "Programming usually targets specific geographic areas and/or subpopulations deemed vulnerable to the extremist appeal." The target population was known and identified to be young men aged 15-35 in specific targeted areas and itwould have been difficult, if not impossible, to target specific individuals below the defined subpopulation and geographic areas. In addition, it is possible to achieve and measure higher level

outcomes by reviewing changes in the intended subobjective vis-à-vis the target group. Furthermore, the CVE cluster was a pilot, designed to garner programmatic lessons learned in an iterative process. TTI conducted several analyses of the CVE pilot designed to provide feedback: Desk Study (May 2013), CVE Assessment I (baselines – August 2013), Retargeting of locations in Kasserine (November 2013), Final Evaluation CVE cluster assessment (December 2013), and CVE Assessment II (June 2014). Such analysis was instructive to programming, and will surely be informative to other USG programs that may support of CVE objectives.